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The last few months have seen a flurry of announcements relating to Australia’s space industry. In July 2017, the Government commenced a review of the Australian space industry, and on 29 September they announced the intention to create an Australian space agency. On the same day, the RAAF and the University of New South Wales announced that a contract had been signed to launch three CubeSats into low earth orbit commencing in 2018. These announcements signal the end of the Australia’s official neglect of space operations. As Australia’s small space community of interest prepare to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the WRESAT launch that marked Australia’s first foray into space, it is worth drawing attention to another little-known aspect of Australian space history. In this post, Michael Spencer tells the story of Australis OSCAR-5,  Australia’s first satellite, built by a group of University of Melbourne engineering students. Australia may have lacked a space industry, but it did not lack the innovative and inspired individuals who had a vision of an Australian role in space. On 29 November 2017, Australia’s space community will commemorate the 50th anniversary of the first Australian-built satellite launched from an Australia launch site. In 1967, the Defence Science Technology Group, previously the Weapons Research Establishment (WRE), partnered with University of Adelaide to develop and launch the WRESAT satellite into orbit. WRESAT was launched from the Woomera rocket range atop a spare rocket provided by the US SPARTA research program. While the WRESAT launch is an important milestone in Australia’s entry into outer space, WRESAT was not the first satellite built by Australians; that honour goes to Australis OSCAR-5. Model of Australis OSCAR-5 [Image Credit: Museums Victoria] Not long after the USSR successfully launched Sputnik I, a group of American amateur radio operators (“Hams”) developed an amateur-built “Orbiting Satellite Carrying Amateur Radio (OSCAR)” to promote public participation in the new field of space-based communications and technology research. Drawing on support from members and volunteers, donated resources, and the assistance of international governments and commercial agencies, Project OSCAR successfully launched OSCAR-1 in 1961. After the US-based Project OSCAR agreed to sponsor environmental testing, space launch, and launch operations a group of University of Melbourne students, mostly undergraduate members of the local “Astronautical Society and Radio Club,” were inspired to build a satellite. These electrical and mechanical engineering students had no qualifications or experience in space mission design. They were motivated to make an Australian contribution to amateur radio and enter the brave new world of orbital space missions, but they recognised that their limitations in space systems expertise and experience would drive a relatively simple satellite design. In 1966, on a shoestring budget, this innovative team of amateur radio enthusiasts built Australis OSCAR-5 — the first non-US built amateur radio communications satellite. OSCAR-5 had four monopole antennas, adapted from commercial-off-the-shelf Stanley measuring spring-steel tapes, extending from its sides for transmitting signals from two beacon transponders. The spring-steel antennas were strapped down during launch and deployed on orbit. It carried horizon sensors for determining the satellite spin-rate and used a magnetic attitude stabilisation control system to adjust the satellite’s spin. A seven-channel telemetry system automatically reported the onboard battery conditions, spacecraft temperatures, and horizon sensor responses, communicated to Ham radio ground stations by using modulations in the beacon signals to represent encoded data. Passive magnetic attitude stabilisation, to control the attitude and orientation of the satellite, was performed by carrying two bar magnets that would move and align with the Earth’s magnetic field, as the satellite progressed in its orbit. Satellite orientation in relation to the Earth is important to be able to orient the antenna with a favourable antenna footprint for the Ham radio operators on the terrestrial surface. The battery-powered OSCAR-5 transmitted telemetry signals on two purposely designed frequency bands and power settings, at 144.050 MHz at 50 mW and 29.450 MHz at 250 mW, which were in popular use among Ham radio operators, at the time. Since solar cell technology was not readily available, the satellite relied on single-use battery power to operate on these frequencies for 23 and 46 days, respectively. The students built the radio system and assembled it into a 9.0 kg satellite payload that was a 43cm × 30cm × 15cm rectangular prism with reflective stripping applied for thermal protection. For comparison with similar modern-day university-level project designs, a standard 1.0 kg CubeSat satellite, such as was built for OSCAR-73 (FUNcube-1) that was launched in 2013, measures 10cm × 10cm × 10cm, less than 1/12th the measured size of OSCAR-5, and can be designed to perform the same mission for much longer, following the introduction of solar panel systems for satellites to generate electrical power. To get these amateur satellites into orbit, the US Air Force and NASA sponsored launch opportunities for university research payloads when spare capacity became available on their space launch vehicles assigned for launching the full-size satellites.  Although OSCAR-5 was built in 1966, a launch opportunity did not become available until 23 January 1970. On that date, the student-built satellite was launched atop a Delta-N6 space launch vehicle from Vandenberg Air Force Base Space Launch Complex as a piggyback payload with the Television & Infra-Red Observation Satellite (TIROS-M), a full-sized Earth observation satellite. After launch, OSCAR-5 was released into a circular low-Earth orbit at about 1450 km altitude and 102-degree orbit inclination angle. The orbit orientation was nearly flying a north-south orbit over the north and south poles, enabling access by amateur radio operators in locations across the globe, as it completed one orbit every 115 minutes. Australis OSCAR-5 in is launch carrying structure. [Image credit: AMSAT] In addition to being the first amateur satellite built outside of the US, OSCAR-5 was also the first to be designed for remote control operations by amateur radio operators. It was designed with an onboard command system to activate the satellite beacon transponder only on weekends, operating between Friday morning to Monday morning, to conserve the battery life and maximise its availability for amateur radio operators, who would normally be operating from their homes on the weekends. The University of Melbourne collected Ham radio contact reports, gained over HF and VHF frequencies, from over 200 operators across 27 countries. During the timeframe that OSCAR-5 was developed and awaiting a US launch opportunity, the Radio Amateur Satellite Corporation (now known as AMSAT) was formed in 1969 as a not-for-profit educational organisation to foster Amateur Radio’s participation in space research and communication. Using volunteer support from its international membership, donated resources, and the assistance of government and commercial agencies. AMSAT has successfully continued to use Project OSCAR to promote public interest in satellite communications and make space accessible to the students and the general public through Ham communities. Project OSCAR has launched over 90 Amateur Radio satellite missions, since 1961. Today, over 20 Ham radio satellites are currently in operation in orbit. The latest Ham radio satellite, RadFxSat (Fox-1B), designated as OSCAR-91, is a CubeSat joint mission of AMSAT and the Institute for Space and Defense Electronics at Vanderbilt University that was launched from Vandenberg Air Force on 18 November 2017. Initiatives like Project OSCAR and CubeSats provide the technical opportunities to that enable creative and innovative minds to experiment and test new designs for exploiting space and inspire the next generations to build on the achievements of previous generations to advance careers and the continuing uses of space. Increased public awareness and involvement in space research and missions, and the miniaturisation and increasing affordability of space technology has improved access to space for researchers and academic students, providing a stepping stone to space-related careers and full-scale space missions. Access to CubeSat technology also increases the options available to military users for experimentation, agile designs, and rapid and affordable access to space for shorter duration space missions when compared to the cost of a full-scale satellite mission.  In September 2017, the Royal Australian Air Force announced that it had joined with UNSW Canberra to invest in the development of CubeSats for three space missions, with the first mission planned for launch in 2018. These satellites will be configured with re-programmable software defined radios, enabling the onboard mission systems to be reconfigured for different missions while deployed on orbit, improving the satellite’s functional capabilities to be adaptable for multiple or changed missions. Artist’s impression of a RAAF CubeSat in low earth orbit. [Image Credit: University of New South Wales] Author’s Note: Although OSCAR-5 has long ago ceased functioning, the global US Space Surveillance Network continues to track it as a residential space object, stable in its low-Earth orbit. OSCAR-5 is identified as Space Catalog number 4321 on a list with an estimated total of about 40,000 tracked orbiting space objects, that listed in chronological order of their launch date. Even though it has expired, OSCAR-5 persists in its low-Earth orbit at about 1450 km altitude as an Australian owned, non-operational, resident space object – awaiting the future intervention of natural environmental forces or an on-orbit event for to it to de-orbit and return to Earth, or not. Squadron Leader Michael Spencer is currently serving at the RAAF Air Power Development Centre in Canberra, analysing potential risks and opportunities posed by technology change drivers and disruptions to future air power. His Air Force career has provided operational experiences in long-range maritime patrol, aircrew training, and weaponeering, and management experiences in international relations, project management, air and space concept development, air capability development, and joint force capability integration. He is also an Associate Fellow and Section Committee member of the American Institute of Aeronautics & Astronautics. The opinions expressed are his alone and do not reflect those of the Royal Australian Air Force, the Australian Defence Force, or the Australian Government. #RAAF #technology #Space #AirForce #Innovation

