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Military exercises provide an opportunity to observe how Defence doctrine is put into action in the field. Here, Flight Lieutenant Emily Chapman provides lessons and reflections from her participation in the Tactical Air Control Party on Army’s Exercise BROLGA STRIKE. Exercise BROLGA STRIKE was the 3rd Combat Brigade’s Combined Arms Training Activity (CATA) conducted over the period 01 Jun – 16 Jun, including a Live Fire Exercise (LFX) component. Almost 3 000 personnel deployed to Townsville Field Training Area (TFTA) for BROLGA STRIKE, including 10 Air Force personnel who formed the 3rd Brigade Tactical Air Control Party (TACP). Air Liaison Organisation (ALO) personnel posted to 3 BDE, including the Brigade Air Liaison Officer (BALO), Battlefield Airspace Control Liaison Officer (BACLO) and Operations Officer (OPSO), were augmented by 44 Wing Joint Battlefield Airspace Control Officers (JBACs) and a combination of Permanent Air Force (PAF) and Reserve OPSOs for the duration of the exercise. The ALO represent the Air Commander and Air Force interests within Army and Navy through a permanent presence in Deployable Joint Force Headquarters, 1st, 3rd and 7th Combat Brigade Headquarters and the Amphibious Task Group. One of the capabilities it deploys is a TACP, which has responsibilities to DGAIR and a Brigade Commander, in the case of BROLGA STRIKE. With regards to DGAIR, the TACP executed air C2 and enabled the Theatre Air Control System (TACS). In support of Commander 3 BDE, the TACP ensured air assets were planned, tasked and controlled in a safe and effective manner that met Brigade air support requirements. ALO roles are critical during operations, with a key lesson from Operation FIJI ASSIST confirming the requirement for, and efficacy of ALO personnel as part of an ADF response. [1] [Image credit: Defence] A number of themes observed during BROLGA STRIKE are presented here as learning reflection and opportunity. These themes centre on mounting, integration, employment of Reservists, learning culture, and professional military education (PME). There is much more to the ALO and air-land integration than covered in this personal reflection piece. Mounting The TACP manning model draws together personnel from a disparate range of locations and with varying levels of experience, both within their category and / or working within a TACP. As such, a dedicated TACP mounting period is required to conduct Reception, Staging and Integration.[2] The duration of this period should be based on achieving specified outcomes, including equipment issue, training and safety briefs, vehicle and equipment preparation, communication testing and Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) rehearsals, but balanced with an appreciation of individual competency. A robust and structured program that is distributed prior to an Exercise is essential to the effectiveness of a TACP mounting period. Overall, a dedicated mounting period prepares TACP personnel to interface with Brigade Headquarters in a confident and competent manner while achieving internal TACP training outcomes. Integration A TACP deploys into the field as part of a Brigade HQs. This includes living in the field, and the use of Protected Mobility Vehicles (PMV) as transport and workspace. To fully integrate into a Brigade HQ, a TACP requires interoperable equipment, training, systems and vehicles. Progress made in this area has been considerable, with personal equipment (weapons and combat ensemble) now consistent between Brigade HQs and the TACP. However, there is an ongoing need to maintain technological pace with the supported HQ and this includes having organic assets, such as PMVs, fitted with key command and control systems such as the Battle Management System (BMS). Having dedicated RAAF PMVs equipped with interoperable systems supports the decentralisation of air effects, a key air power tenet. [3] Organic capability enables a TACP to be more self-sufficient, in-turn reducing the current reliance on Army in some areas. Reservists Reservist OPSO are a critical capability within Air Force and especially so within the ALO because they fill the majority of TACP OPSO positions during exercises. To deploy into the field, often with a new team every year in support of the Readying Brigade, these personnel are committed and driven. They also have strengths based on previous experience and areas of interest. During Brolga Strike, it was clear OPSOs were given roles and responsibilities that maximised outcomes for the TACP and the Brigade HQs based on a concept of employing personnel in roles that matched their strengths. Such an approach enhances team- building and morale, and supports ongoing Reserve commitment. Key to the ongoing value of this approach is appreciating Reservists’ strengths and defining roles and responsibilities, including the mentoring and knowledge transfer to permanent OPSOs new to working in a TACP. These defined roles will be essential into the future, especially the need to de-conflict the experience of long-term Reserve ALO OPSOs with permanent Brigade OPSOs who will rotate through the ALO as a posting. Organisational Learning Culture BROLGA STRIKE exercise design provided a learning environment in preparation for participation in TALISMAN SABRE (HAMEL) 2017 which was evident from the outset of augmentation. Subsequent reading of the 3rd Brigade 100 Day Assessment reflects that Exercise BROLGA STRIKE is one point in a broader Brigade culture where learning is Command driven. During Rehearsal of Concept (ROC) drills, Brigade leaders were observed to identify and apply experience from previous exercises. Learning exchange driven in this way visibly brings to the fore the benefits of knowledge capture, analysis and dissemination and supports the institutionalisation of learning practices. Critical to this process is distilling and implementing the knowledge that is transferable to the next exercise, task or operation. This level of analysis is supported by the Centre for Army Lessons (CAL), who was present during Brolga Strike, further reflecting learning culture within the Brigade. It will be interesting to compare the insights they derive from their collection with this opinion piece. A number of other learning activities were observed during BROLGA STRIKE, including mentoring during the planning process and 4 Regiment, Royal Australian Artillery facilitating access to the gunline for observers. In regards to the mentoring observed, it is the manner in which the mentoring was conducted. The environment developed by the mentor was calm, consistent and recognised people’s contribution. While two Courses of Action (COA) were developed by COA Leads, the environment was learning-focused and not competitive to get one plan up over the other. The tempo of the exercise supported this process, with time available for this mentoring to occur in a conducive manner. An example of this learning environment is being provided the opportunity to observe an artillery M777 gunline. This observation period occurred towards the end of the exercise, which provided time to understand the training scenario and how artillery is being used in support of manoeuvre by other Units and Battle Groups (BG). 4 Regiment conducted a 0300h serial and were on task for a 0730h serial. Observation of the gunline demonstrated a side of Army that Air Force rarely gets to see; resilient, skilled, committed and confident in the face of little sleep, no comfort and a lot of spear grass. Taking these opportunities builds an understanding of respective Service capabilities, which is the foundation of effective joint operations. The third learning outcome from BROLGA STRIKE came from within the TACP. Integration into the TACP commenced with the receipt of 3 BDE TACP ‘Commander’s Guidance’ for the conduct of the exercise, which included training lessons learnt. Internal TACP learning culture became evident during the Exercise. ‘No comms no bombs’ is a colloquial Air Force mantra, and in this context means the location of Brigade HQ nodes is critical for a TACP to control the air. The early and ongoing involvement of the TACP in Brigade planning is essential to achieve communications at respective nodal locations and this was identified as a training outcome of a previous 3 BDE exercise, Exercise BROLGA RUN. [4] Secondly, is the need for innovation when things don’t go to plan or when there is an opportunity to test a concept. The specific example during BROLGA STRIKE was the demonstration of a re-broadcast capability, which required a Brigade commitment to enable the TACP to test the concept and an internal TACP drive to achieve a successful outcome. Enabling the implementation of innovate measures reflects a robust learning culture, both within the TACP and 3rd Brigade. Air-Land Integration PME TACP capability is integrated into Brigade HQs, with varying constructs available. [5] To support building knowledge of 5th generation air capability at Unit and BG level, the inclusion of air capability briefs into Army Unit-level Professional Military Education (PME) programs may be beneficial. Such knowledge is useful when conducting BG planning, requesting air effects and integrating assets into manoeuvre during live exercises. Opportunities to work closely with Combat Training Centre (CTC) to further enhance air-land integration training outcomes and achieve a realistic and immersive training environment are being realised. [6] As such, air-land integration PME is one proposal within a much larger body of work. [7] In Conclusion A posting or exercise with the ALO provides a joint learning opportunity that cannot be derived from the current Air Force Professional Military Education Training (PMET) continuum. Working in a TACP develops competence and confidence to input air power subject matter advice in a high-tempo and challenging planning/execution environment. Air Force and Army personnel will take experiences from the Brigade-level into their future roles as leaders within their respective Service. As such, the relationships built and the exposure gained to land force capability is invaluable in an Air Force focused and committed to achieving joint outcomes. Ongoing Air Force involvement in Army exercises brings greater awareness of what we bring to the fight – and we bring a lot. A note of thanks to 4th Regiment, Royal Australian Artillery for hosting FLGOFF Mole and I during a training serial and SQNLDR Barnes for review of an earlier version of this piece. [1] Adaptive Warfare Branch OP FIJI ASSIST 2016 Lesson Collection Activity. [2] See also TACP Brolga Run16 – First Impressions Report [3] See Tactical Air Control Party Concept of Employment [4] See Exercise Silicon Brolga Strike 2017 Post Activity Report [5] See Tactical Air Control Party Concept of Employment [6] See Exercise Silicon Brolga Strike 2017 Post Activity Report [7] See Joint Fires and Effects Training within the ADF and 3 BDE Air-Land Integration Updated (Oct 16-Jun 17) FLTLT Emily Chapman is a RAAFAR Operations Officer posted to the Air Liaison Organisation. She has a broad range of domestic and overseas exercise and operational experience. She is concurrently a PhD Candidate at the UNSW at Canberra researching civil-military interaction during disaster relief operations. #Training #PME #organisationalculture #mentoring #Army #tacticalaircontrolparty #airliaisonorganisation #PMET #airlandintegration #exercise #lessonslearned

