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Editorial Note: On 11 April 2019, the Sir Richard Williams Foundation is holding a seminar examining high-intensity operations and sustaining self-reliance. The aim of the seminar, building on previous seminars and series looking at #jointstrike and #highintensitywar, is to establish a common understanding of the importance and challenges of sustaining a self-reliant Australian Defence Force in a challenging environment. In support of the seminar, The Central Blue and Logistics in War will be publishing a series of articles. In this article, Nicholas Parker examines fuel security and potential impacts on a 5th Generation Air Force. By 2025 the Royal Australian Air Force will operate a fleet of technologically advanced 5th generation aircraft. However, in modernising the RAAF capability, an inadequate amount of attention has been afforded to the fuel and energy infrastructure that supports these assets. In order to ensure these 5th generation capabilities are employed to their fullest, Air Force must capitalise on new and emerging energy technologies that enhance the support provided by air bases. Australia currently enjoys what it thinks to be a high degree of liquid fuel security. Reports released by the Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism assert that Australia’s market-based approach, ready access to the global and regional markets for crude oil and petroleum products, and efficient supply management by industry, has delivered secure, reliable and adequate liquid fuel supplies. Australia’s guiding principle is that energy markets should be left to operate freely, without unnecessary government intervention. To date, this approach has met the current operational requirements of the Air Force and those of the broader domestic economy. While there are economic benefits to this approach, it discounts current trends in competition for energy sources and market dominance, threats to supply infrastructure, the impact of natural disasters and geopolitical uncertainty (especially in the Indo-Pacific region). An inadequate appreciation of these trends has created complacency resulting in a ‘stove-piped’ Australian energy policy; a policy that does not appreciate the complexity inherent in future energy infrastructure systems. Consequently, energy security and supply is viewed through a ‘singular lens’; whereby the focus has been on discrete energy types with discrete global supply chains that are disparate, separately managed, and (most significantly) vulnerable. Consider the following statistic: Currently 90% of Australia’s fuel supplies are imported; 40% as crude oil and the remaining 60% as refined fuels. In contrast to other developed nations, Australia is alone in its total reliance on ‘market forces’ to ensure secure access to the global fuel supply chain. Furthermore, Australia has no Government-owned strategic oil or fuel reserves and does not mandate minimum stockholding requirements for the fuel refining/importing industry. These oversights induce significant logistics and operational risks to the delivery of Air Force capability. Should a significant supply disruption occur within key sea lines of communication (SLOC) within the Indo-Pacific (e.g., natural disaster, accident, a commercial failure, an act of terror or war), Australia’s capacity to provide fuel for its 5th generation Air Force is immediately jeopardised. The National Strategy for Energy Security, developed by the United States Energy Security Leadership Council, offers a range of recommendations to counter the challenges created as a result of the current global security environment. The National Strategy is the preeminent document on the topic of energy security and calls on the US government to fundamentally strengthen a combination of energy security measures (Energy Security Leadership Council, 2016), including: Support, rather than hinder, innovation in energy technology; Major reductions in crude oil consumption by increasing domestic energy production; Reforms to energy-related regulations; and Transform the domestic distribution section so that oil is no longer its primary fuel. Australian energy policymakers must undertake policy reform that is reflective of the US approach, appreciating that the challenges and opportunities in energy security are global in nature, and remain cognisant of the significant implications an approximate policy approach has for Australia’s national security. To date, energy policy pundits have been relatively silent to the 2016 Defence White Paper’s acknowledgement of the strategic influence of energy supply chains and energy security on national defence. While energy requirements and subsequent security have never been a key driver behind Australian defence policy, the Defence White Paper does raise the requirement to ‘improve Defence’s fuel resilience.’ Further, when reviewing a critical infrastructure bill in March 2018, the Australian Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security made the following recommendation: “The Department of Home Affairs in consultation with Defence and the Department of the Environment and Energy need to review and develop measures to ensure Australia has a continuous supply of fuel to meet national security priorities.” Adequate, reliable and economically competitive energy to sustain Air Force 5th generation capabilities and infrastructure must be seen as a shared responsibility between the Government and the Australian energy industry. The importance of a strong Government-industry partnership in addressing energy security challenges in the long-term cannot be understated. In the interim, however, there are a number of practical measures that the Air Force and the wider Australian Defence Force can undertake to fortify the energy requirements of a 5th generation Air Force. These include: Advancing the development of energy technologies by integrating contractual efficiencies for their use in warehousing and distribution contracts. In particular, create incentives for the purchase and use of medium and heavy-rigid distribution vehicles that use advanced fuel sources;[1] Use an Air Force and energy industry partnership to create performance-based advanced fuel standards in order to reduce traditional fuels consumption. Accelerating the adoption of advanced fuel systems[2] into 5th generation aircraft and military vehicles will reduce the logistics and operational risks to Air Force capability associated with the use of traditional fuels; Empower Estate and Infrastructure Group to pursue efficiencies in airbase energy infrastructure with a view to creating completely self-reliant airbases through, for example, the use of solar and wind systems;[3] To support the recommendation above, establish an Air Force ‘Energy Security Research Grant’ to fund research and development in advanced fuel technologies for use in 5th generation aircraft, military vehicles and airbases; Build an international consensus amongst Australia’s coalition and regional partners on the importance of shared responsibility and coordinated action to deal with future energy security challenges. Air Force cannot remain ignorant to the interdependency of energy and national security as long as it remains heavily dependent on traditional fuels to power its 5th generation aircraft, military vehicles, and airbases. Despite a current abundance of supply, such dependence introduces operational risks and critical vulnerabilities to 5th generation air power. While innovation in advanced fuel technologies will require years to mature, through the combination of measures proposed in this article, Australia will move toward being more energy secure, and more self-reliant. Flight Lieutenant Nicholas Packer is a Logistics Officer in the Royal Australian Air Force. Nicholas is currently posted to RAAF Base East Sale as an instructor at the RAAF Officer Training School mentoring newly commissioned officers through their 17-week ab initio course. The views expressed are his alone and do not reflect the opinion of the Royal Australian Air Force, the Department of Defence, or the Australian Government. [1] Advanced fuel sources are distinct from renewable energy sources such as solar and wind power systems. Examples of advanced fuel sources include biodiesel, hydrogen cell, electric-hybrid, ethanol, natural gas and propane. [2] Development of advanced fuel systems for use in motorsport has demonstrated high technical performance can be achieved from advanced fuel sources. [3] There are a range of academic studies that have highlighted the value of hydrogen and pumped hydro-systems to store energy generated by solar and wind systems (Blackburn, Energy Security: Is there a problem?, 2018). #RoyalAustralianAirForce #SelfSustainment #EnergySecurity #AsutralianDefencePolicy #5thGenerationAirPower #AustralianDefenceForce

The contest of ideas needed to drive Australian military concepts and capabilities into the future can take many forms. Unfortunately, most debate occurs in small groups, is cloistered away in hard-to-find directories, and, when it is available in open forums, can take the form of jargon-laden officialese, or be laced with academic/strategic shibboleths. This does not need to be the case. In this post, Central Blue editor Trav Hallen highlights the diversity of sources and styles that can be used to move the military debate one mark at a time. The single hardest challenge for the editors of The Central Blue is generating the quality and quantity of content that will spark and engage the interest of Australian military professionals. Over the past few years, I believe we have established a reputation as the go-to air power blog in Australia. This is because we have been successful in publishing a diversity of articles covering a range of topics from differing perspectives. But the reality is submissions are drying up. The question is why? The diminishing number of submissions stands in stark contrast to the growing interest in and promotion of professional military education in the Australian Defence Force (ADF). Efforts to improve education within the ADF have led directly to improvements in the quality and quantity of debate within and across the three services. There is no better evidence of this than the number of serving Australian military officers that are published internationally in books on military