In this post, Chris McInnes provides some thoughts on what he thinks a fifth-generation force looks like. He is not sure he is right and he is pretty sure some of you think he is wrong. He, and we, would love to hear your thoughts on this topic. The Lockheed Martin marketeers that came up with the ‘fifth generation’ slogan for the F-22 Raptor must be very pleased. The three Services of the Australian Defence Force, led by the Royal Australian Air Force but joined more recently by the Royal Australian Navy and Australian Army, have embraced the goal of becoming a fifth-generation force. It has become the catchphrase of choice to differentiate where the Services are going from where the Services have been. There is enormous value in having such a unifying theme and the habitual use of fifth generation in formal presentations and informal discussion would suggest it has firmly taken root. Despite its widespread use, the characteristics of a fifth-generation force remain ambiguous. Someone invariably asks ‘what exactly is a fifth-generation force and how will we know when we get there? Come to think of it, what were generations one to four?’ These are valid questions, but I tend to think it has been quite useful to not have too much specificity so far. The absence of specifics has prompted each Service tribe, their myriad sub-tribes, and their partners to think what fifth generation means to them in their circumstances. But we are perhaps getting to the point where we need to put some flesh on the skeleton of what it means to be a fifth-generation force. This post is my attempt to do that, or at least prompt a discussion that will help people put meat on the bones of their own version of fifth generation. In my view, a fifth-generation force is an organisational response to the Information Age and the characteristics of fifth-generation systems. ‘Fifth generation’ began as a technology descriptor and assessments of that technology’s impact on warfare has been used derive a notion of fifth-generation warfare. The missing leg of the triad so far has been the organisational change necessary to operate fifth-generation technology most effectively to fight fifth-generation warfare. This appears to be, as Peter Layton points out, a “very complicated way of war” so organisational considerations are important. So as not to stray too far from the origins of the fifth generation nomenclature, I have sought to characterise a fifth-generation force by adapting the characteristics that define fifth-generation systems. The characteristics of fifth-generation fighter aircraft are generally perceived to be stealth, manoeuvrability, advanced avionics, networked data fusion, and multi-role capabilities. Stealth becomes signature aware. Stealth is the combination of low observable technologies and signature optimisation tactics. Similarly, in organisational terms, a signature aware organisation matches an awareness of its physical, electromagnetic, virtual, resource, and social signatures with practices and behaviours that optimise that signature for given scenarios. This is an extension of current practices such as public affairs, operational security, and lean business practices. However, viewing the management of an organisation’s footprint through the operational lens of signature management is an important response to the proliferation of sensors, scrutiny, and threat vectors.  A signature-aware organisation broadens the awareness and pursuit of signature-related objectives beyond specialist staff, such that all personnel can shape their actions and footprint in support of the desired outcome. Manoeuvrability becomes adaptivity. Fifth-generation aircraft manoeuvrability is linked to sustained high speeds, such as the F-22’s super-cruise, and a capacity to rapidly change directions. I view adaptivity as a concept that incorporates organisational flexibility (range of change), agility (rate of change), and a readiness, if not eagerness, for the organisation to change. Most importantly, in adaptive organisations formal leaders do not direct change: they set the conditions that foster change from within the organisation. I think we are relatively well postured for this requirement on an individual level but I’d suggest there a few areas that need focus to shift from being an organisation with adaptive people to a genuinely adaptive organisation. A culture of delegated decision-making, distributed collaboration, and a looser coupling to formal decision systems, such as risk and acquisition processes, are necessary to foster a more adaptive collective. Formal decision systems are important instruments, but they should inform and support while not constraining decision-making flexibility. The character of future warfare drives this requirement — events are simply going to move far too fast for the formal leader- and process-centric decision-making that mark our current organisational constructs. In an adaptive organisation, the worst thing you can do is not make a decision. Advanced avionics becomes a human-machine team of teams. Fifth-generation platforms use hardware and software to optimise the wetware of their crews. A fifth-generation force needs to be founded on human-on-the-loop human-machine team of teams to optimise decisions. This is a step beyond our current human-in-the-loop approach that supports and accelerates, but rarely optimises, decisions. Rather than simply using computers to automate processes — the ‘traffic lights’ in so many command and control systems are essentially a digitised check list — a fifth-generation force will exploit the processing power of computers to ‘roll the dice’ on possible options and present recommendations to a human decision-maker to apply human judgement. The human-machine combination will be critical to the force’s ability to deal with the uncertainty and chaos of a war that is potentially being fought on a pulse-to-pulse basis. And just as Facebook tells you which of your friends are interested in a particular event or page, the human-machine team would capitalise on machine processing to identify and alert teams that are working in a similar area or on a similar problem, fostering a team of teams approach. Any conflict posing human-machine teams against humans with machines will be a very one-sided fight. Networked data-fusion becomes cognition-centric. Fifth-generation aircraft have been designed with the collection, transmission, and processing of information as their defining feature to enhance the cognitive capacity of their crews. Initially, I called this characteristic ‘information-centric’ but I realised that this placed the value in the wrong place. ‘Information-centric’ portends an organisation that considers information as having value in itself. A cognition-centric organisation, by contrast, views information only as a means to an end. Information is simultaneously terrain to be controlled and exploited, a weapon to be targeted and employed, and a supply to be husbanded and secured. The value of the information in all of these perspectives is the impact it can have on the cognition and decisions of actors in the environment. Thus, a cognition-centric organisation values education (how to think) as much or more than training (what to think) so that the potential cognitive value of information can be realised. A cognition-centric organisation recognises the futility of efforts to control information flows or ‘the message’ in an information-rich world and understands that the value of freer information flow in your own organisation, principally through better thinking and superior decisions, outweighs the associated costs. Starting from a basis of control-by-exception also allows the organisation to focus on securing only those things that absolutely must be protected. Multi-role capabilities become outcomes-based. Fifth-generation aircraft can shift from one role to another in single missions, and are less constrained by traditional ‘type’ roles such as fighters or bombers. A fifth-generation air force shifts from effects-based or platform/system/domain/stovepipe-centric views of the organisation, air power, or operations to an outcomes-based view. The shift from effects-based to outcomes-based thinking is similar to the move in Western planning doctrine from centre-of-gravity-oriented planning to objectives-oriented planning. Effects, like centres of gravity, are simply instruments to be used to achieve larger purposes but both of these grew larger and more intricate than the purpose for which they were conceived, namely achieving outcomes. As our organisations avail themselves of a wider array of effects, coming from or through multiple domains, we need to recognise that outcomes may provide the only relatively constant organising logic across time, space, and organisation. Individual effects, their utility and how they are generated will be transient and success may require the orchestration of a myriad effects in potentially non-repeatable combination. A consistent organising logic based on outcomes will be a useful means of providing unity of effort and focus while fostering initiative among people who understand what the boss wants, and have a cunning plan on how to give her exactly that. A fifth-generation force is not simply one that operates fifth-generation equipment or fights fifth-generation wars. It must also be a fifth-generation organisation.  These are my five characteristics of a fifth-generation organisation. I’m not sure they are right and I’m quite certain some of you think they are wrong. I’d love to hear why. Wing Commander Chris ‘Guiness’ McInnes is an officer in the Royal Australian Air Force. The opinions expressed are his alone and do not reflect those of the Royal Australian Air Force, the Australian Defence Force, or the Australian Government. #RAAF #organisationalculture #AirPower #AirForce #F35

The integration of manned and unmanned systems may be the next step in the evolution of air operations. In this post, Donald Woldhuis and Michael Spencer describe the US Army’s approach to integrating tactical unmanned systems with the AH-64 Apache, referred to as Manned-Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T). Is this a capability that smaller forces should be looking to when considering the replacement of their battlefield helicopter fleets? New battlefield helicopter capabilities are being developed by the US Army that will integrate manned and unmanned systems as part of an emerging Manned-UnManned Teaming (MUM-T) capability for its AH-64 helicopters. MUM-T is a standardised systems architecture and communications protocol that enables live video and still images gained from the sensor payloads of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) to be shared across a force to improve battlefield situational awareness. MUM-T will provide the teamed helicopter crews with network connectivity to UAV missions being conducted in the same battlespace, both on a deliberately planned or opportunity basis. The improved ability for helicopter aircrew to receive and share live intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) data will improve their adaptability and responsiveness to changes in the battlespace, thereby enhancing their decision superiority. US Army battlefield helicopters previously teamed with OH-58 Kiowa manned reconnaissance helicopters to conduct attack missions against targets on the ground, such as enemy infantry and armoured fighting vehicles. Apache aircrew typically fly nap-of-the-Earth to evade enemy defences which made targeting difficult for their onboard target surveillance and acquisition systems. The Kiowa was ideal as an agile tactical air vehicle to provide ISR information for targeting. After a 30-year history of teaming, dating back to the Vietnam War, the US Army embarked on a modernisation program and began decommissioning the Kiowa helicopters in 2014, with the last being decommissioned in September 2017. As US Army AH-64 Apache battlefield helicopter units assumed the reconnaissance role from the Kiowas, the US Army began looking for innovative new ways that could provide ISR support to the Apaches in an era when the modern battlefield is being covered by many high-altitude and persistent ISR sensors from many different air missions operating concurrently in the same or nearby mission areas where the Apaches are likely to be flown. US Army looked to MUM-T as a means to connect Apaches with existing UAV systems that are in operational service and being used combat ISR missions, and gain access to real-time UAV ISR data. The traditional systems architecture used for battlefield command, control, and communications to provide options for sharing ISR data between different types of systems using MUM-T. Beyond the simple sharing of data originally conceived for MUM-T, the new MUM-T architecture also makes it possible to transfer the direct control of the UAV sensor, or the total UAV system (including the sensor), to the Apache aircrew. Australian Army operators have described combat experiences from overseas battlefields