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Dr Robbin Laird 20 April 2022 The Italian Air Force is part of the broader European defense transition in which the shift from the land wars to direct European defense is underway. The Italians have not only bought two variants of the F-35 but build the aircraft in Italy as well as delivering aircraft from their factory to the Netherlands. The IAF and the Italian Navy both operate F-35s with the challenge still being working integration between both services as well. The Italian Navy trained last year off the East Coast of the United States and did initial exercises between the ITS Cavour and the USS Gerald R. Ford. In addition, Italy flies the Eurofighter as a key combat aircraft and has worked integratability between the Eurofighter and the F-35 as well as having spearheaded enhanced integration of Eurofighters within Europe itself. Lieutenant General Aurelio Colagrande, Italian Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff, started his presentation to the Williams Foundation seminar by underscoring that although Italy and Australia are geographically far apart, their work on airpower modernization is not. This is how he put it: “Even though we are on the opposite sides of the world, therefore apparently very far away and with a different viewpoint on space and time, in the operational environment, Australia and Italy are closer and similar than ever before. We fly some similar aircraft, like the C-27 and the F-35. We’ve been in the same coalition in Iraq and in Afghanistan. “The entire world is changing faster and faster so that a regional issue now become immediately part of the geopolitical landscape…. From a global perspective, we act in the same realm. As air forces, we operate in a domain strongly dependent on technology in order to deliver air power rapidly and everywhere.” I have spent a great deal of time with Italian Air Force when they were first procuring the F-35 and the head of the Italian Air Force at the time, highlighted how acquiring of the F-35 would drive significant cultural change in the IAF, an argument very similar to what Air Marshal Brown was making at the same time in Australia. This is how Lt. General Preziosa put it in a 2015 interview with me: “The F-22 and the F-35 are called fifth generation aircraft, but really the F-35 is the first airplane built for the digital age, we are rapidly moving from the dog-fight concept to the data-fight evolution of the broad utilization of air power. It was conceived in and for that age, and is built around the decision tools in the cockpit and is in fact a “flying brain.” And that makes it different from other aircraft. It is a multi-tasking aircraft, and fits well into the I-phone age. Other aircraft – with the exception of the F-22 – are built to maximize out as multi-mission aircraft, which execute tasks sequentially and directed to do so. “The F-35 fleet thinks and hunts and can move around the mission set as pilots operate in the battlespace and leverage the data fusion system. It is a battlespace dominance aircraft; not a classic air superiority, air defense or ground attack aircraft. It changes the classic distinctions; confuses them and defines a whole new way to look at a combat aircraft, one built for the joint force age as well. The Army and the Navy will discover, as the F-35 fleet becomes a reality, how significant the F-35 is for their combat efforts.” In his remarks to the Williams Foundation seminar, Lieutenant General Colagrande provided an update on this perspective based on the experience of the past several years of the IAF and the F-35. “We immediately felt the need to generate a national plan to evolve with the entire organization in a fifth-generation Italian air force, where consolidated competence, new scales, different mindset, modern airmen are all vital ingredients to effectively perform an entire set of new capabilities together with legacy system. “In this air force evolutional journey, we face new challenges that we are trying to manage with new and innovative solutions, finding new partners and associates. Of course, we are just at the beginning of our trip, but the initial outcomes are definitely reassuring, and the quality of our approach seems just right.” He argued that the challenge facing an operational air force is to be able to “plug and fight” with the systems they have. As he noted: “New capabilities have never been ‘plug and fight’. It is difficult to gain rapid full operational advantage from a multitude of new capabilities because to fully exploit them, it is necessary to be equipped with greater technical competence as contemporary weapons systems are much more capable than those in the past. “This condition highlights more than ever how the human being is the weakest part of the equation. Since to fully exploit a new weapon system, there is a need for a specific dedicated, progressive training to the end users. To that end, interpretability and collaboration are key elements in order to be effective.” He then went on to discuss a very interesting Eurofighter integration effort which has happened under the radar of public recognition but suggestive of the kind of force integration efforts among allies which are critical to be able to fight more effectively tonight. Lieutenant General Colagrande highlighted this development in the following manner: “Plug and Fight is a name of a successful endeavor that the German Air Force conducted together with our British friends of the Royal Air Force and with us. “Within the NATO and as air policing framework in Europe, the German Air Force, Royal Air Force and Italian Air Force, are now able to operate in a completely mixed Eurofighter squadron, sharing not only aircraft or spare parts, the so-called material component, but also operational, maintenance, logistic procedures, and more important the will to succeed in doing operations together. “This may appear as an easy operation, but it was actually the end state of a very intensive journey started a few years ago with the launch of the European Typhoon Interoperability program. German Air Force, Royal Air Force and Italian Air Force worked out to put in place technical arrangements, to write handbooks for flying ops, ground ops, spare parts management, and maintenance, and so on. “We needed to train on a regular basis to stay proficient in performing the mission. Indeed, thanks to this initiative, at the beginning of March this year, the German Air Force and Italian Air Forces have successfully supported together a real air policing operation in Romania. And we will probably do the same in the next month with our UK friends.” This Eurofighter interoperability effort has been and is indeed a major challenge. But doing so can obviously deliver more significant coalition capability rathe rather than simply having nations operating the “same” aircraft but actually not being able to integrate those aircraft into a cohesive combat capability. I first visited the European Air Group based at High Wycombe in 2014 and the focus of that first meeting was on 4th-5th generation integration. I went back over the next few years, and saw how his coalition building group was broadening their efforts to include meeting the challenge of Eurofighter integration. The European Typhoon interoperability program to which Colagrande referred is indeed the EAG program. During a 2016 visit to the EAG we discussed the European Typhoon interoperability effort being led by the EAG. This was what I wrote at the time about the effort: “The session was led by Brigadier General de Ponti, Deputy Director, of the European Air Group and joined by the “drivers” of the ETIP (Euro Typhoon Interoperability Project) as well as organizers of exercise efforts to shape a new approach, namely Lt. Col. Jacobo Lecube of the Spanish Air Force and Lt Col. Marco Schiattioni from the Italian Air Force and Chief of Staff Col. Stephane Pierre, of the Belgian Air Force. “The overall focus of the effort is upon shaping a more common fleet approach among Eurofighter nations. Although four nations came together to build a common airplane, the planes have been used by four different air forces with limited overlap in standards and operating practices. As the Euro-Typhoon is clearly a key element for the future of European airpower and with the coming of the F-35 to Europe, this makes little sense. And what the European Air Group is focused upon are practical ways to shape more common fleet approaches among the air forces, which fly Euro-Typhoon. Also, shaping a common template in doing Baltic air policing in which Eurofighter/Typhoons are becoming a frequent asset in executing the mission provides an obvious opportunity to find ways to shape common procedures and support approaches as well. The problem was simply put by one of the participants: “When an Italian Eurofighter lands on a German base, it cannot use the ground support equipment or change a tire, because the standards are different. These are procedural issues, which may make sense in terms of national norms but not in terms of common fleet operations. Through this project we seek to end differences which get in the way of common operational support.” According to BG de Ponti: “The Eurofighter-Typhoon project is an important effort for our air forces. It is about the co-evolution of Typhoon with the shaping of a 4th-5th generation integrated force. It is two prongs of shaping more effective European airpower. It is a building blocks approach to shaping evolving capabilities.” Such an effort is what force integration among allies requires. But the better outcome is to shape common approaches at the outset of building new platforms and doing so with common C2 and ISR connectivity as well, if indeed the integrated networked force is to have its full impact on warfighting and deterrence. Lieutenant General Colagrande underscored the importance