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Air Vice-Marshal Don Bennett arguably is Australia’s greatest wartime leader, yet very few Australians have heard of him. He particularly played a critical role in the formation of Bomber Command’s Pathfinder Force in World War II which led to the German's "greatest lost battle" of the war. With the 80th anniversary of the first Pathfinder mission marked on August 18, 2022, Williams Foundation fellow Dr Alan Stephens OAM wrote a retrospective obituary on Air Vice-Marshal Don Bennett and was published in the Sydney Morning Herald on August 30. Celebrating Don Bennett on 80th anniversary of WW2 Pathfinders When Don Bennett died in 1986, the Herald ran a short obituary filed by the Press Association. Descendants of Pathfinders and serving RAAF personnel acknowledged the founding of the Pathfinders group of Bomber Command 80 years ago at a luncheon in Sydney in August. This obituary, coinciding with the anniversary, remembers his contribution to World War II. Years after World War II, Hitler’s minister of armaments and war production, the organisational mastermind Albert Speer, reflected on the bomber offensive waged against Germany. Speer’s verdict was unequivocal: the Allied air forces’ victory represented “the greatest lost battle on the German side”. The Combined Bomber Offensive was the most important sustained campaign fought by any Australians during World War II. It brought the Nazi war economy to its knees, and it crushed the spirit of the German people who enabled it. As the most authoritative historian of the war, Richard Overy, concluded, “it is difficult not to regard the campaign as decisive”. Air Vice-Marshal Donald (Don) Bennett, the Australian who commanded the Pathfinder Force (PFF) that recently celebrated the 80th anniversary of its first mission, was one of the principal architects of that victory. Widely regarded as the technically most brilliant airman of the war, Bennett was a driven man, utterly determined, and ruthless with those who didn’t meet his demanding standards; but he was also an inspirational leader touched by genius. His singular achievement was to bring expertise and method to a campaign that previously had been deficient in both. Context is everything. World War II was a war of necessity (as opposed to a war of choice); it was nothing less than a fight for civilisation against a depraved enemy committing genocide. The consequences of defeat were unthinkable. Set within that context, Don Bennett might be regarded as Australia’s greatest military leader. Bennett assumed leadership of the PFF on its formation in July 1942, at the age of 31, via an already remarkable career. He was born in Toowoomba on 14 September 1910, the youngest of four sons of stock-and-station agent and grazier, Queensland-born George Thomas Bennett, and English-born Celia Juliana, née Lucas. A strict Methodist, Celia was the greatest influence on Don’s character. “Somewhat of a loafer” at school, Bennett worked as a jackeroo on the family property, where he developed an intense interest in motorised vehicles, at one stage helping a neighbour rebuild a Maurice Farman biplane. Unable to follow his brothers into medicine or law because of his modest academic record, and inspired by seeing flying displays by the Wright brothers, Bert Hinkler, Amy Johnson and Charles Kingsford-Smith, Don determined to become a pilot in the Royal Australian Air Force. He moved to Brisbane, studied science at night school, and was eventually selected by the RAAF as one of only fifteen successful candidates from thousands of applicants. Training began at Point Cook airfield outside Melbourne in July 1930. Australia was mired in the Great Depression, and while the RAAF was able to train pilots, it couldn’t afford to retain them; consequently, Bennett and his fellow cadets had to agree to transfer to the (British) Royal Air Force upon graduation. Don topped his course in flying, and in August 1931 began a four-year commission with the RAF in the United Kingdom. Bennett excelled, flying a wide variety of aircraft, and qualifying for navigator’s and wireless operator’s licences, three different ground engineer licences, a commercial pilot licence, and a flying instructor’s certificate. A teetotaller who was never known to swear, he was regarded by some as an “arrogant aviation obsessive” who “could not suffer fools gladly”. That was a little harsh: Bennett held everyone, including himself, to the highest professional standards, but he could be warm and charming. In April 1935 he met Elsa Gubler, a young Swiss woman. “Ly” was beautiful, intelligent, spoke seven languages, and shone at sport. It was a classic romance: their eyes met, they were both smitten. Four months later they married at the registry office in Winchester. It was to be a close and rewarding union of equals. On their honeymoon cruise to Australia, Bennett asked Ly to help him with a book he was writing on aerial navigation. The Complete Air Navigator became the standard text on the subject. Permanently settled in England, Bennett left the RAF and in January 1936 joined Imperial Airways, where he played a major role in the establishment of international civil aviation. He pioneered long-distance flights to Africa, India and the United States; made the first commercial trans-Atlantic flight; trialled aerial refuelling; and constantly enhanced operational techniques. When World War II started, Bennett became superintendent of the Atlantic Ferry Organisation, flying American aircraft to the UK. He rejoined the RAF in September 1941 and by December was commanding a bomber squadron. Shot down by ground fire over Norway in April 1942 while leading a strike against the battleship Tirpitz, he evaded capture and escaped back to the UK via neutral Sweden. With the Allied armies in retreat, Bomber Command (later joined by the United States Army Air Forces) assumed responsibility for opening a second front in western Europe. But the campaign suffered from a severe absence of method. An official investigation in August 1941 made the alarming finding that, of those crews recorded as having completed their mission, only one in three had been within eight kilometres of their target. This was massively ineffective and unsustainable. The RAF decided to form an elite “Pathfinder” unit to guide the main bomber force and mark its targets. The decision was vehemently opposed by the head of Bomber Command, Air Marshal Arthur Harris, who argued that it would be counter-productive to take the best crews out of his squadrons. Perhaps more to the point, Harris rejected the strategy of attacking “precision” targets such as factories, oil, transport, and power generation, instead cleaving to his conviction that his Command’s primary goal should be to “de-house” the workers who were enabling the Nazi war machine. Overruled by his superiors, Harris personally selected Bennett to lead the PFF, describing him as “the most efficient airman I have ever met”. Initially the Pathfinders were hampered by unsuitable aircraft, obsolescent technology, inadequate training, poor organisation, and obstruction from the recalcitrant Harris. Their first mission on 18 August 1942 was a fiasco. Bennett became the necessary agent of change, applying his unrivalled expertise, intellect and strength of character at every level of the Pathfinder’s activities. Uncompromising standards were set; obsolescent aircraft were replaced by the war’s best bombers, the Lancaster and Mosquito; and vastly improved navigation aids and a sophisticated system of target-marking pyrotechnics were introduced. The best crews were designated as “Master Bombers” and circled overhead targets to marshal the main strike force. Contrary to regulations, Bennett frequently flew on operations. By December 1943 the PFF had grown to nineteen squadrons and Bennett, aged 33, was the youngest air vice-marshal in the history of the RAF. Eighty percent of the tonnage of bombs dropped on the Nazi homeland fell between January 1944 and May 1945, with 95 percent of missions meeting the RAF’s accuracy parameters. Led by the Pathfinders, the campaign “placed a clear ceiling on German war production in 1944, and undermined it fatally in 1945”. It was the greatest lost battle on the German side. The danger was extreme, the cost grievous. Some 3700 PFF aircrew were killed (including 500 from the RAAF), a loss rate of around 44 percent. Bennett was one of the principal contributors to the Allied victory, but he was treated shabbily by the British establishment in post-war commemorations, being the only senior RAF commander not to be knighted. His relationship with Harris was often fractious; while he personally felt that many of his RAF counterparts were prejudiced against Australians. He left the RAF and resumed his career in commercial aviation, with varying success; and he became involved in increasingly far-right politics, again with varying success. His autobiography, Pathfinder, was published in 1958. He died in Slough on 15 September 1986, survived by his wife and two children. Air Vice-Marshal Donald Bennett’s life was defined by his peerless leadership of the Pathfinders. No other Australian held such an important command for so long, and none contributed more to victory in the most consequential war this country has fought. Given that compelling context, it is not unreasonable to suggest that he is Australia’s greatest military leader. Alan Stephens is a historian and visiting fellow at UNSW Canberra. With thanks to the Sydney Morning Herald for permission to repost this piece.