has taught the importance of organic ISR. From the Battle of Mosul, reported as the largest conventional land battle since the 2003 capture of Baghdad, it was deduced that “the most effective weapon on the current battlefield is a joint and interagency enabled combined arms ground team with an Armed ISR platform flying above… An Army without organic airborne Armed ISR will be at a severe disadvantage on a contemporary urban battlefield.” The observed success in employing UAVs to improve situational awareness has increased demands for more responsive support from ISR systems operating closer to the enemy and the rapid transfer of the latest detailed ISR data over longer communications ranges. One solution is to leverage the direct support missions and independent missions already operating concurrently in adjoining or overlapping areas. MUM-T enables a networked force to share ISR data over a broader area thereby supporting decision superiority of forces in the tactical fight. More informed tactical decisions can be made closer to and over the battlefield by reducing the dependency on rear-echelons to centrally process, exploit and disseminate mission results and situational awareness updates. With MUM-T, task force commanders can choose from a range of integration options for combining assets and perform a single mission or multiple missions concurrently. A team of manned helicopters and unmanned air vehicles, each configured for different mission roles but working as a coordinated team can be tasked to cooperatively achieve a mission objective. Alternatively, MUM-T enables commanders to separately deploy manned and unmanned air vehicles on discrete missions with the capability to share data between them, and also temporarily divert control of an ISR sensor or UAV between operators in the different missions.  Additionally, a networked combat UAV, configured with strike weapons, may also be teamed with a manned helicopter. This teaming provides additional fire support options that extend its fire support mission after its weapons are spent, additional options for weapons effects if the UAV is loaded with different configured warheads, and extend the engagement range in the mission beyond the engagement range of the helicopter. NATO has prepared NATO STANAG 4586 – Standard Interfaces of UAV Control System (UCS) for NATO UAV Interoperability to describe five different Levels of Interoperability (LOI) to cover the five levels of MUM-T complexity and which UAV control functionalities are shared with another user in the mission team, as follows: LOI-1 Pushing ISR Imagery from Network – the receipt and retransmission of secondary imagery (ie imagery that has been processed and uploaded by the source into the battlefield network, for access by a network user) by the manned aircraft; LOI-2 Pulling ISR Imagery Directly from Source – the receipt of primary video imagery that is being directly streamed from a UAV, or relayed from different platforms, into the manned aircraft using Tactical Common Data Link (TCDL); LOI-3 Forward Remote Operations of the UAV Payload – using the TCDL to transfer operational control to enable the manned aircraft to remotely control the operation of the UAV payload sensor (eg remotely pointing and recording the sensor); and LOI-4 Forward Remote Operation of the UAV, excluding take-off and landing – using the TCDL to transfer operational control and enable the manned aircraft to remotely control the operation of the deployed UAV, excluding control of the take-off and landing (eg remotely controlling the UAV flight trajectory and payload operation, including the sensors and weapons). LOI-5 Remote Operation of the UAV, including launch and recovery – using the TCDL to transfer operational control and enable the manned aircraft to remotely control the operation of the UAV, including control of the take-off and landing. NATO STANAG 4586 is useful for operators and systems designers to engage in the development of new and modified systems using a common understanding of MUM-T concepts. However, manned helicopter systems already put its operators in a situation that is demanding, complex, and with a high workload. While MUM-T offers advantages to improving the situational awareness of the helicopter aircrew, it should not be at the expense of the original role for which the helicopter was designed. A major consideration in MUM-T-enabled systems is managing the increase in the operator workload associated with accepting control of the ISR sensor and UAV System designers must give due regard to the impact of MUM-T on aircrew workloads.  The operating concepts for MUM-T must be cognisant of the human factors and capacity to balance the management of the operator’s mission system while concurrently controlling another mission system. Current concepts for employing MUM-T typically focus on the UAV supporting the manned aircraft. However, in the future, a role reversal might occur, and a manned aircraft is configured to provide direct support autonomously to unmanned robotic UAVs. As an example, a large multi-crew and multi-sensor ISR aircraft might be configured to provide force-level ISR over a battlespace in direct support of multiple independent UAV missions. Each deployed UAV might autonomously network with the ISR aircraft receiving data updates, or even temporarily take control of an onboard sensor to gain specific information on the battlefield situation before continuing on its mission. Through operational use and testing by combat helicopter units, MUM-T systems are demonstrating their value and capability. These systems will provide mission commanders with the ability to reliably and quickly inform networked battlefield situational awareness and increase the economy of force in the use of limited combat resources. MUM-T provides operators with the option to exploit manned and Australian Army Tiger Armed Reconnaissance Helicopters. [Image Credit: Department of Defence] unmanned air capabilities deployed on otherwise discrete missions in the same operating area. Having an optional capability to network and produce a new mission synergy provides increased flexibility, adaptability and responsiveness to a dynamically changing battlespace, enabling better decision superiority on the battlefield. The 2016 Defence White Paper states that the Army Tiger armed reconnaissance helicopters will be replaced and that new dedicated light helicopters will be acquired for Special Forces. MUM-T may be an option to provide cost-effective ways to enhance and improve mission-level situational awareness by integrating future helicopter systems with current and planned ISR sensors and UAVs. MUM-T enables the network integration of manned and unmanned platforms operating in the networked joint battlespace. The better that two aircraft can communicate, the better they can share situational awareness data, resulting in more effective and better informed aircrew who can confidently make better and timely decisions on the battlefield. Lieutenant Colonel Donald Woldhuis recently completed a year as a Fellow at the RAAF Air Power Development Centre in Canberra. The focus of his research was the importance and influences of electronic warfare to fifth-generation air forces. He has operational experience as an AH-64D Apache helicopter pilot in the Royal Netherlands Air Force, including multiple operational deployments to Iraq, Afghanistan, and Africa. Besides flying, his previous postings included liaison, tactics development, Head of Operations, Squadron Command, and policy writing at the Netherlands Defence Headquarters. He is also a graduate of the Australian Command and Staff Course. Squadron Leader Michael Spencer is currently serving at the RAAF Air Power Development Centre in Canberra, analysing potential risks and opportunities posed by technology change drivers and disruptions to future air power. His Air Force career has provided operational experiences in long-range maritime patrol, aircrew training, and weaponeering, and management experiences in international relations, project management, air and space concept development, air capability development, and joint force capability integration. He is also an Associate Fellow and Section Committee member of the American Institute of Aeronautics & Astronautics. The opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect those of the Royal Australian Air Force, the Royal Netherlands Air Force, the Australian Defence Force, the Netherlands Ministry of Defence, the Australian Government, or the Government of the Netherlands. #Army #UAS #drones #USArmy #technology #Helicopter #Innovation #UAV

We started The Central Blue at the end of 2016 with two goals in mind: to provide a forum for the discussion and debate on issues relating to Australian air power, and to encourage airmen to write about their profession of arms. In 2017, our first full year of operation, we made solid progress towards both of these goals. But there is still much work to be done both in promoting discussion on air power topics, and in actually getting airmen typing. With these challenges in mind we decided that for the final post of 2017 we would review the year that was and outline a plan for the year to come. In so doing we hope that you may be inspired to re-engage with some of the 51 posts we have published this year, and provide comments with your thoughts on what topics we should aim to explore in 2018. A Year in Review Our contributors have explored a range of topics, including: Conference summaries (EW and Middle East Operations) Capability development (C-27J, ISR, and multi-mission augmentation pods) Lessons learned on exercises (Exercise BROLGA STRIKE) Education (Operator-Intellectuals, PMET, and joint education) History (Battle of the Bismarck Sea and generational change in fighter aircraft) But three posts in particular stand-out, two for the interest they generate and a third for the foundation it laid. We opened the year with a post that turned out to be our most popular, and which continues to attract an impressive level of interest and comment: Steve George’s continuation of the debate surrounding putting F-35B’s on the Canberra Class LHDs. It would seem that the heady blend of fifth-generation fighters and the possibility of a return to a carrier navy strikes a chord and polarises opinions across the Australian blogosphere. What was most compelling about Steve’s post was his clear articulation of the issues upon which the fighter-equipped LHD debate hinges. There is no one solution or answer to these issues, they are contingent on a number of assumptions on naval and air power theory, and Australia’s strategic priorities. So in engaging in this debate, Steve’s interlocutors who contributed in the post’s comment section pushed the blog’s broader readership to identify, articulate, and defend their assumptions. It is this cut-and-thrust of intellectual debate that we hope will continue to be a key component of The Central Blue experience. This spirit of generating debate also drove our second most viewed post, which is also one of our most recent. In ‘My Fifth Generation’, Central Blue editor Chris McInnes provided a personal perspective of what it means to be a fifth-generation organisation. This post attracted attention and comment from a diverse array of groups and individuals, both within Australia and abroad. The reason for the interest in this personal reflection on the fifth-generation concept appears to be a thirst for substance in a discussion that has been dominated by catch-phrases and jargon. As it is a defining concept for the future of the Air Force, it is difficult to underestimate the importance of understanding what a fifth-generation organisation actually is. Unfortunately, there are very few forums within which airmen can discuss, debate, and refine their own views on what a “Fifth-Generation Air Force” actually means to them. This is a problem that The Central Blue aims to address. By providing a forum in which individuals can