This week saw the Australian Defence Force (ADF) undertake its largest amphibious landing since the Second World War as part of its largest and most complex joint and combined exercise, Talisman Sabre. In this post, Wing Commander Paul Hay argues that the Government’s investment in airborne intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities presents the Air Force and the ADF with unprecedented opportunities to enhance land and littoral operations. But, he argues, exploiting those opportunities will take new thinking and new approaches. For a decade in the Middle East the Australian Army elements relied largely on US assets to deliver most of their airborne ISR support. The lack of dedicated capabilities in the force-in-being required the Royal Australian Air Force to provide support through a rapidly developed leased Heron unmanned aerial system (UAS) and the use of AP-3C maritime patrol aircraft in an overland role. Manning the Heron capability created some internal capacity and skill challenges, while AP-3C crews needed to maintain their maritime capabilities in addition to preparing for the overland role in the Middle East. After their operations in Afghanistan, the Heron workforce largely melted back into Air Force and the AP-3Cs largely went back to their core maritime roles. Thankfully, lessons regarding the importance of suitable and integrated ISR systems in supporting the land fight were learned. The Government has subsequently directed significant investment through the Defence White Paper 2016 (DWP16) to remediate this shortfall in the ADF’s organic ISR capability to support to land, and more broadly the amphibious forces. The DWP16 outlines an investment in a tiered suite of airborne ISR capabilities designed to integrate with, and support, land and amphibious elements (Figure 1). The planned suite of airborne ISR capabilities will include the long range ISR and electronic warfare (EW) aircraft operating at high level and long range, a tactical ISR platform providing support to special operations, and an armed medium altitude UAS providing persistent ISR and attack coverage, all integrated to deliver support in the land and littoral environments. The Defence White Paper 2016 outlines an investment in a tiered suite of airborne ISR capabilities to support land and littoral manoeuvre. [Image credit: author] These planned acquisitions present Defence with the opportunity to build and maintain an ‘ISR force by design.’ ISR is largely platform agnostic – rather it is about the combination of sensors, suitable and robust communications networks, processing, exploitation and dissemination systems, and a dedicated workforce of ISR professionals that understands the missions being supported. As such, these new capabilities being acquired necessitate a new way of thinking, not just in terms of operating the capabilities, but how we raise, train and sustain the entire integrated ISR force within a tightly integrated organisational command and control (C2) design. Air Force cannot possibly generate the desired outcomes or exploit these capabilities to their full potential by simply trying to continue to conduct business as usual. These are new capabilities that will provide a massive increase in ISR capacity and effects in the land and littoral environments and necessitate a revolutionary approach to our employment concepts. To be an integral part of our fifth generation Air Force, and effectively support Army and Navy, they cannot be operated in a legacy sense or the investment will be wasted. Army will no doubt be watching how we bring these capabilities into service and may well be asking themselves “is Air Force acquiring these new assets for Air Force, or to support Army?” As Air Force and Navy have learned over the past few decades, you can’t generate and sustain an effective airborne maritime surface and subsurface warfare capability overnight – it takes years. It requires an intimate understanding of Navy’s needs, what they are trying to achieve at different times in varying environments, acquisition of suitable sensors, equipment and weapons, all underpinned by a robust training system and a dedicated workforce. This same philosophy needs to be applied to providing support for land and amphibious elements. The transition from the amphibious task force afloat to the land environment is extremely complex undertaking and will require close integration of a number of assets and an intimate understanding by the Air Force elements to support the myriad of entities effectively. It will require a workforce that understands how special force operate, how Army’s combined arms teams’ manoeuvre and interact, and the different support requirements through the phase of an amphibious lodgement by both air and surface craft. This level of understanding will take years to generate. Supporting these operations will be reliant upon suitable and capable ISR sensors fit for the task and available when needed, appropriate and capable communications networks, and a suitably trained workforce that understands the land commander’s mission aims, scheme of manoeuvre and support requirements without having to be told. This cannot be an afterthought or a secondary task – it must be a primary role for those airborne ISR assets. Where AP-3C crews can readily identify naval vessels and understand the relative threat to a naval task group, the crews operating these new ISR capabilities need to be able to rapidly identify land threat systems and understand what that threat system means to the supported commander and his scheme of manoeuvre. Unfortunately there is no land-focused formation equivalent to Number 92 Wing, which specialises in understanding airborne support to naval operations. Thus, there is no organisation to own the airborne ISR support to the complex land and amphibious manoeuvre problem. Instead, this support is delivered through what essentially amounts to largely uncoordinated ad hoc support arrangements supplied for each discrete task. Exericse Talisman Sabre 17 offers a contemporary and timely activity for Army and the amphibious elements to consider how they would utilise these future ISR capabilities to support them. The planned acquisition of these ISR capabilities provides an opportunity to deliver on the Chief of Air Force’s vision for an integrated, joint Air Force. Given the majority of Air Force’s ISR capabilities will be located at RAAF Edinburgh, consider what we could provide to Army if we designed, from the ground up in consultation with Army and Navy, a dedicated formation consisting of the tiered overland ISR capabilities mentioned above to provide land and amphibious ISR support. This dedicated formation might include tightly integrated Special Operations Command, Army, and Navy personnel who are thoroughly invested in training and optimising the employment of those assets on operations. The Air Force personnel in this joint formation would become our experts in support to land and littoral operations, and would understand special operations, combined arms manoeuvre and amphibious operations. Soldiers from 2nd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment disembark a landing craft from HMAS Canberra during an amphibious beach landing conducted as part of Exercise Talisman Saber 2017. [Image credit: Department of Defence] The need to train a new workforce offers some additional opportunities to think differently and train differently, and perhaps look outwards at some of the latent capacity that exists in the community to assist. We might want to consider integrating Defence industry and academia into our ISR force design to assist us with experimentation, rapid ISR system prototyping and testing, training our workforce, perhaps even filling some of the ground analytical positions within our weapon systems to provide long term continuity. The collocation of Army’s 7th Battalion and 16th Air Land Regiment, Air Force’s G-550 long range ISREW aircraft, the tactical airborne ISR aircraft, armed MALE UAS, P-8A Poseidon, MQ-4C Triton, No 1 Remote Sensor Unit and Distributed Ground Station – Australia in Adelaide give Defence a potent suite of joint capabilities in one location. The proximity of Cultana, Woomera, and Port Wakefield training areas and maritime approaches offers opportunities for joint training in nearly all environments. This again provides an opportunity for new thinking – that whole region could be utilised as a joint ISR training and proving ground with the services tightly integrated with Defence Science and Technology Group (DSTG), state government, defence industry and academia as integral parts of the ISR system. Designed well, we could not only create a potent integrated ISR force, but could enhance it through these external partnerships essentially creating an integrated “ISR hub” in Adelaide. In a previous post, I offered some thoughts on how a dedicated training establishment for the non-commissioned ISR workforce would be beneficial. This training establishment could be extended to train every member of the precinct to develop a professional workforce, be it aircraft maintainers, information systems personnel or aircrew. Most of the fundamental training could be outsourced or partnered, with common training provided across the workforce and only weapon system specific ISR training required in operational conversion units. The Air Force has a unique opportunity to get it right and create the new structures to exploit integrated ISR forces early and well. Will we try to just fit these new capabilities into our current structures and processes, or will we take the time to review how our fifth generation Air Force needs to be structured, trained and sustained in order to support Army and the amphibious elements? Air Force could, if we take the time to think, grasp the opportunity and actually deliver to the ADF “an ISR force by design” tightly integrated with DSTG, defence industry and academia and a focal point for ISR expertise in Australia. Wing Commander Paul Hay is a serving Royal Australian Air Force officer. The opinions expressed are his alone and do not reflect those of the Royal Australian Air Force, the Australian Defence Force, or the Australian Government. #Training #commandandcontrol #RAAF #P8 #Army #UAS #AirPower #Joint #UAV #EW #ISR #LHD

In her post on joint professional development, Emily Chapman made a powerful argument for closer collaboration between single service outlets, in order to expand intellectual horizons and prevent silos of intellectual excellence. The teams behind Grounded Curiosity, The Central Blue and The Cove agree. We intend to work with Emily to implement some of her ideas and strengthen ties between our forums. We believe that challenging single domain identities and mindsets will help to develop our thinking. We believe that sharing knowledge across services at the junior-leader level, in a less formal way, will improve our individual and collective professional mastery. Opportunities for joint dialogue at this level will complement existing service and joint professional military education. We believe we will be stronger and smarter together. We believe we will be strongest and smartest if we unite in a manner that fosters diverse perspectives so that they may be harnessed to pursue a common goal. We think it is important to critically evaluate the depth and breadth of jointness we want to achieve, and what might be lost in the pursuit of this aim. Homogenous jointery can be harmful. Image credit: National Defense University Press Debate within Services, or sub-elements of Services, will still be required to explore mastery of individual domains, address specific issues, and – crucially – generate alternative views on common challenges. For example, we think the different perspectives on multi-domain operations coming from the US Army and Marine Corps, on one hand, and the US Air Force on the other are invaluable. A number of studies cite diversity of thought as one of the key factors producing quality decision-making, and without single-service mindsets, some of this diversity may be lost when we come together in the joint realm. With that in mind, we turn to Emily’s proposals. Provide visible links to like-minded websites.  The Cove has taken this feedback on board, creating a ‘Partners’ area to share links to like-minded sites, and Grounded Curiosity and The Central Blue plan to create similar pages. The editors will look for opportunities to cross-post each other’s content to broaden readership and increase the variety of issues covered. Create a centralised Australian Defence Force (ADF) website. Emily proposed an ADF website, possibly sponsored by Vice Chief of Defence Force Group, to collate debate across all domains and levels of war. While we feel the proposal has merit, we would like to explore the idea further to understand where it might have value. We are cautious about losing the autonomy and grassroots momentum of the sites in their current format, or discouraging debate on Service specific topics. This proposal also raises consideration of ownership and governance. Arrange a Postern Association workshop. The Postern Association, an Australian Army association which provides an informal and self-organised network for professional development, plans to hold a workshop to discuss inclusion of Air Force and Navy perspectives. In addition, the Postern Association has created an Air Force Liaison Officer position and is seeking Navy representation. Emily has agreed to take up a the position of Postern Association Operations Director, supported by Eli Blair and a great operations team, in order to implement some of her ideas directly – a great outcome for the organisation. Promote the annual DEF Aus Forum. Grounded Curiosity and Postern Association already provide great support to this event. The Central Blue will include a link to DEF Aus on its resources page, and will actively encourage its contributors to pitch their ideas in the annual forum. We thank Emily for her suggestions – they prompted robust discussions across Services and ranks about what we were seeking to achieve and the best way to pursue those aims. We think this kind of back and forth is exactly the sort of exchange that Grounded Curiosity, The Cove and the Central Blue should be fostering. We encourage others to be as forthcoming. #Jointness #PME #PMET #professionaleducation

