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The Sir Richard Williams Foundation is deeply saddened by the news of the passing of Senator Jim Molan AO, DSC. Jim was a Director of the Foundation before entering Federal Parliament and we will always be grateful for his contribution to our mission. During his time serving in uniform, as a national security strategist and in the Senate, Jim’s contribution has been significant and lasting. He was a passionate advocate for the Australian Defence sector and a strong supporter of the veteran community. The Board and members of the Foundation offer our sincere condolences to Anne, their children Erin, Felicity, Mick and Sarah and their families. Vale Jim Molan

It’s difficult to believe this is our last post for 2022, but with Christmas a week out, the team at The Central Blue is getting ready to head off over the break. But, not entirely check-out. This week, Wing Commander Marija Jovanovich and TCB editor Squadron Leader Jenna Higgins share their recommended reads for the summer break to bring some intellectual colour to the grey matter. Whether in-print, on-tablet or as an audiobook, these are interesting reads you can knock over, learn from, and even enjoy. It is not an exhaustive list of foundational strategic literature or leadership texts. It’s not even a list of new releases. But they’ve picked these books as ones you should be able to easily pick up and put down as time allows amid all the other things happening during your much-deserved downtime. Range: Why Generalists Triumph in a Specialized World – David Epstein (2019) In the book, Epstein argues that range – defined as more diverse experience across multiple fields – is more relevant in today's society than specialization because the wicked problems of the modern world require bridging experience and knowledge from multiple fields to foster solutions. Why should you read it? I read this book in two different ways – it is both about individuals and about teams. I venture the second is more important to us. Individuals with ‘range’ take a lifetime to make, but as leaders we can build teams with ‘range’ now. I encourage you to read this book at least in part as a leadership text. Prisoners of Geography: Ten Maps That Tell You Everything You Need to Know About Global Politics – Tim Marshall (2016) All leaders are constrained by geography. Their choices are limited by mountains, rivers, seas and concrete. Yes, to follow world events you need to understand people, ideas and movements ‐ but if you don't know geography, you'll never have the full picture Why did Jenna enjoy it? As someone who has always been fascinated by the lines on a map, this book gave me more insight into why conflict has the potential to develop and evolve. Perception and old world borders will continue influence decisions– the nine dash line is but just ONE example. Sandworm: A New Era of Cyberwar and the Hunt for the Kremlin's Most Dangerous Hackers – Andy Greenberg (2020) In 2014, the world witnessed the start of a mysterious series of cyberattacks. Targeting American utility companies, NATO, and electric grids in Eastern Europe, the strikes grew ever more brazen. They culminated in the summer of 2017, when the malware known as NotPetya was unleashed, penetrating, disrupting, and paralyzing some of the world's largest businesses. It was the largest, most destructive cyberattack the world had ever seen. The hackers behind these attacks are quickly gaining a reputation as the most dangerous team of cyberwarriors in history: a group known as Sandworm. Working in the service of Russia's military intelligence agency, they represent a persistent, highly skilled force, one whose talents are matched by their willingness to launch broad, unrestrained attacks on the most critical infrastructure of their adversaries. A chilling, globe‐spanning detective story, Sandworm considers the danger this force poses to our national security and stability. As the Kremlin's role in foreign government manipulation comes into greater focus, Sandworm exposes the realities not just of Russia's global digital offensive, but of an era where warfare ceases to be waged on the battlefield. It reveals how the lines between digital and physical conflict, between wartime and peacetime, have begun to blur—with world‐shaking implications. Why it's topical: As our coalition and NATO partners witness first‐hand the devastating physical destruction imposed by Russia within Ukraine, it’s important to reflect on two things. Firstly, this war has been going on for decades. The history between the two countries is complex and fascinating. Secondly, any cyber‐attack on Ukraine has natural global repercussions. Ukraine is both a cyberwarfare testing ground, and demonstration of cyber resilience. For those of you who have read Dune (or watched the movie) – you’ll quickly recognise the Sandworm reference. Radical Candor: Be a Kickass Boss Without Losing Your Humanity – Kim Scott (2017) Scott earned her stripes as a highly successful manager at Google and then decamped to Apple, where she developed a class on optimal management. She has earned growing fame in recent years with her vital new approach to effective management, the “radical candor” method. Radical candor is the sweet spot between managers who are obnoxiously aggressive on one side and ruinously empathetic on the other. It’s about providing guidance, which involves a mix of praise as well as criticism—delivered to produce better results and help employees achieve. Why Maz thinks you should read this book: Radical candour is a cornerstone of my command philosophy. This book is where I learned the concept; I practise a modified version, adapted to our environment. She is keen to hear what you think about the theory! (Twitter: @maz_jovanovich) Shackleton's Boat Journey – Frank A. Worsley (1940) This is an account of the Shackleton boat journey. On August 1, 1914, on the eve of World War I, Sir Ernest Shackleton and his hand‐picked crew embarked in HMS Endurance from London's West India Dock, for an expedition to the Antarctic. It was to turn into one of the most breathtaking survival stories of all time. It is an extraordinary story of courage and even good‐ humor among men who must have felt certain, secretly, that they were going to die. Worsley's account, first published in 1940, captures that bulldog spirit exactly: uncomplaining, tough, competent, modest and deeply loyal. It's gripping, and strangely moving. Why it's worth a read: In addition to being a cracking story, this may as well be a leadership textbook. Amongst many gems, there is a line in it that has stuck with me, and which resonates through my approach to command and leadership – Shackleton “had a mental finger on each man’s pulse”; that’s why he could both drive his people to achieve what they did and look after them like he did. Destined For War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap? – Graham Allison (2019) China and the United States are heading toward a war neither wants. The reason is Thucydides’s Trap: when a rising power threatens to displace a ruling one, violence is the likeliest result. Over the past five hundred years, these conditions have occurred sixteen times; war broke out in twelve. At the time of publication, an unstoppable China approached an immovable America, and both Xi Jinping and Donald Trump promised to make their countries “great again,” the seventeenth case was looking grim—it still is. A trade conflict, cyberattack, Korean crisis, or accident at sea could easily spark a major war. In Destined for War, eminent Harvard scholar Graham Allison masterfully blends history and current events to explain the timeless machinery of Thucydides’s Trap—and to explore the painful steps that might prevent disaster today. The why: 10/10 for relevance to the world today and our place within it. Have you got a read lined up for this summer that you'd like to review? Be sure to let us know by dropping us a line at thecentralblue@gmail.com. From all the team at The Central Blue, we'd like to wish you a safe, enjoyable, & refreshing Christmas break.