express and develop their personal understanding of air power, we can shore-up the intellectual foundations upon which Australian air power is built. And this brings us to the third stand-out post for the year: our ‘debrief’ with the Chief of the Air Force, Air Marshal Davies. The support of the Chief is critical to the success of The Central Blue, without it we cannot expect airmen to engage in the discussion on air power issues that are so important to the development of their own and the Air Force’s understanding of air power. As this idea of engaging in discussion and debate on air power is so critical to what we do The Central Blue, it is worth quoting the Chief’s view verbatim: “Air power is not a static concept; rather it must be studied, reflected upon, debated, and challenged. As airminded members of the profession of arms, Air Force personnel have a responsibility to participate in this contest of ideas. It is far, far better that we should respectfully engage in that contest than to hide our thoughts, only to find them wanting when it matters most.” We are proud of the debate and the discussion that The Central Blue has been able to foster. Though there is undoubtedly more to be done, we have taken the first steps in providing a forum for the contest of ideas that is so vital to the ongoing development of air power in Australia. But the actual posts are only part of the story, albeit the most visible part. More important than the words on a screen are the connections that are made in the process of developing, expressing, and refining ideas. For that you need a network of engaged and motivated individuals that are actively involved in furthering the discussion. We’ve been fortunate at The Central Blue to have a diverse range of contributors across ranks, specialisations, and services. But at the heart of the enterprise are the editorial staff that are responsible not just for the editing of posts, but also extending the network through social media and personal connections. Realising the importance of having an engaged and proactive editorial group that see the network as being as important as the posts, we have expanded number of The Central Blue editors from two to five. We are fortunate that we have a diverse, engaged, and proactive group of volunteers that are committed to the cause. The editorial team that will take The Central Blue into its third year are: Wing Commander Jo Brick Wing Commander Trav Hallen Squadron Leader Jenna Higgins Squadron Leader Alexandra McCubbin Wing Commander Chris McInnes This team brings passion to the discussion of the air power, and a drive to develop critical thinkers who are able to guide air power into the future. Planning ahead As we plan ahead for 2018 The Central Blue will continue to pursue its core goals of promoting discussion of air power and getting airmen to write. But we will be adding a third goal: expanding the network of air minded thinkers and writers. There are two ways we plan to further these goals in the year ahead: collaborating more broadly with international partners, and engaging directly with Australian airmen to get them writing. The first step will be a collaboration with From Balloons to Drones exploring the employment of air power in high intensity warfare. This six week series of posts commencing in mid-February will be published in the lead up to the Williams Foundation Seminar on high intensity warfare in late March. This collaboration will bring together contributors from around the world to answers questions about the past, present, and future of air power in major conflict. More details will be released early in the New Year. A longer term plan will be to directly engage with airmen to encourage them to develop their ideas and put them out there to further the debate and discussion on the range of issues that affect them and their profession of arms. A number of initiatives are being planned to support this engagement including promoting The Central Blue as an outlet for research and writing completed as part of Air Force PMET, as well as encouraging and supporting airmen’s participation in events such as Defence Entrepreneurs Forum Australia (DEF Aus). Throughout, we will continue to work closely with the broader Australian military writing community through forums such as The Cove and Grounded Curiosity. Closing thoughts 2018 holds great promise for The Central Blue and our efforts to further the discussion of Australian air power, but we also need feedback from our readership to understand how we can improve. Most importantly, we need to hear from you regarding what issues and topics we should be discussing and debating. So while we take a break over the Christmas period, we encourage you to put your ideas on topics in the comments section, tag us with them on Twitter (@TheCentralBlue), or post them to us on Facebook (@TheCentralBlue). These comments will inform our way ahead and let us know what topics and issues our readers think are important. For those who have an idea and want to write and just need a little encouragement, send us an email with your ideas (centralblue@williamsfoundation.org.au); the editorial team will help you transform your ideas into a post that will further the discussions that we need to be having. Thanks for your readership and your support for the work we are doing. We’ll be back posting again on 7 January 2018. We wish you all a happy and safe Christmas and New Year break. #PME #RAAF #organisationalculture #PMET #AirPower #Jointness #Education

In this post, S.C. Collective assumes the role of the ‘devil’s advocate’ and challenges the military’s beatification of the Common Operational Picture (COP) as a concept and technology. The Advocatus Diaboli (Latin for Devil’s Advocate) was formerly an official position within the Catholic Church: one who “argued against the canonization (sainthood) of a candidate … to uncover any character flaws or misrepresentation of the evidence favouring canonization”. In common parlance, the term devil’s advocate describes someone who, given a certain point of view, takes a position he or she does not necessarily agree with (or simply an alternative position from the accepted norm), for the sake of debate or to explore the thought further.Wikipedia First, a definition from doctrine: “Common Operational Picture – A single identical display of relevant information shared by more than one command that facilitates collaborative planning and assists all echelons to achieve situational awareness. Also called COP.” So, what is wrong with this definition? Well, the Common part, the Operational part, and (predictably) the Picture part. The Common part, especially the “single identical” truth concept, sounds good until you examine the unintended consequences. To establish commonality, everyone needs to have all the information. That is clearly problematic when operating in constrained and contested networking environments, but it also implies some centralised decision making and likely centralised fusion to determine what everyone should see. Different crew members on the same jet don’t have identical displays, so why would we want it across commands? The concept of common also conflicts with security compartmentalisation, so we end up with COP-like systems at multiple independent levels of security (i.e. not common). The Operational part is perhaps less problematic if you’re working at the operational level. However, most of us aren’t – we’re working at the tactical level. Those of us conducting the “collaborative planning” work in the Targeting and Master Air Planning processes in the Air and Space Operations Centre (AOC) aren’t really that concerned about what is currently airborne. That makes for a small operational audience (basically only the Combat Operations Division). Further, the current implementation of the COP (notionally based on aggregating Recognised Air Picture, Recognised Maritime Picture, the Wide Area Surveillance Picture and Regional Area Surveillance Picture and a spare plug for the Recognised Land Picture) is completely platform-centric, whereas the operational level should be focused on effects. The Picture part is arguably the worst aspect of the COP because focusing on portrayal constrains our thinking – icons on a digital map is not much progressed from the WWII manual plots. The Operations Room at RAF Fighter Command’s No. 10 Group Headquarters, Rudloe Manor (RAF Box), Wiltshire, 1943. [Image Credit: © IWM (CH 11887)] That ‘icons on the map’ view focusses on platforms rather than effects and does not provide a meaningful way to show communication links, electromagnetic spectrum usage, information operations, or cyber considerations. It also limits what can be displayed to available screen space. The primary COP source (for the ‘as built’ system) could provide significantly more information, but is filtered at the source. As the complexity of the environment and sensor capabilities increase, we will need to throw increasing larger amounts of information away to avoid making the picture opaque. Even a limited display is often hard to understand – turning coordinates into icons on the map doesn’t make it information. Instead, we need that data to drive decision support tools and provide cueing and targeting assistance – ideally autonomous, but not retyping the coordinates would be a step forward. Sample tactical graphics display, with at least one hostile displayed. [Image Credit: Supplied by author] Even et Diabolus would concede that the current COP does support filtering and some analysis – it is not just a picture. However, to the extent that we know how to get something useful out of it, we often don’t. Perhaps that is because of the name – we think of it as a picture to fill half the big display at Joint Operations Command, not a tool, and certainly not as task-relevant information. With these issues in mind, what should we look for instead? As the Advocatus Diaboli, my aim with this post is not to provide a better solution; however, if we want to support collaborative planning and situational awareness, then our priorities might include: Crew and user specific task-related information, rather than commonality. Implications: The system needs to understand each users’ task context and what data would be relevant to those tasks, and to present the relevant data elements in a way that makes sense to the task(s). Data for decision support tools and user views of networks and effects, rather than a single (picture) portrayal of platforms. Implications: We need to agree on open standards for data models, and protocols for exchanging that data, not just a standard set of icons. Prioritising near over distant, and aggregating distant things, rather than treating all information the same way. This is in accordance with Tobler’s law: ‘everything is related to everything else, but near things are more related than distant things’. In geospatial terms, these distances are in metres; in network terms, they are in milliseconds. Implications: We need a system architecture that provides decentralised fusion and aggregation, to support decentralised execution, and to manage throughput in a congested or contested network connection when things are getting emotional. This requires adaptive rules for filtering; policy for when and how aggregation can support security outcomes for “special” capabilities; and detailed understanding of how the filtering and aggregation affect decision support tools. Alerting of exceptions, rather than providing ‘as expected’. Implications: System definition of what is exceptional given the operational context, and the level of alerting that is appropriate given the user needs, network capability and the other alerts. Once we have all that, we can find a better name. The S.C. Collective is a self-synchronising (sometimes only plesiochronous) independent thought activity with a penchant for Old Horizon Fridays. Current focus activities include integration of ISR with non-kinetic effects. #Jointness #situationalawareness #technology