If we are already swimming in sensors and drowning in data, what can we do to get our heads above water? Wing Commander Paul Hay argues that the key is not a new sensor, platform, or system but improving the management and integration of the information we already collect to create an Internet of ISR. Our collection management doctrine, processes and networks are based on tried and true Industrial Age concepts. But these may not be the most effective or efficient way to support our war fighters in the Information Age, much less the dynamic environment that we expect to find ourselves operating in the future. A large proportion of the world’s population can access information about anything via the Internet. Yet our systems impose obstacles that keep valuable ISR information from those people that need it the most, whether they be war fighters, analysts, or commanders. Perhaps we should reconsider the way we treat our ISR data and make it discoverable to anyone that has permission to see it. ADF collection management doctrine is centred on joint collection management processes whereby the myriad of customer collection RFIs are “racked and stacked” and apportioned to discrete collection assets. The assets collect against targets that present on the day, and pass the data to available processing, exploitation and dissemination (PED) assets. Each collection target is analysed and fused with other data as per the customer requirements in the RFI as a discrete task. The end product is sent to the customer in accordance with the dissemination instructions. The system is robust and proven to work for discrete tasks, but is also proven to be ineffective and inefficient at a macro-level. The system described above is hierarchical, centrally-controlled, and generally delivers product to a limited customer base. The current model is a Soviet-style planned economy. Contrast that system with something we all understand – the Internet. If you want to know something, anything really, just “Google it”. Google will search indexed data across the entire globe and return results in order of relevance. You get the answer you want; but you have absolutely no idea where the server that stores that data is. All you care about is that it is accurate and that you received the result in less than a second. Not only that, but a million other users on the internet could have asked the same question and received the same answer from the single piece of source data. Moreover, the system can suggest other information of relevance to you based on what other people’s searches. Why can’t we do that with our ISR collection to enable many timely decisions instead of just one? The answer to that may lie in our networks, our ISR doctrine and resourcing, and our ability to trust our collected data and our people. How much of the ISR data collected over time never gets analysed by a person? How much of that data might be of use to someone? How many people out there are completely unaware that a collection mission occurred in their area of interest? Multiple studies have shown that we are already “swimming in sensors and drowning in data.” Clearly we will never make all data available to everyone, but we should at least know that the data exists and be able to make it available to those that do need it. Our ISR concept should revolve around indexing data as soon as practicable and make it discoverable as early as possible. This may include make aircraft servers accessible while still on task, immediately on landing or when necessary on return to a main operating base. The figure illustrates how such a concept might function. ISR data made discoverable as early as possible. [Image credit: author] In a previous post I made mention of how we may better enable emergency services in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities. That may be a great place for Defence to start, but we should consider extending that to our war fighting networks. They need to be defendable, the data needs to be trusted, people need the right permissions to access it, and sufficient bandwidth must exist for the customer to ‘pull’ the data. Should we not be doing everything we can to enable the people need data to access data as fast as possible to make a decision? What if a young platoon commander just needs a picture of what’s on the other side of a river or road before his platoon breaks cover to cross it, rather than a fully annotated image outlining vehicles? Perhaps he trusts his own ability to determine if a vehicle is a sedan or a tank. At the same time as the platoon commander is reviewing this graphic, the system allows an analyst using specialised tools and skills to determine that the T-72 tank in the picture is a decoy. More importantly, the system allows both users to know that the other is looking at the graphic as well, suggest other relevant information, and provides tools for the users to exchange views in real time. One example of such a system – there are many in use around the globe – is the Defence Science and Technology Group’s Evolutionary Layered ISR Integration Exemplar Architecture (ELIIXAR). This developmental system enables users to run single searches and other services across a variety of ISR data sets. ELIIXAR provides the architecture that allows services, applications, and users to exploit diverse data sets as though they are one. Unifying data sets in this fashion enables the application of automated analytics to exploit the potential of ‘big data.’ It may enable analysts and decision-makers to reverse the current 80/20 split between looking for information and looking at information. Thus, it can dramatically improve the effectiveness and the efficiency of the ISR system. What if an ELIIXAR-like system was made widely available on land, maritime, and air platforms and ISR data was made discoverable as close to its collection point as possible? No person in the loop, no RFI – just rapid decision-maker access to information they may not have known existed, and certainly did not know how to find. Whilst this is no doubt a very simplistic view of what is no doubt a technically challenging proposition, the ever-diminishing decision cycles and war fighter needs may drive the solution for us. Wing Commander Paul Hay is a serving Royal Australian Air Force officer. The opinions expressed are his alone and do not reflect those of the Royal Australian Air Force, the Australian Defence Force, or the Australian Government.

In the final of his three-post series exploring the potential utility of podded capabilities for the Royal Australian Air Force, Squadron Leader Jimmy uses vignettes to explain how pod-augmented capabilities could be used to enhance air power’s contribution to operations. In my previous two posts I have highlighted the potential of ISR and Multi-Mission Augmentation Pods, and identified some practical options that could expand the utility of the Royal Australian Air Force’s current fleet. I close out my series by describing how I envision these capabilities could actually be employed. Conceptual Vignette One: Defence Aid to the Civil Community following a large scale natural disaster – C-27J equipped with an active electronically scanned array (AESA) and a tactical reconnaissance (TacRecce) pod There is a large and fast moving bush fire, akin to the January 2016 bush fire, that is raging between Mandurah and Bunbury in Western Australia. A C-27J is tasked to deliver emergency supplies to the airfield of a local country town that is hosting a large regional evacuation point. In addition to the required aid and supplies, the C-27J is equipped with an AESA pod and a TacRecce pod. Prior to launch the Air and Space Operations Centre (AOC) receives an update from the Western Australian Department of Fire and Emergency Services (DFES) on the situation, including the latest location of the fire front and an estimated location for the fire front when the C-27J reaches the area. Intelligence and ISR specialists in the AOC use this overview to quickly create a collection deck for the C-27J’s pods, which the pods’ on-board processors can automatically analyse and report against. The collection deck is emailed to 35 Squadron, the RAAF’s C-27J squadron, before the aircraft departs RAAF Richmond, New South Wales en route directly to the country Western Australia destination. As the C-27J comes into sensor range of the fire area the pods begin collecting against the collection deck. The AESA prioritises GMTI (Ground Moving Target Indicator) and the TacRecce pod images large swathes of the area. The GMTI collect is focussed on looking for traffic abnormalities; gaps in traffic activity on routes that were assessed to be open prior to launch, any areas of significant traffic activity within the fire zone and evacuated areas with vehicle activity. All of theses activities that are automatically identified by the pod systems, are internally cross-cued so that each report consists of MTI data and chip outs of SAR (Synthetic Aperture Radar), EO (Electro-Optic) and IR (Infra-Red) imagery of the activity of interest. These ‘point outs’ could identify areas or routes that have been closed by the fire that DFES are not currently aware of, or traffic jams caused by rapidly changing road conditions. The route assessment could also indicate routes still in local use, or unmarked secondary routes being used by locals that DFES may not otherwise have been aware of. The evacuated areas with vehicle activity could indicate isolated persons that are potentially at immediate risk, or looters. All of this automatically analysed and ‘flagged’ data could be data-linked off-board for human analysis and decision support. These analysts might be forward deployed with DFES or back in DGS-AUS (Distributed Ground Station-Australia) providing near real-time analysis and in direct communication with DFES. A bushfire closes a road in Western Australia in Jan 2016. Image Credit: AAP/DFES Upon landing at the isolated country airfield, whilst the supplies are unloaded, the unclassified geo-referenced and orthorectified TacRecce imagery, with an overlay of annotations based on the GMTI analysis is downloaded and disseminated along the lines suggested by Paul Hay in a previous post on this blog. Whilst on the ground, the Bush Fire Brigade (BFB) commander highlights that one of the areas of significant activity identified by the GMTI is under imminent threat from the fire front, and the fire has knocked out the telephone network in the area. After completing the unload, the C-27J heads directly to the threatened area whilst en route to Perth and changes the mode of the AESA pod from GMTI to a high powered directional Wi-Fi router. This Wi-Fi capability is used to send a message directly to any Wi-Fi enabled phones in the area, containing an imminent threat warning and route recommendation. After completing this activity, the C-27J lands in Perth and downloads all TacRecce data, with the appropriate annotations, for use by DFES at the regional level. This high