This December marks 50 years since the ‘maximum effort’ Operation Linebacker II air campaign that forced the North Vietnamese regime back to the negotiating table. But are there lessons from the operation that should be considered in the context of the Russo-Ukrainian War? Dr Peter Layton thinks so – and they’re not just tactical implications, either. Fifty years ago the American government was trying to end the country’s military involvement in Vietnam. It came not with a whimper but with a bang in the short, sharp Linebacker II air campaign (18-29 December 1972). This air campaign’s partially successful role in that particular war’s termination may offer some insights for today’s Ukraine war. America entered the war between South and North Vietnam in earnest in mid-1965, quickly stabilising but not winning the conflict. Frustrated, the North ordered a major uprising that became the 1968 Tet Offensive which saw the destruction of the Viet Cong guerrilla warfare forces in South Vietnam. After that, only the North Vietnamese army could win the war for Hanoi and so was accordingly developed. In the 1972 Easter Offensive, the North launched a major land assault that was comprehensively defeated by the South Vietnamese Army and American air power. This second failure still did not convince the North to agree to a peace settlement at the talks underway since late 1968. Moreover, the South Vietnamese were very unhappy with a peace agreement negotiated without its participation or consent; it demanded changes to ensure the country’s survival. US president Richard Nixon now decided ending the war required putting maximum pressure on North Vietnam. This included launching the large-scale, high-tempo Linebacker II bombing campaign. Linebacker II had the same basic targets as Linebacker (the successful interdiction campaign that helped defeat the 1972 Easter Offensive): logistic infrastructure, bridges, railways, storage depots, military facilities, airbases and surface to air missiles sites. The big difference was Nixon removed most political restrictions on bombing allowing air raids into Hanoi’s urban areas and demanded a maximum rate of effort; 20,000 tonnes of bombs were dropped and almost 2000 sorties flown in 10 days. This aimed to convince the North Vietnamese government it could not win by stalling the peace talks and to frighten the populace, convincing both that the war needed to be ended. It was a psychological assault as much as one for military gain. At the tactical level, there were errors made in the first few nights with the 15 B-52 bomber losses arguably higher than should have been. Nevertheless, USAF crews learned fast and loss rates quickly dropped. Combining tactics improvements with attacks on the Northern air defence system meant that by the end of the 10 days, American air power was effectively unopposed. Bombing could continue unimpeded for as long as required – a situation readily apparent on the ground. While there was much angst initially expressed, when reporters returned to Hanoi post-war the damage was much less than anticipated, confirming the bombing had been relatively accurate and restricted only to valid military targets (pp 2-30). However, the psychological impact on the people was significant as every night for almost two weeks they had to stay in bomb shelters while a major air war went on above. The North Vietnamese air defence forces fired several hundred Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAM) and hundreds of thousands of rounds of anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) fire. Politically, the Linebacker II campaign was effective in very quickly convincing the North to agree to the peace terms in Paris, allowing the US withdrawal under ‘peace with honour.’ The bombing also reassured the South Vietnamese government that if the North attacked again US air power would return and so it signed the peace accord as well. That’s the good news. But after the Americans left, the North Vietnamese rearmed and in 1975 launched another major land force assault into the South, during which American air power did not return. This attack comprehensively defeated the South Vietnamese Army and Air Force (pp. 57-82). While Linebacker II ended the American phase of the war, its impact only lasted three years. It did not bring lasting peace, but was decisive only for the short-term. Linebacker II bears some comparison with the present Russian air offensive in the Ukraine. The Russian weight of effort is much less than Linebacker II and now involves mainly long-range missile and drone attacks. Moreover, today’s SAM and AAA are much more effective, seemingly with about 75% of the attacking weapons being shot down. However, the Russians are attacking Ukraine’s centralised energy network and its national grid; a few well-placed weapons are generating systemic effects. Additionally, the attacks are timed to leverage Ukraine’s harsh winters so as to cause considerable psychological impact on both the population and the government. Furthermore, Ukraine’s allies are adamant it cannot retaliate and attack into Russia. South Vietnam was similarly hamstrung and needed the US air campaign to drive the North into negotiating an acceptable conclusion to the war. Russia has no incentive to seek peace; it can continue its missile and drone attacks as long as its weapon production rates allow, stockholdings permit and other nations such as Iran continue to sell. Today is then more like the middle of 1972 when the North Vietnamese land offensive had failed and the North Vietnamese government was stalling for time. The Russian army has been rolled back and suffered heavy losses but President Putin will not begin peace talks until the ‘West’ recognises Russia’s annexations of four Ukrainian regions. In 1972, the aggressor refused to accept the country it attacked was a sovereign state; Russia is using the same tactic today in trying to ignore Ukraine and its agency. Linebacker II was deemed a success but South Vietnam was invaded again in 1975. There is a real possibility that when Russia eventually agrees to peace, it may simply rearm for a future assault as North Vietnam did. NATO membership for Ukraine is being discussed; for an enduring peace it may be essential as a deterrent against further Russian adventures. Linebacker II revealed that air power can have a major role in war termination through shocking an adversary and reassuring an ally. Worryingly though, it also highlighted that a permanent peace can be difficult to achieve. Dr Peter Layton is a Visiting Fellow at the Griffith Asia Institute, an Associate Fellow with RUSI (London) and author of the book Grand Strategy.