The execution by Daesh of a downed Jordanian F-16 pilot in 2015 highlighted the importance of personnel recovery in combat zones. In this post, Andrew Fisher argues that the Australian Defence Force can already take steps to develop a personnel recovery capability that will provide the force with an insurance policy for its people and capability. “By failing to prepare, you are preparing to fail.” – Benjamin Franklin Nobody likes paying for insurance. We all believe that ‘it won’t happen to me’ or that ‘I’m a defensive driver’. In most cases reason takes over and we part with our hard-earned money to buy some peace of mind that should the worst happen, we will be covered. Take that analogy and apply it to our military personnel and equipment. The Government, through the Defence White Paper 2016 (DWP16), is investing large sums of public money in state-of-the-art training, facilities, and equipment to maintain a capability ‘edge’ over potential adversaries. But where is the insurance policy that gives our personnel at higher risk of isolation and exploitation, such as Special Forces and aircrew, peace of mind that they will be covered in all operational environments– that we have the intent and capability to recover them? DWP16 notes that the Australian Defence Force (ADF) does not have a dedicated combat search and rescue (CSAR) capability and speaks of investigating options from 2023 onwards. It is vital to start confronting the question of personnel recovery (PR) in preparation for the delivery of that capability. It’s easy to ignore the need for an insurance policy when you haven’t needed it in over a generation. The conflicts that Air Force has been involved in since Vietnam have taken place in more or less permissive airborne environments. The moral obligation to recover our people established in joint doctrine since 2006 has not translated to a full-spectrum PR capability in the ADF. Recent experience has resulted in a focus on search and rescue, in permissive environments and a tendency to ‘fight the last war’ rather than prepare for the CSAR that is likely in the next high-end conflict. The example of the Jordanian F-16 pilot ejection and subsequent capture and execution by Daesh in Syria in 2015 serves as a stark reminder to both leadership and operators that something could go wrong on operations. Operations in that theatre also highlight Australia’s dependence on dedicated US PR capabilities in expeditionary operations. United States Air Force Pararescuemen of the 129th Rescue Wing move injured role players to the landing zone for extraction by HH-60 Pave Hawk combat search and rescue helicopter during Exercise Angel Reign 16, a CSAR exercise conducted in Townsville. [Image Credit: Department of Defence] This reminder is timely in the midst of the wholesale capability transition in Air Force, often associated with the term ‘fifth-generation Air Force’. Part of what this means is developing a force that is capable of maintaining a capability advantage rather than a numerical advantage over a range of potential adversaries. Personnel are operating more sophisticated and in most cases highly classified weapon systems. These weapon systems are driving an increased focus on force protection ‘in garrison’. Higher security clearances and higher classification rated facilities are some of the measures that are required to operate these weapon systems. So far, we seem happy to invest in broad force protection when operating at home but not necessarily when deploying forward. The acquisition of the KC-30A has enhanced our ability to project air power, but what happens when we leverage the air power characteristic of reach to penetrate contested or degraded environments? How are these enhanced force protection measures applied in a deployed setting and what if something happens when operating at the edge of that projection? Where is our insurance policy? A principle of search and rescue planning is that the time to rescue should be equal to or less than survival time. A corollary to this should be that in uncertain or hostile environments, the recovery of personnel in possession of highly exploitable information or equipment which provides that capability edge, should be achieved in less than the time that it takes to exploit it. By assuming that we’ll be covered by the United States, we are running the risk of not assuring the security of our advanced capabilities and failing our obligation to look after our people. Additionally, reliance on the United States means that we will not have an organic, expeditionary PR capability for unilateral or minor operations in our near-region that the United States may not support. Where do we start in developing a systemic approach to PR? The ADF has traditionally looked to how the United States does it, which is a useful starting point as it allows us to leverage decades of hard-earned experience. But as a comprehensive model it fails in the Australian context due to the size of our fighting force. It takes significant resources and genuine command commitment to have a dedicated PR force, a difficult proposition for a mid-sized force. This investment has to balance the likelihood of isolation and exploitation that personnel may face in future conflicts and the consequences to personnel and equipment of such events.  A dedicated PR capability is not something that can be stood up from scratch within the rapid deployment timeframe, for which Operation OKRA has become a benchmark. As a medium-term option, we can do everything as an organisation to ensure that our people are prepared for the worst case. We do have the ability to put those personnel identified at higher risk of isolation and exploitation through more robust survival, evasion, resistance and escape training. We have the ability to consolidate the functions of ADF PR into a single body to drive the capability with a single joint voice, rather than the piece-meal approaches that are currently being taken. We have the ability to shape joint and single service doctrine to make PR considerations more prominent and to start to make PR part of our DNA. Equally as important is that we shape our training so that the first time our aircrew experience a PR event either on the ground or from the air isn’t on operations. Royal Australian Air Force staff from the Combat Survival Training School demonstrate a combat search and rescue recovery during the Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape course at the Townsville Field Training Area. [Image Credit: Department of Defence] PR is an insurance policy for a fifth generation Air Force. By investing in a PR system in anticipation of the long-range CSAR options outlined in DWP16 we will be protecting the people and equipment that will ensure we maintain a capability edge into the future. Investing in a PR system tailored to our future PR needs will protect the people and the equipment that will ensure our capability edge into the future. Squadron Leader Andrew Fisher is a serving Royal Australian Air Force Air Combat Officer with experience in maritime patrol and joint personnel recovery operations. The opinions expressed are his alone and do not reflect those of the Royal Australian Air Force, the Australian Defence Force, or the Australian Government. #AirForce #AirPower #CSAR #Training

Is the Spartan a miniature Hercules or an oversized Caribou? Brad Drew argues the Spartan’s unique combination of capabilities means the answer is neither. Instead, the Spartan provides a niche capability that enhances Australian Defence Force (ADF) capabilities across a range of mission sets. The C-27J Spartan’s payload, range, and ability to operate onto soft, narrow, and unprepared surfaces  combined to provide a unique battlefield airlift capability for the ADF. As the platform progresses towards its final operating capability, the key challenge for the Royal Australian Air Force’s (RAAF) Air Mobility Group (AMG) is defining the scope of this capability. While the C-27J can conduct long range movements of cargo between large airfields, the C-27J’s potential will be optimised by focusing on what makes it unique: its ability to operate onto soft, narrow and unprepared surfaces. A Royal Australian Air Force C-27J Spartan from No 35 Squadron takes off from Walcha Airport during a training mission in September 2017. [Image Credit: Department of Defence] The Spartan was procured under a Foreign Military Sales agreement between Australia and the United States in 2012 to replace the already retired DHC-4 Caribou. Shortly thereafter, the United States Air Force elected to remove the platform from service, transferring a number of airframes to the United States Coast Guard (USCG) and United States Army Special Operations Command. This left Australia as one of the principal operators of the C-27J, with the RAAF’s ten airframes second only to the USCG (14) and the Italian Air Force (12). The acquisition effort under Project Air 8000 suffered several  setbacks, including delays in training crews and maintenance as well as a global shortage of spares impacting fleet serviceability. Following this, test and evaluation activities highlighted that the Spartan could not achieve the short field characteristics of the Caribou, nor carry large loads across long distances as efficiently as the C-130. These observations are obvious in hindsight – the C-27J is not a Caribou, nor is it a C-130. As the C-27J capability matured within AMG, the real value of a battlefield airlift asset such as the Spartan began to emerge – the ability to carry moderate loads onto soft, narrow and unprepared surfaces. The C-27J is the only aircraft in the ADF inventory capable of carrying a larger-than-helicopter sized load onto a soft narrow surface. Put a C-130 in a similar circumstance and it will either damage the landing surface or infringe on lateral clearance requirements due to the larger wingspan and wheelbase. Operating a Caribou or a rotary wing platform onto the same landing area will require a commitment to conduct multiple sorties and significantly reduce the range available both in to and out of the field. The acquisition of the C-27J opens up, for the first time, the ability to land on soft, narrow surfaces such as lake beds, roads and beaches whilst carrying a significant quantity of cargo over a large range. A comparison of C-27J range and payload against other ADF airlift platforms. The dashed line indicates reduced payload operations for the C-27J that offer an increase in allowable airframe stresses when manoeuvring in a tactical environment. [Author supplied] There are a number of areas where the unique characteristics of the C-27J enhance existing ADF capabilities. Australia is a widespread and sparsely populated continent and the C-27J provides greater reach to the military in order to effect Government objectives. The ability of the C-27J to access soft, narrow and unprepared surfaces allows an expansion of the current capability envelope around areas such as domestic counter terrorism, aeromedical evacuation and disaster relief missions. The ability to infiltrate and exfiltrate troops and equipment onto unprepared and austere surfaces will vastly improve the reach of domestic counter terrorism teams. Infiltration by airborne insertion with paratroopers is limited to the cargo that is able to be attached to the jumper or safely dropped using cargo parachute techniques. Road insertions can take time, particularly given the vast distances that may need to be covered during an operation in Australia. The C-27J is currently the only platform that allows a rapid infiltration of troops and sensitive or large equipment which cannot be airdropped onto a narrow, unprepared surface – such as a road or river bed – without accepting the increased risk of damage to the surface inherent with a C-130. Visualising terrorist activity in large, populated areas – such as major cities – is discomfortingly easy but there are other possibilities. Consider