of being to leverage new capabilities throughout the combat force and this required significant emphasis on training and innovation in force operations as well. This is how he characterized how the Italian Air Force is addressing this challenge: “We soon initiated an operational testing and evaluation process that now includes both the A and B variant for novel interoperability. We participated with the F-35 air policing in Iceland. We proved our air power expeditionary concept together with our Italian Navy and the British ones. We launched a very challenging operational training infrastructure program in Sardinia, an Italian island in the Mediterranean Sea where we have lot of airspace, air to air, air to ground, EW and lots of test ranges and good weather throughout the year. “Furthermore, in Sardinia, we are setting up our international flight training school where we will train in the phase four advanced training, our future fifth generation pilots. Within the OTI framework, we are investing in connectivity network in order to offer a real effective advanced training. “And through it, we intend to achieve one of the most challenging objectives, the integration between legacy and new generation weapon system for exploiting the main operational output of the fifth-generation assets that we believe is the ability to be task enablers and force multipliers. “And we also conducted a pure fifth generation event, the Falcon Strike 2021. The first major European exercise for fifth generation aircraft, but not just with them, but for them, in a highly contested and congested scenario, a multinational coalition from United States Air Force, United States Marine Corps, Royal Air Force, Royal Navy, Israeli and Italian Air Force F-35s participated with the exercise. “Focusing on fifth generation requirements, testing new sea-basing approaches to air operation, exploring new fifth generation rules of engagement that allow a high level of delegation of decision-making to the lowest possible level, the cockpit. All small steps of course, but all pieces of an overall increased level of performance for the entire air force.” He highlighted the cooperation in the UK-led Tempest program as one element of the way ahead for the Italian Air Force as well. “The next generation fighter will not be just a simple aircraft. It will be a system of systems with very strong and secure connectivity. It must be conceived through an open system architecture to accommodate the required agility, the future technological developments and better compensate for any changes or updates to the operational requirements.” He provided a significant cautionary note as well in his presentation. The cutbacks in defense in Europe have been significant and have left Europe more vulnerable than is prudent. “The Italian Air Force has witnessed a significant reduction in aircraft numbers over the past decades. We developed the idea that greater quality may compensate for less quantity, but quality cannot substitute quantity. Technological quality advantage allows us to achieve the superiority in the operating area of a permissive scenario. “But such an approach is not an applicable paradigm in the military comparison with a peer-to-peer or near-to-peer competitor who accounts for hundreds of military assets, or when simultaneous commitments or more than one operation operate far away from each other. “In other words, mass still has its importance as we are learning by the last updates coming from the east European flank. Going back to quality versus quantity concept, we should think about the fact that quantity is by itself a quality. “The technological trap mechanism even more obvious when it comes to weaponry. State of the art weapons are so expensive to develop, acquire, and in many cases, integrate, that you end up buying too few of them, depleting the stockpile below a minimum acceptable level, thus creating a serious gap when it comes to operations. Once again, it is evident that mass enables either by a lower technological level or with new industrial or commercial solutions for greater combat capability.” Lieutenant General Aurelio Colagrande, Italian Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Aurelio Colagrande was born in L’Aquila on 8 October 1962. He attended the Air Force Academy from 1981 to 1985 and graduated as military pilot in 1986 at the European NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training (ENJJPT) in Sheppard AFB – TX, USA. In 1987, Lt Gen COLAGRANDE was assigned to the 2nd Wing in Treviso and in 1989 was moved to the 51st Wing in Istrana where he was appointed as OPS Chief and later on as 103rd Squadron Commander. Between 1995 and 1999, he flew several flying sorties over the Balkan Airspace collecting more than 70 flight hours. In July 2000, he was appointed to the Logistic Department of the Italian Air Staff in Rome and later, in 2002, moved to the Joint Strike Fighter Program Office in Washington DC (USA), as Italian National Representative. From July 2006 until September 2007, he was back to the Logistic Department of the Italian Air Staff as Head of C4 ISTAR Branch and Chairman of the Italian JSF WG. From 2007 to 2009, he was appointed as 6th Wing Commander in Ghedi, after this assignment he returned to Rome, at the Secretariat General of Defence and National Armaments Directorate as Chief of the Aeronautical Programs Office. From 2011 to 2013 he was appointed as the 46th Air Brigade Commander in Pisa, following this period he was assigned to the Air Operational Command in Rome as Deputy Chief of Staff, assuming later on the Chief position until March 2019. From 20 March 2019 to 11 January 2022, he was the Commander of the Air Education and Training Command. As of 12 January 2022, Lt.Gen. Colagrande is the Italian Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff. Lt.Gen. Colagrande has a University Degree in Aeronautical Sciences and a Master in International Studies. Link to article: Shaping a Way Ahead for the Networked Integrated Force: An Italian Air Force Perspective (Defense.info)

Dr Robbin Laird 19 April 2022 In his presentation to the Williams Foundation seminar held on March 24, 2022 which focused on “accelerating the transition to a networked integrated force”, Air Chief Marshal Sir Mike Wigston presented the perspective of the RAF on the challenge. The last time an RAF Chief of Staff spoke at a Williams Foundation Seminar was in March 2018. Air Chief Marshal Sir Stephen Hillier, then Chief of Staff of the RAF, addressed the Williams Foundation Seminar on the shift from the land wars to high intensity conflict. At that seminar, this is how Hillier highlighted the challenge: “You asked me to speak about high-intensity warfare in Europe. Perhaps I’ve not really provided that much of that specific geographical context. But then as I said right at the start, I don’t believe that what I’ve described can be bracketed within a particular geography. The challenges I’ve described are truly global and truly common to us all. I believe that airpower’s inherent characteristics and capabilities make it especially able to respond effectively to those challenges.” A clear driver of the shift is that airpower advantage will have to be fought for and not assumed. And his way ahead focused very much on leveraging what new platforms we are acquiring but to build out from them to shape new ways ahead to regain strategic advantage. “But the asymmetric advantage airpower has given us for the last three decades at least, is narrowing. The integration into our air forces of fifth generation capabilities such as the F-35 Lighting will only redress the delta to a degree. Of equal importance in maintaining our combat edge is this ability to manage vast amounts of information, and make decisions more quickly and more accurately. Technological developments will be a key element in ensuring that the lever of the best possible output from our air and space platforms, but our C2 structures, processes, and approach to information sharing will be a decisive factor.” What Hillier discussed throughout his 2018 presentation in Australia was the presaging of what would be introduced in 2020 as the new integrated operating concept for the UK forces. That operating concept which is rooted in the kill web approach was officially launched in the Fall of 2020. Chief of Defence Staff, General Sir Nick Carter, at the 2020 version of the annual Royal United Services Institute address by Chief of Defence Staff, highlighted the launch of the new strategy. “What should be our response to this ever more complex and dynamic strategic context? My view is that more of the same will not be enough. We must fundamentally change our thinking if we are not to be overwhelmed. Hence, we are launching this Integrated Operating Concept. “We cannot afford any longer to operate in silos—we have to be integrated: with allies as I have described, across Government, as a national enterprise, but particularly across the military instrument. Effective integration of maritime, land, air, space and cyber achieves a multi-domain effect that adds up to far more than simply the sum of the parts, recognizing—to paraphrase Omar Bradley—that the overall effect is only as powerful as the strength of the weakest domain.” Since Hillier last spoke, the UK has faced the challenges of Brexit, Covid-19, has introduced the new carriers as operational realities, and has operated the new carrier outside of the European area of operations. The RAF and Royal Navy have also begun the F-35 era, and the UK government has launched the Tempest next generation airpower program as well. And as the current Chief of Staff of the RAF spoke at the Williams Foundation, Europe was experiencing its first major war in a very long time. And Air Chief Marshal Sir Mike Wigston was speaking after the UK government had committed itself to increased defense spending and the launching