On 3 August 2022, the Government announced an independently-led review that will consider Defence's force posture and force structure. The Defence Strategic Review aims to help Defence better understand where it should prioritise investment, as well as ensure the Australian Defence Force (ADF) is well positioned to meet the nation’s security challenges through to 2033 and beyond. The review comes on the back of the 2020 Defence Strategic Update which highlighted the region's rapidly changing strategic circumstances, and significant reduction in warning time. In calling for the review, the Defence Minister emphasised the rapidly evolving situation “necessitates an immediate analysis of where and how ­defence assets and personnel are best positioned to protect Australia and its national interests.” According to Minister Marles, the review would also explore opportunities to “better integrate and operate” with the United States, the United Kingdom and other strategic partners. Given the potential for significant change to the structure of the ADF and capability prioritisation, the topic has already generated much discussion on #miltwitter. While it may be tempting to capture your thoughts in 280 characters, The Central Blue is putting the call out for your thoughts in short (300 word) or longer (500-1500 word) formats. Send us your ideas Given the speed of the Review, we want to hear from you by 20 November 2022. Pieces submitted by this time will be eligible for the Dr Alan Stephens Air Power Literary Prize, and be sure to checkout our Author Guidelines before sending your work to thecentralblue@gmail.com Themes to consider Interested to respond, but unsure where to start? Consider writing a response to one of these thematic questions: Strategy & Air Power What is the ADF’s strategy and what role does the RAAF play in it? Is the ADF too focused on one threat? What future strategic challenges require an operational response involving the RAAF? How would you reprioritise air capability in the Integrated Investment program? What investment is required to support ADF preparedness within the air and space domain? What air and space power capabilities do we need to bolster? In what ways should we rely on the AUKUS arrangement? What lessons from recent state-on-state conflict do we need to incorporate into our thinking and investment? What is the role of space capabilities in the current environment? Acquisition, industry & technology What capabilities should we seek to acquire? What are the pro/cons? What do we cut to fund it? What is industry's role in Australia's future strategic posture? Is the acquisition process adequate to meet the current challenges? Are there any other options? What are they? Should we be investing in more creative ISR and IAMD systems (think floating rigs, balloons and other disposable capabilities) in our northern approaches? Personnel & basing What ADF & civilian workforce challenges need to be considered in a potential rebasing program? What incentives and initiatives will be required to attract the right technical expertise away from key population centre's to bases and longer-term deployments? What can be learned from FIFO industries such as mining? How might this model be applied in a Defence setting? Are our air bases suitability agile and adequately prioritised and funded? How agile are infrastructure and estate planning & management processes?

Is it time the Australian Government devised a National UAS Strategy that intertwines keeping the ADF at the forefront of everchanging UAS technology whilst expanding Australia’s industrial capability and global footprint? In this piece by PLTOFF Tim Sullivan, he explores several components of such a strategy and lays out a rationale for developing it with urgency. Hostilities in Ukraine have continued to demonstrate the compelling case for unmanned aerial systems (UAS) on any future battlefield. Australian Industry must capitalise on this. Many Australian companies have the knowledge and capability to be world leaders in the still emerging UAS market. What industry is missing, however, is the high-level strategy and direction which would empower companies to take the risks required to develop and produce world-class capability. The Australian Government needs to implement a National UAS Strategy (NUASS) that ties together existing programs, incentivises investment in Australian technology, and supports export opportunities with the intent to promote Australia as a preferred security partner. Current capability and policy Australia has the demonstrated expertise and infrastructure available to become a world leader in UAS technology. There are currently Australian offerings at all categories of UAS capability. At the large and complex, high end of the scale is Boeing’s MQ-28A Ghost Bat. It is one of the highest profile UAS platforms with large scale applications. Designed to operate alongside manned aircraft or independently, the Ghost Bat is intended to provide combat mass and increase the effectiveness of human aircrew. Another Australian company – Insitu Pacific – has supported Australian ScanEagle customers for over a decade and was recently awarded a contract to locally manufacture and assemble the Integrator UAS for the Australian Army. The Integrator will provide intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capability without the need for a runway. There are also other smaller-scale platforms being developed by Australian companies, one of these being DefendTex with their Drone40, a loitering UAS capable of providing kinetic and non-kinetic effects. Development of these systems has been funded by the Australian Government, and the British Army and US Marines are included as customers. Despite the growth within the sector, government policy generally remains lacking. That said, there is a couple of notable attempts with certain government departments acknowledging the growth potential of the UAS market, and potential benefits for the Australian economy and defence sector. The Department of Defence for instance includes ‘Robotics, Autonomous Systems, and Artificial Intelligence’ as one of its Sovereign Industrial Capability Priorities (SICPs). While this is a good start, the priorities don’t acknowledge the breadth and depth of the industry, nor does the policy accurately convey the importance or large-scale applicability - especially considering that combat clothing and radar technology are SICPs in their own right. The Queensland Government has developed a QLD Drone Strategy, which was released in 2018. Queensland’s vision is to make the state a “world leader in drone technology and application” and is supported by a $14.5 million investment in order to create a Flight Test Range. Possessing local test capability is critical to developing technology in a timely manner, while providing access to foreign companies will further attract investment and talent to the industry. Scaling Industry Capacity To successfully develop and produce military technology, a company must overcome two main challenges; high initial capital, and limited customer scope (relative to commercial technologies). These issues are compounded when viewed together. If a customer cannot or will not commit to buying a sufficient quantity, the required funding becomes less accessible and the product’s commercial viability is compromised. Within a National UAS Strategy, the government can address these key issues in three ways. Firstly, through the provision of grants for assistance in covering large, one-off capital expenditures, such as the construction of manufacturing facilities. Initial start-up costs significantly extend the time to profitability and divert resources from R&D and business development. Secondly, the government could then consider the use of tax credits and incentives. By reducing the tax burden for companies who are able to find military customers, they are guaranteeing additional future cash flow which helps these companies grow. This strategy also incentivises private investment. Lastly, the Australian Government must trust these companies to solve problems that they themselves do not have the answers to and purchase equipment accordingly. The best examples of this are the successes of both Palantir and Anduril. These companies pitched independently developed products, solving problems that hadn’t yet been defined in engineering specifications and have become large prime contractors in their own rights. To say nothing of how this approach will drive innovation, local companies will have more opportunities to demonstrate proven technologies to a global market. Through the implementation of these three options within a National UAS Strategy, the Australian Government could effectively signal to local industry that UAS technology is a long-term priority, and consequently provide a degree of certainty to invest in R&D. The Australian User A National UAS Strategy must also outline a concerted Government effort to purchase locally designed and built UAS to enhance ADF capability. Sovereign production increases supply chain resilience and improves the ability to quickly replace combat losses in the event of conflict. According to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Australia is the world's fourth largest arms importer, but only the sixteenth largest exporter. The use of the Javelin missile by Ukraine provides an insight into the risks of this imbalance. Between February and May 2022, the US provided approximately one third of its Javelin missiles to Ukraine, with the manufacturer Lockheed Martin stating it may take “a couple of years” to meet current demand. A sovereign UAS production capability would immediately reduce the risk to ADF personnel in a hostile environment and would further reduce our dependence on the US who may prioritise the replacement of its own assets. Security Leader Finally, a National UAS Strategy must seek to establish Australia as a security and UAS leader. Exporting Australian designed and built technology provides an opportunity to secure Australia’s position as a security leader, and partner of choice for nations across the globe. More importantly, we should establish the use case for countries closer to home in the Asia Pacific region. Within the pacific islands, UAS technology could be a cost-effective and simple option to address a number of security challenges they are currently faced with. UAS could offer an ISR capability to maintain situational awareness of their large ocean territories. Alternatively, UAS could provide logistical capability to supply remote communities, or mapping capabilities to monitor the effects of climate change. Conclusion A National UAS strategy presents a unique opportunity for the Australian Government. Consolidating and building on existing programs, incentivising R&D through grants, tax incentives and committing to purchase Australian technology will signal to companies and investors alike that UAS development is a risk worth taking. The rapidly deteriorating strategic environment is reason enough to implement a National UAS strategy; however, the windows of opportunity in emerging markets are fleeting. If we do not act now, the nation will lose an important opportunity to grow Australian industry and secure our supply chains. Tim Sullivan is an Officer in the Royal Australian Air Force. Prior to joining Defence, he spent time in the defence industry in both engineering and commercial roles. The views expressed are his alone and do not reflect the opinion of the Royal Australian Air Force, the Department of Defence, or the Australian Government. He can be found on LinkedIn.