Banjawarn Station for example: located 350km north of Kalgoorlie, Banjawarn Station was at one time owned by the Aum Shinrikyo, a Japanese terrorist group responsible for the 1995 sarin gas attack on a Tokyo subway. Authorities believe that Banjawarn Station was used as a testing ground and possible production site for the gas used in that attack. An asset such as the C-27J could conduct a precise infiltration of personnel and equipment into a remote area like Banjawarn Station without the range and cargo limitations of a rotary wing asset, and without the risk to public infrastructure associated with using a C-130. Providing medical assistance in remote locations is another key challenge for the Australian Government. While Australia can boast a qualified doctor for around every 350 people within the country, this is heavily weighted towards the urban populace. Several initiatives exist to provide remote medical care – such as the Royal Flying Doctor Service (RFDS) – however all of these are constrained by budget and capability. A remote mass casualty event – such as a large-scale training accident within the Woomera Range Complex – is likely to encounter many logistical difficulties. With an overall size in excess of 122,000km2, the evacuation of multiple casualties from a particular location within the range would traditionally require rotary or vehicular support to deliver patients to an airfield, then a C-130 or other fixed wing aircraft to provide transport to a medical facility. The ability of the C-27J to access unconventional landing surfaces, such as roads and lake beds, offers several advantages. Operating directly to, or nearby, the incident site may remove the requirement for rotary or vehicular transport whilst providing a larger patient capacity than current RFDS aircraft. The C-27J’s ability to operate on soft, narrow surfaces also enhances Australia’s disaster relief capabilities. In the last ten years Samoa, New Zealand, Japan and the Solomon Islands have all experienced a tsunami while Australia and nearly every regional neighbour have been hit by a major tropical cyclone. When large quantities of water erode the underlying strength of a runway surface, it is difficult to anticipate how many movements an airfield can sustain before damage occurs. This is where the low pavement strength requirements for the C-27J excel; under unknown conditions, the C-27J poses the lowest risk for continued operation of any ADF platform that is able to carry a moderate sized load over a large range. Finally, by sharing the burden of air mobility across all available platforms – and focusing the right asset on the right missions – the ADF can maximise use of its air lift capability. The C-27J is not a small, twin-engine C-130 and although technically the successor to the DHC-4, it is not a Caribou. The Spartan has a distinct niche – the ability to quickly carry moderate sized loads a long way and operate onto soft, narrow surfaces. Exploiting this niche is the best way for the ADF to capitalise on the potential the Spartan offers. Squadron Leader Brad ‘Loopy’ Drew is a serving Royal Australian Air Force officer with experience flying the C-27J and the C-130J. He is currently the Executive Officer of No 35 Squadron. Squadron Leader Drew would like to thank Wing Commander Jarrod Pendlebury and Mr Eamon Hamilton for their assistance in producing this post. The opinions expressed are his alone and do not reflect those of the Royal Australian Air Force, the Australian Defence Force, or the Australian Government. #counterterrorism #aeromedicalevacuation #HADR #Joint #airmobility

In his previous post, Brian Weston described the RAAF’s transition from the Avon Sabre to the Mirage IIIO during the 1960s. The Mirage IIIO remained in operational RAAF service from 1965 to 1988. The transition from the second generation Mirage to the fourth generation Hornet began with the Government’s selection of the Hornet in October 1981. This post explores that transition. As Weston highlights, the Hornet transition involved more than simply flying a new jet, the organisational changes resulting from introduction into service of the new capability laid the foundation for the operational success of the RAAF’s air combat capability in 2003. A Royal Australian Air Force F/A-18A Hornet taxies back into the main air operating base in the Middle East Region following a mission in support of Operation Okra. [Image Credit: Department of Defence] Following-on from the Sabre to Mirage transition, after two decades of service, the RAAF replaced the Mirage IIIO with the F/A-18A Hornet. Unlike the preceding transition, the Hornet did not involve the vast broadening of capability conferred by changing from a day-fighter to an all-weather tactical fighter. The Hornet did, however, introduce a far deeper tactical fighter capability than was ever possible with the Mirage. Much of the capability gain came not just from generational and technological developments, but from the size of the Hornet which conferred immediate improvements in payload and sensors, especially radar aperture and power. The Hornet also improved on a major limitation of the Mirage, namely, its short range. Not that the Mirage was any worse than its 1950s peers; simply, the advance of time and technology gave the Hornet a 25 per cent increase. More significantly the Hornet was capable of air-to-air refueling, thus setting right some earlier conceptual thinking, when the RAAF asked Dassault not to equip the Mirage IIIO with single-point pressure refueling, on the basis that pressure refueling facilities would not be available at forward operating airfields. This decision had long term consequences, because even if the RAAF had later sought to modify the Mirage for air-to-air refueling, it could not be done easily as there was no single-point pressure refueling manifold within the Mirage into which to tap an air-to-air refueling probe. To these enhancements, brought about by greater size and an ability to refuel while in flight, can be added aerodynamic advances, digital technology generational advances, and the benefits flowing from the F/A-18A human/machine interface which set a new benchmark in fighter cockpit design. The RAAF had done well, and its promotion into a bigger league of tactical fighters was starkly evident when the first two F/A-18B aircraft were ferried to Australia, non-stop, across the Pacific. Given its 20 years of Mirage operational experience, the RAAF also had a solid foundation on which to introduce the new fighter. That expertise had been gained not only from the permanent deployment of Mirages to Malaysia, but also from an increasing participation in Australian and regional exercises, including deployments to the USAF Pacific Air Forces Exercise Cope Thunder, at Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines, commencing in 1981. Like the preceding transition to the Mirage, that of the Hornet also needed to be accomplished without any loss of operational capability. So when No 3 Squadron returned from RAAF Base (now Royal Malaysian Air Force Base) Butterworth to convert to the Hornet, a new Mirage unit, No 79 Squadron, was formed at Butterworth to meet Australia’s Five Power Defence Agreement obligations. During the Sabre to Mirage transition, No 2 (Fighter) Operational Conversion Unit was over-burdened, but this time it was tasked solely with Hornet training. And rather than establish another fighter training unit to assume responsibility for the ongoing Mirage conversion courses, as had been done for the Sabre to Mirage transition, the conduct of all Mirage operational conversions was transferred to No 77 Squadron–contravening the dictum that military training should always be carried out in training units, not operational units. No 77 Squadron also assumed responsibility for the Macchi MB-326H lead-in fighter training and for the conduct of the last Mirage fighter combat instructor course. All this, while maintaining its status as an operational fighter squadron. This was not a smart decision, as was evident when the unit’s aircraft establishment and annual flying rate grew to more than 40 aircraft and 11,000 hours per year respectively. After No 77 Squadron converted to the Hornet in 1987, No 75 Squadron followed. No 75 Squadron, which had been based in Darwin with its Mirages since 1983, then moved to the newly-constructed base at Tindal. The sole remaining Mirage unit, No 79 Squadron, was concurrently disbanded, thus ending two decades of Australian service by Dassault’s elegant fighter, and bringing an end to 32 years of a permanent RAAF fighter presence in Malaysia. The transition from Mirage to Hornet was completed in May 1989, along with the most significant reorganisation of RAAF operational units since World War II. This change amalgamated all of the RAAF’s tactical fighter units and air defence radars, irrespective of where they were located, into one operational group, the Tactical Fighter Group. The RAAF had successfully brought into service not only an outstanding tactical fighter but also a new system of functional command, changes that without doubt, contributed to the exemplary performance of No 75 Squadron in the Iraq War of 2003, where the unit successfully conducted air superiority, close air support and air interdiction operations. This piece was initially published in the April 2017 issue of Australian Aviation. Air Vice-Marshal Brian Weston (Ret’d) was Commander of the Tactical Fighter Group from July 1909 to July 1993.  He is currently a board member of the Sir Richard Williams Foundation. #AirForce #AirPower #technology

All too often air forces tend to associate solutions to capability problems with the use of high-tech, often expensive, fixes. In this post, Squadron Leader Michael Spencer uses the story of Beatrice Shilling to highlight that this should not be the case. Shilling’s simple yet effective solution to an engine design flaw that limited the performance of RAF Spitfires and Hurricanes during the early World War II air battles over France and Britain stands out as the exemplar of pragmatic problem solving enabled by technical mastery and creativity. The Battle of Britain made the legend of the Spitfire and the Hurricane. But despite the rightfully earned reputation of these exceptional fighters, they were not without their design flaws. One flaw, in particular, placed the British fighter pilots at a significant disadvantage against their Luftwaffe foes; a design flaw in the Merlin engine that limited the aircraft’s’ ability to perform negative g manoeuvres, forcing pilots to adapt to operational limits in their air combat manoeuvres. A technical solution to this problem was found by a scientist at the Royal Aeronautical Establishment (RAE), Miss Beatrice “Tilly” Shilling. Her relatively simple solution, fondly nicknamed “Miss Shilling’s Orifice”, significantly improved the combat effectiveness of the RAF aircraft and their pilots, and helped make a legend of the aircraft and an engineer. Beatrice “Tilly” Shilling [Image via University of Manchester] The performance of a combustion engine is mainly due to the amount of air and gasoline that flows into the engine cylinders, controlled by a float-type carburettor, under the force of gravity. The pistons combust the fuel/air mixture and energy is released to drive the propeller driveshaft. A weakness of the Rolls-Royce Merlin engines, the engines powering the RAF Spitfire and Hurricane, was a sudden loss of power from fuel starvation occurring in the gravity-fed carburettor whenever the aircraft nose was suddenly pitched slightly downwards in a quick negative g manoeuvre. If the negative g was sustained, the engine would stop completely. The ability to rapidly transition into a steep dive to either pursue or escape an enemy fighter was an important attribute for fighter aircraft. The Merlin’s loss of power as it experienced negative g disrupted RAF pilots’ efforts to line-up or escape a pursuing enemy fighter when engaged in mortal