In this multi-faceted #AirForce2121 piece, SQNLDR Kylie Melville reflects on what logistics will look like over the next 100 years. Ranging from strategic challenges such as climate change, to technological innovations such as AI, she argues that the logistics function needs to also find a way of transforming itself from that of tactical executioners to operational artists who amplify airpower effects. Preamble On the first day of spring, 2021, amidst a history changing COVID19 pandemic, news broke…… ‘Australia Post to pause parcel pick-up for four days with 500 staff in COVID isolation’. As a logistician, explaining to my 9-year-old daughter why she wouldn’t receive her Grandmothers’ gift in a 20th century logistics world was something unexpected. More intriguing was her answer….. …. ‘Why don’t they use robots?’ What a good question…….. Vignette: OP BACKCAST 2121 Logistics Aviator Sini scans the real time virtual operations room in the Air and Space Operations Centre confirming Pilot Aviator Gears is about to complete a successful mission. On the 200th anniversary year for the RAAF, as a 2121 Air logistician, LA Sini reflects…… 2021 – Human centric tactical logistics capability bricks focussed on capability support to long life of type platforms, and land heavy personnel footprint operated airbases. 2041 – RAAF announces launch of logistics Capability Program encompassing - airbases, tactical autonomous delivery systems, integrated battlespace logistics systems, climate conscious logistics solutions and, agile, relevant LOGIS. 2061 – CAF announces next combat aircraft replacement will be fully autonomous coupled with exploration of fully autonomous untethered airheads in land, sea, air and space domains. 2081 – First major deployed fleet of fully autonomous tactical logistics systems with minor augmentation by human management workforce. 2101 – Doctrinal and Concept released for application of autonomous tactical logistics force as part of the air domain tactical autonomous combat power doctrine series. 2121 - The 2121 Air and Space Operations Centre is alive with humans applying analysis within their expertise influencing the daily battle plan through seamless application of operational art. Everyone is connected with virtual reality drawing data from across the joint deployed automated force, all aviators equally important in orchestrating a fully automated tactical combat power war. ……Focussing back to the virtual map displaying locations of deployed near region forces through VR lens, the battlespace changes in real time. Logistics analysis is now required by LA Sini using swift, real-time data to brief Air Commander on autonomous tactical logistics functions contributing to the fully autonomous tactical combat power. Today’s challenge - munitions…. Airbase Drift is in location as one of the numerous maritime, land, air and space airhead options, floating, ready to provide agile munitions resupply effects. Criticality is flashing in the VR lens, one sortie left at Airhead Drift. LA Sini approves automated demands with one swipe of a finger. Hyperloop Transport Company informs delivery to Airhead Drift in 20min. No sooner does Logistics Aviator Sini submit an update to Chief Combat Ops, Maritime Domain now requests diversion to HMAS KISMET, none on board. Autonomous logistics assets are redirected in line with joint force priorities – approved by Commander Joint Support. As LA Sini analyses other agile munitions resupply options, a second shipment via SpaceX priority supply vehicle is confirmed, estimated delivery time - 10min. Pilot Aviator Gears lands combat air asset 235 on Airhead Drift, just as SpaceX robotic delivery is complete. LA Sini delegates robotic rearm to the logistics team, heading to plans room with other aviators focussed on collating the air domain picture for JFACC daily briefing. Logistics in 2121: Enablers to Aviators An Air Force that successfully competes in 2121 cannot rely on advanced capabilities alone; it needs novel approaches to the traditional application of airpower. Technology advancement and climate change are two drivers influencing change in the application of tactical combat power – in particular the human dimension of tactical combat. George W Bush implied technological importance 2002 stating ‘We are witnessing a revolution in the technology of war; power is increasingly defined not by size but by mobility and swiftness – influence is measured in information….’. This is just as relevant for today’s logistician who is focussed on delivering a human-centric logistics function yet must also embrace the technology revolution. A role shift is required for the 2121 Logistician- from tactical human-centric doers to future operational artists. One capable of providing the 2121 Air Force a truly technologically advanced integrated battlespace capable of contemporary and modernised warfighting. ‘We are witnessing a revolution in the technology of war; power is increasingly defined not by size but by mobility and swiftness – influence is measured in information……’ - George W Bush [Air Force Journal of Logistics – Quotes for the Air Force Logistician Volume 1] The idea that machines will be smarter than humans is hotly debated, but the fact that a tactical combat power advantage will be provided by machines in 2121 is not. The ultimate realisation of this prophecy is far from reality; Artificial Intelligence (AI) is already used across numerous industry sectors to improve services. Health care now implements AI to support disease diagnosis, nursing and managerial assistance, promote healthy living, as well as improve mental health monitoring and reporting . The evolution of data driven verification of various neuro-psycho-physiological features is expected to predict mental health disorders faster than human diagnosis. Similarly, in transport and logistics, the potential advantage of autonomous vehicles and machinery is profound. The mining industry has implemented a number of autonomous capabilities providing: refuelling, large machinery operations, mobile equipment interfaces to monitor equipment health and maintenance demands, and computer assisted operational decision making. Militaries are also modernising their forces through autonomy. US military and industry partners are rapidly developing autonomous capabilities including armed unmanned ground vehicles, long-range high subsonic unmanned air vehicles, and unmanned underwater vehicles. The Air Force’s rapid development of the Loyal Wingman demonstrates that a modernised future-ready military will be delivered through autonomy. Technology laws[1] suggest that technology advancements will far exceed sole human capabilities, creating a world in which human intelligence won’t exist without AI enhancement. This trend suggests that in 2121, tactical combat power will be entirely autonomous and increasingly in demand, and will only be further exacerbated by the extreme physical environments faced by 2121 military forces. Future Warfare will be executed within extreme and hazardous environments brought on by climate change, making the battlespace unfit for human application of tactical combat power. Scientists around the world agree global warming caused by humans is unequivocal. Today, evidence indicates Earth’s temperature has risen by one-degree causing global sea levels to rise twenty centimetres in ten years, increased the number of extreme weather events annually, declining arctic sea ice, decreased snow cover and retreating glaciers. By 2121, these climate impacts will intensify and endure. Earth at three degrees of warming will experience a sea level rise by 80 centimetres causing coastal cities to sink, continuous extreme weather events such as droughts, floods, cyclones, hurricanes, tornadoes, bushfires and tsunamis, and loss of predictable seasonal change. Regions around the globe, as we understand them today, are expected to remain in a consistently hazardous state. In aggregate, these constant, continuous conditions will result in a 2121 operational environment which will be unfit for human application of tactical combat power. Therefore, the intersection of rapid advancements in autonomy and artificial intelligence with increased environmental hazards brought on by climate change, will result in the complete automation of both tactical combat power and logistics enablers. Today’s 2021 airminded Logistics is a critical enabler focussed on sustaining air operations through human application of tactical logistics functions, primarily through capability and airbase support. 2021 air platforms are highly complex integrated mission systems requiring substantial capability support through engineering, maintenance and supply management to remain serviceable and relevant through a long life-of-type . 2021 Air bases - expeditionary or otherwise – are the weapon system needed to successfully sustain platform rates of effort required by the Joint Campaign. 2021 logistics functions are primarily delivered through the human application of tactical logistics functions like air movements, refuelling, base warehousing, and security. Today’s tactical bias builds significant and critical expertise within the logistics community in delivering tactical logistics effects, but fails to imbue operational art into the mind of today’s air force logisticians. Transitioning today’s logisticians into operational artists required for 2121 warfare is a key requirement for executing competitive and relevant autonomous and untethered tactical logistics in the 2121 future force. ‘One machine can do the work of 50 ordinary men. No machine can do the work of one extraordinary man’. - Elbert G. Hubbard [Air Force Journal of Logistics – Quotes for the Air Force Logistician Volume 1] Elbert G. Hubbard once stated ‘[o]ne machine can do the work of 50 ordinary men. No machine can do the work of one extraordinary man’. 