This week, FLTLT Joshua Vicino asks the question – how can Defence maximise the brain power of its people with engineering degrees in a post-FPR world where a typical engineering degree isn’t of great assistance in a ‘govern and assure’ role. The story is always the same. An Engineering Officer newly posted to Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group (CASG) arrives to a vague and non-descript duty statement with little understanding of what they’re supposed to do. In an attempt to prove their usefulness, they send emails, attend meetings, and read documents, all the while wondering in bewilderment how the system seems to function with such an open ended approach to posting. Confronted with this exact situation, I at least enjoyed the benefit of a newly established formal induction training session. The session explained core System Program Office (SPO) business in the post First Principles Review (FPR) world. It covered planning, governing, and assuring the ‘actual’ work of capability acquisition, which was expected to be contracted out at every opportunity. Like many others in my position, I had never worked in an acquisition agency before, and most definitely had never undertaken any of the detailed development and analysis tasking that is associated with the delivery of complex military systems. Confronted with this guidance and a prevailing sense of panic at not understanding my new role, I asked the presenter how I was supposed to plan, govern, and assure such work given my limited experience and skillset. The answer contained advice that is now infused in my identify: ‘Josh, you’re a smart dude with an engineering degree; you’ll figure it out.’ Now, I’m not going to lie. This was simultaneously the most liberating and the most terrifying thing that I had ever heard. On the one hand, it was liberating to know that I had the support and backing of my organisation to put my best foot forward. On the other hand, it was terrifying. I witnessed Senator Penny Wong observe at a Senate Estimate Hearing that, cumulatively speaking, there are ‘around 39 Defence projects running a total of 79 years late and 17 major projects running $4.3 billion over budget’. I couldn’t help but feel like I was part of the problem. In acknowledging this fact we must ask; how can Defence maximise all the utility and brain power afforded by smart people with engineering degrees in a post FPR world? Delving Deeper Internal reporting, community sentiment, and personal experience describe a problem characterised by an inadequate understanding of job requirements, underpinned by a lack of appropriate training and education that is feeding a broader skills shortage. An internal study into engineering support identified that suitable training is not provided to SPO personnel on how to fuse governance and assurance practices with contracted organisations who undertake the ‘actual’ work of delivering technical services. The study goes on to note that at best, Commonwealth staff will often infer good governance and assurance practice through ad hoc comments provided in a range of disparate training courses. Additionally, the internal study found that the govern and assure practices espoused by the FPR create major difficulties for SPOs in retaining engineering competencies in their Commonwealth workforce. This in turn was identified as a factor that inhibits the provision of engineering support. Such findings were reinforced at a recent CASG engineering conference, where participants commented on the difficulty of recruiting and retaining sufficiently qualified people who can operate in the new govern and assure paradigm. In particular, one organisation noted that they have been carrying a crucial vacancy at the engineering executive level for nearly two years. Given the requirement for CASG to principally undertake ‘govern and assure’ practices, it must be noted that a typical engineering degree isn’t of great assistance here either. Speaking to my own experience, whilst I can do math and write code (not very well, I admit), I am yet to see a great deal of relevance in recursive least squares optimisation methods or multivariate vector calculus to the role of a CASG engineering Officer. Now, having suitably described the problem, the question remains - what to do about it? Solving the Problem I believe there are two parts to this – Firstly; training in the core competencies associated with governance and assurance within SPOs. Secondly; greater education on broader, more philosophical aspects of how to think and behave in a large, complex organisation such as CASG. Much like the maintenance organisation training that Engineering Officers receive in anticipation of posting to an operational Squadron, CASG incumbents require short (i.e. one or half day) courses that tackle what it means to ‘plan, govern, and assure’. Training should include examples that link these practices back to one’s current project context. This is best thought of as a vocational trade based program – members undertake on the job training at work, learning from experienced hands like Chief Engineers, Chief Logisticians, resident ‘olds and bolds’ (you know who I mean - we’ve all got them, remember to give yours a high-five at work tomorrow) whilst simultaneously getting the equivalent of one day a week at trade school. This approach is designed to help members understand the ‘nuts and bolts’ (no, dear reader, I will not be pardoning this pun) of their duty statement as they slowly stitch it together with ‘real world’ experience over the course of their posting. Secondly, members need support for attending longer (i.e. one/two week) courses on more philosophical topics such as organisational leadership, behaviour, and change etc. These courses, the kinds of which are offered by Business schools across the country, are the types of longer term professional development programs that need to be provided in order to open Defence members up to alternate approaches and broader perspectives. If we continue to raise junior members in the ways of old then we simply grow them in the image of the past, serving only to exacerbate our current state of being perpetually over budget and late to need. Closing Remarks It is a well-known fact that Defence’s Engineering Officers are smart, and indeed, have engineering degrees (it’s a requirement of the job). However, the clearly documented deficiencies in training, education, and skills suggest that a degree alone is insufficient for the needs of the organisation. Indeed, my personal experience of CASG to date has left me feeling like an apprentice who isn’t getting their day a week at trade school - untrained in core skills, making it up as I go, and wondering when the house is going to fall down. If Defence is to address Senator Wong’s observation that it is ‘79 years late’ and ‘4.3 billion dollars over budget’ across a suite of projects, then these problems need to be addressed. As articulated in this thought piece, the solutions need not be excessively complicated or, dare I say it, even ‘innovative’. What it does require though is suitable training, delivered at the right time, and by the right people. Flight Lieutenant Joshua Vicino is an Electronics Engineer working in the Royal Australian Air Force. He holds a Bachelor of Science and Master of Electrical Engineering from The University of Melbourne. He is currently the Project Engineering Manager for Project AIR7000 Phase 1B - MQ-4C Triton Acquisition.

This week we return to one of our core writing themes for this year - #FutureChiefs. In this instalment, TCB editor Luke Webb explores a new role for future CAFs – that of technology leader. Should future Chiefs of Air Force (CAF) be the leaders and figureheads of an aviation enterprise, or some other organisational ontology? It’s my contention that the centre of gravity of Air Force is moving from being a flying enterprise to a knowledge-actor network that’s fuelled by a range of advanced technologies – both in the air/orbit and on the ground. As such, future CAF’s will be charged with developing, advancing, and exerting the effects that spring from this Blue intellectual force and its associated technologies base – all in addition to the existing suite of responsibilities CAFs are expected to fulfil. Sure, the Air Force of the future will still do plenty of flying and exerting effects, and the prospect of the enterprise echoing a Silicon Valley tech behemoth is not likely the most relevant model to adopt despite the burgeoning technology stack that powers Air Force. But whilst Air Force is not a technology outfit, it reverts to an aviation social club without a high degree of tech-centricity [1], and this, I argue, means that a #FutureChief needs to add technology leader to their epaulettes. A parallel to examine would be the leaders of other public sector organisations like DSTG, CSIRO and the Chief Scientist of Australia. Individuals who know their technical tradecraft, but whose role and identity are not so firmly set around deep domain expertise. Instead, these are leaders who have substantial experience in transformations – whether in launching new high-tech start-ups (such as Alan Finkel), leading major research efforts whilst managing many risks and unknowns (such as Professor Graeme Clark) or making breakthroughs in areas of significant complexity and communicating these to non-technical audiences (such as Professor Lisa Harvey-Smith). They’re effective managers of the business of discovery, experimentation, and transformation, and not just of the end-products of science & technology (S&T) processes. Articulating how a future Air Force will likely be shaped by technology and intellect management would fill a series of articles, but as technology cycles shorten and the reliance on the technical expertise of its people increases, the success of Air Force will depend on far more than the ability to launch airborne sorties. It will become an organisation that needs to constantly evolve its technology and intellectual network to produce the effects that modern conflict will demand of it. Therefore, it will need a leader that is intimately aware of the fragility of evolving an organisation along these lines. To empower this vision, I’d argue #FutureChiefs will need to expand their role to include (or beef up) the following personas: An aerospace power futurist (or at least someone who can listen and respond to futurists, but with a critical lens). A Socratic master – the key knowledge provocateur and instigator of deeper organisational thinking and learning A narrative setter and a storyteller – painting the vision of how the enterprise needs to change and its ‘next state’ intent An ambassador to the Government of the day and an educator of the stakeholders that will shape the enterprise’s future. Articulating constant change is a delicate art and a time-consuming activity – especially when a major strand to this effort is masterly explaining failure and uncertainty The Chief attorney & ethicist to lead and challenge technological developments to be in line with the codified and uncodified expectations of the national (and increasingly international) citizenry whom Air Force serves. The Air Force of the future will face significant challenges around information mobility and rapid sensemaking. Whilst a future CAF won't be the primary technology architect, it will be their role to empower the Air Force ecosystem to continue iterating, adapting, and changing. It will require a leader who not only recognises the complexity and dependencies of the tail-to-tooth chain of Air Force, but who also has an instinct to lead its successful adaptation to deliver ever-new aerospace-derived effects – all without losing its aviation professionalism that makes Air Force such a unique organisation. [1] And by tech-centricity, this is not to assert that technology is the one core strand of DNA of Air Force. Aerospace power relies on the masterful skill and knowledge of its people, using their experience to leverage technology to produce effects in, from and through air & space. This piece assumes that the growing focus on Air Force people will remain a core part of CAF’s role (along with all the other existing components) and rather advocates for another important strand to future CAFs’ work - leading Air Force in S&T mastery. Luke Webb is a Melbourne-based aerospace engineer, casual academic & science communicator. He is the Chair of the Melbourne Branch of the Royal Aeronautical Society, and one of the editors of The Central Blue.