combat. This created issues during the Battle of France and the Battle of Britain. Their German foes did not face this same issue. Daimler-Benz engines installed in Luftwaffe Messerschmitt Bf-109s had been configured with fuel-injection systems since 1937. Mechanically or electrically controlled spray nozzles would pressurise the fuel and inject it directly into each of the engine piston cylinders. The pressurised fuel flow in the Messerschmitt engines were unaffected by negative g manoeuvres. This meant that a Luftwaffe pilot could simply “bunt” into a high-power dive to escape a Spitfire or Hurricane attacking them from behind. This provided the Luftwaffe fighter pilots with a critical manoeuvre advantage over the RAF fighter pilots. This RAF engine problem was solved in 1941 by installing a diaphragm, a metal disc with a small hole in the middle, designed by “Tilly” Shilling specifically to address the Merlin engine carburettor problem and stop fuel being forced upwards, away from the piston chambers, during a negative g manoeuvre. This modification enabled RAF pilots to perform steep dive manoeuvres without experiencing a loss of power or the engine stopping. The diaphragm was fitted across the carburettor float chamber to prevent the fuel from draining and starving the engine during a negative g manoeuvre. The simplicity of the diaphragm design meant it could be fitted to an engine while it was still in the aircraft at an operational airfield without needing to remove the carburettor. In early 1941, Miss Shilling travelled around England with a small work team to retrofit the diaphragms, giving priority to front-line combat fighter units. By March 1941 the diaphragm had been installed, as standard, throughout the entire RAF Fighter Command. Tilly became famous for her invention which was fondly nicknamed “Miss Shilling’s orifice.” “Miss Shilling’s orifice” was in service for two years, during which time Miss Shilling is recognised as having contributed to the RAF shooting down many enemy aircraft and also to having saved the lives of many RAF pilots. Improvements to the Merlin carburettor continued until the design incorporating “Miss Shilling’s orifice” was finally superseded in 1942 by the Bendix-manufactured pressure carburettors, which used a pressure system to negate the fuel flow problem completely. Although the Merlin engines are mostly known for powering the RAF Spitfire and Hurricane fighters, they were also used in the de Havilland Mosquito and Avro Lancaster bombers, Bristol Beaufighter, Fairey Battle light bomber, Halifax and Wellington Bombers, Boulton Paul Defiant II, and in the upgraded USAAF P-51 Mustang. Merlin engine production was finally concluded in 1950 after a total of nearly 150,000 engines had been manufactured. Tilly originally started work in 1936 as a technical writer at the Royal Aircraft Establishment (RAE) Farnborough, the research and development agency of the Royal Air Force. Six months later, she moved to the Carburettor Section of the Engine Experimental Department. In 1939, she was promoted to Technical Officer-in-charge of carburettor research and development. Apart from her professional interests in aerospace engineering, Tilly also had a pilot’s licence and raced motorcycles, including a Norton motorcycle that she had stripped down, rebuilt, and tuned herself. She continued to work at the RAE after WWII, working on projects including the investigations into the De Havilland Comet crashes, aircraft refrigeration, and providing scientific advice to the British bobsleigh team on their vehicle design. In 1948 she was awarded the OBE for her contributions to the war effort. Tilly retired from her post as Senior Principal Scientific Officer at RAE Farnborough in 1969 and received an honorary doctorate from the University of Surrey in the same year. Miss Shilling OBE PhD MSc CEng died in 1990. Tilly’s story highlights that solutions to critical technical issues can be relatively simple. The realisation of innovation in tactics and system designs will assist to maintain the viability of capability systems as the future environment unfolds throughout its lifecycle. Even the suggestion of a small hole in a metal disc can improve in capability. Workforces should be trained and educated in a way that promotes and supports innovation and disruptive thinking to constantly evaluate operational capabilities to push them to the limits of viability until new capability change can be justified. Squadron Leader Michael Spencer is currently serving at the RAAF Air Power Development Centre in Canberra, analysing potential risks and opportunities posed by technology change drivers and disruptions to future air power. His Air Force career has provided operational experiences in long-range maritime patrol, aircrew training, and weaponeering, and management experiences in international relations, project management, air and space concept development, air capability development, and joint force capability integration. The opinions expressed are his alone and do not reflect those of the Royal Australian Air Force, the Australian Defence Force, or the Australian Government. #Innovation #technology

The arrival of the RAAF’s first F-35A will see a generational shift in Australia’s air combat capability.  But this is not the first time that the RAAF has undergone a significant generational shift in capability.  In this post, Air-Vice Marshal Brian Weston (Retd.) reflects on the experience in transitioning from first to second generation fighter aircraft in the 1960s. With the fifth-generation F-35A Lightning II waiting in the wings and time soon to be called on the venerable F/A-18 Classic Hornet, it is timely to reflect on how the RAAF effected previous fighter transitions. The transition from the Australian-built Avon Sabre to the French Dassault Mirage IIIO involved a huge advance in capability from a day fighter to an all-weather interceptor, later developed into a (lightweight) all-weather tactical fighter. And while some operational profiles were carried over from the Sabre to the Mirage, especially when the sun was shining and the sky was blue, there was nothing in Sabre operational doctrine which compared with flying intercepts at low level, at night, over the thunderstorm-riddled Malacca Straights. Nor of flying all-weather, low-altitude night strike missions utilising the capabilities of the Cyrano IIB ground mapping radar, the Doppler navigation set, and the aircraft’s grid navigation system–a technology based on the Canadians’ CF-104G Starfighters in their all-weather, low-level, NATO tactical nuclear strike role. Dassault had designed a formidable fighter platform, as RAAF test pilot Squadron Leader Bill Collings demonstrated during tropical trials at Darwin in February 1964, when he took Mirage A3-1 to Mach 2.198 at 53,000 feet and Mach 1.3 at 77,000 feet. A 77SQN Mirage banking away, with a Matra missile underneath. [Image Credit: RAAF] The Mirage had an advanced integrated weapons system, albeit of analogue technology. The heart of this was a twin-gyro platform reference system which in the air-to-air mode linked the Cyrano IIA radar, the Matra R530 all-aspect semi-active radar missile, and the various facilitating (analogue) computers. To this was added the air-to-ground modes of the Cyrano IIB radar and a Doppler-enhanced grid navigation system. The Mirage’s flight controls also included an analogue fly-by-wire mode which when engaged, facilitated attitude hold, height lock, and heading hold, as well as reducing “transonic tuck”, an abrupt nose-up pitch when decelerating from supersonic speed. Ground school for the Mirage was a world away from the simplicity of the Sabre, generating the occasional cry from students, “we only need to learn how to fly the Mirage, not build it”. But their pleas were to no avail as “know your equipment” has always been a hallmark of RAAF aircrew training. Because the first fifty Mirage IIIO(F) aircraft had only an air-to-air capability, the RAAF initially converted Nos. 75 and 76 Squadrons as air defence only units. When No. 3 Squadron began receiving its Mirage IIIO(A) aircraft, with the Cyrano IIB radar, Doppler and supporting ground-attack systems, it was designated as an 80/20 ground attack/air defence unit, with a remit to develop the RAAF Mirage air-to-ground operational doctrine, tactics and weapons expertise. Simultaneously, No. 2 Operational Conversion Unit conducted the largest fighter combat instructor course since the course’s inception, with No. 10 Fighter Combat Instructor (FCI) Course having six students flying the Sabre and six flying the Mirage. The lessons from both 3SQN’s ground-attack prioritisation and 2OCU’s fighter combat instructor course were fed back into the Mirage operational conversion syllabus and the operational Mirage squadron categorisation schemes. The Sabre to Mirage transition placed a huge load on No. 2 Operational Conversion Unit as the unit was also required to conduct the introductory fighter weapons courses on the Vampire trainer/fighter, Sabre operational conversions, and maintain a de facto Sabre squadron known as “2OCU Transition Squadron”. In March 1970, the RAAF concluded such tasking was excessive, and those three responsibilities were spun off into a new unit, No 5 Operational Training Unit, whose heritage traced back to World War II. While the fighter force was in transition, the RAAF was also required to maintain two operational fighter squadrons at Butterworth, Malaysia, as part of the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve, and to convert those units from the Sabre to the Mirage. Additionally, Nos. 75 and 76 Squadrons had to upgrade their Mirages from air defence fighters to all-weather tactical fighters. Further demands were placed on the fighter community through a commitment to train Malaysian and Indonesian personnel prior to the gifting of refurbished RAAF Sabres to Malaysia and Indonesia. And while all this was going on, outside the fighter force, the RAAF was introducing Iroquois helicopters and Caribou STOL airlifters (both of which were immediately committed to the Vietnam War), C-130E Hercules transports, P-3B Orions, and Aermacchi MB-326H advanced trainers, and not too far away was the most complex aircraft the RAAF had ever operated to that time, the F-111C. It’s fair to say that, in the face of considerable institutional challenges, the transition of the RAAF fighter force from the Sabre to Mirage was a job well done. This article was initially published in the March 2017 edition of “Australian Aviation” Air-Vice Marshal Brian Weston (Retd), flew the Jet Provost, MB-326H, Vampire, Hunter, Sabre, Mirage and Hornet during his RAAF career. #Training #AirCombat #RAAF #AirPower #Mirage #Sabre #F35