ethics, air power, and strategy. We are creating better thinkers, strategists, staff officers, and operational artists; however, the majority of us are blind to their insights, arguments, and challenges as they are not engaging in the public forums that maximise their exposure. Instead, while there is undoubtedly a significant increase in the quality and quantity to staff work that is being moved around the offices of Russell for the edification of the few, the broader professional community remain largely ignorant of the intellectual investments powering the ADF forward. Every staff paper, speech, and brief that remains buried in network folders represents a lost opportunity to inspire the intellect, stimulate the curiosity, and gain the insight of an increasingly engaged professional military community. To be sure, not every brief can nor should be made available to a broad audience. But the necessities of security should not obscure the possibilities of wider engagement. Indeed, this broader engagement may actually be an important dimension of the staff process. As current Chief of Air Force, Air Marshal Leo Davies, stated in his interview with the editors of The Central Blue: I need Air Force people to engage in these discussions because the ideas on how we are going to execute the Air Force Strategy and position our Air Force to meet the challenges of the future can come from anywhere and anyone. Moreover, the strongest ideas are those that have been most thoroughly tested – and public discussion is the most competitive arena for ideas. The main aim of this post is to provide an example of staff work that may have remained resigned the oblivion of a database were it not for the existence of The Central Blue as an outlet. Additionally, it highlights that engagement in the so-called ‘contest of ideas’ need not be in the form of stuffy, academic prose or form. In fact, debate, discussion, and interest can be generated just as effectively through a light-hearted take on contemporary issues as with a more serious article. What follows is a modified version of a speech I gave as the Master of Ceremonies at the 2019 Royal Australian Air Force Washington Ball. In attendance at the Ball were civilians, public servants, industry representatives, and Australian, American, and foreign military personnel from the rank Airman First Class through to four-star General. The aim of the speech was to draw attention to how different cultures can provide ways to view similar problems. More specifically, it took the American military predilection for the use of sporting metaphors to describe military concepts and provided an Australian spin. It is presented here to hopefully continue the debate that started that evening: Are Australian sporting metaphors a useful tool for creating ‘human-inspired dilemmas’ for our future adversaries? Australian contributions to creating human-inspired dilemmas for future adversaries Militaries in both the United States and Australia have identified that they can no longer hope to maintain a competitive edge over potential adversaries through technological solutions alone. Future success will not depend solely on who has the most advanced system, but rather on who can use their available capabilities to create the most effective and insurmountable strategic, operational, and tactical dilemmas for their opponent. Australia has been proactive and forward-leaning in ensuring that it can lead and contribute to the type of allied and coalition efforts that can win in future operations by cognitively overwhelming a future adversary. We Australians have, however, also been guilty of placing a heavy emphasis on the military systems themselves. I would like to propose that we can take on a greater share of the allied burden by developing and implementing new and novel ways to confuse and cognitively overwhelm any potential adversaries. It is a proposal that was inspired by a talk given by the Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force (USAF), General David Goldfein at the Brookings Institution earlier this year. In that talk, General Goldfein spoke of the F-35 as the ‘quarterback’ of the joint force. That got me thinking: One way in which we Australians can share the burden for the future fight is by providing the United States access to Australian sporting metaphors to describe their military and strategic concepts. You see the problem at the moment is that the United States military has become dependant on the widespread use of American sports metaphors to explain military concepts. But these metaphors are so well understood that any potential adversary is left in no doubt as to what the United States is thinking or planning to do. For example, if a USAF general were to say that the United States was going to ‘throw the adversaries a curveball’. Said adversary would know to expect the unexpected. If, however, the same general were to say in a public forum that she planned to ‘bowl the adversary a yorker’, I’m quite confident the adversary would have absolutely no idea what the hell she was talking about, and as such, they would not know what to expect. Advantage the United States. This type of proposal has the obvious drawback that