Editorial Note: Between February and April 2018, The Central Blue and From Balloons to Drones, will be publishing a series of articles that examine the requirements of high-intensity warfare in the 21st Century. These articles provide the intellectual underpinnings to a seminar on high-intensity warfare being held on 22 March by the Williams Foundation in Canberra, Australia. In this article, Dr Randall Wakelam examines the importance of education for aviators in the 21st Century. While drawing on the experience of the Royal Canadian Air Force, Wakelam argues that while the value of education is often hard to quantify, it is nonetheless an essential aspect in the development of airmen who need to master the profession of arms and the challenges associated with that idea. His argument transcends national boundaries and applies to any large, medium, or small air force seeking to prepare for the challenges posed by the future operating environment. I have a prejudice: My prejudice is that airmen do not like thinking: Airmen are obsessed with bombs, fuses, cockpits and screens and are actually rather uncomfortable exploring the underpinning logic and doctrine: So producing a thinking air force is a strategic requirement. Air Chief Marshal Sir Brian Burridge, RAF Air Power Review, 2004 In Burridge’s statement from the early years of this century, one can readily see that education for air power professionals has been and will continue to be important for the successful management of air forces both regarding national and international processes like procurement and collation operations and the day to day conduct of air operations. However, the caution that he offers about discomfort for education is equally important, and his concern is not new. Indeed one of the central themes of Carl Builder’s study of the USAF – The Icarus Syndrome – was that leaders had too often shifted their focus from the tough questions of running the institution to a more limited attention to technologies and air vehicles.[1] Moreover, we see a similar tendency to eschew non-technical aspects of air power in the early days of the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) College where of a 5,500-hour, four-year syllabus, fully 1,955 hours were spent on the sciences, while only 230 were dedicated to history, war studies, and imperial defence issues. There was no non-technical course on air power theory. In the view of former RAAF historian Alan Stephens, ‘the Air Force [was] very plainly identifying itself as a technocracy.’[2] Building on these examples and concerns I want to argue that education is good for the RCAF, both for individuals and for the institution. A recent RCAF Journal article ‘Professional Airpower Mastery and the RCAF’ also makes the point, stating that Canada’s air force is very good tactically, but that beyond this it lacks the ability to be as effective as it might at higher levels of warfighting or in the broad domain of national and international security.[3] At those levels, we, again both individually and institutionally, tend to muddle through problems – sometimes successfully, sometimes less so. To put that article in context for an Australian audience, it should be noted that one of the many sources used by those authors was Sanu Kainikara’s 2011 work At the Critical Juncture: The Predicament of Small Air Forces.[4] Returning to a Canadian context, a late 1960s study, The Report of the Officer Development Board (ODB), posited that all officers move away from hands-on tactical and technical expertise fairly early in their careers, replacing those technical and tactical ‘occupational skills’ with broader pan-service and then pan-Canadian Forces/whole of government ‘military expertise’ competencies.[5] This progression is as true of the RCAF as it is of the Royal Canadian Navy or the Canadian Army. More to the point of this article, the ODB also stated that officers needed to start their service with a strong intellectual ability and then have to grow that as the challenges they confront become less predictable. The ODB made this point in the context of a world which was dominated by tense geopolitical circumstances, burgeoning technological advances and security challenges that ranged from superpower standoff to asymmetric conflict to the full range of peace support operations.[6] Things are not much different today. We are called upon to deal with the often abstract and chaotic problems of the 21st century using what the ODB labelled called ‘executive and military executive abilities’. Major-General David Fraser, then just returned from commanding Regional Command South in Kandahar, made a similar observation in a 2006 lecture at the Canadian Forces College, pointing out that at the tactical level leaders need to have the intellectual agility, and associated confidence to be able to deviate from a plan when circumstances dictate.[7] However, he went on to argue that while at the tactical level circumstances can be complicated, at the operational and strategic levels of war decision makers often face complexity, overlaid with ambiguity and chaos – what is often called the wicked problem. We learn technical and tactical skills through training for the most part, but the broader competencies are more generally the product of education. Training allows for standardised responses to predictable circumstances whereas education permits reasoned responses to unpredictable circumstances.[8] Training can be relatively well measured as we can see in the course training standards and training and education plans that form the basis of hundreds of qualifications. From Robert Smith-Barry’s reforms to pilot training that he implemented a century ago today we implicitly understand the value of standardised training for aircrew and more broadly for all air force hands-on competencies. Knowing that your winger knows what she or he is doing; knowing that the techs have done their snag rectification by the book and that battle managers understand clearly what they can do to assist in the fight allows each of us to perform confidently. Moreover, all these skills and knowledge are based on a validated training system which ensures technical and tactical competence. Education, and its value is, on the other hand, a bit less quantifiable: does a Bachelor’s in aeronautical engineering equate to an effective aircraft designer or a skilled technical authority? Does a Master’s in International Relations make for an effective commanding officer (CO) when deployed on coalition operations or an astute policy analyst proposing changes to air force roles and structures? In these examples, the answers are probably yes, but there is no easily applied ‘training standard’ to tell us so. The ODB said that the undergraduate degree provided a necessary ‘training of the mind’ and a graduate degree in areas related to the profession of arms was a useful and necessary enrichment both in knowledge and intellectual capacity.[9] Those thoughts from 50 years ago are all well and good, but those who do not have a degree, or an advanced degree often seem to do ‘just fine’.  However, what does just fine mean? It may mean that success has not come from an optimal application of thinking power – allowing a logical, viable solution. Rather, it may mean that a solution is derived from a limited perspective based on the individual’s limited or skewed sense of the issues. Education is not a guaranteed antidote to the latter problems, but it frequently offers the learner new ways of considering evidence and weighing alternatives. Indeed, this was the implicit message in the RCAF’s curriculum of the RCAF War Staff Course. Air Commodore George Wait, the Staff College’s first commandant, had an opportunity to offer his thoughts on the content and conduct of the syllabus and by extension the notion of a professional development philosophy that combined training and education. He wrote: [t]he backbone of the course consists of a series of lectures on staff duties given by the Directing Staff, which leads students through service writing, precis writing, appreciations and orders and instructions.  The students then put their knowledge to work by doing a series of practical problems on the employment of air power.[10] However, to give this routine staff training some added richness the programme of studies also included lectures given by well-qualified visiting speakers, both officers and civilian officials, on a variety of topics, including other services, allied and enemy forces, matters of the strategic direction of the war, and war production. ‘Only by such a means,’ Wait had said in earlier correspondence with Air Force Headquarters, ‘can the students be given the broader and more authoritative outlook that they will require in staff positions.’[11] The same notion of broad education was stated more explicitly in the late 1950s in the RCAF Staff College’s syllabus: The RCAF Staff College makes no attempt to graduate experts in a particular field, nor does it expound any easy universally applicable doctrines. Rather by providing its graduates with an education of the broadest scope and by developing habits of clear thinking, it attempts to provide them with the breadth of interest, openness of mind, reasoning ability, and a broad view of their Service and profession, which will enable them to master the specific tasks of any appointment and to make sound decisions in any situation. (emphasis added)[12] Much of my original paper had been drafted before the 7 June 2017 release of Canada’s new defence policy ‘Strong, Secure, Engaged’. Reading through it and ‘blue sky’ imagining the work needed to implement the policy one cannot but think that it will require big and imaginative minds to deal with how we make good on the vision and indeed there are repeated references to flexibility of mind and the utility of education. Tactical excellence alone, one can surmise, will not guarantee success. Practically, how do we do develop a learning strategy that ensures policy ends? The recently restructured and re-energised RCAF officer professional development system offers a flight plan towards realising this goal. First, we have confirmed the need for all officers to achieve, or in certain special cases to be on the path to achieving, an undergraduate degree before commissioning. As of 2016, in Canada, we now have a course – the Air Power Operations Course (APOC), that looks remarkably similar to the War Staff Course, albeit only 60 percent as long. Finally, there is a vision, yet to be defined and approved, for expanded senior officer education, this to be achieved through focused workshops of several days or a few weeks duration depending on the topic. The APOC has six ‘performance objectives’, the first being a learning outcome to develop the air-mindedness of students, who are drawn from all RCAF occupations, so that they can work collaboratively with officers across all flying and technical communities within the RCAF and can explain and represent the air power concepts and practices to officers in joint headquarters and other services. The second objective is to develop staff officer competencies in clear and logical thinking and communications. The remaining objectives – planning of operations in deployed and coalition situations – build on the first two and expose students to the complexity of modern air operations, and this in a service where tactical and maritime helicopters (and everything else that flies) are air force resources. What the more senior follow-on courses might look like is still very much undefined, but the wisdom of the 1959 syllabus would suggest that a tactically oriented curriculum will not do. What senior air force leaders need is something more. This same idea was much in evidence in a recent Australian Defence Force study. The following are extracts from ‘The Chiefs: A Study of Strategic Leadership.’[13] The report reaches three major conclusions, relating respectively to individual development, organisational development and leadership style. These conclusions are that: for the ambitious officer, “what got you here won’t get you there”; for the military institution, “what got us here won’t get us there”; and the principle that “leadership is a team sport” is just as valid at the senior level as it is lower in the organisation.[14] It is recommended that: the core JPME [Joint Professional Military Education] effort (or at least that from mid-career onwards) be oriented around the four strategic leadership roles of Strategic Leader, Strategic Builder, Strategic Director and Steward of the Profession. such JPME be focused on preparing officers for future roles in both leadership and support for senior leaders. officers from mid-career onwards periodically be exposed to and engage with contemporary and evolving issues at the strategic level, with exercises that require them to examine the responsibilities and skills needed for the Director-Leader-Manager-Steward forms within their own current and immediate-future career roles. (For example, as part of preparation for ship/unit command, O4 and O5 could examine the application of these four roles to that level of command and the level of command immediately above it.) such engagement use active rather than passive modes of learner behaviour. each Service continue with the current encouraging trend of introducing career models that enable selected officers to develop in-depth specialisations within relevant fields – not just within “personnel management” and “project management/technology” but also within economics, politics and military sociology.