of the new Integrated Operating Concept. In other words, the UK faces a number of challenges which certainly require better force integration within the UK forces and with allies, simply to get the scale, and depth necessary for UK direct defense, let alone contributing to wider allied considerations. How does Wigston see this getting accomplished? This is how he framed the challenges: “One year ago, the UK government published the Integrated Review of Security, Defense Development And Foreign Policy. It was a significant statement of Britain’s place in the world and the role of the UK Armed Forces in that. Last April, before the ink was even dry, Russia first threatened military action against Kyiv. It was a chilling foretaste of what we are now seeing unfolding there. The outrageous, unprovoked, and unjustified invasion of a sovereign country in Europe, thousands of deaths, and the displacement of over 10 million Ukrainian citizens, something we thought we had consigned to history.” He then argued that the Integrated Review had highlighted three key themes which current events simply reinforced as key challenges. “Firstly, the recognition that it’s an uncertain and increasingly dangerous world. We face fast evolving threats to our nation’s and our allies. “Secondly, in this era of strategic competition, the UK must be prepared and able to act globally as a problem solving, burden sharing nation, amplifying our effect through deeper relationships and partnerships. “And thirdly, with the equivalent of a 42 billion Australian uplift in defense funding over the four years from 2021, that the UK government could not be clearer in its view of the integral role of the UK Arm Forces in protecting and projecting the United Kingdom around the world.” “The Integrated Review confirmed the need for the UK to be able to deter and defend against state-based opponents, to strengthen our technological and scientific base and to continue the modernization of every aspect of our armed forces. And it also looked at broader aspects of security too, including climate change, population pressures, and resource competition.” But with the Covid-19 impact, it will be challenging for the UK or any major liberal democracy to establish sustained defense spending, so what then are the priorities to be focused upon with investments, and force design going forward? “My chief of defense staff has made his priorities, and of course they’re now my priorities, very clear. Firstly, that everyone must be absolutely focused on playing their part in turning the ambition of the Integrated Review into reality. “Second, it’s around transforming, reforming, and integrating effectively. “Third, it’s about having formations, units, platforms, systems, and people that are more deployable and deployed more, at home and abroad. “Fourth is the need to be more lethal. And to be more lethal, it’s absolutely essential that we are more innovative. “And fifth, and probably the most important, is our people, our culture, and the diversity of our workforce in every sense of the word. And threading through all of those is that critical need for multi domain integration across the maritime land air space and cyberspace domains. To achieve that nirvana of multi domain integration, we must integrate across defense by design, and we must integrate by instinct.” Wigston then highlighted how such an approach affected the RAF. “To continue to protect the UK and our allies in this threat laced world, the Royal Air Force must be ready to understand, decide, and then act faster, with even greater precision, lethality and in more places around the world simultaneously than we do today. And we’ve got to do it sustainably too, both in terms of resource and the environment Above all, it will require the Royal Air Force to integrate ever more closely with our Royal Navy, Army and Strategic Command, the Ministry of Defense, other government departments and our international partners. “Success demands, swift, joint, fully integrated action across all war fighting domains, land,, sea, air, space and cyber. Our aircraft, spacecraft and systems must integrate seamlessly to allow the transfer and exploitation of information, rapid decision making and timely delivery of effects.” In his presentation, he highlighted the way ahead as envisaged by the UK with regard to the airpower piece of shaping the evolving networked and integrated force. This is the team tempest or future combat air system approach. And this is Wigston described it: “The Future Combat Air System is such a critical development program for the nation, because we need to start work now on what will replace Typhoon from the late 2030s and why we are investing three and a half billion Australian over the next four years alongside our international partners like Italy. We’re taking a revolutionary approach, looking at a game changing mix of swarming drones and mixed formations of un-crewed combat aircraft, as well as next generation piloted aircraft like Tempest. Our uncured combat aircraft, Mosquito, is already taking shape in Belfast and our experimental swarming drone, Arvena, has already exceeded expectations on operational trials. This isn’t the stuff of a distant sci-fi future. We’re aiming for Mosquito and Arvena derivatives to be fielded operationally this decade, transforming the combat battle space in a way not seen since the advent of the Jet Age.” The integration piece for the RAF evolves on two levels, the UK national force and its ability to work more effectively with allies in coalition operations. And he describes the latter in the following terms: “We must place a premium on being allied by design, through building alliances and improving interoperability. And it means that we have to be integrated with allies across government as a national enterprise, and particularly across all the instruments of our military power. Our multi-domain effects have to add up to more than the sum of the parts. ‘In that regard, I can’t think of a better example of multi-domain integration than the UK carrier strike group that deployed last year through the Indo-Pacific region, as far as Japan. It brought to life, the deeper UK focus on the Indo-Pacific, a region the Integrated Review identified as critical to our economy, our security, and our global ambition to support an open and resilient international order. “At the heart of that carrier strike group, of course, is our ability to operate fifth generation combat aircraft from the sea. Lightning is a phenomenal war fighting machine, from land or sea. And last year 617 Squadron Royal Air Force and VMFA-211 from the US Marine Corps demonstrated that enormous utility from the Royal Navy’s HMS Queen Elizabeth.” “We must train our personnel to work together through integrated exercises with government partners and allies. As we develop our military plans and processes, we must ensure that they’re integrated by design rather than working with partners ad hoc at the point of need. Our modernization from an Industrial Age of platforms to an Information Age of systems has to be enabled at every level by a digital backbone, into which all sensors, effectors and deciders are connected.” Frankly speaking, this is very hard to do. I have spent a great deal of time over the past decade on ships, land bases in the UK and in the United States watching how the UK and the USMC and U.S. Navy have worked the integration which the RAF chief underscored with regard to the ability of the UK carriers to work with the United States. This was a deliberate effort which has been very challenging to do and, frankly, not widely noticed in the broader political or strategic world. If such efforts are to be prioritized, ensuring that they get the kind of strategic and funding support will be crucial. And the significant investment in the land wars is a significant investment cost which is not easily carried forward in such an effort. And getting governments on the same page with regard to rapid decision making is its own challenge, but equally important as shaping the joint operational approach so well laid out by the RAF Chief of Staff. Indeed, Wigston highlighted the hinge between the military and the civil authorities which is crisis management. “Air and space power gives our government the ability to act or signal strategically worldwide, at range, at speed, precisely with minimal physical and political risk and maximum political choice. We play a decisive role protecting and defending the United Kingdom and our allies 24/7 today. But as chief of the air staff, it also falls to me to design and start to build the force my successors will have to fight with and win within 10-, 20- or 30-years’ time. “The Royal air force must be ready to operate in that complex operating environment of the future. Above all, we must be able to defend the UK and our allies in the face of those sophisticated new air and missile threats.” It really is decision superiority that force integration is about. How to operate with maximum effect throughout the extended battlespace but with not just military but civil decision making capable of resolving crises. And that is a major challenge facing our democracies. Air Chief Marshal Sir Mike Wigston KCB, CBE, ADC Chief of the Air Staff Air Chief Marshal Mike Wigston CBE ADC is the Chief of the Air Staff, in command of the Royal Air Force, leading a Whole Force of some 35,000 Regular and Reserve personnel, and 5,000 Civil Servants, supported by thousands of contractors. Commissioned on a University Cadetship in 1986, he completed his pilot training on the Tornado GR1 in 1992 followed by a succession of frontline tours, including operational deployments enforcing the no-fly zones in Iraq. He commanded 12(Bomber) Squadron, flying the Tornado GR4 and leading the Squadron on two operational tours in Iraq and large force exercises in Canada, Malaysia and the USA. Appointments