2121 warfare may encompass autonomous and untethered logistics; however, the 2121 nature of war will still require a human element for success. The knack for operational art will still exist in 2121. Operational art is not simply the transactional application of knowledge, tactics, and procedures, but incorporates fundamental human traits such as innovation, guile, deception and forethought to out-manoeuvre an adversary (Department of Defence, 2019). Therefore, while automation will absorb tactical combat power in 2121, it will be the human element through application of 2121 operational art that will guide the delivery of tactical combat effects. This will not just encompass combat artistry, but also the integration of logistics effects. Today’s air-minded logisticians generate tactical logistics functions after air battle plans are agreed, whereby in 2121 logistics aviators will be fully integrated into operational battlespace management through application of operational art executing autonomous and untethered logistics functions. The Air Planning Cycle orchestrates the air domain contribution to the joint force, but air logistics does not drive the creation of the air battle plan, instead takes the output and assigns tactical logistics functions to support air operations (Department of Defence, 2009). The Air Force operations logistics support model describes these tactical logistics functions as; organic logistics within squadrons, scalable combat ready support squadrons, maintenance and supply elements for capability support and responsive national support base elements (Department of Defence, 2009). Importantly these logistics functions focus on support to tactical execution, rather than designing and optimising the entire air battle plan with due consideration for logistics demand. Hence currently, logistics is not fully integrated into the air domain application of operational art. By contrast, the 2121 Air and Space Operations Centre will require all aviators to integrate their expertise - applying operational art to control the air battle plan for the autonomous and untethered tactical combat force. To realise this result, the 2121 logistician will need to transition from today’s human doer of tactical logistics functions to operational artists, integrating logistics effects seamlessly into the air battle plan. The Air Force that exists in 2121 will successfully compete when novel approaches are integrated with advanced capabilities in the application of airpower. Climate change and technology advancement will drive an autonomous tactical combat force requiring aviator operational artists at the operational level orchestrating the fight. World class airpower effects in 2121 will be dependent on a transitioned logistician that is no longer focussed on human application of tactical logistics functions, but a logistician that is astute in operational art able to integrate logistics effects into the battlespace. SQNLDR Kylie Melville has served as a logistics officer in the RAAF for 20 years which has included multiple operational logistics postings and deployments. Her last posting within the Air and Space Operations Centre at Headquarters Joint Operations Command was conducting logistics operational planning which has inspired her current work at Air Force Headquarters in Logistics Branch's Future Logistics Capability Directorate. [1] Moore’s Law: Processing powers doubles about every 2 years while prices are halved (Pinto, 2013) Gilders Law: Network bandwidth doubles every six months (Pinto, 2013) Less’s Law: The cost of storage is falling by half every 12 months, while capacity doubles (Pinto, 2013)

Automation is finding its way into more aspects of Air Force technologies. These processes are able to significantly speed up manual processes and relieve aviators of mental capacity to tackle the greater issues. But is automation the perfect solution we’re led to believe it to be? Warrant Officer Xavier Sherriff delves into the risks automation can bring when reliance is not coupled with understanding. We live in a world where automation is becoming more prominent. Examples range from the ‘do not disturb’ function on the iPhone, through to advance flight automation systems that use Artificial Intelligence. Automation can be seen as the ‘magic potion’ used to solve human induced error, but does this sword have two edges? While automation offers a range of benefits, it may also impair our depth of understanding, while almost certainly introducing new risks. But does that matter? The Emirates Flight EK407 - ATSB investigation report provides an example of where the fundamental trust in automation was misplaced. The investigation into this incident found that the payload data was entered into the aircraft Flight Management System (FMS) incorrectly - 100 metric tonnes lower than intended. This had several flow-on effects impacting the aircraft’s take-off parameters. The Emirates Flight EK407 incident is a classic case of ‘garbage in, garbage out’; however, this is by no means the first-time data entry errors have occurred, and it is unlikely to be the last. The FMS operated exactly as it should. The data was input by the co-pilot, but the lack of cross check resulted in the error being missed. A situation was created where the aircraft would breach the end of the runway. This incident clearly demonstrates how reliance on automation induces new risk if due diligence and cross checks do not occur. The results of which are disastrous to safe and effective flying operations. There are many ways automation can present hazards to flying operations. Misuse and hidden errors are two of the most common issues found when using automation. Misuse occurs when humans manipulate with automation. While hidden errors are often associated with software that doesn’t undergo certification compliance or a fault that isn’t identified during the compliance activity. Misuse As a Royal Australian Air Force loadmaster, I have seen examples where automation has greatly improved tactical effectiveness allowing the aviator to ‘hand off’ the laborious work required so that attention can be focused elsewhere. Examples include systems that enhance situational awareness and software that automatically calculates aircraft weight and balance. This automation presents a chance for a shallower depth of understanding of core concepts, while still achieving mission outcomes. Additionally, it may be limiting our ability to identify errors and creating a ‘going through the motions’ mentality. Is a shallower understanding of core concepts like weight and balance any less important than a pilot understanding ‘theory of flight’? I would argue no, and that this deeper level of understanding is vital for any high-risk profession. A detailed understanding of core concepts will increase the likelihood of identifying errors and determining the cause efficiently. With the introduction of electronic weight and balance, loadmasters no longer need to complete manual calculations post initial qualification course. Believe me, nobody is happier about this than I am! However, it also means that loadmasters are no longer practicing these skills without a conscious effort to do so. This appears to be degrading our depth of knowledge relating to core loadmaster concepts, such as weight and balance theory. This weight and balance theory forms the basis for everything we do. Hidden Errors Consider this example - when completing the weight and balance utilising the electronic application, I was presented with an error. The application indicated a forward and aft centre of gravity limitation that was 1.1% different to the FMS. All my data entry was correct and cross checked, but I was still unable to identify the error! I had unwavering faith that the application was doing everything correctly, therefore it must be automation bias. As events turned out, the application had a limitation that was not yet known. The application didn’t factor the fuel contained within the external tanks (a recent modification at the time of the event). The fuel contained within these tanks has a tangible effect on centre of gravity limitations. When the tanks were fitted gap training was provided for aircrew to make them aware of how this impacted the limits, however, the application did not receive an update, nor were these internal limitations known or recorded. Members might assume the application was functioning correctly and this error could cause significant delays. Through a process of error detection, I determined the problem and made manual amendments after consulting the Aircraft Flight Manual for the correct limitation. This demonstrates that core skills and knowledge are vital for flight safety and in preventing automation bias. Identification and Recovery My identification and resolution of the error took time, but luckily on this occasion, time is what I had. Given my aviation knowledge, skills, and experience of calculating weight and balance manually, I was able to ascertain the issue and solve the problem. Later, I thought about the event and considered that if it had been a less experienced loadmaster with a greater reliance on the automated system, they might not have identified it at all. In the end, I reverted to manually