[15] We can see that technical and tactical competencies are no guarantee to success at higher levels of command and leadership and that organisations that are similarly successful like likely need to approach institutional and national/international challenges with ways and means (intellectually and practically) that differ from what works in tactical situations. Some, if not all the Australian Defence Force’s recommendations for learning could be implemented within the RCAF’s professional education programme, but there is much to be gained from learning environments outside the air force. The recent introduction of sponsored assignments to complete a Masters in War Studies at the Royal Military College (with a focus on air power topics) is one such avenue. Similarly, a new internship programme, with placements in think tanks, industry and government will expose air force officers to different ways of thinking, planning and operating. Where does this leave us as we advance through the new century? As suggested at the outset a narrow focus on technical and tactical proficiency, while necessary, cannot be the nexus of professional education. Many observers and practitioners have noted this. A broad blend of intellectual dexterity coupled with both hands-on skills and broad knowledge would seem to have been and remains today the essence of professional effectiveness and thus the desired outcome of an aviator’s education. Dr Randall Wakelam teaches military and air power history at the Royal Military College of Canada.  After graduating from RMC in 1975 he flew helicopters for the Army, becoming CO of 408 Tactical Helicopter Squadron in 1991. Along the way, he also had staff appointments in aircraft procurement and language training policy. Since 1993 he has been an educator, first in uniform at the Canadian Forces College in Toronto and now at RMC. His research and publishing focus on air power and military education. *A shorter version of this paper was first drafted for the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) in the Fall of 2017, but both it and this version are the products of about 30 years of thinking about how military professionals can best educate themselves.  Where the examples used are largely specific to historical and contemporary Canadian experience there is, I believe, much that is common to most, if not all, modern air forces. [1] Carl Builder, The Icarus Syndrome:  Air Power Theory and the Evolution of the Air Force (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Press, 1998). [2] Alan Stephens, Power Plus Attitude: Ideas, Strategy and Doctrine in the Royal Australian Air Force 1921-1991 (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1992), pp. 109–11. [3] Brad Gladman et al, ‘Professional Airpower Mastery and the RCAF,’ RCAF Journal, 5:1 (2016), pp. 8-23. [4] Sanu Kainikara, At the Critical Juncture: The Predicament of Small Air Forces (Canberra: Air Power Development Centre, 2011). [5] Randall Wakelam and Howard Coombs (eds.) The Report of the Officer Development Board: Major-General Roger Rowley and the Education of the Canadian Forces (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2010), p. 46. The same issue applies to senior warrant officers as they reach formation (wing, air group, etc.) and national level senior appointments where they must be able to understand the sorts of challenges their commanders face. [6] Ibid, pp. 26-31. [7] Major-General David Fraser, Lecture to the Advanced Military Studies Course, Canadian Forces College Toronto, October 2006. [8] Ronald Haycock, ‘Historical and Contemporary Aspects of Canadian Military Education’ in Greg Kennedy and Keith Neilson (eds.) Military Education:  Past, Present, and Future (Westport, CT.: Praeger, 2002), p. 171. [9] Wakelam and Coombs, Officer Development Board, p. 40. [10] William R. Shields and Dace Sefers, Canadian Forces Command and Staff College: A History 1797-1946 (Toronto: Canadian Forces College History Project, Canadian Forces College, 1987), pp. 4-15. [11] Ibid, pp. 4-16. [12] R.C.A.F. Staff College Calendar Course 23 (1958-9), “Conclusion.” [13] Nicholas Jans, Stephen Mugford, James Cullens and Judy Fraser-Jans, ‘The Chiefs:  A Study of Strategic Leadership’ (Canberra:  Australian Defence College, 2013). [14] Ibid, p. 111. [15] Ibid, p. 113. #Training #PME #RAAF #organisationalculture #PMET #AirPower #AirForce #Education

Is it possible to reconceptualise the value of failure to the RAAF and its operational effectiveness? In this new #FailureWins post, Christopher Kourloufas examines the notion of complex failure and its valuable counterbalance known as ‘intelligent failures’. In doing so, he explores ‘safe to fail’ experimentation concepts and how they can enhance Air Force professional mastery. Failure is neither always bad nor always good – what matters is the context. Any response to failure must be tuned to the context within which it occurs. Especially if we want to encourage positive behaviours of our people and teams in the increasingly complex operational environment. Is it possible to reconceptualise the value of failure to our organisation and operational effectiveness? The focus of this piece is complex failure, and its valuable counterbalance known as ‘intelligent failures’. What I’m not talking about are the preventable failures - those caused by deviations from accepted procedures (See ‘types of failure’ insert). Air Force relationship with failure Failure within the Air Force is generally not an option that is welcomed. Failure is indeed bad in certain contexts. However, given the complex and uncertain nature of military operations, jumping to simple explanations can neglect the nuance of the situation, opportunities for learning and ways of gaining advantage. Our understanding of failure is coloured by our experience in training, aviation safety and risk management settings. For instance, trainees passing or failing against performance metrics for fitness, weapon safety and courses. In an aviation safety setting, failure is dealt with in a dry, technical way – part failure, procedural failure, system failure. And within risk management, failure is related to the non-achievement of an outcome. Failure is something to be detected, reported, analysed and managed. And the risk of failure is to be controlled (to avoid it) or mitigated (to respond to it). All of this adds up to a strong, negative conception of failure for the aviator. It encourages failure avoidance at all costs – which leaves opportunity on the table, could lead to hiding failure or potentially punishment for individuals responsible for failure. In spite of nice sentiments about learning from failure’s lessons and the sprinkling of thought leaders within the organisation that embody this, the brutal fact is that it simply is not valued by the organisation. For instance, failure is dealt with in a superficial way in both the leadership and learning doctrines, providing little nuance for the military professional. Other hints come from examining how we view the success of our people. Success is fundamental to our promotion, performance reporting and awards systems. We format individual reporting narratives with templates like ‘Did-Achieved-Demonstrated’ and previously ‘Situation-Task-Action-Result’. What this emphasises, is that behaviour is valued on the basis of achievement, results and demonstrable outcomes. This prevents the possibility to set conditions for a possible future whose results may not be apparent for some time. The preference then is for the present, the status-quo. The shallow narratives that we craft, however, leave the reader with no appreciation of the means for how these results came about. They are also prone to cognitive biases, for example, the ‘narrative fallacy’ which is the tendency to link unrelated events into a narrative and impose a pattern of causality. This cognitive trap typically overestimates the role of skill and underestimates the role of luck as factors of success. The challenge How is this resolved against the overwhelming body of evidence that has said for decades that ‘failure’ is neither a synonym for ‘incompetence’ nor always bad? There is a conflict between what is known within contemporary literature as being productive and our reflexive response to failure. And how do we progress from here, so that we can actively promote and nurture valuable ‘intelligent failure’ that acts as a counterbalance to complex failure? The complexity-failure relationship Our operations and capabilities grow ever more complex – and this is especially apparent within competition below the threshold of conflict. Competition is about gaining and maintaining relative advantage. It is a non-linear (temporally and in effect), continuous process that is not addressed via technological superiority. The expectation from our political and military leadership is that we must advance national interests in contexts that challenge our mental ‘map’ of the world. This is because ‘[our] map is not the actual territory’. What that means for us, is that we are spending more time at the ‘frontier’ of the profession of arms – where we leave the solid ground of ‘best practice’ and even ‘good practice’. Productive reactions to complexity flow in the order of ‘probe-sense-respond’. It is about pushing forward through the darkness of our understanding and illuminating as far forward as we can. This can be thought of as an experimental process during which we will of course face failure– but we can fail intelligently, too. ‘Safe to fail’ experiments The good news is that we don’t have to be scientists to carry out experiments at the frontier to generate novel practices. There is room for experimentation at all levels of the Air Force and in every workplace. Intelligent failures which result from experiments at the frontier provide valuable new knowledge that can help us leap ahead of a competitor or adversary. These experiments are small and pragmatic, they outline a direction and not a destination and have a focus on learning and sharing ideas. It’s a good idea to design the experiment so that the stakes are lowered as far as possible – and in some instances consequences may even be reversible. Experiments can be playful or run in parallel. Taking small, pragmatic steps toward a new direction can help constrain uncertainty and illuminate new ground of the frontier. The preferred direction could be called ‘mission command’ in the military sense; and in the business world, a shared vision of the future guides these experiments. Importantly, safe to fail experiments must be underpinned by Psychological Safety – the absence of interpersonal fear. That is, team members have a safe space to give constructive, critical feedback to surface errors and identify novel opportunities for improvement. Safe to fail experiment considerations I offer the below approach to carrying out experiments at the frontier adapted from the body of knowledge referenced so far. These experiments are investments into understanding a possible future state. Importantly, having a window into a potential future informs planning, management and decision making. I know from experience as a structural integrity engineer, however, that experiments will never be fully representative of real life and all the possible conditions faced in the future. Safe to fail experiments are also crucial investments in our people’s capacity to deal with ambiguity, uncertainty and complexity. It is imperative, then, that we continue to empower our professional masters to boldly explore uncharted territories. The value of failure to the Air Force We have an opportunity to reframe failure in a way that better prepares us for complexity and enables us to seize advantage that comes from ambiguity and novel situations. This is possible through the design and conduct of “safe to fail” experiments that produce intelligent failures. These valuable failures enhance decision making and help us navigate at the frontier of our professional mastery. As well as enriching our decision making, these experiments are productive ways to grow the capacity of our aviators to grapple with ambiguity and complexity. As members of the profession of arms, it is our responsibility to continue to courageously illuminate new frontiers so that we can further national objectives. [T]he only thing I know for sure after all of this research is that if you’re going to dare greatly, you’re going to get your ass kicked at some point. If you choose courage, you will absolutely know failure, disappointment, setback, even heartbreak. That’s why we call it courage. That’s why it’s so rare. - Brene Brown in Dare to Lead, 2018 Biography In an attempt to avoid the Dunning-Kruger Effect, Chris is sticking to what he knows – failure. As a structural integrity engineer, he has had a career focused on detecting, analysing and learning from failures. Understanding what can go wrong and influencing decision making at all levels of the Air Force has been crucial in keeping our personnel safe and capabilities effective.