it would not work if the United States were to go to war against the British, which is not unheard of. So in the spirit of carrying our weight in assisting the alliance in sowing confusion among our future foes, I offer you some initial thoughts on Australian sporting metaphors that the United States may choose to use, or not, sometime in the future. Members of the Governor-General’s XI cricket team, Ashleigh Gardner and Able Seaman Maritime Logistics-Support Operations Sarah Beard, play a few balls on the flight deck of HMAS Canberra as Engineering Officer, Commander Guy Lewis plays wicketkeeper. [Image Credit: LSIS Helen Frank/ Commonwealth of Australia] From Cricket: Instead of saying we need to stop responding to an adversary in a conventional way, and instead need to create new and challenging dilemmas for them, we could say: ‘We have to stop playing them with a straight bat. What we need to do is bowl them some googlies, full-tosses, yorkers, and grubbers. That should put them on a sticky wicket’. To highlight how confusing this would be for any potential non-cricket playing adversary, the Merriam-Webster English Dictionary defines a googly as: ‘An off-break with a leg-break action.’ The adversary has no hope. From Netball: Instead of talking of areas or capabilities where an adversary is weak or vulnerable, we can instead refer to specific capabilities as being their Wing Defence. To quote Australian comedian Tommy Little: Wing Defence is easily the most unco position on the court. If you’ve got a [player] that can’t catch, chuck [them] in Wing Defence. If you’re one short, just play without Wing Defence, we won’t notice. And finally, Australian Rules Football: Let us be honest, the modern and future battlespace will not resemble the conduct of an American Football game, with its specialised teams brought on to and off the field in an orderly manner to play their discrete plays. Rather, it will more likely reflect the pandemonium of an Australian Rules game, where the action is constant and what occurs off the ball is as important as what occurs on the ball. We need a range of players that are adaptable and can operate across the full field of conflict. From our own back pocket, and back through the corridor or around the flanks into the forward pockets. We cannot afford to play end-to-end footy, we need to be disciplined, seeking uncontested possession, taking speckies, and shooting from outside the 50. And most importantly, as we close into the end game, we need to guard against the Colliwobbles. Conclusion As you can see, Australia has a wide variety of sporting metaphors that may be useful for the United States to start confusing their adversaries. We would happily share these with our allies; however, our netball and cricket metaphors are currently Commonwealth-Eyes Only, and Aussie Rules is strictly NOFORN. This is something that we can work on addressing. What I hope this post highlighted, in a light-hearted way, is that different cultural lenses provide new ways to view, describe, and understand the challenges of modern and future conflict. As military professionals, we need to guard against lapsing into default options to understand and describe the possibilities of future operations. Instead, we need to open the aperture and challenge conventional wisdom with new ideas for new realities. Wing Commander Trav Hallen is a serving Australian Defence Force officer as well as a co-editor for The Central Blue. The views expressed, particularly on Wing Defence, are his alone and do not reflect the opinion of the Royal Australian Air Force, the Department of Defence, the Australian Government, or any official Australian sporting body. #PME #organisationalculture #Doctrine #Army #PMET #Sport #AirPower #Culture #AirForce #Innovation #Education

19 August 2018 On 23 August 2018, the Sir Richard Williams Foundation is holding a seminar on #jointstrike to discuss the imperative for an independent deterrent. The aim of the seminar is to build a common understanding of the need for an independent joint strike capability to provide Australia with a powerful and potent deterrent and a means of demonstrating strategic intent. In the lead up to the seminar, The Central Blue will be running a series in order to generate discussion and enable those that cannot to attend to gain a perspective on the topic. In this post, Andrew Hoffmann argues that effective deterrence is as much about thinking as it is about technology. There are two sides to the strike equation. On the one side lay all of the inputs to joint strike: platforms, weapons, command and control arrangements and so on. On the other side lay the outcomes of applying joint strike: weapons effects, impacted targets, degraded target systems, collateral effects and so forth. The bulk of investment in joint strike occurs on the inputs side of the equation–comparatively little investment is made to ensure that joint strike capabilities achieve the right outcomes. Our tendency to focus on the inputs means we will soon be able to strike more targets with greater precision than ever before; but how will we employ these capabilities against our adversaries? What types of targets will these capabilities