in operational headquarters have included Al Udeid Airbase, Qatar, as the Chief of Combat Operations in the Combined Air and Space Operations Centre; Basrah International Airport, Iraq as Commander 903 Expeditionary Air Wing; and one year in Afghanistan as the Director Air Operations in Headquarters ISAF Joint Command. He was appointed CBE in 2013 for his contribution to that mission. Staff appointments in the Ministry of Defence have included the Operations Directorate and the predecessor to what is now Military Strategic Effects. In 2013, after a short spell as the Tornado Force Commander, he became the Principal Staff Officer to the Chief of Defence Staff. In January 2015, he was appointed Administrator of the Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia and Commander British Forces Cyprus, responsible for the civil governance of the Sovereign Base Areas and command of British forces based permanently in Cyprus. Senior Royal Air Force appointments have included Assistant Chief of the Air Staff, responsible for the strategic coherence and coordination of the Royal Air Force, and oversight of the RAF100 centenary programme. Prior to becoming Chief of the Air Staff, he was Deputy Commander Capability, responsible for the strategic planning and delivery of all aspects of Royal Air Force capability including people, equipment, infrastructure and training. Education and training includes reading Engineering Science at Oriel College, Oxford; the Advanced Command and Staff Course; an MA in Defence Studies from King’s College London; the Higher Command and Staff Course; and the UK Pinnacle Course. He is a Vice Patron of the Royal Air Force Charitable Trust and President of the Royal Air Force Rowing Association. Author’s Note: Ed Timperlake and I discuss the UK Integrated Operating Concept in the context of the kill web approach in our forthcoming book, A Maritime Kill Web Force in the Making: Deterrence and Warfighting in the XXIst Century. Link to article: Shaping a Way Ahead for the Networked Integrated Force: A Royal Air Force Perspective (Defense.info)

In this instalment of #FutureChiefs, Keirin Joyce (@keirinjoyce) questions if AI could fill the role of CAF - or is a hybrid affair the best way forward? Could the future Chief of Air Force be a computer? Probably not. War is a human affair after all. But could we say “Any Aviator, paired with the Chief’s computer”? The role of the RAAF is to generate first class Air and Space Power. To do this requires two activities; Raise, Train and Sustain (RTS) (fixed wing) air and space capabilities, and run their capability life cycle (CLC). This is achieved successively by Air Force 2-stars. Subsequently , the requirements for the Chief can be derived as follows: They must lead RTS and CLC activities, as well as be the Defence Aviation Authority (DAA). In addition, the Chief must lead the Air Force Board (AFB), perform representative and ceremonial functions, and front Government as the face of Air Force (as seen by most in the regular appearances at Senate Estimates hearings). This leads to the next key question: What experience does CAF need to do those things? They must intrinsically understand airworthiness, have the ability to lead, mediate and guide the 2-stars, be a good public speaker, not bad at drill, and have an elephantine memory in order to answer questions on notice about anything and everything Air Force. However, it’s easy to see that no one meets the memory requirement; that’s why CAF takes a stack of massive flagged binders into Senate Estimates. So, remove this, and you have our Air and Space Power Leader. Do any of these attributes require someone performing the role of CAF to be a pilot? That’s an easy no! As Air Force moves toward greater non-piloted air and space power applications, the requirement for a pilot to lead Air Force diminishes further. One simply needs to consider the growth in uncrewed (and autonomous) aviation, space, cyber, integrated air and missile defence and air-basing. It is very simple math that there is a time in the not too distant future when piloted aircraft effects will be outweighed by the rest of air and space power capability. So what will make the best #FutureChief of Air Force? One kick-ass computer that supplements the memory requirement, that knows every rule, regulation, fact, figure and story of the Air Force; an artificial intelligence device that can crunch the data to meet the goal of true concept led force design. Pair that computer with someone with airworthiness (spaceworthiness?) experience, who is well spoken, okay(ish) at drill, and a competent LEADER. And that could be any Aviator! Wing Commander Keirin Joyce, CSC is an Air Force officer who has been supporting UAS technology development within the ADF for the last 15+ years. More information on this #FutureChiefs series can be found here.

Building a capacity for junior leaders to ask deep questions and possess a greater integrated view of Air Force specialisations is central to Isaac Stephenson’s argument about improvements to the Officer Training School (OTS) regime. In this piece, he offers several actionable recommendations for improvement to the initial training framework for Air Force Officers, including opening the aperture in timing and curriculum to empower Junior Officers with a greater understanding of the why behind their mission. In Stephenson’s mind, such adjustments would better position the RAAF for the future. 2022 is my fifth year of service in the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) and consequently I am due for my time-based promotion to Flight Lieutenant. I am yet to complete the required course for this promotion and so I thought I’d reflect on my initial experience as an Air Force Junior Officer. As an eager twenty-year-old with a keen interest in all things military, I couldn’t wait for my moment to engage in discussions about doctrine, strategy and military history. However, due to the compressed time period granted to Officer Training School (OTS) I found all these topics had to be left by the wayside. I would like to use this article to start a discussion around improving RAAF initial military training. I propose three big changes which I believe can set the RAAF’s officer core up for future success and enhance tactical and strategic thinking. Step One. Introduce and encourage open discussion on doctrine, history and strategy to every specialisation to build awareness of how every role in the RAAF contributes to a wider military strategy from Officer Training School. History is the foundation of who we are today. Understanding military history and the origins of military doctrine is the cornerstone of today’s Royal Australian Air Force. It’s the platform to learn from past mistakes and advance military tactics so the Air Force’s Officer Corps is well equipped to contribute effectively at every level. It also introduces respect and understanding between different roles and functions of the RAAF. YouTube Channels such as one named Military History Visualized that broadly document various case studies can be used to teach the importance of a whole-of-team approach to military strategy. In one particular case study Military History Visualized looks at the relationship between logisticians and engineers and the United States and German Air Force’s in conflict. In this video “Logistics of the German Air Force in World War 2,” a few examples of Luftwaffe logistics and doctrine are compared to that of the United States Army Air Corp in the Second World War. The key lesson I drew from this case was the understanding in the integration of logistics and aircraft design in military strategy which appears to have been taken into consideration by the United States Army Air Corp and not so by the Luftwaffe. Instead, the Luftwaffe’s doctrine stated “...supply chain management is always servant of operational and tactical leadership and must never become its stumbling block.” (Logistics of the German Air Force in World War 2, time 3:00) Looking at this statement alone, it is clear the Luftwaffe didn’t have an appreciation for the importance of logistics in its culture and decision-making. This demonstrates the dangers of having an Air Force that doesn’t respect the gravity and prominence of including these critical support roles in decision-making and strategy. This way of thinking limited the Luftwaffe severely as the war deteriorated and the supply situation became more limiting and critical. Today, to avoid these pitfalls the RAAF must understand the significance of support roles in developing military strategy. By providing Junior Officers with the context and the history behind why the symbiosis between support and warfighting roles is so essential will assist in cultivating respect and understanding between specialisations from day one. Step Two. A cultural shift must occur to encourage personnel from all specialisations to become instructors at Officer Training School. I found during my initial Officer training, many of my directing staff were from select specialisations, such as; logistics, personnel capability, environmental, ground defence and engineering. Although this offers a strong spread of different musterings and perspectives, there was a distinct lack of aircrew, medical and intelligence representatives, just to name a few. As I continue along my pilot path, I have noticed few aircrew have a desire to instruct at OTS or the Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA). Some factors that contribute to this include; a lack of flying and allowances that follow, perceived hindrance to career progression, a seemingly undesirable location and an overall lack of interest in becoming an instructor at OTS. To generate the cultural shift required, the Air Force could consider offering the following incentives; shorter posting lengths to OTS, a financial bonus to all instructors, a Pay