We are privileged and excited to introduce our first Central Blue debrief with the Chief of Air Force (CAF), Air Marshal Leo Davies, AO, CSC. In his debrief, the CAF discusses the value of public debate and outlets such as the Central Blue in generating the airminded strategists necessary for Royal Australian Air Force to realise its potential as the world’s first fifth-generation air force. Central Blue (CB): Sir, thanks for taking the time to answer a few questions. What role do you think a forum like The Central Blue can play? Chief of Air Force (CAF): I, and the rest of Defence, need airmen that understand air power. But we also need airmen that can take their airminded perspective and think critically and creatively about how to develop, employ, and adapt joint forces to meet the nation’s needs. We need airminded strategists. When I took command in 2015, I outlined a commitment to ‘better enable the development of superior air power strategists and strategic thinking.’ One of the key ways to do that is for Air Force personnel to engage in intellectual and intelligent debate about air power, strategy, and any number of other topics. Developing and implementing strategies is an intellectually demanding task that is quite akin to engaging in thoughtful debate – both require you to think and communicate simply and clearly about circumstances that are anything but. Getting good at anything takes practice and I see things like The Central Blue and other blogs as a great way for people to practise developing and communicating their ideas. I particularly appreciate that The Central Blue provides a more accessible means of debate, for authors and readers, than submissions to formal journals. Thus, The Central Blue provides an important means of developing airminded strategists and strategic thinking. I thank the Williams Foundation for supporting The Central Blue and I encourage serving members to contribute to it and to similar forums. CB: Serving members are often reluctant to engage in public debate for a variety of reasons, including concern about repercussions about stepping out of line or putting an idea out there that might be wrong. What are your thoughts on this issue? CAF: Obviously, members of the ADF need to be mindful about the comments they make in public but I trust my people to exercise their judgement and discretion about what is, and is not, appropriate. You as editors have a role to play in that well but there is nothing that has been published on The Central Blue so far that has given me cause for concern. The posts on The Central Blue that have suggested alternative ways for Air Force to do things have been constructive and thoughtful. No organisation is perfect and there is no single answer to any question so I fully expect there to be different views. As for being wrong, well I have always found that to be a particularly useful way of learning! But more importantly, even something that people might tell you is wrong might just force them to reconsider their assumptions or preconceived ideas. The most important of the five vectors in the Air Force Strategy is the people vector and I have committed to modernising our education and training system. But not all education comes through formalised programs, and I think informal networking, reading, and writing is a critical part of Air Force’s professional development and education efforts. Our investment in formal education and training will be undermined if we prevent people from practising their skills and refining their thinking. I need Air Force people to engage in these discussions because the ideas on how we are going to execute the Air Force Strategy and position our Air Force to meet the challenges of the future can come from anywhere and anyone. Moreover, the strongest ideas are those that have been most thoroughly tested – and public discussion is the most competitive arena for ideas. The Central Blue is an unofficial outlet so nothing on this blog, aside from my own words, is endorsed by the Air Force, Defence, or Government — but that does not mean we won’t borrow from it! CB: That’s a great segue. You have explained how you see The Central Blue contributing to the development of individuals. What organisational benefits do you think the blog can generate? CAF: The organisational benefits of enhancing the public debate around air power and strategy are many. Public discussion increases external organisations’ understanding of the contributions of air power, and encourages Air Force personnel to challenge their own assumptions about air power and its role in national strategy. One of my priorities when I took command was having an Air Force that understood and could explain air power’s role in national security and The Central Blue is deeply engaged in that effort. Enhancing the cognitive capacity of our personnel by developing agility of thinking and individual initiative will be imperative in shaping the organisation’s ability to adapt to change. Future warfare will bring challenges to our way of operating that we must begin to articulate and consider now. Some of these will be unpleasant and difficult for the organisation to address internally – so an unofficial outlet like The Central Blue can provide a really useful avenue to kick ideas around without creating organisational churn. The Williams Foundation seminars have been performing this function for years so I see The Central Blue as a natural extension of that support. The Central Blue also flattens the structure and makes ideas and arguments accessible. There is no shortage of good ideas inside Air Force but we are a hierarchical organisation so it is difficult for people in one Force Element Group to see the ideas coming from another. I think The Central Blue is a really useful means of cross-pollinating ideas between the community of communities that we have in Air Force. I know that you guys are heavily involved with your counterparts at The Cove, and Grounded Curiosity, and are supporting the Defence Entrepreneurs Forum coming up in December. I mention those links because I think it shows The Central Blue is already starting to act as a hub for a professional network that crosses organisational lines. That is a great thing and is fundamental to our future success. CB: Sir, thanks again for your time. Any closing thoughts? CAF: Air power is not a static concept; rather it must be studied, reflected upon, debated, and challenged. As airminded members of the profession of arms, Air Force personnel have a responsibility to participate in this contest of ideas. It is far, far better that we should respectfully engage in that contest than to hide our thoughts, only to find them wanting when it matters most. The Central Blue provides a forum for those ideas to be proposed, evaluated, and debated. I congratulate you, thank the Williams Foundation for supporting the blog, and I encourage Air Force members to read, reflect, discuss and write on this forum and others like it. Air Marshal Leo Davies joined the Royal Australian Air Force as a cadet Navigator in 1979 and graduated to fly P-3B and P-3C Orion aircraft with No 11 Squadron at Edinburgh in South Australia. In 1987 Air Marshal Davies completed pilot training and after completing F-111 conversion course was posted in 1988 to No 1 Squadron at RAAF Base Amberley. His appointments include commands of No 1 Squadron and No 82 Wing, Australia’s Air Attache in Washington, and Deputy Chief of Air Force . He was promoted to Air Marshal and appointed Chief of Air Force on 4 July 2015.

In this post, our first serving Australian Army contributor — Captain David Caligari — argues collaboration across the Australian Defence Force (ADF) is imperative if we are to have the edge to fight and win future conflicts. Collaboration is built into our people — can we harness the potential this offers? The barriers to start a new crowd-powered service are low and getting lower. A hive mind scales up wonderfully smoothly. Kevin Kelly, The Inevitable Our ability to fight and win in a complex world depends on our people. More, in the 21st century, winning will depend on these people collaborating. The ADF must embrace a philosophy of collaboration. This means: collaborating to develop knowledge; collaborating to share and network that knowledge; and collaborating to constantly update and innovate with that knowledge. In short, the ADF must strive to create a Joint “Body of Knowledge”—a shared virtual reservoir of expert knowledge that is the edge to fight and win. The knowledge edge The future operating environment will be dynamic and require innovation to disrupt adversary actions. This disruption will not be determined by the presence of Joint Strike Fighters or advanced submarines, but by the ADF’s ability to ‘crowd-power’ knowledge and wield it to out-innovate the adversary. The ADF is not alone in this challenge. Knowledge is the lifeblood of organisations participating in the digital economy. For these organisations, their knowledge edge is their intellectual property. For the ADF, our knowledge edge will be obtained through the ability to share, access, and adapt the accumulated knowledge of our people. The Joint Body of Knowledge is the ADF’s digital memory. It is the repository of all the organisation’s documented information—including standard operating procedures, doctrine, and other information—hosted by an information management system. The software used for this system doesn’t matter; it could take many forms. However, the optimal information management system will be accessible, searchable, and manipulable. It will enable wide input, and fully leverage the ADF’s ‘hive mind’ so that its content is continually updated, and can be stewarded to indisputable accuracy. Tipping point The world is rushing towards information decentralisation and sharing—a trend Kevin Kelly argues was previously impossible due to technological constraints. The ADF is learning to engage with modern technologies enabled by information decentralisation. These modern technologies include the internet, before which there was no way to coordinate a million people in real time or to bring thousands of workers together to collaborate on projects. The ADF’s own mini-internet—our intranet—now holds the power to bring together our collective brainpower. The ADF is the crowd, or ‘hive mind’, that can be harnessed to develop, refine, and define the future direction of our organisation. The ADF is primed to embrace collaboration. The ADF’s people live in a world of sharing: whether it be what we are thinking (Twitter), what we are reading (StumbleUpon), our finances (Motley Fool), our social lives (Facebook), shopping (eBay), or going anywhere (TripAdvisor), sharing is becoming the foundation of modern life and culture. As the Ryan Report states, the majority of ADF personnel are “Gen Y”—digital natives who never knew a time before the age of the internet and the smartphone. In this sense, the difficult job has been done: the ADF’s workforce is positioned for change. As Major General Gus MacLachlan identified in his Command and Leadership Philosophy: “we sit in a world in which most of the Army’s soldiers [Air Force’s airmen, and Navy’s sailors] are familiar with the world’s largest car company [Uber] owning no cars… The game has changed.” Next gen professionals It is well-known that to remain relevant on the global war fighting stage, the ADF must be innovative. Correctly developed, the Joint Body of Knowledge will provide the launch point for innovation. As Brigadier Chris Field asserted in a recent article, improving collaboration is in fact the foundation of innovation. Collaboration is best done in the digital space. A digital Joint Body of Knowledge allows the basic skills, knowledge and attributes developed by individuals in training to become knowledge which can be accessed and critiqued by all. ADF personnel who learn to fire a weapon, steer a ship, or perform diagnostics on an airframe can use technology to contribute their expertise to the Joint Body of Knowledge. Each small contribution sharpens the knowledge edge needed to out-innovate the adversary. Conclusion The contemporary ADF serviceperson is built for collaboration. The ADF workforce is a hive mind which, in Kevin Kelly’s words, is decentralised power that is “fast, cheap, and out of control”. Modern sailors, soldiers, and airmen also have available intellectual capacity. They are giving to Twitter, Facebook, and TripAdvisor what they could be giving to developing operations within an Air Operations Centre, or helping to determine the size of the future infantry section. This capacity must be harnessed if the ADF is to remain competitive. Otherwise, we will fail to have the knowledge edge needed to fight and win the next battle for the sea, land, air, space, or cyber domain. Captain David Caligari is the Training Officer, Depot Company at the Australian Army School of Infantry. He would like to acknowledge his collaboration with Katherine Mansted, which has informed the perspectives shared in this piece. The opinions expressed are his alone and do not reflect those of the Australian Army, the Australian Defence Force, or the Australian Government. #organisationalculture #technology #Joint #Innovation #Jointness #lessonslearned