strike? Will striking those targets actually bring us closer to winning the war? In this post I argue that the investment in joint strike inputs needs to be matched by a commensurate investment in the thinking about how those capabilities are employed to generate desired outcomes. Without balancing this investment, our emerging fifth-generation force is at risk of being held back by our fourth-generation thinking about the targets we choose to strike. This post will examine four areas of targeting effectiveness. Firstly, we will examine how we have gone about improving targeting effectiveness in the past. Secondly, we will look at how better thinking could lead to improved targeting effectiveness in the future. Thirdly, we will look at a holistic approach to targeting systems. Finally, we will explore the concept of fragility and its impact on effective targeting. Improving Targeting Effectiveness Aviation and air power have always been technical ventures. It is little surprise then, that Western nations have turned to developments in technology as the primary means through which the effectiveness of targeting can be improved. The focus has been on the development of technologies around precision guided munitions (PGM). Increased precision improves the effectiveness of targeting by reducing the number of aircrew exposed to high threat environments, reducing the potential for collateral damage, and has allowed the Air Force to achieve more operational ‘bang’ for the tax-payer ‘buck’. Improvements in precision have been phenomenal. Deptula illustrates this point: ‘…a single aircraft and one PGM during the Gulf War achieved the same result as a 1000-plane raid with over 9000 bombs in World War II’.[1] Since the Second World War, however, Western air forces have become trapped in a virtuous and self-reinforcing cycle of increasing precision (see Figure 1). As Lovett aptly describes it, the “…Western style of warfare…is hostage to the use of precision weapons.”[2] Figure 1: Virtuous self-reinforcing cycle of increasing precision [Image credit: Author] The phenomenal improvements in precision leads to an interesting question: Can further improvements in precision translate into more effective targeting? Or have we hit a natural limit to growth in precision? Fortunately, increasing precision is not the only path leading to more effective targeting. Better thinking in targeting For an organisation excited by technology, the alternative path that leads to more effective targeting is somewhat dreary. The alternative path that I propose is to improve our thinking about how we understand enemy target systems and how we develop the strategies that drive the selection of targets for strike. Better thinking would lead to a better understanding of enemy systems. A better understanding of enemy systems would result in fewer–but better–targets being selected for strike. This would realise an improvement in targeting effectiveness similar to that which has been realised through increased precision: decreased risk to aircrew; reduced collateral damage; and better ‘bang’ for ‘buck’. As well as Air Force investing in the efficiency of doing things right through increased precision, I believe that we need to make a commensurate investment in the thinking that underpins target selection to ensure that we are doing the right things to bring the enemy to a desired future state. A holistic approach to targeting – doing the right things The systems approach to targeting views the enemy holistically, as a system. The Target Systems Analysis (TSA) process used by the ADF goes a long way to achieving a holistic approach–but more can be done. Systems theorist Donella Meadows provides a theoretical construct for how to effect change within systems. While she no doubt intended her metaphorical framework of ‘leverage points’ to be used to improve the operation of systems–it nevertheless provides a useful starting point when considering how to degrade an adversary system. Meadows defines leverage points as ‘…places in the system where a small change could lead to a large shift in behaviour’.[3] She offers twelve levers to change a system (see Figure 2). Figure 2: Leverage Points in Systems (adapted from Meadows 2008, pp. 145-165) [Image credit: Author] The framework is useful when considering how to most effectively bring about change within systems. For example, low points of leverage include entities that are easy to see and affect, but whose removal would cause little change within the overall system.[4] In the context of joint strike, targeting fielded forces (numbers), a reserve force (buffer) or supply line (stock and flow structure) hit relatively low points of leverage within an adversary target system. On the other hand, high points of leverage are often hard to see and difficult to affect, but when affected can transform the system.