resolution orthorectified imagery could be quickly added to geospatial tools on the ground to provide a post-disaster image overlay to extant imagery and mapping. It could even be added from the deployed environment or by DGS-AUS to open source geospatial tools such as Google Earth to complement open source and social media based disaster response activities such as Google Crisis Response. Conceptual Vignette Two: Operations in Iraq and Syria – SAR / GMTI Equipped KC-30 A SAR / GMTI pod is mounted via a replacement of a passenger door on a KC-30 in a tanker orbit over Iraq. The tanker orbits above northern Iraq for at least four hours. A Royal Australian Air Force KC-30A Multi Role Tanker Transport returns from a mission over Iraq. [Image Credit: Commonwealth of Australia] The sensor independently collects against a pre-planned collection deck without impacting the tanker’s primary task. SAR change detection is used to monitor locations of interest for activity every 15 minutes. When it detects changes, such as the arrival of vehicles, a geo-referenced and time stamped chip out of the relevant before and after images is sent to an ISR Duty Officer (ISRDO) in the Combined Air and Space Operations Centre (CAOC) for follow up. Concurrently, once a baseline understanding of activity has been established, automated pattern analysis of the GMTI data for significant changes in pattern of activity is applied. Automatically generated indications of a change in activity could be used to internally cue a SAR image of the location of interest; a chip out of the MTI data of interest, the assessment of activity and an accompanying SAR image of the location could be sent via the KC-30’s SATCOM to the ISR Operations Duty Officer in the CAOC for intelligence fusion and further investigation. This could include activity in areas of low civilian population on routes assessed to be used by threat actors for resupply or attack preparation. The GMTI collect is also uploaded to coalition GMTI databases in real-time for retrospective analysis, which could provide significant value in understanding traffic patterns, the status of known and unknown routes and potentially curfew times in threat areas. Dare to dream; Ad Astra! Squadron Leader Jimmy is a current serving RAAF Intelligence Officer. The opinions expressed are his alone and do not reflect those of the Royal Australian Air Force, the Australian Defence Force, or the Australian Government. #AirPower #Innovation #ISR #technology

In its first century, air power established itself as an indispensable component of any effective military force. In this post, Dr. Sanu Kainikara asks what the next step-change will be that will guide the development of air power into its second century. In the past few decades, air power, and its application as a weapon of war or force projection capability, has seen an enormous improvement in capabilities. In keeping with the current global ethos of avoiding excessive use of force while fighting a war, air power now has the ability to deliver extreme destructive power with precision, proportionality and discrimination. Based on this capability, air forces have also developed into deterrent and coercive forces second to none. Considering that the military employment of air power is only a century old, these are great achievements. Even so, military forces are continually looking to improve their effectiveness through fine-tuning already sharp force application capabilities. This brings out the question—how much more effective can air power become? The answer is not straight forward and the term ‘effectiveness’ needs to be understood in a nuanced manner to arrive at a reasonably argued answer. Effectiveness—the ability to serve the purpose or produce the intended or expected result—in air power terms involves not only the ability to create the necessary effect, but to do it while minimising the chances of own forces being placed in danger. Therefore, the increasing efficacy of the application of air power has to be tempered with ensuring that the safety of own forces is also assured to a minimum accepted level. This dual requirement led to the development of uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs) that have now become armed with precision strike weapons to become uninhabited combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs), a misinterpretation of the word ‘combat’. The X-45A Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV) technology demonstrator on its sixth flight on Dec. 19, 2002. [Image Credit: NASA] The introduction of UCAVs into the battlespace opened a hitherto unknown and un-investigated arena of military operations. Not only were there technological hurdles to overcome, but a whole plethora of moral, ethical and legal aspects of warfare also started to be questioned. At the beginning, the UAVs were considered to be purely intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, which could be employed in benign airspaces where long-term ISR collection was required. By arming them, the technologiclly advanced military forces changed the existing equation of applying lethal force. Going back to the primary reason for the introduction of UAVs, the need to safeguard one’s own combatants, there should be no argument regarding the arming of these vehicles. However, the so-called ‘drone strike’, a misnomer if ever there was one, has become an emotive issue not only with the people at the receiving end of the strike but also with the ‘politically correct’ media. Why is this so? Before analysing this, it has to be stated here that an air strike can now be carried out with equal efficiency and precision by either a manned fighter or a UCAV. The only difference is that the human in the decision-making loop that permits the release of the weapon is placed at different places in each case. In the case of the manned fighter, the human is at the sharp end of the loop whereas, in the case of a UCAV, the human is almost at the beginning of the loop. In other words, in one case the human is placed in immediate danger while in the other, there is no danger to the human from the reprecussions of the actions that are being initiated. If there is no danger to own forces in the second case then why is there such a hue and cry regarding strikes carried out by UCAVs? Here, the survivability of the UCAV in a contested air space, because of its low speed, restricted manoeuvrability and lack of self-protection measures, is not being analysed since it is extraneous to this discussion. The fundamental reason for the discomfiture with the use of UCAVs is the fact that in the majority of cases, the opposing parties do not have air power capabilities and therefore such strikes are considered unethical. When the instances of collateral damage are added to the dialogue, the pendulum of public opinion decisively swings away from the use of UCAVs and air power. The real reason, however, is that in most of the Western democratic nations, the public opinion regarding national security and the employment of defence forces has been dominated by left-wing, anti-war groups. Once again, this discussion does not need to go into political debates and is curtailed here. The Falcon HTV-2 (Hypersonic Test Vehicle) on the upper stage of the launch vehicle after jettisoning of the payload fairing [Image Credit: DARPA] So what is going to be the next breakthrough in terms of air power efficacy? Currently, the accuracy achieved by air-launched weapons, the clarity of airborne ISR and the global reach of air transportation are such that no further improvement seems possible or warranted. There can definitely be improvements in the speed with which response options can be provided and delivered. The realm of hypersonic flight is already very close to becoming reality. The next step change in the functioning of air power and related systems will take place when artificial intelligence (AI) becomes operational and is accepted as such. This statement needs clarification. AI is already a reality in many applications. However, complete autonomy has not yet been granted to AI in the case of weapon release functions. It is also true that AI has already proven to be fail-proof when tested under controlled conditions. There are many reasons for AI not being granted complete autonomy—capable of individual thought and decision-making rather than a pre-programmed response—the fundamental one being the question whether it is ethical to permit a ‘machine’ to make the decision whether or not a human being is to be ‘killed’ or eliminated. In the case of fully autonomous airborne systems, further complications arise. In combat situations would it be ethical for a manned fighter to be destroyed by a ‘machine’? Would it be possible to program the machine only to destroy another machine, and in that case, does it mean complete autonomy for the AI? The question of legality in the use of fully autonomous combat systems is another area that has not been clarified. In fact, the process of creating laws that could govern the use of AI has not even got under way and there is certainty that under the current geopolitical environment, agreement will not be reached. In these circumstances, where ethics are being questioned and there is no legal coverage for its employment, it is highly unlikely that AI will be employed to its full capacity in the near to mid-term future. In turn, it would mean that developments in air power capabilities and more importantly in its application will remain curtailed for the foreseeable future. Yes, the missiles will go further; space will become more pervasive; airborne platforms will fly faster, compute solutions at a much more rapid pace; and air power will entrench its place as the first-choice weapon in the vanguard of power projection. However, these are but refinements of what air power already does. For example, when hypersonic flight becomes a normal reality, how much more effective will air power become? A reasonable answer would be, not by very much from what it does now. The future of air power is going to be the same as it is today unless the next step-change takes place—AI is going to be the next technology that elevates air power further into being the most potent capability that the human race has yet invented. Dr Sanu Kainikara is the Air Power Strategist at the Royal Australian Air Force’s Air Power Development Centre and an Adjunct Professor at the University of New South Wales. He is a former fighter pilot of the Indian Air Force. The opinions expressed are his alone and do not reflect those of the Royal Australian Air Force, the Australian Defence Force, or the Australian Government. #artificialintelligence #UAS #drones #AirPower #technology #Innovation #UAV #CollateralDamage