and Conditions Manual update to include Sale as a regional area for regional bonuses, a clear posting plan to a location or position of their choice. Similar to Royal Military College (RMC) Duntroon for Army, OTS or ADFA should be honourable and desirable postings for anyone in the Air Force to contribute to OTS. This in turn will provide greater perspective, inclusion, and understanding across all the various specialisations. I have found in my short career that very few specialisations have an understanding of what other specialisations do and everyone appears to work in their respective roles and not look outside their lane. This can create confusion and misunderstanding of job allocation and responsibility. I hope by incentivising all personnel to teach in our initial training schools we will push to bridge the gap between specialisations from day one. With this experience in OTS, instructors can provide personal insight from their careers and deliver briefs that explain how their specialisation contribute to developing and operationalising the wider Air Force strategy. Furthermore, they can tailor their operational experience to include how other specialisations enabled them to complete their role. This will provide inspiration, context and real world experience to Officer students and provoke discussion. Step Three. Allocate more time and resources to the Officer Training Course. The Royal Air Force and the Royal New Zealand Air Force allocate six months to initial Officer Training courses to develop their Air Force Officers. During these extra two months they add more emphasis on military history and doctrine as well as more time allocated to the current curriculum. I suggest an additional two months for OTS to include extra content tailored to military doctrine, strategy and history. A longer OTS course with a larger cohort will also provide more diversity in specialisations. OTS is the best time in an Officer’s career to have such a wide variety of specialisations working together. Extra time in this environment not only provides time for military content to be taught, it also enables the creation of established relationships and networking that will carry into their careers in the wider Air Force. During my training at OTS, I was told that many of the topics I have previously mentioned would be introduced to me during my initial pilot training. However, I have found that throughout the Pilot Training Continuum (Basic Flying Training School, Advance Flying Training School, P8A Poseidon Operational Conversion), and now a year into being a Co-Pilot on the P8A, there is no time for these subjects to be introduced and taught. Immediately after my conversion, I deployed on OP GATEWAY within the South China Sea. If it wasn’t for my own interest in geo-politics and strategy, I believe I would’ve felt embarrassed to ask the purpose of what we’re doing. By the time I finished my conversation on the P8A, I felt I should’ve already known. I believe we shouldn’t rely on people’s interest in these important military topics, but rather give everyone an introduction from the start. Many people may not continue to engage in the material. Notwithstanding, the Air Force should give Junior Officers the tools to encourage them to ask questions early in their careers. I don’t believe we should wait for professional military education (PME) courses as part of promotion or Staff College to introduce people to these ideas, because by then I feel it is too late. These suggestions will cost the Air Force time, money and resources; however, it has been my experience that for Officer Aviation Candidates at least, there are significant periods of waiting for their respective courses. I have often found that the experience of other colleagues who have gone into the wider Air Force directly after OTS have often felt “undercooked” and their respective Initial Employment Training courses don’t cover the subjects mentioned in this post, the same as my pilot training experience. Likewise, many of my ADFA colleagues found that throughout their ADFA training there were similar shortfalls and therefore these changes will need to be implemented into the ADFA Single Service Training which is primarily conducted at OTS. Furthermore, it will likely take some time to adjust to the scheduling changes, but once it has settled it will become the new norm. Improving our initial Officer training is a pivotal component that will place the Royal Australian Air Force in good stead in defending Australia and our national interests. This begins at Officer Training School. Isaac Stephenson graduated pilots course in November of 2019, on the final CT4/PC9 course and is posted to 11 Squadron as a Co-Pilot on the P8A Poseidon. References: Military History Visualised, “Logistics of the German Air Force in World War 2,” YouTube Video, 4:05, January 15, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZgGXRJg-NNU&ab_channel=MilitaryHistoryVisualized Military History Not Visualised, “Why were Wehrmacht Logistics so Bad?” YouTube Video, 11:23, July 20, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3n0BpQj9jqc&ab_channel=MilitaryHistorynotVisualized Produced by Media Services Royal Air Force College Cranwell, 2017, A Guide To Initial Officer Training https://www.raf.mod.uk/recruitment/media/2337/20170804-iot_course_info_booklet.pdf US Air Force Officer Training School Website https://www.airforce.com/education/military-training/ots/overview David Turnbull, 2021, PME is NOT a Dirty Word! https://airpower.airforce.gov.au/blog/pme-not-dirty-word

The Royal Australian Air Force is the principle air and space force of Australia, and yet each branch exclusively conducts its own air power projection operations. Squadron Leader Stephen Bell leads the #FutureChiefs discussion by considering the possibility that the role of future CAF could be opened to all services as ADF moves further into an increasingly joint approach in building an integrated force. Submissions in this #FutureChiefs series will likely focus on broadening the Chief of Air Force (CAF) position to all Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) officers, not just pilots. However, I propose that if we are to truly embrace the Joint / All-Domain operating concept, then the ‘Head of Air & Space Power’ should not be limited to a subset of the Air & Space workforce who wear blue. To consider the requirements for future CAFs, it is important to understand what the role of the Service is within Defence and therefore what functions the CAF performs. The recently released Australian Military Power doctrine defines the role of the RAAF as the generation of Australia’s Air and Space Power. To lead the RAAF in this role, CAF has three primary responsibilities: raise, train and sustain (RTS) Australian Air (fixed wing) and Space military capabilities; be the ADF capability lead in the Air and Space Domains; and act as the Defence Aviation Authority. Being able to lead, and advise government, across these responsibilities with credibility and legal defensibility is fundamental to any choice for future CAFs. Underpinning credibility and defensibility is relevant experience in the Air and Space Domains, including in operations, sustainment and administration. However, that experience is not exclusive to the aviators of the Royal Australian Air Force. Army Aviation Command and the Fleet Air Arm also produce Air Power specialists with a variety of experience that could meet all the responsibilities of CAF and bring diversity to Australia’s Air Power senior leadership. Fundamentally, this question is about ‘what is the role of the single services’. The logical conclusion from recent doctrinal and policy changes is that the mission of the Services is to be domain leads. Therefore, there is no reason a future CAF couldn’t be a Lieutenant General (LTGEN) or Vice Admiral (VADM) as fixed wing RTS remains blue through the RAAF Air Commander. Extrapolating this further, if the RAAF is doctrinally the Air & Space domain lead, then why doesn’t it own Army Aviation Command and the Fleet Air Arm, further justifying a tri-service CAF. But that’s another debate entirely… Squadron Leader Stephen Bell is an Officer in the Royal Australian Air Force. An Aerospace Engineer by qualification, he has held a variety of Joint, Capability and Operations experience including flying squadrons; capability project & sustainment offices; and headquarters experience at the operational and strategic levels. He has also gained exposure through operational deployments both domestically and overseas. He's on Twitter at @Wigles5 More information on this #FutureChiefs series can be found here.