[5] In the context of joint strike, targeting the ideology (paradigm) of an adversary target system would be an example of high point of leverage. Historically, Air Forces have been really good at targeting ‘things’–entities that typically yield low leverage within the overall target system. Our focus on precision has further reinforced this strength. This leads to two important conclusions for targeting strategists. Firstly, we must realise that any single strike capability will not be able to directly affect all twelve of the system leverage points, and therefore must integrate with other capabilities to affect a system holistically. Secondly, we must consider that targets within a complex system interact in a non-linear manner; desirable effects caused against a low point of leverage may cascade through the system and result in undesirable effects being caused against a high point of leverage–which would be unhelpful. To further explore the issue of cascading undesirable effects we need an understanding of systemic fragility. Systemic Fragility The concept of fragility emerges from the interdependencies within a complex system. In his seminal work Antifragile, Taleb argues that while some systems can be fragile and break under stress, other systems–antifragile systems–can benefit from shocks. Antifragile systems adapt and get stronger under the ‘right amount of stress,’ disorder, and volatility.[6] In the context of military strike operations, antifragility can be observed when a system is struck, and it adapts–ultimately becoming stronger as a result. Military history is replete with examples of fragility and antifragility. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, while a tactical success, introduced a systemic stressor that ultimately mobilised and strengthened the US military.[7] The US was antifragile in 1941. In contrast, the 1991 ‘Gulf War’ targeted the highly centralised Iraqi military and occurred so quickly that it could not respond, let alone adapt.[8] The Iraqi military was fragile in 1991. Targeting strategists often make an ill-informed assumption of fragility when selecting targets for strike.[9] An antifragile enemy grows stronger when fought, more resilient with chaos and more unpredictable when attempts are made to control it.[10] How, then, should antifragile systems be targeted? There appear to be four options. Firstly, avoid direct conflict with the antifragile components of the system to limit their improvement–for example, avoid engaging militarily and instead use an alternate form of national power.[11] Secondly, exceed the ‘right amount of stress’ required for system adaptation–instead push the system into a state of irrecoverable shock so that it does not have the opportunity to adapt.[12] Thirdly, increase the tempo of strikes so that the system is not afforded time to recover from a period of stress.[13] Finally, the target system could be made more fragile by increasing the cost of learning, getting the enemy to standardise, building mistrust between mid-level leaders and strengthening the top leadership to make the system more rigid.[14] Each of these targeting strategies could run counter to the prevailing conventional wisdom for Western targeting. Fragility theories suggests striking fewer targets when targeting cells are generally scrambling to develop more targets; bigger bombs when precision allows us to employ smaller bombs; and potentially strengthening adversary leadership rather than targeting them. Conclusion Modern joint strike capabilities bring all the technological wizardry that excites organisations like our Air Force. But how will we use this wizardry? Will we use it in much the same way as our fourth-generation platforms–by simply attriting the enemy ever more efficiently and with ever increasing precision? Or will we invest in the thinking that is required to select more meaningful targets as part of a more effective targeting strategy? In this blog I have argued that there is ample room to further develop the thinking that underpins how we link joint strike capabilities to outcomes in the battlespace. Our investment in doing things right needs to be matched with a commensurate investment in doing the right things. One way to ensure that we are targeting effectively, is to take a holistic systems approach to targeting. Theoretical concepts such as ‘leverage points,’ understanding how effects cascade through systems, and accounting for systemic fragility, are all ways to improve the effectiveness of targeting through better thinking. Better thinking about the adversary targets that we choose to strike is key to realising the full potential of our emerging fifth-generation joint strike capabilities. Wing Commander Andrew Hoffmann, CSC is an officer in the Royal Australian Air Force. The opinions expressed are his alone and do not reflect those of the Royal Australian Air Force, the Australian Defence Force, or the Australian Government. [1] Deptula, D. A., 2001. ‘Effects-Based Operations: Change in the Nature of Warfare’. Aerospace Education Foundation, Virginia, viewed 03 March 2018 , \p. 8. [2] Lovett, D. J., 2012. Spacepower for Australia’s Security – Grand Strategy or Strategy of Grandeur. Canberra, Australia: Air Power Development Centre, p. 3. [3] Meadows, D., 2008. Thinking in Systems: A Primer. London, UK: Earthscan, p. 145. [4] Meadows 2008, p. 17. [5] Meadows, D., 1999. Leverage Points: Places to Intervene in a System. Hartland, VT: The Sustainability Institute, p. 18. [6] Albino, D. K., Friedman, K., Bar-Yam, Y., Glenney W., 2016. Military strategy in a complex world. New England Complex Systems Institute, 18 February 2016, retrieved 06 February 2018 , p. 6; Taleb, N. N., 2012. Antifragile: Things that gain from disorder (Vol. 3). New York, NY: Random House Incorporated, pp 5 & 17. [7] Albino, p. 12 [8] Deptula, p. 6 [9] Albino, p. 2 [10] Brafman, O. and Beckstrom, R., 2007. The Starfish and the Spider. New York, NY: Portfolio, p. 6 [11] Albino, p. 12 [12] Albino , p. 11 [13] Taleb, p. 58 [14] Albino , p. 17-18; Brafman & Beckstrom , p. 155 #Training #commandandcontrol #history #Strategy #AirPower #Education #C2