‘Podded’ capabilities have the potential to significantly increase the flexibility of Air Force assets across a range of traditional and emerging roles. In this second of a three-post series, Squadron Leader Jimmy explores collection options other than full motion video (FMV) that could enhance platform utility and flexibility with minimal interference to traditional mission sets. In the previous post I discussed the potential utility of mission augmentation pods to provide the Australian Defence Force with an expanded mission capability for aircraft that are not currently ISR capable. TacRecce TacRecce has been a capability gap for the ADF since the retirement of the RF-111C in 2010. Contemporary TacRecce refers to photographic reconnaissance conducted by tactical aircraft within the operational theatre. Current TacRecce capabilities include the US Navy Super Hornet with ‘Shared Reconnaissance Pod’ (SHARP) or RAF Tornado GR4 with Reconnaissance Airborne Pod for TORnado (RAPTOR). TacRecce continues to be a high demand asset in recent and contemporary operations such as Libya, Afghanistan and the fight against Daesh, for reasons explained below. TacRecce is also regularly used in the UK to provide a rapid response imagery capability to support flood emergency response activities; Figure 1 below shows one such example from 2014. It is worth noting that despite the common perception of the ubiquity of satellite imagery, the US continues to maintain the U-2 in service with both the Senior Year Electro-optical Reconnaissance System-2 (SYERS-2) and the Optical Bar Camera (OBC), as their flexibility in tasking, coverage and resolution are still unmatched. The USAF is currently trialling a next generation SYERS sensor on the RQ-4 Global Hawk to ensure continuity of this capability. Figure 1: Electro Optical Image from RAPTOR Reconnaissance Pod on RAF Tornado Jet of UK Floods in 2014. [Image Credit: Crown Copyright, UK MOD] TacRecce provides a rapid response, wide area, high resolution Electro-optical and Infra-Red (EO/IR) imaging capability. Threat dependent, the Collection Management Authority could dictate exactly when collection is conducted, what time of day, what slant angle and azimuth and potentially re-visit the target multiple times per hour, based on the requirements of the supported commander. TacRecce can also get in under cloud in cases where satellites are unable to. Collection can be overt or discrete depending on the profile flown by the platform; the target stand off of late 1990s standard TacRecce sensors for imaging facilities could be up to 70nm. Due to the nature of the sensors, essentially large aperture cameras bolted to an aircraft, the imagery can quickly and easily be released at ‘Unclassified’ for release to Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), foreign partners and the media. Multi-spectral Imaging, such as that on the U-2 SYERS-2 system provides further advantages to the TacRecce capability that I will not delve into here. Full Motion Video (FMV) sensors provide a high resolution but short ranged video of an area through a ‘drinking straw’; a good TacRecce sensor rapidly gathers a snapshot of a vast swathe of the surface at very high resolution. As a mission augmentation capability on a C-17, C-27 or C-130, a TacRecce pod could provide significant value in a number of scenarios. Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) and Ground Moving Target Indicator (GMTI) Radar has a significant advantage of range and coverage over FMV sensors, to an even greater extent than EO/IR TacRecce pods. Pods are already on the market that use SAR to provide collection deck based autonomous SAR imaging supported by image recognition and change detection technology on board. One such system designed for combat aircraft, the ELTA ELM-2060P, advertises a range of 90nm for collection; compared to around 10-20nm for FMV sensors. SAR provides a high resolution, extremely accurate, all weather and long stand off capability. SAR imagery can capture very large areas in a very short time frame; with appropriate interpretation these extremely accurate geo-referenced images can be used as a snapshot to quickly identify changes in an area from the baseline mapping; Figure 2 shows an example of SAR being put to use in support of emergency services in the UK in 2014. Figure 2: Flooded area analysis of the Thames Valley and Hampshire, UK generated by Synthetic Aperture Radar imaging provided by a Sentinel R1 sortie over Somerset. [Image Credit: Crown Copyright, UK MOD] SAR pods have an additional capability that could be of use in a broad range of ADF scenarios: GMTI. GMTI uses the radar to detect and track moving vehicles over a relatively very large area compared to the sensor. This capability has seen broad combat applications from tracking Saddam Hussein’s army in 1991 and 2003 through to identifying insurgent patterns of life and activity in Iraq and Afghanistan throughout recent and current campaigns. Figure 3 gives an idea of the area that dedicated SAR/GMTI systems collect; the image indicates an approximate coverage area of 150 x 150 km square for an operator’s screen for the USAF E-8C Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS). A SAR / GMTI capability in a mission augmentation pod on ADF air mobility and maritime platforms would be significantly smaller than on JSTARS, but could be of significant value in domestic situations, as well as those in overseas military and disaster relief scenarios. Figure 3: USAF E-8C Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System coverage in Operation Desert Storm [Image Credit: Northrop Grumman] When considering ADF employment scenarios for mission augmentation pods beyond FMV, TacRecce or SAR and GMTI offer minimal-interference capabilities to augment an aircraft’s primary role, rather than a ‘re-roling’ of the platform. Collection capabilities at range would provide a significant number of non-interference collection opportunities from the planned and actual route of an aircraft; significantly more than could be collected by shorter ranged sensors like FMV. A stand off range of 70-90nm provides vastly more opportunities for non-interference collect than one of 10-20nm. In the next post post, the final of the three-post series, I will contextualise the potential of mission augmentation pods through the use of two vignettes that describe how the introduction of such pods could support  ADF operations. Squadron Leader Jimmy is a current serving RAAF Intelligence Officer. The opinions expressed are his alone and do not reflect those of the Royal Australian Air Force, the Australian Defence Force, or the Australian Government. #AirPower #Innovation #ISR #technology

‘Podded’ capabilities have the potential to significantly increase the flexibility of Air Force assets across a range of traditional and emerging roles. In this first of a three-post series, Squadron Leader Jimmy explores the concept of ‘podded’ capabilities and how they may increase the utility of aircraft assets across the full spectrum of operations, regardless of their ‘primary’ mission role. The concept of introducing flexible additional capabilities into the battlespace, raised by Paul Hay in his post “Are we missing out on valuable ISR opportunities?” is an excellent one. A range of ‘podded’ collection and enabling capabilities have the potential to enhance the joint force tangibly. This post is the first of a three-part series that develops the discussion of the utility of modular mission augmentation capabilities beyond Full Motion Video (FMV). More specifically, this and subsequent posts will explore the idea of augmenting a platform’s existing mission set, rather than re-casting the platform in a separate air power role. These concepts could provide a significant boost to joint force capability with minimal interference to the airframe, training, operations and primary tasking of the platforms involved. I will use the term ‘pods’ throughout to collectively refer to pod, modular and roll-in/roll-off capabilities. An FMV feed into a Royal Australian Air Force C-17 Globemaster was an early initiative of Plan JERICHO [Image Credit: Commonwealth of Australia] Airborne ISR with FMV has been a revelation to global militaries over the last ten to fifteen years, but it has left a legacy of commanders and warfighters that are conditioned to having this capability overhead and watching their every move. There is absolutely a time and a place for such requirements, not least in Special Operations. FMV is excellent for providing intimate support to the current engagement; it is a visible, tangible contribution to the ‘current fight’ and surveillance. Supported ground forces innately understand the basic images available through the feed and can ‘see’ themselves and the enemy. However, FMV is rarely a tool of choice for timely and predictive decision advantage; at least with current analytical tools. It lacks stand-off range and requires that the platform remains on station for extended periods. There is a range of capabilities that provide significant utility to the joint force and complement the capabilities of FMV, in particular, ISR and multi-role mission augmentation pods. In this post, I explore the potential utility of ISR and multi-role mission augmentation pods. In the second post of the series, I take a deeper look at some options that would realise this potential. The final post rounds out the series by providing vignettes on how mission augmentation pods may feature in the future battlespace. The potential of podded capabilities For ISR mission augmentation pods there are some clear candidates, the most promising of which are photographic Electro-Optical and Infra-Red Tactical Reconnaissance (TacRecce) and radars with Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) imaging and Ground Moving Target Indicator (GMTI) capability. However, ISR is certainly not the limit for mission augmentation pods; the capabilities that show the most potential are truly multi-role, not just simply ISR augmentation. There are three core ways of making mission augmentation pods ‘multi-role’; either to pack a number of sensors or other capabilities into one ‘pod’, to include a single device that is capable of conducting a number of tasks, or to create a pod with an architecture capable of rapid reconfiguration by ‘swapping’ sensors or devices. The challenges of a future congested and contested communications environment provide significant opportunities for development in multi-role augmentation. Pods are already in service with other nations that combine a number of capabilities in one package; one area where this has already shown potential is for enhancing the communications capabilities of the joint force. Examples of useful pod communications node capabilities include relay, bridging, and data-translation across domains and dissimilar networks, including Line of Sight extension and a gateway between Beyond Line of Sight and tactical Line of Sight communications. According to open source, the US currently fields a pod called ‘TALON HATE’ that combines an Infra Red Search and Track (IRST) system with tactical communication bridging and datalink fusion. The IRST provides an instant capability enhancement to 4th-Gen fighters by giving the host platform a capability to track and target threats without using radar. The TALON HATE capability also provides a communications bridge between stealthy 5th-Gen data-links and those used by the rest of the force, including Link-16. This type of capability provides a significant force enhancement for the future fight; this allows 5th-Gen systems to combine the strengths of their sensors and stealthy penetrating capabilities with the firepower and diverse capabilities of older generation air power. Such capabilities might be as useful under the wing of a KC-30 or E-7 operating in an orbit as they might under the belly of an F-15C. Perhaps the systems that offer the greatest potential to deliver truly dynamic multi-role effects to enhance the capabilities of a 5th-Gen joint force are Active Electronically Steered Array (AESA) radars. AESAs can provide true ‘multi-role’ effects in a single radar; they have the potential to conduct a broad range of radar and communications tasks. The SAR and GMTI tasks that I have already described are within the capabilities of an appropriately designed AESA. So too are passive radio-frequency surveillance, Electronic Counter Measures or Electronic Attack roles. In a trial in 2007, an F-22 RAPTOR AESA transmitted and received at 274-megabits per second to a ground station. The demonstration included the transfer of a 72MB SAR image in 3.5 seconds; this would have taken 48 minutes using Link 16. An AESA, therefore, has the potential to deliver some of the capability of the communications node pod, and much more besides. An AESA that has the capability to conduct even a few of these capabilities would be truly multi-role and a useful and flexible capability for the joint force. Training, mission planning, communications and exploitation Before I delve into a discussion of potential ISR mission pods, I need to deal with the foundational elephants in the room, namely the training, mission planning, communications and exploitation elements of any new systems. As the comments in response to Hay’s post suggest, there is a danger of overmatching the training capacity of fleets with the distraction of additional mission sets; the emphasis should, therefore, be on finding capabilities that can complement the extant role of the platform with minimal role training requirement. The impost on aircrew, tasking authorities, communications networks and human analytical capacity would be a significant consideration for these capabilities. To mitigate these as much as possible automation and programmable prioritisation