Chris McInnes takes a look at Flying Camelot: the F-15, the F-16, and the Weaponization of the Fighter Pilot Nostalgia by Michael W. Hankins. McInnes is quick to highlight that this book is about so much more than the platforms on the cover, exploring fighter pilots, aircraft, and the broader culture. In particular, Dr. Hankin takes a look at John Boyd and his followers’ contribution to the development of fighter aircraft. Using additional analytical layers of historiography Dr. Hankin challenges ideological views of Boyd and shines a light on the failings, as well as successes, of Boyd’s contributions. McInnes’ comprehensive review will not only show why this air power historical book is worth your time, but excite you to getting your very own copy. Dr Michael Hankins, the curator of United States Air Force (USAF) history at the Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum, has produced an insightful, engaging, and highly accessible account of how a small group of people with a particular worldview sought to influence American military development in the post-Vietnam era. I highly encourage readers of The Central Blue to join Dr Hankins’ 200-page guided tour through the machinations of the United States (US) military-industrial-congressional complex, and to reflect on the insights for those working in analogous Australian environments. But fair warning: this is not a book about the F-15, the F-16, and fighter pilots despite the title. Instead, Dr Hankins has produced a well-researched and argued analysis of the ideas and influence of John Boyd and his acolytes in, firstly, the Fighter Mafia in the USAF and, latterly, the Reform Movement across the wider US military establishment. I can see where the title came from (although I speculate that it might not have been the author’s first choice). Boyd was a fighter pilot, his experiences as such profoundly influenced his ideas and approach (for good and ill), and he took some stereotypical ‘knights of the sky’ fighter pilot cultural characteristics to extremes. He and his worldview played a role in the design and development of the F-15 and F-16 fighter aircraft. All of this is in the book, but there is much more to Dr Hankins’ analysis than fighter pilots and fighter aircraft - and it is the better for it. The fighter pilot cultural aspects, which Dr Hankins describes in some depth in the opening chapters, are used as a sort of ‘golden thread’ throughout the book tying everything to a central theme. The YF-16 prototype - the Flying Camelot of the title - is held up as the purest expression of Boyd’s knights of the sky vision. For me, the fighter pilot nostalgia arguments were not sufficiently compelling to be the central theme and the ‘golden thread’ seemed increasingly inelegant and forced as the book moved beyond fighters to broader issues. There are stereotypical fighter pilots and Boyd did, in some respects, embody some of those stereotypes. But like all stereotypes, the ‘knights of the sky’ paradigm is narrow and misleading. As Dr Hankins himself argues, Boyd was simply one of many fighter pilots - among many other contributors - involved in the development of the F-15 and the F-16 and each of these people brought their own experience and expertise to the table. Indeed, it is interesting that Boyd's long-term impact on the US military services appears to be roughly inversely proportional to the number of fighter pilots in those services. As the book demonstrates in multiple places, few people are better placed to counter or balance the over-zealous ideas of fighter pilots than other fighter pilots. Nonetheless, Dr Hankins does a terrific job of framing and capturing the originality and impact of Boyd and his followers in the Fighter Mafia and Reform Movement. I have read multiple books on Boyd and his ideas and I found this analysis of the man, his thinking, and his contributions to be well founded and well argued. Unlike some other Boyd scholars, Dr Hankins explores not only what was said by and about Boyd and his ideas, but also who said it and when they said it. Through this additional layer of analysis, Dr Hankins argues that much of the acclaim for Boyd and his ideas, the Fighter Mafia, and the Reform Movement flows from a small group of self-referential people (usually members of the Fighter Mafia or Reform Movement) with a vested interest in advancing ‘Boyd the Messiah’ and his ideas. Dr Hankins is forensic in dissecting the inconsistencies, contradictions, and limitations in the ideas propounded by Boyd and his followers. In many cases, Dr Hankins is careful to show they did make valuable contributions, but these were not as profound, unique, or unorthodox as is often portrayed. For example, Dr Hankins shows that Boyd’s synthesis and articulation of a range of existing works on energy manoeuvrability theory did make a valuable contribution to fighter aircraft development but only in a narrow field, and with the support of others who shared similar views based on existing theories. In other cases, Dr Hankins is less restrained and argues, with solid evidence, that Boyd and his followers were zealots who selectively misused historical examples to further arguments, contradicted themselves to bolster post-event credibility, and behaved in ethically and legally dubious ways. This culminated in the Reformers claiming credit for the US military’s success in the 1990-1991 Gulf War, despite previously arguing against many of the complex technical systems that enabled that success, such as the book’s title fighters. Nonetheless, Dr Hankins is at pains to credit Boyd and his followers with some positive impact on US military reform, such as improving operational test and evaluation. Dr Hankins is particularly effective in illustrating the limitations and narrowness of Boyd’s thinking, from his early work on air combat and energy manoeuvrability through to his later efforts to capture broad patterns in conflict and competition, including the (in?)famous Observe-Orient-Decide-Act Loop. This is important because Boyd’s emphasis on tempo, manoeuvre, and dilemmas as means to cause paralysis and collapse in opponents has influenced Western military thinking, sometimes unhealthily. Frequently referring to the arguments of those refuting Boyd and his followers at the time allows Dr Hankins to deftly show that their thinking was often astrategic, ahistoric, and narrow. Boyd and his collaborators argued for lots of simple, agile combat platforms with a minimum of complex systems like sensors or defensive aids, as opposed to fewer complex platforms. The YF-16 prototype was indeed optimised for daylight dogfighting in accordance with Boyd’s energy manoeuvrability ideas and knights of the sky ethos. But, as the book relates, it is hard to conceive of that airframe or its pilot lasting very long in the cloudy, densely-defended skies of Cold War Europe, or democratically-elected governments condoning the heavy attrition of highly-trained pilots from all-volunteer militaries. Dr Hankins notes the group’s tendency to cherry pick from history to support their arguments, including idolising the German militaries of the first half of the twentieth century. But he misses the biggest critique of this seemingly widespread fascination with these German militaries. They lost. Comprehensively. Twice. Flying Camelot is a good book and well worth your time. Dr Hankins provides extensive notes and a comprehensive bibliography. He writes in an engaging and accessible way that makes some occasionally highly-technical discussions quite lucid and illuminating. The book is, however, not what it says on the cover: it is better. Michael W. Hankins. 2021. Flying Camelot: the F-15, the F-16, and the Weaponization of Fighter Pilot Nostalgia. Cornell University Press; Ithaca, NY.

By Robbin Laird FEATURED STORY Remembering Brendan Sargeant: Australia's Premier Strategist | Defense.info This is a piece I never wanted to write and certainly did not anticipate having to do so. This weekend Australian friends informed me of the untimely death of my friend and colleague Brendan Sargeant, who would often point out that I misspelled his name. Hopefully I got this right my friend. I first met him many years ago when he was serving in the Australian embassy in Washington DC. He was introduced to me by a mutual American friend and his Australian wife. I can remember that meeting clearly as my last. During our initial meeting we had a wide ranging discussion about the world, but then honed in on the issue de jure which was the joint strike fighter. By the time I had met him, I had met many of the pioneers in standing up the aircraft and the program and we discussed what I had written and what I thought about the coming of the program and its impact. Having had the chance to work with Secretary Wynne, first as head of acquisition and then as Secretary of the Air Force, it was clear that the program was founded to create a new global capability for the United States and its allies. Brendan had honed on this aspect of the program and early on got it and its importance for Australia. We had many conversations through the years, but they always we very similar to the first one — wide-ranging, blunt, and always left me with more to think about and to puzzle over. I am sure his many friends would say the same. Because that was the thing about Brendan — he would ignite reflection and curry thoughts, whether you agreed with the particular point or not. When I finally got to Australia in 2014, and kept coming back because of my involvement with the Williams Foundation, my twice a year visits — at least until I left in a hurry on March 2020 — I would have the chance to meet with him and to visit his home and be hosted by his wife and he and be in the presence of his friends, and we would have a wonderful meal and have a wide ranging conversation about Australia, the United States and the world. The fact that this will not happen again truly saddens me. But whatever the loss for me personally, it is an even greater loss for Australia. Australia, like the other liberal democracies, is entering a new historical era and sorting out our way ahead is more than challenging. This was the topic we discussed frequently by phone since my last visit to Australia, and I was very much looking forward to my next visit and meetings with Brendan. But in a way my last published interview with him is a very good epitaph for him. That discussion was about the need for strategic imagination for a period of historical change such as we are clearly. This is how he described what was needed: “We need to be ruthless in our self-analysis, about our strengths and weaknesses, and who we are. We need to have a clear sense of the range of possible futures and the various responses that we may need to make. That is why I say a crisis is a challenge to imagination, a challenge to identity before it becomes a policy or a strategy challenge.” This was what Brendan brought to the table. He met this challenge and provided constant insight and guidance. To think that he is no longer here is very hard to contemplate. I have lost a friend; and Australia has lost a leader.