Accelerating the Transition to a Networked, Integrated Force National Gallery of Australia 24 March 2022 Final Report Dr Robbin Laird Link to the final report on Defense.Info Download Final Report Synopsis and Program Download PDF Presentations Welcoming Remarks and Formal Close AIRMSHL Geoff Brown AO (Retd) Sir Richard Williams Foundation Introduction and MC John Conway Sir Richard Williams Foundation Keynote Address General Kenneth S. Wilsbach Commander, Pacific Air Forces Accelerating the Transition Air Vice-Marshal Robert Chipman AM, CSC Head Military Strategic Commitments Indo Pacific Context Lieutenant General Steven R. Rudder Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific and Commanding General Fleet Marine Force 5th Gen Information Environment Major General Susan Coyle AM, CSC, DSM Head of Information Warfare Multi Domain operations Threats and Opportunities Air Vice-Marshal Chris Deeble AO, CSC (Retd) Executive Director, Strategy, Northrop Grumman Australia Not Just Platforms’ – Architectural & Policy Considerations Enabling Truly Effective 5th Gen Joint C2 Rod Equid Chief of Enterprise Focus Areas, Raytheon Australia The Italian Air Force, a 5th gen. Air Force and beyond Lieutenant General Aurelio Colagrande Italian Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff Acquiring and Sustaining Next Gen Capabilities Tony Dalton AM Deputy Secretary National Naval Shipbuilding UK Perspective Air Chief Marshal Sir Mike Wigston KCB, CBE, ADC Chief of the Air Staff Army Perspective Brigadier Ian Langford, DSC and Bars (PhD) Acting Head Land Capability (representing Chief of Army) Getting the bigger picture - Networking the Force Tom Rowden Vice President International Strategy and Business Development Lockheed Martin Rotary and Mission Systems Future Trends Peter Jennings PSM Executive Director, Australian Strategic Policy Institute Navy Perspective Commodore Darron Kavanagh AM CSC, RAN Director General Warfare Innovation – Navy Air Force Perspective Air Marshal Mel Hupfeld AO, DSC Chief of Air Force

Dr Robbin Laird 27 April 2022 At the Williams Foundation seminar on March 24, 2022, Peter Jennings, Executive Director of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, put it bluntly and directly to the audience: We are facing a significant defense threat, and we need to take it seriously and get prepared. A recent article by Greg Sheridan in The Australian raised a similar waring when he looked back to the 1930s and saw analogies to the current situation. “If the 2020s are really the 1930s all over again, how is it the government is not going to produce any significant new defence capabilities for the rest of this decade? “This decade does resemble the 1930s, not because we face a new Hitler or even a new imperial Japan but because of the utter fecklessness of defence policy and the miserable failure in defence of both sides of politics. Australian leaders spent the 1930s “admiring the problem” of defence. They understood Nazi Germany and imperial Japan and made sententious statements all through the decade. But they did almost nothing to provide significant Australian capabilities.” Peter Jennings speaking at the Williams Foundation seminar, March 24, 2022. Jennings noted that when Prime Minister Morrison introduced in July 2020, the new defense strategy, as an aside he was concerned that indeed the current decade had a resemblance to the global threats of the 1930s. Jennings highlighted what he sees as the key driver of this challenge, namely, what I refer to as the global threat from the 21st century authoritarian powers. Here is how he put it: “The publicly stated goals in terms of the world’s two most powerful authoritarian regimes are to break the international order and to remake it under their control. Beijing and Moscow’s, having both separate and shared interests, but their intent has been publicly articulated for at least a decade. One thing you can say about these authoritarian systems is that they do not disguise their plans. No one today could credibly claim that China is an enigma wrapped in a mystery. You just need to read Xi Jinping’s speeches….” He then underscored the question of how the authoritarian leaders have envisaged the way ahead. “We know Xi Jinping believes that the West, and the United States in particular, is in terminal decline. We know that Xi thinks of himself as a world’s historical figure, uniquely placed to hold China together and uniquely placed to force Taiwan into the People’s Republic. “I also think it’s fair to say that Xi Jinping’s view of Taiwan is somewhat like Putin’s in Ukraine shaped by emotion and by invented historical memory. In other words, this is not a bloodless game theory calculation. A war over Taiwan would ultimately be Xi Jinping’s war rather than China’s war, just as the war in Ukraine is Putin’s war, not necessarily Russia’s war. “But the tragedy of Russia and China is that their political systems have been purpose built to give one leader the capacity to take their country to war. And this is how unthinkable was happened.” But then what do Australia and the West need to do? Jennings warns: “As far as Australia is concerned, I think we find ourselves in a type of strategic twilight zone. We know we’re in such a crisis, or at least on the glide path to one. We also know that this is a crisis with the potential to grow into a global configuration. And yet, we are not behaving as though this is the reality we face. If we really thought that war was coming, wouldn’t we be doing things differently around the defense capability development today?” He underscored that Australia needs (and one could certainly add the United States to his warning) to focus on force building and strategic depth as an urgent matter for defense acquisition not only a process of long-term force building. Jennings articulated his concern as follows: “I do wonder if the defense obsession about building the perfect networks and integrated force has contributed to our current inability to change gear. Through all of my defense career, we were designing and equipping the defense force in a world where the pace of strategic change was an interesting artifact, rather than a clock ticking on Australia’s security. “We could take 20 years to design and deliver defense capability, and it didn’t really matter. “And what that meant was that we could polish those capabilities as though we were building the ultimate Hornby railway set, all designed to run around a beautifully networked and integrated track.” He then went back to his 2018 presentation at a Williams Foundation seminar to reinforce his concern and his point: “Four years ago, almost to the day at the 2018, Sir Richard Williams conference, I spoke on the topic of deterrence. And on that occasion, one thing I did was to advocate for the acquisition of the B-21 aircraft. My reasoning for this was that it would add substantial deterrent capability to an ADF, that looked to me, to be under gunned. Now, more credentialed people than me have also made this case. Had we gone down that track at the time of the 2016 defense white paper, we would have been well placed to see the arrival of B-21 currently in production sometime caught quite soon. Now, of course, that didn’t happen. And I would have to say that defense’s interest in that I idea was not so much zero as about minus 100.” As a result of the clash between geopolitical strategic reality and Australian perceptions, he forecast a “German moment” for Australia. “I think Australia is very soon going to have its own German moment. I’m sure you know that just weeks ago, Germany reversed some of its most entrenched defense and security policies, which had been embedded for decades. In response to the Ukraine crisis, Berlin under an SPD-Green government is doubling its defense expenditure and seeking to reverse a disastrously ill-considered set of energy policies that build dependence on Russia. “No one saw this coming. It happened because of a dire strategic need. Australia will have its Germany moment. No one is seeing it coming. It will happen because of a dire strategic need. “Now, if that floodgate unlocks, we will see, I think, a fundamental recasting of defense capability development plans. I don’t know where that leaves the networked an integrated force. Other than to say to you, get ready for big, fundamental changes, and the need for speed in acquisition.” Featured graphic: Photo 200885804 / Australia China © Leestat | Dreamstime.com Editor’s Note: This week the second of our three books to be published this year on the reshaping of defense was published in e-book form with the paperback to be published in June 2022. The first section of the book is entitled “crisis capabilities and escalation management” and highlights the work of Paul Dibb and Brendan Sargeant, both of whom certainly reinforce the argument of Jennings. Link to article: “Australia is Facing its German Moment” (Defense.info)

Dr Robbin Laird 27 April 2022 Interview with AIRMSHL Geoff Brown AO (Retd), Williams Foundation Chair The September 15, 2022 seminar to be held by the Williams Foundation will focus on the key question of how to enhance the lethality of the Australian Defense Force. In particular, the seminar will focus on the gaps and opportunities for the ADF driven by fifth generation airpower. The recent Williams Foundation seminar provided a prologue to the forthcoming seminar and focused on providing an assessment of where the ADF and allied forces are with regard to shaping 21st century integrated and networked forces. Recently, I discussed the seminar with the Foundations’ Chairman, Air Marshal (Retired) Geoff Brown and he provided a look back at the March 2022 seminar as well as highlighting the focus of the September 15, 2022 seminar as well. Geoff Brown: “We started down the path of working a more effective joint or integrated force effort several years ago. The seminar was designed to provide an assessment of the current state of the effort as well as discussing some ways to further enhance the integrated networked force effort. With the end of the COVID-19 perspectives, we were very pleased to have significant international participation in the seminar to provide a wider perspective on that way ahead as well. “I think we are clearly on the right path but we have major challenges remaining, notably on the acquisition side. Tom Rowden did make the point that he thought we were in a better place than the U.S., but we still have a slow-moving bureaucracy around how to get the kind of integrated capabilities which we want, especially when compared to how quickly the commercial sector can operate.” And there is the challenge of working integration forward with the legacy force as has been noted that the force which we will have in 20 years’ time will contain 80% of what we have now. Brown underscored