will be key. There is a spectrum of integration with the platform, from a ‘sealed box’ that simply requires power through to a system that is fully integrated with the aircraft. The ‘sealed box’, with uploaded machine-machine tasking from the Collection Management Authority and data off-boarded for exploitation, would provide the easiest capabilities for fleets to integrate into their routine operations. This type of system would be as close as possible to a ‘non-interference’ capability for the fleet. A ‘sealed box’ approach would require a mind-set change for Collection Management Authorities; there might be no ‘Priority 1’ collection requirements on a Collection Deck assigned to an ISR augmented platform because those are tasked to dedicated assets. The deck for the augmented platform might only include tasks that would otherwise not get supported; it might also cover requirements better serviced by sustained collect for seven hours rather than a single collect. At the other end of the spectrum, fully integrated systems would likely introduce complexity into mission planning, real-time sensor management needs and human analysis, either on-board or in networked direct support to the system. It is reasonable to assume that ‘sealed box’ pods would not yield the level of data or responsiveness that the fully integrated systems could, but ‘sealed box’ systems offer some capability at a much lower financial and temporal cost, allowing it to be spread more widely across Air Force. In addition to procedural considerations, there are some technical issues that would need to be addressed in the ‘sealed box’ example. As there would be no crew interactions with the equipment, sensors might need to be provided with prioritised and standardised machine-readable collection decks from the Air and Space Operations Centre (AOC) or other responsible Collection Management Authority. The sensor system would need to be able to automatically mission plan and manage the subsequent collect, adjusting and seizing opportunities based on the planned and executed flight plan, independent of mission crew input. Aircrew could simply retain the power management and safety responsibilities. This is not an aspirational technology; the Rafael RecceLite, a TacRecce variant of the popular LITENING Targeting Pod, can already do the key parts of this. Litening III Advanced Targeting pod fitted to a Royal Australian Air Force F/A-18A Hornet [Image Credit: Commonwealth of Australia] In future congested and contested electromagnetic environments, militaries will not have an unlimited degree of bandwidth or intelligence analysts. The logical response could, therefore, be for the sensor system to include on-board processing, such as image recognition, automatic change detection or pattern analysis that could highlight data that corresponded to the Essential Elements of Information (EEIs) tasked in the collection deck. If the pod had an organic communications capability or access to one via the host aircraft, it could then transmit ‘chip-out’ extracts of the relevant information to analysts or even Link 16 messages with text containing EEI related information to the appropriate decision makers. Again, this technology already exists; a Canberra-based not-for-profit UAV club has successfully used this type of capability on their home-built UAVs to win major international UAV challenges since 2012. In the next post, I will look at two possible mission augmentation options that could potentially realise the capability advantages described above. Squadron Leader Jimmy is a current serving RAAF Intelligence Officer. The opinions expressed are his alone and do not reflect those of the Royal Australian Air Force, the Australian Defence Force, or the Australian Government. #SAR #technology #Innovation #EW #GMTI #ISR

The War in the Sand Pit conference was held 12-13 May 17 to examine perspectives and lessons from Australia’s wars in Afghanistan and Iraq between 2001 and 2014. Hosted by Military History and Heritage Victoria and Australian National University’s Strategic & Defence Studies Centre, the conference addressed  a range of perspectives from speakers with experience  in the political, Governmental and military dimensions of Australia’s involvement in the Middle East and South Asia. The conference was held in memoriam for Private Robert Poate, who was killed on operations in Afghanistan in 2012. The conference opened with discussion of the political decisions that led to Australia’s commitment to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Hon. Robert Hill, Minister for Defence from 2001-2006, recalled that the initial commitment to Afghanistan was not controversial, and that while nation-building efforts are ‘costly and frustrating’, they ‘remain our business’. Former Secretary of Defence Ric Smith also spoke of the decision to contribute forces to Afghanistan, and how the original intent had been for a limited commitment – for Australian leaders the war had been about terrorism, Afghanistan was just the venue. Australian Special Forces board a C-130 Hercules, Afghanistan [Image credit: Defence] On the Iraq War, conference presenters covered controversial issues: the absence of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the US decision to disband the Iraqi Army and Ba’ath Party, the failure to plan for ‘Phase IV’ stability operations, and poor perceptions of the Australian Army’s performance in that war. There was some debate over Australia’s contribution to Overwatch Battle Group-West (OBG-W), with Brigadier Rawlins calling the deployment ‘confusing’, ‘disappointing’ and ‘professionally disheartening’, while others responded that the Australian troops carried out the mission they were assigned, that success shouldn’t be measured in terms of casualties and that it was not the job of Australian units to impress coalition commanders. The whole-of-government nature of the Afghan war was a theme of the conference, with valuable perspectives provided by police, development and policy practitioners. Lieutenant General Peter Leahy (retd), who was Chief of Army between 2002 and 2008, indicated that diplomacy should be used as a tool of state before the military. To make diplomacy a more effective tool of first resort, more money needed to be allocated to Department of Foreign Affairs & Trade (DFAT) to support shaping and developing in pre-conflict countries. Leahy’s point was reinforced by David Savage, who served as a stabilisation consultant with Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) in Afghanistan, who painted a stark picture of the challenges facing development in Afghanistan; including illiteracy, corruption, and the inability of international actors to comprehend the effects of poorly implemented aid projects. This highlights the importance of understanding the community in which coalition forces are operating. Fred Smith, a DFAT policy officer who served in Uruzgan, Afghanistan, drew attention to the need for local cultural understanding and an informed strategy for working with local forces. He traced the different approaches of coalition members to tribal elements in Afghanistan, concluding that Australia managed the local politics reasonably well. The insurgent-criminal nexus in Afghanistan was a key focus for the coalition, and Superintendent Col Speedie provided insights into the police efforts, which included counter-narcotics, kidnapping investigation and establishment of a Major Crimes Task Force. Speedie explained how the ‘rule of law path’ provides an alternate option to target insurgents – rather than being seized by special forces, an insurgent can be investigated and prosecuted under Afghan law. This approach elicits a very different reaction from the local population and provides flexibility to the battlespace owner. Superintendent Speedie also provided observations on rebuilding local security forces, arguing that the Afghan National Police should have operated as a paramilitary gendarmerie in order to assist in defeating the insurgency prior to shifting focus to community policing. Former intelligence officer Colonel Mick Lehmann (retd) spoke about the successes and limitation of intelligence in Iraq and Afghanistan, and cautioned against drawing the wrong lessons about intelligence support. He spoke of the ‘scars’ that some intelligence personnel carry due to the limitations of the intelligence they were able to provide, such as the lack of success in gaining information on a key Taliban commander and – even more devastatingly – the inability to provide warning of green-on-blue attacks, where Afghan soldiers targeted their Australian mentors. Academic Bill Maley reminded the audience that the Afghan people needed to be considered in any discussion of the war. He cited reporting from the Asia Foundation which showed that the population had been optimistic about the future of their country in the first few years after coalition operations began, but the most recent survey (2016) showed that two thirds felt that their country was moving in the wrong direction. Maley posited that this psychology would determine the outcome in Afghanistan – if the majority of the population believed that the Taliban would come back, then they would. For this reason he felt an additional deployment of troops would be useful in assuring the population that it had not been abandoned. Maley also advocated for greater study of anthropology within Defence institutions, and discussed the possibility of longer deployment rotations in order to better build and maintain local relationships. A joint perspective was provided by Air Commodore (retd) Chris Westwood and Vice Admiral Peter Jones (retd). Westwood’s talk was focused on the Control and Reporting Centre which deployed to Kandahar, but offered broader lessons about the value of niche capabilities, the need for mission rehearsal exercises and a unit culture of deployment, and the benefit of being a ‘trusted agent’ with the US through regular exercises and exchanges. The longevity of the maritime contribution in the Middle East was emphasised by Jones, who described a combination of counter-smuggling duties and more conventional maritime security operations. Moderator Ben Roberts-Smith looks on as Brigadier Dan McDaniel answers audience questions at the War in the Sand Pit conference Brigadier Dan McDaniel looked at lessons at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. McDaniel identified the US Alliance as a key strategic enabler, but warned that it cannot be taken for granted – when his Special Air Service (SAS) unit arrived in Afghanistan shortly after 9/11, they didn’t receive the level of support from the US that they had been expecting. Later, he provided an example of the benefits of investing in the relationship, with contacts he had made on exchange in the US years earlier providing access to key leadership in Afghanistan. His central operational lesson related to national command and control, noting concerns related to competition with the in-country C2 structures and inconsistency in application of the national HQ’s mandate. Key tactical lessons identified by McDaniel included the requirement for self-sufficiency and modernisation of ground units, and the need for a new suite of enablers including armed and unarmed unmanned aerial vehicles. Several speakers discussed the costs of the wars, both in terms of the physical and psychological impact on personnel who served there, as well as the opportunity costs of focusing ADF efforts on the Middle East rather than on the Pacific region. The conference participants acknowledged that they had largely discussed ‘lessons identified’ rather than ‘lessons learned’, and that – with operations in Iraq and Afghanistan still ongoing – there were still more lessons to be identified in future. Members of the Official History of Australian Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan project briefed on the status of their research at the conference. If you participated in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and would like to be interviewed, please visit https://www.awm.gov.au/histories/operations-iraq-afghanistan-and-peacekeeping-operations-east-timor/information-form/. Squadron Leader Alexandra ‘Kanye’ McCubbin is an officer in the Royal Australian Air Force. The opinions expressed are hers alone and do not reflect those of the Royal Australian Air Force, the Australian Defence Force, or the Australian Government. #Iraq #operations #counterterrorism #Afghanistan #intelligence #Uruzgan #wholeofgovernment #counterinsurgency #foreignpolicy #development #lessonslearned