Failure carries a stigma. In mature cultures gripped by the Curse of Efficiency, failure is bad. Very bad. The learning derived from experimentation and exploration does not outweigh the perception of wasted effort - a thing to be frowned upon. 'This is a results-focused organisation!' To demonstrate this, those who successfully adhere to established metrics are rewarded and celebrated. The message is clear: we want you to innovate (of course!) - but don't you dare innovate. - Dr. Jason Fox in How to Lead a Quest A new series: #FailureWins 2022 is shaping up to be a year that offers a multitude of exciting opportunities for discussion, debate and learning. The year starts with a bang with the The Air and Space Power Conference on 23-23 March held in Canberra. The conference seeks to explore resilient and innovative approaches to achieve national and regional advantage in air and space power. Later the same week, the Sir Richard Williams Foundation is hosting its first seminar of the year; Accelerating the Transition to a Networked, Integrated Force. The aim of the 24 March seminar is to examine progress in the establishment of the 5th generation force and identify lessons which further inform and accelerate Government and industry efforts to design, build, operate, and sustain increasingly lethal and survivable air and space capability. Big picture, we can see the major crossover between these two events is the theme of innovation, iteration and lessons learned. Plan Jericho, launched in 2015, aims to support these core themes by providing a framework to Air Force personnel and give Air Force the edge to protect Australia from technologically sophisticated and rapidly morphing threats. However, having a framework in place is only one piece of the puzzle to innovation. A culture that acknowledges risk and embraces failure is critical; such a culture inherently promotes innovation. In the TCB post Effective risk management in an era of strategic competition: An alternative view WGCDR Yildirim highlights that: relying solely on a rules-based system as a ‘one size fits all’ to try to manage all manner of risk to prevent failures must be avoided. To achieve this there must be a cultural shift regarding risk within Defence requiring a concerted effort from every part of the institution. Only when Defence’s culture recognises that risk management is a means to an end, rather than an end in itself, can it take on higher-risk, higher-reward opportunities than its competitors. This notion was further explored in a sci-fiesque vignette Fighting for Time: Conflict in the 22nd Century by GPCAT Phil Arms. His storytelling includes a timely message around reframing ‘failure’ into a culture of growth. To successfully innovate we need to build the right culture; one that embraces learning and jettisons old cultural beliefs and stereotypical notions of success by embracing lessons from failures. So let's normalise failure! We want to talk about the good, the bad and the ugly of failure. What is it? Can it be done? Tell us about your experiences of implementing culture change, the acceptance of failure within the workforce, lessons learned (and implemented) - both successfully and poorly and your suggestions for strategies that can be put in place to support the Jericho framework. Check out the submission guidelines here. Submission close on 01 April 2022. And if you’re keen to discuss an idea with us first, be sure to email us at thecentralblue@gmail.com

The Requirements of a Sovereign Defence Space Capability National Gallery of Australia 1 December 2021 Final Report Dr Robbin Laird Synopsis and Program Download PDF Handbook Download PDF Presentations Welcoming Remarks and Formal Close AIRMSHL Geoff Brown AO (Retd) Sir Richard Williams Foundation Introduction and MC Darin Lovett South Australian Space Industry Centre Australian Space Capability - Historical Perspective Amy Hestermann-Crane The Central Blue Threats to Space Operations Dougal Robertson Sir Richard Williams Foundation Presentation availability to be advised. Sovereign Defence Capability and Space Dr Malcolm Davis Australian Strategic Policy Institute Not available - email info@williamsfoundaiton.org.au to request a copy Space Domain Research & Development Prof Tanya Monro Defence Science and Technology Group Commercial Space-based ISR AIRCDRE Richard Keir AM, CSC (Retd) Sir Richard Williams Foundation Presentation availability to be advised. Sovereign and Resilient Space Battle Management AVM Chris Deeble AO, CSC (Retd) Northrop Grumman Australia Presentation availability to be advised. Space Domain Awareness Nick Leake Optus Presentation availability to be advised. Space Control AIRCDRE Phil Gordon Director General Air Defence and Space Resilient Satcom in a Counterspace Age David Ball Lockheed Martin Space Presentation availability to be advised. Sovereign Defence Space Considerations Terry Van Haren Former Air Attaché Washington The Requirements of a Sovereign Defence Space Capability AIRCDRE Ross Bender Commander Air Warfare Centre National Perspective Anthony Murfett Australian Space Agency Pre-recorded video AVM Cath Roberts AM, CSC Head of Air Force Capability Video not available Navy Perspective CDRE Matthew Doornbos RAN Director General Navy Intelligence and Information Warfare (representing Chief of Navy) No presentation Army Perspective BRIG Ian Langford DSC and Bars Director General Future Land Warfare (representing Chief of Army) Defence’s Vision for Space Capability AIRCDRE Nicholas Hogan CSC Director General Space Domain Review (representing Chief of Air Force) Seminar Outline When the United States Air Force conceived and established the Space-based Global Positioning System in 1973 to enable more accurate military navigation, few would have imagined the impact it would have on modern society, the Western national security apparatus, and the Australian way of life. Fast forward to 2021, global economic security is now dependent on Space-based capabilities, and Defence must play an increasingly prominent role given the quantum of global trade which passes through the region, a third of which transits through the South China Sea. There are now over 2,600 satellites in orbit and the Australian Defence Force has become increasingly dependent on a sophisticated blend of Space-related technologies which must now develop and accelerate to meet the demands of integrated multi-domain operations to counter new threats and new risks. These demands include resilient long-range communications, and greater levels of situational awareness with the ability to sense, track and identify targets in and from Space in all orbits. On the supply side, current Space capacity is insufficient to meet these demands, and the need for a sovereign capability must be driven by a better understanding of the full spectrum of Space-related requirements across policy, process, infrastructure and technology. The imperative to develop Space capability must consider the people and organisational aspects which leverage Australia’s relatively small but highly skilled population. It will require a national effort to leverage people, technology and Australia’s vast geographical area of interest and highly favourable environmental conditions to conduct activities in and from Space. Space is becoming increasingly congested and contested and likely to become a warfighting domain in future high intensity conflicts in the Indo-Pacific region, as well as an essential campaign enabler for Shape Deter and Respond missions and tasks. This will drive the need for increased survivability of Space-based systems and the ability to counter and deny competitors across the spectrum of conflict.

Dr Robbin Laird, Conference: The Requirements of a Sovereign Defence Space Capability 1 December 2021: A Williams Foundation Special Report, 8 January 2022 In this report, the key themes and presentations at the December 2021, Williams Foundation seminar on The Requirements of a Sovereign Defence Space Capability are highlighted. A number of interviews with participants are included. Download the report here Introduction Recently, the Williams Foundation held its latest bi-annual seminar, this one focused on the way ahead for the Australian space enterprise. Since 2014, the Williams Foundation has held bi-annual seminars on the transformation of the ADF as it embraced fifth generation warfare and working joint force integration. Since 2018, the focus has been increasingly with regard to how to extend the reach of the ADF given the changing nature of the challenges facing Australia in the Indo-Pacific region. The discussions really began with a 2018 seminar which focused on the importance of long-range strike and was followed by seminars which focused on ways to enhance Australian resilience and sovereign capabilities. The first seminar of 2021 focused on next generation autonomous systems, and the 1 December 2021, seminar on where autonomous systems, namely satellites, have been a regular feature for both military and commercial purposes for many decades. The Williams Foundation program announcing the seminar highlighted the purpose and focus of the seminar: The Requirements of a Sovereign Defence Space Capability When the United States Air Force conceived and established the Space-based Global Positioning System in 1973 to enable more accurate military navigation, few would have imagined the impact it would have on modern society, the Western national security apparatus, and the Australian way of life. Fast forward to 2021, global economic security is now dependent on Space-based capabilities, and Defence must play an increasingly prominent role given the quantum of global trade which passes through the region, a third of which transits through the South China Sea. There are now over 2,600 satellites in orbit and the Australian Defence Force has become increasingly dependent on a sophisticated blend of Space-related technologies which must now develop and accelerate to meet the demands of integrated multi-domain operations to counter new threats and new risks. These demands include resilient long-range communications, and greater levels of situational awareness with the ability to sense, track and identify targets in and from Space in all orbits. On the supply side, current Space capacity is insufficient to meet these demands, and the need for a sovereign capability must be driven by a better understanding of the full spectrum of Space-related requirements across policy, process, infrastructure, and technology. The imperative to develop Space capability must consider the people and organisational aspects which leverage Australia’s relatively small but highly skilled population. It will require a national effort to leverage people, technology and Australia’s vast geographical area of interest and highly favourable environmental conditions to conduct activities in and from Space. Space is becoming increasingly congested and contested and likely to become a warfighting domain in future high intensity conflicts in the Indo-Pacific region, as well as an essential campaign enabler for Shape Deter and Respond missions and tasks. This will drive the need for increased survivability of Space-based systems and the ability to counter and deny competitors across the spectrum of conflict. https://sldinfo.com/2022/01/the-requirements-of-a-sovereign-defence-space-capability/ The e-book version can be found here: https://defense.info/williams-foundation/2022/01/the-williams-foundation-seminar-on-building-sovereign-defence-space-capability/