calculating the forward and aft limitations. This application issue has subsequently been identified and published to the crews. This event was by no means catastrophic in nature, the aircraft FMS would have advised the captain of the true limitation and highlighted my error, however this bias in a different situation could result in a disastrous oversight. What now? How do we maintain these skills? And further, who is responsible? As an Air Force aviator, there are many training and assessing evolutions that take place over the course of your career. The current method of assuring technical knowledge is via annual category assessments. Including manual weight and balance exercises as part of these exams is one method that could be explored. Annual performance assessments are through an observation of an aviator’s application of knowledge during standard operations, current policy does not mandate a question and answer or discussion style of evaluation with the exception of emergency procedures. These exams and assessments are part of an Aviation Safety Management System, but are they contemporary and do they meet the intent? Does mindset and attitude play a part? Should we be doing more problem resolution training? Can we teach people to have passion for self-learning? Final Thoughts Automation is and always will be a force multiplier. It enables the crew to be more efficient and effective. However, blind reliance on automation has risks that are often hidden under an exterior of perfection. Becoming aware of your own reliance on automation and the mission creep that results from this reliance is a step towards becoming a safer aviator. Warrant Officer Xavier Sherriff is a category B C-130J-30 Hercules Loadmaster with 15 years’ experience. Xavier is currently the training systems development Warrant Officer for the C-130J-30 Block 8.1 upgrade. Xavier has performed postings in Air Movements, C-130J-30 operations, ab initio training and Flight test with the Aircraft Research and Development Unit (ARDU) as an Operational Evaluator Aircrew conducting OT&E. You can follow him on Twitter at @FTLM2021

Enhancing the Lethality and Survivability of the Integrated Force National Gallery of Australia 28 September 2022 Final Report Dr Robbin Laird Link to the final report on Defense.Info Download Final Report More articles from Dr Laird are posted in Event Proceedings Synopsis and Program Download PDF Presentations Welcoming Remarks and Formal Close AIRMSHL Geoff Brown AO (Retd) Sir Richard Williams Foundation MC SQNLDR Sally Knox Sir Richard Williams Foundation Managing Strategic Risk in a Disrupted World Dr Alan Dupont AO CEO, The Cognoscenti Group Thinking Through Tradeoffs Chris McInnes Sir Richard Williams Foundation ACAUST Priorities AVM Darren Goldie AM, CSC Air Commander Australia Mission Rehearsal Gen. Kenneth S. Wilsbach Commander, Pacific Air Forces Research and Analytic Support to the Integrated Force Dr Andrew Dowse AO Director, RAND Australia Controlling Your Destiny Gen. (Ret) John William "Mick" Nicholson Jr Lockheed Martin Resilient Communications in Contested Environments AIRCDRE Jason Begley CSM Director General Joint C4 Joint Capabilities Group Delivering on the Promise of Joint All Domain Command and Control Bill Lamb, Director of the Multi-Domain Mission Command Operating Unit, Northrop Grumman Defense Systems RAF - Decision Superiority AVM Ian Duguid CB OBE MA RAF Air Officer Commanding No 1 Group Royal Air Force Decision Making – You and Technology Simon Taufel Integrity Values Leadership Defence Intelligence Enterprise RADM Stephen Hughes CSC, RAN Head Intelligence Capability Chief of Army Perspective LTGEN Simon Stuart AO, DSC Chief of Army Force Design Considerations MAJGEN Anthony Rawlins DSC, AM Head of Force Design Chief of Navy Perspective VADM Mark Hammond AM RAN Chief of Navy Chief of Air Force Perspective AIRMSHL Robert Chipman AM, CSC Chief of Air Force

Program and Presentations Enhancing the Lethality and Survivability of the Integrated Force National Gallery of Australia 28 September 2022 Final Report Dr Robbin Laird Link to the final report on Defense.Info Download Final Report Synopsis and Program Download PDF Presentations Welcoming Remarks and Formal Close AIRMSHL Geoff Brown AO (Retd) Sir Richard Williams Foundation Introduction and MC SQNLDR Sally Knox Sir Richard Williams Foundation Managing Strategic Risk in a Disrupted World Dr Alan Dupont AO Chief Executive Officer, The Cognoscenti Group Thinking Through Tradeoffs Chris McInnes Sir Richard Williams Foundation ACAUST Priorities AVM Darren Goldie AM, CSC Air Commander Australia Mission Rehearsal (video recording) Gen. Kenneth S. Wilsbach Commander, Pacific Air Forces Research and Analytic Support to the Integrated Force Dr Andrew Dowse AO Director, RAND Australia Controlling Your Destiny John W. Nicholson Jr. Retired U.S. Army General Lockheed Martin Middle East Resilient Communications in Contested Environments AIRCDRE Jason Begley CSM Director General Joint C4, Joint Capabilities Group Delivering on the Promise of Joint All Domain Command and Control Bill Lamb Director of the Multi-Domain Mission Command Operating Unit, Northrop Grumman Defense Systems RAF - Decision Superiority AVM Ian Duguid CB OBE MA RAF Air Officer Commanding No 1 Group, Royal Air Force Decision Making – You and Technology Simon Taufel Integrity Values Leadership Defence Intelligence Enterprise RADM Stephen Hughes CSC, RAN Head Intelligence Capability Chief of Army Perspective LTGEN Simon Stuart AO, DSC Chief of Army Force Design Considerations MAJGEN Anthony Rawlins DSC, AM Head of Force Design Chief of Navy Perspective VADM Mark Hammond AM, RAN Chief of Navy Chief of Air Force Perspective AIRMSHL Robert Chipman AM, CSC Chief of Air Force

Dr Robbin Laird 6 October 2022 On September 28, 2022, the Williams Foundation hosted its latest seminar. At the Williams Foundation Seminar on September 28, 2022, the new chief of Army, Lt. General Simon Stuart, provided his perspective on shaping a way ahead for the lethal and survivable within the context of affordable, ADF joint force which the nation needed in the evolving strategic environment. He started his presentation by reminding the audience that war was a national endeavour and required a whole of nation approach. He warned that the duration and brutality of armed conflict often was of a character that those who forecast short and clean conflicts tend to overlook or minimize. Lt. General Stuart warned: “There is a prevailing commentary today that speaks with undue precision and certainty about the ‘next war’. It generally comes from a perspective that focuses exclusively on the changing character of war, which either dismisses or ignores its enduring nature. “It discounts the effects of fog, friction, chaos and individual agency on the course of a war. It describes a symmetrical response in a single modality of warfare. It supposes will can be imposed and can be resisted at ever increasing distance and without having to close with an adversary. “It focuses on the outcome of the first battle or battles rather than the war. It imagines that the next war will be short, decisive and clean. And it confuses targeting and tactics for operational art and strategy. “Unfortunately, history, including Australia’s history, does not support these hypotheses.” The way ahead for the ADF needed to be placed in such a context. He argued that “the unpredictability of war demands an ADF that is relevant and credible in all domains, and integrated – as a system of systems – that has the best probability of mission success whether deterring war or prevailing in its contest.” His comments clearly implied that the shift from the land wars in the Middle East to the direct defense of Australia would form the framework within which Army and joint force modernization would proceed. He identified the way ahead in the following terms for the Australian Army: “to prevail in the 21st century, Army must be protected, connected, lethal and enabled. Army will make a greater contribution at the operational and strategic levels through new and transformed capabilities such as networked long-range fires, littoral manoeuvre, cyber, space, information warfare, and functionally aligned special operations forces. “We are modernising our scalable, world-class combined arms fighting system – which is a system of systems in and of itself. It is the only part of the ADF capable of fighting and persisting in the most lethal of land environments to give our soldiers the best probability of mission success, and the best chance of surviving and coming home. “We are enhancing and expanding our health, logistics, engineering and aviation capabilities, as well as our command and management laydown in order to be better positioned to modernise, scale, and contribute to mobilisation. “We are equally active in modernising the ways in which people can serve to help us generate the flexibility and capacity we need. “We are transforming the way we train, build partnerships, and embrace contemporary learning approaches to thinking and education – to leverage the incredible potential of our people. “Underpinning all this is the application of new and emerging technologies. We are focused on four areas: Robotics and Autonomous Systems, Artificial Intelligence and machine learning, Quantum and human performance optimisation through an applied, ‘learn by doing’ approach with industry and academia. “We are also adjusting our posture by leveraging the potential of our Total Workforce System (full-time, part-time and everything