In this post, Emily Chapman makes the case for increased ‘jointness’ in professional education, outlining a number of proposals to increase collaboration across the services and prevent silos of intellectual excellence. A single RAAF Officer pitched to a predominately Army audience on the need for a Joint Professional Military Education (PME) Association at the inaugural Defence Entrepreneurs Australia Forum in December 2016. As that Officer, I can attest that it was driven by a zealous quest for a joint perspective to be heard in a land-focused forum at a time when the ADF is consolidating joint capabilities, such as the Landing Helicopter Docks. With no Service deploying in isolation, our intellectual debate should be conducted similarly. DEF Aus Board, 2016 Mapping online intellectual military debate in Australia identifies Grounded Curiosity, Logistics in War, The Dead Prussian, the Australian Army’s Land Power Forum, The Cove and lastly, to my knowledge, The Central Blue. The latter is dedicated to air power, however it also publishes debate critical for land forces, including (for example) ‘A Day Without an ATO,’ which resulted in dialogue between the author, Squadron Leader Chris ‘Guiness’ McInnes, and Colonel Chris Smith. A recent Grounded Curiosity publication that resonated considerably was MAJGEN McLachlan’s article titled ‘What is Modern Military Leadership? A Primer’. Whilst Army- focused, it has a very strong and powerful message that modern military leadership is “inspirational” and “authentic,” with authority “based on ethical behaviour and professional mastery, not simply the badges of rank they wear.” This message is applicable to Navy and Air Force leaders, both within single-service and joint environments. Military leaders often find themselves building diverse teams and this primer is a key theoretical building block.  I am curious to know how many Air Force and Navy personnel read it. Without concentrated and joint effort, there is a risk that online platforms will continue to publish debate valuable for all Services but be unconnected to other Service audiences; both in terms of Service-focused debate and being on different websites. The risk of silos of intellectual excellence being raised between Services is therefore high. As an idea pitcher, Post DEF[X] 2016 I was asked ‘What does success look like for your idea in 2017’? I found it hard to respond. With considerable commitments already could I try and solve the issue I first raised of a joint PME Association? With the publication of Kelly Dunne’s reluctant professional reading journey, it became clear that there is always time to commit to joint intellectual debate and to urge others to consider the joint space. So, I remain engaged, and now turn to how I think we can achieve stronger intellectual ties between the Services. The Cove is growing considerably, with over 100,000 views in four months, but does not have any visible direct links to The Central Blue. The Central Blue has a category ‘Army’ but no direct link to any land-focused websites. A very simple solution is prominent links on both of these websites to other Service websites and resources. I understand there to be some work in both developing and connecting Service websites, so it will be good to see the visible progress. Of most intellectual benefit would be the creation of an ADF website that collates Service dialogue based on themes of air, land and naval debate, and that covers all levels of war. The viability of Vice Chief of Defence Force Group establishing such a website under the Australian Defence College should be considered. People will be able to visit one source and be able to engage across multiple domains and operational levels; thinking, discussing and writing more joint will follow. Such a website would build upon the publication of the Australian Defence Force Journal and link the intellectual debate that occurs through the joint training continuum, commencing at the Australian Defence Force Academy for some. Secondly, a Postern Association workshop is proposed that will see its vision and purpose become more widely known. The agenda for this workshop could include discussion on how to establish Air Force and Navy professional development association equivalents, and an overarching ADF PME Association as pitched to DEF 2016. This workshop can formalise the establishment of an Air Force Liaison Position and work towards engaging Navy in order to commence sharing Service knowledge, process and practices. A third joint opportunity is the annual DEF Aus Forum. DEF Aus is a platform to voice innovation and engage with decision makers on implementing this innovation within Defence, not just Army. The event needs to be more widely advertised across the Services and via Service websites. A DEF Aus symbol should be prominent on The Central Blue, linking innovate thinkers with existing opportunities to pitch their ideas. Chief of Air Force, Air Marshal Leo Davies states in Air Force Strategy 2017-2027 that Air Force will “promote a commitment to ‘jointness’ in Air Force culture such that Air Force members recognise their own capabilities as operating primarily on behalf of the whole ADF.” This gives Air Force personnel guidance to intellectually start talking joint. It can very simply be done, as proposed in this article. Get passionate, get involved in DEF Aus and drive ADF intellectual dialogue and innovation. Emily Chapman is a RAAF Reservist posted to the Air Liaison Organisation. She is concurrently a PhD candidate researching civil-military interaction in disaster relief operations at UNSW Canberra. Her research interests include Defence learning processes, practices and mechanisms. #professionaldevelopment #PMET #Joint #Innovation #entrepreneur #Education

This is the third in a three-part series on the development of Western operational-level air power command and control arrangements by Wing Commander Chris McInnes. The first post outlined the impact of ideas on command and control and the second post looked at the shaping role of technology in air power command and control. In this post, he argues that people are the ultimate determinant of effective C2. Ideas guide and technology shapes air power C2 but the ultimate determinant of effective C2 – and thus effective air power – has always been people. Two key people characteristics that have consistently correlated with effective air power C2 have been depth of relationships and intellectual credibility. Depth of relationships can be the difference between success and failure: improvements in air power C2 efficacy between Afghanistan in 2001-02 and Iraq in 2003 can be attributed in large part to the efforts of USAF Lieutenant General Michael Moseley, based in Saudi Arabia, to build deeper relationships with his superiors at Central Command in Florida, and his counterpart land commander in Kuwait. Then Lieutenant General Michael Moseley, Commander United States Central Command Air Forces [Image credit: United States Air Force] I mention Moseley’s geography to illustrate the challenges posed by physical separation to building partnerships across organisations. Arguably the closest air-land partnership of the Second World War was that in South East Asia Command, principally between British Lieutenant General William Slim and several RAF officers. Slim himself described this as a ‘brotherhood‘ that was underpinned by both commanders living in the same mess. Similarly, the commander of the USAF’s air expeditionary task force in Afghanistan found that ‘people we meet in the dorm, gym, chapel, or dining hall supply the social inroads and information needed to stay abreast of rapidly changing events.’ However, a persistent belief that advanced communications negated the need for physical presence delayed the establishment and empowerment of the Afghanistan air task force for several years. Air power C2 remains fundamentally a social activity and personal links are particularly important in reducing friction between organisations. For the moment, virtual presence remains actual absence. Physical separation also has leadership implications within organisations because  it disrupts the traditional nexus between authority and responsibility by separating the commanders from the commanded. Units involved in distributed operations, such as remotely piloted aircraft squadrons, encounter ‘power struggles galore‘ as commanders around the globe seek to control scarce assets. One can be reasonably sure that those same commanders are less enthusiastic about accepting command responsibilities for the units. Problems due to distance between commanders and commanded are not new though. In 1973, the commander of the USAF’s Strategic Air Command, based in Nebraska, was essentially chased off Andersen Air Force Base in Guam by his own bomber crews after he gave a speech that appeared to confirm the crews’ perception that he was remarkably disconnected from their experience. The rise of distributed operations also challenges traditional personnel motivation that have traditionally been based on geographic and social proximity to combat, and the intrinsic attractions of flight. The challenge confronting air power C2 practitioners is that the span of control and physical separation of contemporary air power makes building deep human relationships more difficult, while the scrutiny and tempo of precision air power makes those relationships more important. Finally, while air power C2 has consistently demonstrated technical and tactical excellence, similar levels of strategic perspicacity have been less forthcoming. Precision weapons and advanced communications enable an air power deluge but, since Desert Storm, precision air power has frequently delivered an incremental drizzle. In part, this has been due to consistent weaknesses in air power thinking. An over-emphasis on achieving ‘decisive’ effects independent of surface forces has too often blinded airmen to the opportunities of joint force operations. The reverse has seen airmen narrow their thinking to what support air power can provide to others rather than developing an air-minded concept for joint operations. Slim’s experience in South East Asia Command illustrates the difference. His was not a land campaign supported by air. Instead, he and his counterparts devised and executed an air-minded approach to jointly ejecting the Japanese from Burma. Slim drove adaptation of his 14th Army so that it could maneouvre and fight reliant on aerial resupply, and prioritised capturing and opening airfields. The air forces developed specific ‘earthquake‘ bombing techniques to neutralise Japanese defensive positions and innovative air mobility practices to account for the hostile environment.  The capture of a Japanese position at Gangaw in January 1945 epitomised the partnerhip’s ethos with Slim recounting in his memoirs that ‘Gangaw was taken by the air force and occupied by the Lushai Brigade.’ Burmese bearers on a Royal Air Force airstrip in Burma sheltering from the midday sun under the wing of a Dakota. In the background are boxes of supplies brought by air and two De Havilland Mosquito photo reconnaissance aircraft belonging to No 684 Squadron, Royal Air Force. [Image credit: Imperial War Museum] The popular perception of Desert Storm is one of triumphant technology but the operation’s success owed much to sophisticated concepts masterminded by Buster Glosson and David Deptula based on John Warden’s air campaign concepts. But even Desert Storm suffered from legacy thinking.  