that “we clearly need to integrate the legacy systems with new platforms, systems or capabilities. The Aegis system is a good example of how one can do this. The Aegis system evolving now is much different from the initial Aegis system as it can now work with a wide variety of weapon systems compared to where it started. The Aegis example demonstrates that the kind of force integration path we are on is achievable, but we need to expand how we in fact can do so. By putting a core system in place and then working with an open architecture enabled by that system, significant integration can take place by incorporating adjacent systems and capabilities.” This approach has clear implications for acquisition. Brown underscored that “rather than having endless competitions to drive down what seems as the lowest price provided by various primes, Defense needs to pick a core prime to manage a weapons area and allow that prime to work with a diversity of suppliers and systems providers to drive the best capabilities to the force. We actually don’t have time now for a lot of the competitive tension that the acquisition system feels it needs to do to get the best value for money. “The key is to get the operators working with industry to drive the kind of rapid change needed.” This is especially true when considering that new platforms are built around a software upgradeability core, and getting to where operators can drive change in concert with the systems providers can allow for the kind of rapid change which operators need to deal with 21st century peer adversaries. The next seminar will focus on shaping a way ahead for the ADF to become more lethal and obviously a core answer to that is the pathway identified by Air Marshal (Retired) Brown. And he added that in the forthcoming seminar one of the key capabilities to be highlighted which can drive the kind of change which the ADF is seeking is around the training domain. “We need to increase the training throughput of the force to accelerate operational changes. The technology’s out there to actually increase training outcomes quite significantly. We’re not even close to utilizing the technology that’s already available, in my mind, to get the best training outcomes. That will be one of the vectors that we’ll certainly look at in the seminar.” In addition, Brown underscored that the whole challenge of resilience of the force is another key dimension which needs to be enhanced as well in shaping a way forward for the ADF. This means looking at efforts to enhance fuel supplies, weapons, supply depth and logistics support. He argued that without the kind of industrial depth which the United States delivered in World War II, it will be difficult to build out the kind of capabilities which are needed for the United States and the core allies. “We need to understand what our real industrial production capability and suspend the idea of needless competition in areas where such competition actually reduces production capability. And on the defense side, we need to be focused on the art of realistic force development and design and avoid paths like the USMC Force Design 2030 which really goes down a unique path not really adding to the overall lethality of the joint or coalition force. We need to ask the question of how new platforms or new force design approaches really add to the lethality of the integrated and networked force or they don’t and avoid the latter. The focus has to be upon deterrence and whether you are moving the needle forward on deterrence or not; if you are not then don’t go down that platform or force design path. The Pacific in particular drives the need for long-range systems, and we are working towards enhancing our capability to acquire and operate such systems.” Link to article: Looking Back and Looking Forward: Shaping a Way Ahead for the Integrated Networked Force (Defense.info)

Is a culture where acceptance of failure is normalised one that will have a positive impact on ADF capability? Robert Vine argues that in at least a training environment, outcomes should be evaluated on a scale of performance rather than as a binary pass/fail schema. As part of our #FailureWins series, Vine makes the point that if we want to improve performance and measure capability, we need to measure ourselves against several different variable scales rather than a polarised classification. Is a culture where acceptance of failure is normalised one that will have a positive impact on ADF capability? When you reflect on a career’s worth of experience, what sticks in your mind is the times where things went wrong and it's these hard lessons that influence your approach to the future. If the experience of failure is a strong driver for improvement then maximising this culture seems logical. But what would be the negative consequences of a force that never succeeds in training? How should we balance the competing benefits of success and failure? All training events, be it individual, unit level, joint or coalition is a balance of the needs to teach people, test equipment, develop tactics and verify capability. Meeting a training objective demonstrates that a standard has been met. It proves that individual performance, system operation and tactical proficiency produce a capability. Failing to meet an objective identifies a deficiency that needs to be resolved. It is important to measure success or failure to demonstrate if the ADF is ready for the roles that it is directed to perform. In this context, failure is not a negative outcome. Failure clearly identifies what needs to be fixed, with repeat attempts serving as a way to confirm whether the fix has worked. This methodology is useful to encourage improved performance, but what does failure tell us about the capability of the force as it currently stands? Rather than viewing training outcomes as a binary pass/fail, the ADF must emphasise training as a scale of performance. If we want to improve performance and measure capability, we need to measure ourselves against a number of different variable scales. For example: Losses: How much of the force was expended to achieve the mission? Capacity: How much of our resources were used to achieve the mission? Timeliness: How long did it take to achieve the mission? Resilience: How long did it take to recover capability after the mission? Consequences: Did the force achieve the mission without adverse consequences? Adaptability: Did the force adapt to changes in the adversary or operating environment? Integration: Did the force optimise its resources towards the mission? Outcome: Did the force achieve the mission in the manner planned? This method of capability assessment requires the ADF to exercise in a realistic environment. It can no longer be acceptable to exercise against a limited adversary such that the mission is challenging, but still achievable. Logistics must be tested, rather than assumed away. Bases must be measured against a genuine threat rather than treated as safe-havens. When did we last allow the adversary to use initiative and asymmetric approaches? Without a realistic exercise environment, any measure of success is pointless because war is a relative game where the adversary adapts and improves. To understand our capability relative to an adversary, the ADF must incorporate an independent organisation that sets exercise scenarios which mimic the operational environment. No longer can we develop scenarios as a training aid to demonstrate performance of the force against the adversary we would like to fight. Instead, we must employ a realistic operational environment that allows us to understand how we will actually perform on operations and provide context to what improvements we need to make to the force. Similarly, the ADF must carefully consider how individual performance is measured. Utilising a system where performance is measured on a scale, which is valued higher; someone who achieves the highest score, or someone who achieves the greatest improvement? If success in warfare is a game of continuous improvement relative to the adversary, then we must reward those who are most adept at improving, not those who demonstrate the best initial performance but fail to adapt to the adversary. Utilising these performance metrics would drive a culture of continuous improvement while still demonstrating the performance of the force. One of my experiences on Air Warfare Instructor Course still comes to mind over 10 years later, not just because it was a poor performance (an assessment failure) but because of the personal and organisation improvement that has occurred since then. I was to be the Mission Commander for a mission that required us to adjust all our plans from offensive to defensive operations within just three hours. It became apparent in the first few minutes of the mission that the plan was poor. Despite this acknowledgement, I did not adapt quickly enough. The mission was a failure. However, my analysis of the reasons for the mission failure were good – identifying that our process for planning required too long and relied too much on individual experience rather than tactical procedures. I would go on to pass the course, fix this issue by writing the procedures we needed, and train others in how to use them. Now, I regard this event as one of the most positive in my career. I am proud of my efforts to improve individually, and to aid in improving the organisation. Unfortunately, we rarely provide people the opportunity to transfer individual lessons to the organisation. If we are to judge performance on a scale and value improvement, then we need to provide people the ability to implement hard won lessons into the organisation. We need to provide people time to write new tactics, the authority to change their systems configuration, the budget to buy necessary equipment, and reward testing new ideas. Failure can prove to be a strong driver for some individuals to improve performance, but normalising failure should not neglect the need for the ADF to know that it is ready to perform its role. A system that measures performance not just as a binary pass/fail but as a scale offers the potential to drive individual and organisational change. When coupled with a system that rewards improvement and provides the broad ability to make the changes quickly, we can generate a culture that is able to improve at a greater rate than an adversary. To achieve this the ADF must train in a realistic environment rather than an idealistic one. Robert Vine is an Air Battle Manager in the Royal Australian Air Force currently specialising in futures and concepts for Joint Command and Control, and Integrated Air and Missile Defence. The opinions expressed are his alone and do not reflect those of the Royal Australian Air Force, the Australian Defence Force, or the Australian Government.