in between), investing capability and seeking to leverage joint basing opportunities and the dispersal and resilience of our estate across the 157 Army locations that span the breadth and depth of our nation.” He concluded by identifying what he sees as two key challenges to delivering the right kind of Australian Army force appropriate to the challenges facing Australia. “The first is what might be described as conventional wisdom that describes with great certitude how the next war will unfold. It is a perspective that does not contemplate an ADF that will need to be able to fight on land, in complex and urban terrain and among populations – either in support of Joint Force air and maritime manoeuvre, fires, or indeed to prosecute Joint land combat. “The second is how this thinking intersects with the necessary prioritisation of resources. The land domain is the least modernised and Army the least capitalised service. “This in itself is not the issue – but reapportioning resources beyond the point where the ADF is relevant and credible in the land domain most certainly is the point. These two contemporary challenges are consequential for the future of our Army, for a relevant and credible Australian Joint Force. Our quest for an integrated force is built on the assumption that we are more than the sum of our constituent parts – but equally each of the parts must be viable in the first instance. “ He pointedly ended his presentation by arguing that “With a 60-year-old Armoured Personnel Carrier at the core of our Joint Land Combat system and a sustained campaign by some to scuttle it’s planned and long overdue replacement.” It should be noted that Air Marshal (Retired) Geoff Brown, Chairman of the Williams Foundation, specifically commented to the Army Chief that a 60 year old weapon system should be in a museum, not on the battlefield. Link to article Dr Robbin Laird, Shaping a Way Ahead for the Australian Army: The Perspective of Lt. General Simon Stuart (DefenseInfo) 6 October 2022

Dr Robbin Laird 14 October 2022 On September 28, 2022, the Williams Foundation hosted its latest seminar. The focus was on the challenges which need to be addressed in making the biggest change to Australian defence seen in recent memory. Rather than focusing on the away games and support for its major ally in such efforts, the focus was returning to the direct defence of Australia and what needs to be done with an adversary which can cut Australia off from global supplies. As the new Chief of Navy put it: “I believe it’s important to raise our eyes above the tactical level for a moment to reflect on why we build and employ an integrated force. And I say this because what we build and what we do with it matters only in so much as it enhances our national well-being. “Our national well-being like all nations is derived from sustained economic prosperity, and peaceful coexistence with nations. And as a trading island nation connected to the global trading system by seabed cables, and maritime commerce, our economic well-being is almost exclusively enabled by the sea and by the seabed. “Enablement though is not enough. Sustained economic prosperity has only been possible because these systems — freedom of navigation for commerce, and seabed infrastructure which enables our financial and strategic connectivity with the global trading system — have flourished in an environment of acceptance and adherence to the complex array of treaties, laws and conventions that for almost 80 years have been iterated, improved and almost universally supported. “We call this the rules-based order, and we credit it with providing it with good order at sea in the collective interest of peace for all nations. Those of us who understand Australia derives its well-being from this system are alarmed that such norms are being challenged. “We are concerned that the right to peaceful coexistence with other nations can no longer be assumed. As former minister for defence the honorable Kim Beazley stated in Perth last month, and I paraphrase, what right do we have to exist as a sovereign nation of only 25 million people occupying an island continent with room and natural resources the envy of the world? “The answer is the rights conferred by adherence to the rules-based order. The very rights we have assumed to be enduring and beyond contest for decades. But that is no longer the case. This system is now being challenged and our government has commissioned the defence strategic review in response to these challenges. “It is reasonable to conclude that that which cannot be assumed, must be guaranteed. And that is why the lethality and survivability of our defence forces is being re-examined. In this context, there is a direct and distinct nexus between the lethality and survivability of the integrated force and the survivability of our nation. “And this relationship is recognized by our prime minister in the last month. The Honorable Anthony Albanese has stated that he sees the three key principles of our current security policy are to defend our territorial integrity, to protect our political sovereignty from external pressure and to promote Australia’s economic prosperity through a strong economy and resilient supply chains…. “Australia is a paradox. The geography which makes it difficult to invade and conquer Australia also makes Australia dependent upon seaborne trade. In other words, Australia might not be vulnerable to invasion, but the hostile power does not need to invade Australia to defeat Australia.” Unpacking an understanding of the evolving relationship between the nation and the ADF is at the heart of reworking the defence of the nation in the years to come. The defence capabilities which have enabled the ADF to deliver significant but targeted warfighting capability will now be adapted and refocused on Australia’s direct defence and role in its region. But how will this intersect with how national efforts unfold? How will the necessary ADF mobilization potential intersect with the mobilization of the nation? How will the ADF build out its workforce and be supported by the enhanced capability of domestic defence industry to support the ADF in a crisis or sustained conflict? The pandemic as a prologue to the kind of macro crisis which faces Australia highlighted the need for more secure and stable supply chains. How can Australia build resilient supply chains and with whom? How to build the knowledge base with regard to what needs to be protected by such an effort and what can be left to the forces of globalization? The fuel challenge is notably significant as the geopolitics of fuel and setting climate change standards without regard to geopolitical reality will only leave Australia and the liberal democracies vulnerable to energy supply extortion. It is difficult to miss what is going on in Europe and its relationship with Russia as a basic lesson in the relationship between geopolitics and energy. And the question of Australia’s geography is a foundational point for understanding how the ADF will re-deploy and re-calibrate as the nation prioritizes infrastructure in the regions in Australia central to the projection of power from the continent to the first island chain of Australia and beyond. The importance of shaping enhanced capabilities for operations from the North of Australia was a frequent point made in various presentations to the seminar. Link to article Dr Robbin Laird, Preparing for Major Change in Australian Defence: The September 2022 Williams Foundation Seminar (DefenseInfo) 14 October 2022

The last time the RAAF operated seaplanes was 1950, but is there an argument to bring back some sort of modern amphibious seaplane? FLGOFF Joakim Siira thinks there are several – from tactical concepts associated with climate change to strategic relationships with key partners in our region. Years ago, before I joined the Royal Australian Air Force, I volunteered at the RAAF Association Aviation Heritage Museum in Bull Creek, Perth (I highly recommend you visit, given the chance). While working front of house selling tickets and gifts to customers, I was taken under the wing of many older veterans with whom I became good friends, whilst also being under the wing – literally – of a Consolidated PBY Catalina, undoubtedly the most famous and celebrated seaplane of all time. The Catalina served with great distinction during the Second World War, performing a range of tasks including reconnaissance, search-and-rescue (SAR) and mine-laying. Their strategic effect was well out of proportion to the number of airframes flying. All that time under the wing of a Catalina got me wondering; can the case be made for a modern-day seaplane capable of conducting strategic level effects? The last seaplane in-service within the RAAF was…the Consolidated PBY Catalina, retiring in 1950 after a decade of service [1]. This coincided with the worldwide decline in seaplane use and development. The rise of the aircraft carrier and naval aviation, long-range missiles as well as the advent of the jet engine combined with the massive increase of land-based airfields built during the war meant water-based aircraft had become largely redundant militarily. The USSR attempted to develop a jet-powered seaplane during the late 1980s, the Lun class ekranoplan, but never saw full-scale production. Maritime reconnaissance and SAR is now conducted by the P-8A Poseidon at 11 Squadron (once employing Catalinas). Based in Adelaide, the aircraft regularly operates from northern Australia and South East Asia for operational tasking. In