Glosson regarded Warden’s initial thinking as ‘naïve‘ because it did not account for the role, or requirements, of ground forces. Moreover, he viewed Warden’s thinking on the probable duration of the campaign as wildly optimistic. This latter point is indicative of airmen’s tendency to ignore Clausewitzian friction. Instead airmen have consistently sought to engineer victory, reducing war to a question of resource allocation and scheduling. The RAAF’s strategy acknowledges the centrality of people and joint war fighting for Australian air power as it enters a more challenging age. Effective air power C2 requires cohesive command teams with high levels of acuity, agility and adaptivity to minimise avoidable friction and overcome the unavoidable. These characteristics come from deep intellectual and social foundations that have been tested and adjusted through realistic, collective experiences. Such experiences have not been prominent in Australian military history as contributing niche capabilities means following, not leading. Australian air power’s organisation and culture reflects this history. Instilling a culture of strategic scholarship is a challenge for every air force but especially Australia’s as it confronts the complex engineering and logistics challenges of being the world’s first fifth-generation force. Plan Jericho’s program of work includes a discrete project focused on education and training for the future force, and the establishment of the Williams Scholars scheme is a positive step within the Air Force. The Central Blue is also a contribution to that effort. These are important steps but the word friction –  ‘that which distinguishes real war from war on paper‘ – does not appear in Australia’s Air Power Manual. That matters because fighting real wars is air power’s ultimate purpose and the friction that characterises war should be a focal point for the people directing and doing the fighting. As I have hopefully shown in these three posts, air power C2 is a primary source and solution to friction. Ideas guide and technology shapes but people are the fundamental determinant of effective C2 because they allow ideas and technology designed for one purpose to be adapted and applied successfully to others.  The pursuit of excellence in peacetime activities must not crowd out the RAAF’s reason-for-being: that most complex and chaotic of human activities, war. Wing Commander Chris ‘Guiness’ McInnes is an officer in the Royal Australian Air Force. The opinions expressed are his alone and do not reflect those of the Royal Australian Air Force, the Australian Defence Force, or the Australian Government. #AirPower #C2

The Air Force’s exploitation of its suite of advanced capabilities will hinge on a highly-skilled and agile workforce. In this post, Wing Commander Paul Hay argues that non-commissioned personnel will provide the majority of the needed breadth and depth, and that optimising this workforce to meet future demands requires a different approach to training and management. The recent arrival of the EA-18G Growler and P-8A Poseidon aircraft heralded the introduction into service of the Air Force’s new generation of intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, electronic warfare (ISREW) and fast jet platforms. Over the next six to seven years additional ISREW capabilities such as the G550-based ISREW aircraft, MQ-4 Triton, an armed medium altitude long endurance (MALE) UAS and a land based Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD) system will all enter service. We will need to ensure as an Air Force that our training and personnel structures adapt sufficiently to generate this new workforce. This work has already commenced with the development of an Aviation Academy; however, the Academy is aimed at remediating the commissioned workforce. Air Force may wish to consider undertaking a similar body of work and structured training system for the airman workforce. The bulk of Air Force’s ISREW data is currently generated by a Heron Unmanned Aerial System and AP-3C aircraft as well as from coalition partner assets, but the volume and types of data is limited. Fast forward to 2023 and the environment will have completely changed. A standard 24-hour Air Tasking Order day may include a permanent Triton orbit, a MALE UAS orbit, a G550 ISREW mission and a P-8 Increment 3 conducting a regional Operation Gateway patrol. These capabilities will all contain multiple ISREW sensors and will produce vast amounts of Full Motion Video (FMV), still images, signals intelligence product, radar imagery, radar and video moving target indicator (MTI) data and other products. These sensors will in the most part be operated by the airman workforce. The large array of the multi-sensor ISREW product will be analysed and fused at Distributed Ground Station – Australia (DGS-AUS), other networked Australian Defence Force (ADF) deployed Processing, Exploitation and Dissemination (PED) nodes, coalition partner PED nodes and by national agencies. The processing, exploitation and fusing of multiple data feeds, and ultimately the dissemination of this data to the customer will be largely conducted by the airmen workforce. In broad role based terms this highly skilled and multi-disciplined workforce will be a mix of sensor operators and analysts, relying on a common fundamental understanding of collection management and ISREW fundamentals and experts in their particular streams. Air Force’s future ISREW systems will feature an array of sensors, many of which will be operated primarily by airmen. [Image credit: Royal Australian Air Force] With commissioned ranks only flying on ISREW platforms for one or two postings before promotion, the majority of the Air Force ISREW subject matter expertise will arguably reside within this airmen workforce. If carefully managed, over the course of their ten, twenty or thirty year careers they will have the opportunity to master these highly capable platforms and their related ground segments, and analyse and fuse the generated data to support a myriad of ADF and allied joint commanders. In terms of ISREW, this workforce needs to be the focus of a long term management strategy requiring a structured training system to generate and maintain the workforce over time. It may also assist in avoiding the high loss rates experienced by the USAF with its UAS airman workforce as a result of limited pathways for development and respite. The current model for generating this workforce is largely stove-piped within individual force element groups (FEGs) through their platforms or weapon systems, with initial employment ISREW fundamentals training occurring at multiple locations within multiple FEGs. In many cases the same or similar material is being taught in multiple locations, with some operational conversion (OPCON) units conducting fundamentals training as these skills are not able to be taught elsewhere. Subsequent postings are generally also limited to within stove-piped organisational constructs, with limited opportunities for career broadening or development within the member’s core mustering. This model reduces both the Air Force’s organisational flexibility, increases overhead, dilutes focus and does not baseline quality assurance. As well, it narrows an individual’s options for role and geographic postings experience, and so their and broader personal development and the normalisation of skills across Air Force. Air Force is well down the path of designing an Aviation Academy which is due to become operational in 2019, however efforts are currently focused on the officer workforce. The impending aircraft acquisitions and associated airman workforce requirements may necessitate a similar body of work to be conducted to develop an Airman Academy to ensure the new generation of ISREW capabilities can be effectively employed from the moment they enter service. The Airman or combined Academy would generate a standardised baseline workforce with modular teaching components. The standardisation of fundamental and post-graduate knowledge and skills would enable a more flexible workforce with structured growth paths for re-streaming of workforce over time. The Airman Academy would have significant commonality with the Aviation Academy, thus being able to leverage much the same training material and equipment to teach aviation fundamentals. The Airman Academy would conduct modular training courses in ISREW fundamentals, an example being how generic electro-optics systems function and the employment of those systems. Both sensor operators and analysts would conduct this common training, with operators then streamed to learn how to operate the sensors, and analysts streamed to focus on the exploitation and reporting of the information generated by the sensors. Service needs and individual aptitude would determine streaming within the Airman Academy; however, the common baseline of skills and modular training system would greatly reduce the training delta required to re-categorise in the future and provide significant efficiencies in terms of training resources, while also providing standardised training across FEGs. Under this proposed system, an analyst who has spent two to three years analysing and reporting on electronic intelligence (ELINT) collection would arguably make an ideal candidate for aircrew and may well graduate OPCON as a Cat C operator and progress more quickly than a direct aircrew entrant. The management of individual qualifications across trades, as well as the maintenance of compliance training and ICT system access, would be an interesting area for discussion. Loadmasters and Crew Attendants would conduct the aviation fundamentals and airman aircrew basic courses with the remainder of the workforce, and then conduct OPCON on their aircraft type. Any of the musterings would be able to return in an instructional role at the Academy throughout their careers and would have the opportunity to re-muster through the same training system. This larger, commonly trained workforce could be more effectively managed across Air Force as a large system rather than a number of stove-piped workforces that exist today. An individual would have opportunities to move relatively freely between roles and capabilities over the course of a career, and Air Force would be able to more rapidly generate workforce across individual weapon systems when operational requirements dictate. It would also generate a highly professional workforce over time, with many personnel gaining a broad experience base across multiple joint domains and concepts. A nominal and very simplistic view of how an Airman Academy would generate the ISREW workforce, including the potential through life career options within a ‘life cycle’ for airmen is depicted below. Concept for an Airman Academy and an Air Force ISREW Airman Workforce “Life Cycle” Additionally, an Airman Academy would remove the need for OPCON units to be teaching fundamentals at their unit, rather they could reduce OPCON times by simply conducting weapon systems role training, platform conversion and the delta training from the academy onto the aircraft systems. In terms of finding workforce to staff the academy, some of the personnel associated with the fundamentals training in the OPCON units would be moved to the academy, with those instructional positions becoming developmental positions over time for the airmen they are training. Air Force may even wish to consider a more structured approach to education, including changing the conversion squadron construct to a common Operation Conversion Unit (OCU) construct across Air Force, such as an Air Mobility OCU (1OCU) and an ISREW OCU (3OCU) where common role training is undertaken followed by a relatively quick weapon system specific conversion, all within the OCU. Air Force could ensure the workforce is maintaining warfighting currency across the entire organisation by having personnel attend either the Air Warfare Centre or Academies every couple of years for re-training in contemporary threat systems and warfighting techniques. A broad concept for this is below; I will leave this concept hanging for future discussion. Concept for future Air Force education structure Air Force may wish to consider a broad review of airman training once the dust settles on the Aviation Academy work currently underway. The long term success of the Air Force ISREW platform may well hinge on a well managed airman workforce sustained through a structured training system. Wing Commander Paul Hay is a current serving RAAF Officer. The opinions expressed are his alone and do not reflect those of the Royal Australian Air Force, the Australian Defence Force, or the Australian Government. #Training #airman #operationalconversion #workforce #EW #ISR