Dr Robbin Laird 21 April 2022 LtGen Steven Rudder, Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific and Commanding General Fleet Marine Force, provided a USMC perspective on the way ahead for the networked and integrated force which highlighted the impact of the F-35 on the USMC role in Pacific operations. He noted the Marines are operating both the F-35Bs and F-35Cs in the Pacific. By having an ability to operate both from the sea and from land, the two F-35s provided a significant fifth generation warfighting capability which can enable the Marine Corps focus on expeditionary operations. As he put it: “we’ll continue to operate our F-35C from the carrier with our agreement with the Navy, but also when they’re not on the carrier, we’re operating them off land bases as well to give us the operational flexibility we want to achieve.” With the operation by allies in the Pacific, the Marines are able to bring their operating experience to Asian allies soon to operate the aircraft, notably the Singapore Air Force and the Japanese as well. He provided a slide in his presentation which highlighted the combined training which occurred with the Singapore Air Force last year as well as a slide which highlighted joint operations with Japanese Self Defense Forces during last year’s Talisman Sabre exercise. LtGen Rudder understandably underscored as well the integrated operations which the USS America operating USMC F-35Bs with HMS Queen Elizabeth operating UK F-35Bs and the ability of the Marines to cross-deck between the ships. He noted: “Our aviation communities can plug and play in coalition operations and this is key element of moving ahead with a networked integrated force.” For the Marines, airpower integration is crucial, but it is the ability to integrate from the sea to land operations which is critical as well. As Rudder put it: “we have been working on the ability to take F-35 data and to use that data for target acquisition and get such data down to our ground force.” One initiative being pursued is the deployment of ground fires, such as the Naval strike missiles, in support of naval sea control and sea denial operations, which is leveraging such a data transfer. He noted that the Marines have over the last year have been working on such an approach to force integration. Indeed, a key way ahead for the Pacific-based Marines is to be able to support the U.S. Navy’s Sea control and sea denial operations. This is another aspect being worked with regard to enhancing the ability of the Marines and Navy to deliver an enhanced network integrated force. In my own view, the intersection between the U.S. Navy’s evolving approach to distributed maritime operations and the USMC’s approach to mobile and expeditionary basing are inextricably intertwined, a subject which I address with my co-author in our forthcoming book, A Maritime Kill Web Force in the Making: Warfighting and Deterrence in the 21st Century. The Marines have also created a Marine Littoral Regiment designed to provide a new way for the infantry to operate in the Pacific. And such a force clearly needs support from airpower organic to the USMC or from the joint force. To move further down the road of a networked integrated force, Rudder underscored that “we are buying mesh networks that are able to take wave forms from space, surface, or air, and translate them into to a common operating picture for our ground forces. We are focused on enhanced shared awareness in order to be able to hold targets at risk. We need to address the threats we face in an integrated fashion.” In the interview I did this past summer at his office in Honolulu with LtGen Rudder, he highlighted how he saw the way ahead for the USMC with regard to working with allies and with the joint force. “We are focused on shaping an effective posture that combines forward bases with rotational partnerships with key Allies. I have already highlighted how important our posture is in Japan. Employing Infantry and MV-22s from Okinawa and F-35s from Iwakuni (in southwest Honshu) we readily integrate with Japans Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade.” “MRF-D plays a role as well. Six months out of the year, we rotate 2,000 Marines into Australia with ground forces, MV-22s, fires, and logistics capability. Now that the Australians are operating the F-35 and routinely exercising amphibious operations, we can work jointly on expanding high-end bi-lateral and multi-lateral operations. As a combined force, we have already increased the complexity of operations as recently demonstrated during Talisman Saber 21.” “And as we build up and deploy greater numbers of forces to Camp Blaz, Guam, we will use this location as an additional posture location for 5,000 Marines and Sailors. All of these posture developments allow us to have various operational touch points from which one could aggregate force capabilities. With a combination of air and sea lift, we are designing a force with the ability to rapidly move into positions of advantage.” We then discussed the evolution of fires which the Marines can bring to the Pacific fight. With the end of the INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) treaty, the United States can now build longer range conventional capabilities. The Marines are looking to participate in this effort, and employ them from expeditionary forward bases well inside the adversary’s weapons engagement area. The objective is to contribute to SLOC defense or be additive to offensive naval fires. According to Lt. Gen. Rudder: “If we look forward in the not-too-distant future, we’ll have the ability to have land-based long-range fires, aviation fires, and persistent high endurance ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) with the MQ-9. We’ll be able to move those capabilities with KC-130s, MV-22s, or amphibious lift allowing us to project long-range fires forward anywhere in Asia, much like we do with the HIMARS (High-Mobility Artillery Rocket System) today.” “HIMARS fits in the back of a KC-130 allowing rapid mobilization and insertion. We will exercise the same operational tactic with anti-ship capability. We want to project sea denial capabilities to cut off a strait of our choosing or maneuver into positions to create our own maritime chokepoint. “As we saw with hunting mobile missiles in the past, having long-range fires on maneuvering platforms makes them really hard to hit. As we distribute our long-range fires on mobile platforms, we now become a hard platform to find. Our desire is to create our own anti-access and area denial capability. “For the last several years, we were thinking about the adversary’s missiles, and how they could be used to deny us access to forward locations. Now we want to be the sea denial force that is pointed in the other direction. Land based fires are perfectly suited to support naval maneuver.” “We want rapidly to move by air or sea, deliver sea denial capabilities onto land, maneuver to position of advantage, deliver fires, maneuver for another shot, or egress by air or sea. We are training current forces on concepts for sea denial missions supported by maneuver of long-range fires. This is a key element of the naval integration.” With a growing capability of joint sensor networks, the potential for more effective joint targeting is a reality. As the joint force focuses on dynamic targeting, services are closely coordinating fires networks and authorities. The advantage of land based expeditionary fires is that they provide persistence cover within an established air and surface targeting solution. This is how Lt. Gen. Rudder characterized how he saw the way ahead. “We are completely integrated with naval maneuver and working hand and hand with the joint force. I MEF and III MEF have been operating seamlessly as three-star naval task forces astride Seventh and Third Fleets. “During crises, I become the deputy JFMCC (Joint Force Maritime Component Commander) to the Pacific Fleet Commander. The MARFORPAC staff integrates with the PacFleet staff. Even during day-to-day operations, we have Marines at PacFleet planning and integrating across multiple domains. Should we ramp up towards crisis or conflict, we will reinforce our JFMCC contribution to ensure we remain fully prepared for all-domain naval force execution.This means that our anti-ship missiles will integrate into naval maneuver. “We also aggressively pursue PACAF integration for bomber, fighter, and 5th Generation support. Daily, our F-35s are integrated into the PACAF AOC (Air Operations Center). We are focused on better integration to insure we have a common operating picture for an integrated firing solution.” The USMC F-35s play a key role in all of this. Although there is a clear focus on enhanced integration with the U.S. Navy, the integration with the USAF is crucial for both the U.S. Navy and the USMC. Lt. Gen. Rudder highlighted the role which USMC F-35s play in Pacific defense and force integration. “We count on pulling fifth-gen capability forward in time of crisis. We are committed to having forward deployed F-35s conducting integrated training on a regular basis with our PACAF counterparts. “We will also conduct integrated training with our Korean, Japanese, Singaporean and Australian partners. We are also training with aircraft carriers when they operate in the region. Notably, the USS Carl Vinson, the first U.S. Navy F-35C variant carrier.” “And the F-35B has caught the operational attention of the rest of the world. The United Kingdom’s HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH is the largest fifth-generation fighter deployment ever conducted on an aircraft carrier. We are proud to be a part of that UK deployment, with a Marine F-35B squadron, VMFA-211, embarked and operating with our British partners. They are currently doing combined operations in the Western Pacific. “We are excited to see the Italians operating F-35s off the ITS CAVOUR, and we hope by the fall of this year that we’ll be landing an F-35B on the Japan Ship IZUMO, as the Japanese look ahead to the purchase of F-35Bs. The South Koreans are considering going down a similar path, with Singapore also adding F-35s to their inventory.” “Aside from shipboard operations, the F-35B can do distributed operations like no other combat aircraft. We can go into a variety of airfields which may not be accessible by other fighter aircraft, reload and refuel, and take back off again, making the both aircraft and the airfields more survivable.” The Marines are the only combat force that tactically combine fifth generation with tiltrotor capabilities. This combined capability is crucial for operations in an area characterized by tyranny of distance. The MV-22 Ospreys can also carry a wide variety of payloads that can encompass the C2 and ISR revolutions underway. And if you are focused on flexible basing, the combination of the two aircraft provides possibilities which no other force in the world currently possess. But shortfalls in the numbers of aircraft forward create challenges to unleash their full potential for enabling the Marines as a crisis management force and enhance the Marine Corps contribution to the joint force. The nature of distributed operations in the Pacific demands long range aircraft like the MV-22 to sustain the force. The amphibious operating capability of the USMC becomes more significant as flexible basing and the enhanced capabilities which a family of amphibious ships could bring to the force. This is how Lt. Gen. Rudder put it: “We can reconfigure our amphibious ships to take on many different assault functions. I think when people talk about amphibious assault, they have singular visions of near-beach operations. Instead, we need to think of our amphibious capability from the standpoint of our ability to maneuver from range. “Rather than focusing on the 3,000 or 5,000-meter closure from ship to shore, I think about the 600, 700, 1,000-mile closure, with amphibs able to distribute and put people in place or to conduct resupply once you’re there. Amphibious lift, with its ability to bring its own connectors for logistics support, is increasingly significant for the operational force. “In addition, we have to make sure that we’re able to close the force when lethal and non-lethal shaping has done its course. At some point, you’re going to need to seize and defend land. We have two ways to tactically accomplish this mission, either by air or by surface assault. There’s no other way to get forces ashore unless you secure a port that has the space to offload and a road network to move ashore. Open port options are highly unlikely during crisis, thus amphibious lift is increasingly becoming more valuable for maneuvering forces in the maritime domain.” The Marines are launching a new capability in the next couple of years, the Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR). According to the MARFORPAC commander: “We are working towards initial operating capability (IOC) of the MLR in 2023. We want to demonstrate the maneuverability of the MLR as well as the capabilities it can bring to naval operations. “Near term, we will work to exercise new capabilities in the region, such as loading the NMESIS (Navy/Marine Corps Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System) system on the KC-130s or LCAC for integrated operations with F-35s, MQ-9s, and other maritime targeting capabilities.” In short, the USMC is in transition in the Pacific, and working towards greater interoperability with the joint force, notably, the U.S. Navy and the USAF. For my assessment of the evolution of the USMC in the Pacific over the past few years, with a significant number of interviews from the MARFORPAC staff as well, see my new book on USMC transformation which has been published on March 31, 2022. Link to article: Shaping a Way Ahead for the Networked Integrated Force: The Perspective of MARFORPAC (Defense.info)