Brian Weston 'On Target - 'Then Now Always ‒ Centenary of the RAAF' in Australian Defence Business Review, Mar/Apr 2021 p.84 The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) celebrated its centenary on 31 March 2021, with the underlying theme of Then Now Always. Then traces the growth of the RAAF from its heritage of the Australian Flying Corps, through peace and war, to the potent middle-weight air force that is the RAAF of today. The Now is the RAAF of today ‒ an exemplary and respected national institution of trust, esteem, service and sacrifice, all of which provides the RAAF with a sound base to meet the challenges of the future ‒ the Always. As much has already been written about the Then and Now, this column will focus on the Always. There seems little doubt the commencement of the second 100 years of the RAAF will be dominated, possibly for decades, by a challenging and deteriorating geo-strategic scenario in the Indo-Pacific, where an increasingly assertive and belligerent China is determined to expand its power and influence over much of the region. Past prognostications of the progressive development of China into a valued international player of substance ‒ the consequence of enhanced education, free international trade, greater international capital flows, a growing economy, adherence to post-World War II international protocols, accompanied by an expanding democratisation ‒ are distant memories as the reality is that such a development will put the Chinese Communist Party’s hold on power at risk. The Chinese Communist Party has learnt well from how these developments unleashed internal forces which led to the fracturing of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and fellow- traveller European communist nations, some 30 years ago. All of which has resulted in a Chinese Communist Party consolidating its iron rule over its citizens, while China’s leader, Xi Jinping, has entrenched himself as leader of China. Xi Jinping concurrently occupies the following powerful appointments: General Secretary of the Communist Party of China; Chairman of the Central Military Commission (Commander-in-chief of the People’s Liberation Army); President of the People's Republic of China; and Chairman of the National Security Commission of the Communist Party of China. Also, Xi Jinping, in 2012, was designated as China’s Paramount Leader and, in 2018, he removed the presidential limits which previously limited the duration of occupancy of the office of President of the People's Republic of China. With Xi Jinping entrenched as the autocratic leader of the People's Republic of China, the Chinese Communist Party has put in place comprehensive monitoring and surveillance, and control and propaganda systems, to suppress any emergent democratic or populist initiatives especially with regard to free speech. The prospects of the Chinese Communist Party conceding power seem remote. Internationally, Xi Jinping has initiated an expansion of China’s power and influence, especially regionally, by pursuing initiatives that extend beyond the bounds of accepted post-World War II norms, while marking itself as a global strategic competitor to the United States. Every indication is that Australia will need to contend with the Chinese Communist Party’s rising hegemonic aspirations for years to come ‒ and in that context, the future theme for the RAAF, Always, needs to be set. In this environment, Australia’s first strategic response will be diplomacy ‒ skilled, professional and astute, comprising both unilateral and multinational initiatives with the emerging Quadrilateral Dialogue between Australia, Japan, India and the United States a prospective, powerful diplomatic tool, notwithstanding the alliance with the United States remains core to Australia’s future national security. A second response must include the development of Australia’s cyber capabilities as in grey-zone confrontation, cyber-attack by state-sponsored actors is an attractive weapon of choice. A third response is the strengthening and diversification of Australia’s economic base with less reliance on China as a trading partner and with the rebuilding of selected, vital Australian economic and industrial capabilities to ensure enhanced levels of Australian self-reliance; both of which will need to be done in partnership with Australian business and industry. But all three responses will achieve little unless backed by credible, regional military presence and power; a role well-suited to a potent, middleweight air force with reach, speed, presence, spatial awareness, flexibility, regional responsiveness and strike power ‒ all appropriate attributes of an air force with a future theme of Always, but which raises the question of how the RAAF should further evolve to meet this challenge. Presently, the capability of the RAAF has been much enhanced with the introduction of the F-35A and its support enablers of the Wedgetail airborne early warning and control capability and the KC-30A air-to-air refuelling capability; plus, the emerging complementary team of the P-8A Poseidon and MQ-4C Triton platforms, together with the EA-18G Growler and the MC-55 Peregrine ‒ all augmented by a capable regional air mobility force of C-17A, C-130J and C-27J platforms. The question is how should the RAAF evolve further in accordance with its theme of Always in the face of increasing future challenges. Brian Weston is a Board Member of the Sir Richard Williams Foundation Download PDF here

Brian Weston 'On Target - 'Operational Presence and Persistence ‒ Personnel' in Australian Defence Business Review, Jan/Feb 2021 p.72 The previous On Target column noted that while the RAAF has evolved into a potent middle-weight air force well-suited to operations in the nearer, Indo-Pacific region, the current air force capability ‒ and indeed the broader ADF capability ‒ will be sorely stretched if required to sustain a high tempo of operations for lengthy periods. The column also noted that in times of great power competition, competing nations will often place markers ‘in the sand’ to identify those issues and interests that involve a nation’s vital national interests. In that way, a nation can issue unambiguous warnings to strategic competitors which caution competitors to restrain their activities and expansions so as not to violate a nation’s vital national interests. But placing markers ‘in the sand’ without clear messaging of resolve may not deter further confrontation as messaging without resolve will likely achieve little. Strategic messaging must therefore be reinforced with actions that indicate resolve, commitment and capability. One avenue for a nation to indicate resolve is through pre-emptive military activities. Typically, these military activities, while pre-emptive, should be non-provocative and conform to international protocols. Presence and patrol operations, and of the conduct of surveillance and reconnaissance operations, are one such use of a nation’s military capabilities. In some circumstances, forward-deployed presence and patrol forces alone, may be inadequate to signify both the resolve and capability of a nation to defend its vital national interests, which could require the precautionary deployment of more substantial combat capabilities. The deployment of these forces to supporting locations, probably towards the rear of the theatre but on heightened alert levels, should provide a credible deterrent to escalation. Given these scenarios, and the distances and strategic disposition of Australia’s interests in the nearer Indo-Pacific, it is timely to enquire about the preparedness of Australia’s defence forces to sustain these operations; the nature of which should not be confused with past patterns of deployments, of one frigate or one airborne warning and control aircraft or one tanker, to the Middle East. Of particular concern given the scale of Australia’s theatre of interest, the nature of military presence and patrol operations, and of the open-ended timescales involved, is the preparedness of the RAAF, and of the wider ADF, to meet such a challenge ‒ especially regarding the numbers of trained defence personnel necessary in the sustainment of continuing, precautionary, presence and patrolling operations across a vast theatre. In such a scenario it is not just the need to sustain a higher tempo of operations, but that the increased tempo may have to be sustained for lengthy periods of time which will necessitate the augmentation of front-line operational personnel with qualified and experienced ‘reserve’ operatives, something that is not presently in the air force order of battle. The introduction of long range, long endurance, unmanned systems will assist, but even unmanned systems require operational augmentation as the numbers of unmanned human operatives increase dramatically once open-ended 24/7 operations are commenced. Similarly, tactical and operational level control centres will require augmentation to sustain 24/7 operations‒something that was not necessary when the RAAF, and the ADF, avoided this workload by ‘piggy-backing’ limited numbers of operational personnel into coalition‒mainly US‒tactical and operational level control centres. Further to the rear, command and control centres, data analysis and dissemination centres, and communication centres will need augmentation, together with critical supporting national level agencies including cyber and space. Where will these specialist personnel come from, given neither the air force, nor navy, has an extant large ‘reserve’ component, and neither are these specialist skills readily available in Australia’s civilian population‒apart from a small pool of recently retired air force and navy personnel. Unlike the Australian Army, which has a long tradition of using militia, citizen and reserve forces to augment the Regular Army, Australia’s air force and navy have not established credible and substantial ‘institutionalised’ air force and navy reserve forces. Compounding the limited availability of personnel is that few will have the required level of security clearance to operate and support ADF operations given the high security classification levels of ADF systems‒a seemingly simple issue but, in reality, a far more complex problem. In conclusion, in the strategic circumstances currently evolving in the Indo-Pacific, it is not difficult to conceive of scenarios that must be confronted with not only determined and skilled diplomacy but also the deployment of operational military forces that lay down the markers ‘in the sand’; such as, a sustained military presence, the conduct of continuing surveillance and patrol operations, and of the precautionary deployment of combat capabilities. Yet how is this to be achieved when neither air force, nor navy, has the personnel augmentation policies and capabilities necessary to sustain the 24/7 operations of such forces over long periods of time. Brian Weston is a Board Member of the Sir Richard Williams Foundation Download PDF here