support of these operations, Cocos Island infrastructure is being upgraded to accommodate the Poseidon, due to be finished in 2023. Nevertheless, land-based aircraft remain victim to one of the central characteristics of air power theory – impermanence [2]. There are two considerations to this worth exploring in the context of modern military seaplanes. The first is impermanence. Simply put, no RAAF aircraft can rescue anyone from the water. A P-8A can deliver life-saving equipment for the crew of a sunken vessel, loiter overhead for hours and relay information to surface vessels, but sooner or later it needs to return to a purpose-built, kilometres-long length of strengthened concrete to land. They can help, but they cannot affect the rescue. The RAN’s Seahawk helicopters can, but they are tied to their frigates, and if said ship is outside the Seahawks maximum range, they are also of no use until getting closer – at the frigate's maximum speed of 27kts. If there is a time-critical element to a situation, speed of response is a decisive factor. This may be either in the case of a downed aircraft, a sinking ship, or in the aftermath of a natural disaster, all where exposure to the elements is a killer. A seaplane combines the mobility of a fixed-wing aircraft with the ability of a ship to operate on the water and remove people from danger. The second consideration is the impermanence of infrastructure. As noted in the Air and Space Centre’s article ‘Airbases: Now. Then. Always’, climate change is a significant risk to not just Australian airports, but those of our allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific. The 2011 and 2022 floods both necessitated RAAF platforms to operate out of RAAF Bases Amberley and Richmond, with extreme weather events and sea levels only predicted to increase by the year 2090. With an increasing frequency of extreme weather events, and consistent flooding of two of six of our operational airbases likely to continue, there will continue to be massive strategic consequences. The RAAF and ADF will not be able to fulfil their obligations to support the nation and the region if critical infrastructure is out of action. It’s possible the aforementioned runway works at Cocos Island may be finished just in time to become redundant. So, is there a place in the modern air force for a modern amphibious seaplane? And where would we get one from? The latter is relatively easy to answer, the former not so much. A seaplane would functionally share a number of roles assigned to the P-8A - maritime reconnaissance and SAR for instance. A seaplane, however, has the benefit of being able to land on both runways and suitable stretches of water, whilst also carrying personnel and cargo. Despite requiring significant financial commitment - at a reported unit cost of USD$156 million, plus sustainment, competing geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific make the investment worthy of consideration. Australian aid is going to be sent following a natural disaster, and if an Indo-Pacific islands’ runways are out of action, a seaplane may still be able to operate out of their naval facilities instead, even if degraded, allowing Australia to execute its foreign policy objectives. So where to source one? There are three military seaplane producers: Russia, China and Japan. With Russia and China being unlikely contenders in the current political climate; Japan seems like a safe choice. It is worth noting however that China has also recently developed a large seaplane, the AVIC AG600 Kunlong; it is currently undergoing flight testing. Japan has a long history of long-range seaplane production pre-dating the Second World War. Their current platform, the amphibious ShinMaywa US-2, first entered service with the Japanese Self Defence Force in 2009, with 6 currently flown by the 71st Kotukai. Significantly, it is also being developed as a water-bomber, with the ability to carry 15 tonnes of water or repellant; a capability that Australia would heavily make use of during the summer fire season. With a reported maximum range of 4700km, a mission radius of 1900km, and the ability to operate on sea or land, (by operating out of Cocos Islands, Guam, Nauru or French Polynesia), it could cover much of the Indo-Pacific in its SAR or reconnaissance capacity. There is again a geopolitical factor; a purchase of this significance would further strengthen Australian-Japanese ties on the back of the signing of the Reciprocal Access Agreement in January, as well as Japan’s attendance at Exercise Pitch Black for the first time this year. In this context, the geopolitical messaging of the first ever RAAF procurement from an Asian nation can have a strategic effect worth more than the sum of its parts – that message being Australia and its allies are stronger than ever; an important message to send to the region in these tense times. For all the current focus on potential conflict in the region and further abroad, one thing we know for sure is that sea levels are rising. As the underlying enablers of Air Force capability change, most notably availability of suitable dry land, it behoves us to adapt to that change. Seaplanes are one option that provide RAAF with a capability that negates a critical disabler – impermanence – and allows RAAF to execute the ADFs mission of Shape, Deter, Respond where it might otherwise not be able to. FLGOFF Joakim Siira is a logistics officer based at RAAF Williamtown, with a background in aviation and intermodal logistics. The views expressed are his alone and do not represent the opinion of the Royal Australian Air Force, the Department of Defence or the Australian government. #AirPower #ClimateChange #infrastructure #procurement [1] Wilson, Stewart. 1994. Military Aircraft Of Australia. Weston Creek, ACT: Aerospace Publications. [2]The Air Power Manual. 2022. 7th ed. Canberra: Air and Space Power Centre, Royal Australian Air Force. Image credits: U.S. Air Force. 2022. US-2A During Cope North. Image. https://theaviationist.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/US-2-top-new-678x381.jpg RAAF. 2013. Warbirds Downunder 2013 Air Show In Temora. Image. http://images.defence.gov.au/20131102raaf8566593_9947.jpg

By Brian Morra 20 October 2022 Link to article Brian Morra, The Next Phase of the Russo-Ukraine War: The Impact of Air Force General Sergei Vladimirovich Surovikin (DefenseInfo) 20 October 2022 Text The Kremlin announced in early October that a new overall theater commander had been appointed to run its ‘special military operation’ in Ukraine. The new commander of the Russian Ukrainian front is four-star Air Force General Sergei Vladimirovich Surovikin, who is also the commander of the Russian Aerospace Force (comprising both the Air Force and Space Force). Previously, Putin had appointed two Army generals as overall commanders. Neither used airpower effectively. General Surovikin is a different story altogether. Almost immediately after his appointment, Russian air attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure targets escalated to levels not seen since February and March of 2022. The renewed October air campaign is clearly Surovikin’s doing. He has unleashed the Russian Air Force on Ukraine’s electrical grid, power generation centers, and other public utilities in Ukraine’s urban centers. His goal seems to be to cripple the Ukrainian economy by denying all industrial sectors the power required to run their businesses. Civilian casualties are mounting as some Russian missiles miss their intended infrastructure targets, probably due to faulty targeting data and failures in terminal guidance systems. The loss of access to electricity and other power sources also means that Ukrainian civilians will struggle to heat their homes and cook their food as wintry weather approaches. Who is General Sergei Surovikin? Ironically, even though he is commander of the Russian Aerospace Force, he spent most of his career in the Army. He is a legend among hardliners, and he famously supported the KGB-led coup against Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in 1991. As a young Army captain, his tank unit attacked Moscow protesters who were marching in the streets in support of Russian President Boris Yeltsin and against the unlawful coup against Gorbachev. Surovikin’s tanks killed three protestors, at least one of whom was a Soviet Army veteran of the war in Afghanistan. After the coup plotters failed to depose Gorbachev, Surovikin was imprisoned for his unit’s deadly actions. Russian President Yeltsin later pardoned him and Surovikin became a hero to hardliners – a status he maintains today. Putin personally called General Surovikin to wish him happy birthday earlier this year. More recently, as a three-star general, Surovikin was the architect of the successful and brutal Russian air campaign in Syria. As a reward for his service in Syria, Putin transferred him to the Air Force, promoted him to four star general, and named him commander of the Aerospace Forces. With the arrival of Surovikin, the war has entered a new and dangerous more phase. Ukraine has inadequate air defenses, and it now faces a serious, sustained air campaign for the first time. In the wake of the new air campaign, Ukrainian President Zelensky has implored NATO and the G7 member nations to supply him with promised air defense equipment. If he has sufficient weapons, Surovikin will wage a relentless campaign. The Aerospace Force that he commands is also the service most likely to employ nuclear weapons should the Kremlin decide to use them.

Dr Robbin Laird 17 October 2022 During my September 2022 trip to Australia in my role as a Research Fellow of the Williams Foundation, I wrote the report for the September 28, 2022 seminar and engaged in discussions during the month focused on the nature of the challenges facing Australia and the need to shape effective approaches to the direct defence of Australia within alliance contexts. I had a chance to discuss a number of aspects of these challenges with my colleague Dr. Ross Babbage who is the Chief Executive Officer of Strategic Forum Pty Ltd and a Non-Resident Senior Fellow of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) in Washington DC. A key issue which combines both defence and alliance issues is the challenge of ensuring reliable supply chains in the context of the digital age. The pandemic certainly brought to public attention the fragility of supply chains for Australia and the entire liberal democratic world. And the war in Ukraine has generated a broader energy crisis, notably in the wake of the aversion of many countries and the U.S. Administration to prioritize energy production during a perceived global “climate crisis.” The first issue which became evident was that the reliance on China for a significant amount of the West’s manufacturing capability left them vulnerable to the 21st century authoritarian states and their political agenda to change the “rules-based order” forged after World War II. With the Western economies eschewing heavy manufacturing in favor of a more environmentally friendly “service economy,” there is a key question of how then the West maintains a viable “arsenal of democracy”? The energy dependence of Europe on Russia has clearly underscored how not having viable alternatives for basic commodities can undercut Western agendas and policies. Although there is currently much focus on building alternatives in Europe, the continued emphasis on the “climate change emergency” clearly conflicts with a realistic long-term geopolitical energy strategy for all of the allies. And the Biden Administration’s rapid move away from the American energy independence reduces America’s ability to help allies in extremis. And indeed, when it comes to critical supplies, given the current U.S. trajectory, how much allied sharing will really be possible during a future crisis? The second issue which we discussed was the way ahead with rare earth minerals and processed metals. Dr. Babbage underscored that Australia has large quantities of many of the key rare earth minerals. But it generally does not process them; that has largely been done in China. This clearly needs to change, but this requires Australia and her partners to shoulder the key processing opportunities and burdens. It also means that Australia, her partners and allies need to work through ways to build and sustain relevant supply chains The third issue is that the Australian government needs to work with a variety of allies and partners, and not just wait for leadership from Washington. This is how he put it: “The slowness on some of the issues in this area means that Australia needs to move rapidly and take the initiative ourselves in developing bilateral or trilateral or multi-lateral alliance or partner relationships.” He underscored that “we need to get the network of allies and partners working effectively together to improve supply chains. In addition to our discussions with agencies in Washington, we’ve been having discussions with our friends in the region, most notably Japan and South Korea, but also with some of the ASEAN countries and India. “We are also focused on discussions in Europe because their industrial base is very significant and could play important roles in future Indo-Pacific contingencies. We have our own independent and close relationships with most of these European countries facilitated in part by our own European-origin populations.” The fourth issue is to expand ways for government to work with industry to ensure that essential supplies are available in a crisis and to ensure that Australia can do all of the important things it needs to do even during a very prolonged crisis. And Dr. Babbage underscored that innovations being generated by industry in a number of areas to strengthen supply chain robustness also can enhance Australian resilience as well. This is the case, for instance, in rare earth materials, as well as in advanced robotic technologies and some types of smart manufacturing. Babbage cited the example of an Australian rare earth minerals company, Lynas Rare Earths. They currently have a processing plant in Malaysia which they are closing in the coming two-to- three years. They are currently building a new plant in Australia and a second with an American partner in Texas. They are also modifying and modernizing the conventional rare earth refining process. He then mentioned another Australian company, Australian Strategic Materials, which has teamed with a South Korean company to develop and put into operation a completely new technology for rare earth mineral processing. This new technology process is much cleaner, less power intensive and cheaper to operate than legacy processing technologies. The first of this new type of processing plants is now fully operational in South Korea and is supplying Korean and other customers. This company is planning an even larger rare earth mining and processing operation in Australia and is also considering licensing their advanced technologies to allied partners. As a result of these and related developments China may lose its dominance of the rare earths industry during the coming decade. Put another way, shaping a way ahead for the defence of Australia is much broader than buying a new platform for the ADF. It is now also about the ecosystem for strengthening the supply chains that foster Australia’s prosperity as a functioning society and also the country’s security and that of its allies and security partners. The pandemic provided a hammer blow; the war in Ukraine triggered a global food and energy crisis; and the two together made it very clear that defense against a multi-domain power like China is not simply about winning the next battle with powerful military forces. It is also about being able to prevail in a struggle for national and allied survival. The featured graphic: Australian Supply Chains: State of Play. AUSTRALIAN CEO SURVEY 2021-2022. Link to article Dr Robbin Laird, Reliable Supply Chains, Defence, Partners and Allies: Shaping a Way Ahead for Australia (DefenseInfo) 17 October 2022