15 August 2018 On 23 August 2018, the Sir Richard Williams Foundation is holding a seminar on #jointstrike to discuss the imperative for an independent deterrent. The aim of the seminar is to build a common understanding of the need for an independent joint strike capability to provide Australia with a powerful and potent deterrent and a means of demonstrating strategic intent. In the lead up to the seminar, The Central Blue will be running a series in order to generate discussion and enable those that cannot to attend to gain a perspective on the topic. In this post, Hugh White explores some of the challenges to posing and sustaining a credible deterrent. If you wanted to sum up America’s (and its allies’) military-strategic posture towards China in Asia today in a sentence, you’d say that we aim to deter China from using force in situations like Taiwan by the threat of a full-scale military response. So it’s worth asking whether we’re really doing enough to deter China. We can illuminate this a little by looking at Europe. In 2016, after Russia annexed Crimea and invaded other parts of Ukraine, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) feared that some of its members—the Baltic states or even Poland—might be next. It responded by deploying multinational combat formations to these frontline member states. This ‘enhanced forward presence’ (EFP) consists of four battalion-sized ‘battle groups’, one in each of the Baltic states and Poland, composed of contingents from a total of 20 different NATO member states. In NATO circles the EFP is seen as a big deal, because it is believed to show the alliance’s resolve to resist with armed force any Russian military move against these new member states. This is thought to be an effective deterrent. NATO’s Enhanced Foward Presence [Image credit: NATO] Of course, these tiny forces are not expected to stop or even slow a Russian advance. Though NATO is reluctant to use the term, they are a classic tripwire. Ensuring that allied forces are engaged by the Russians at the start of any incursion is supposed to make a full-scale NATO military response inevitable. Moscow is expected to calculate that no NATO member could stand back once its own forces had been attacked. That is why so many member states are represented. But is that right? Does the EFP tripwire do much to strengthen Moscow’s expectations that an attack on Latvia, for example, would mean war with NATO? It’s easy to assume that any NATO member would find it hard to refrain from contributing to a full-scale military response once its own forces had been engaged, and soldiers killed. Both domestic and international pressures would be intense. However, things might not play out that way. Much depends on what happens on the battlefield. The pressure on NATO to escalate would indeed be intense if an EFP battalion was rolled over and crushed with many casualties. But things would be different if the Russians were smart enough to encircle the NATO units without doing much damage to them, and then invite them to surrender, offering to send them home with their tails between their legs. This is not an unlikely outcome, when a single battalion faces multiple divisions. Would NATO member governments then order their forces to fight on against hopeless odds, or would they meekly accept Moscow’s offer? And how much resolve for an escalating fight would they have then? So here is one problem with the EFP: the forces are too small to guarantee the kind of fight that would compel NATO to escalate. But there’s a bigger problem too. Imagine that an EFP battalion does get into a serious fight with Russian forces, and takes many casualties. Everyone in NATO agrees that a major military response is required. What would they do? There seems little doubt that Russian forces could quickly seize control of one of the Baltic states or a sizable chunk of its territory, so the only meaningful NATO response would be a major military operation to expel them. That would be a huge and costly business—by far the largest land operations undertaken anywhere in Europe since World War II. Massive forces would need to be deployed long distances—including, presumably, large US forces across the Atlantic—and would need to be protected as they did so. Russian airpower would have to be neutralised with a sustained campaign of strikes on targets within Russian territory, to which Russia would be sure to retaliate. And then a major land campaign would need to be undertaken. In all this, the risk of nuclear escalation would be very real. How credible is it that NATO would take this on, at massive cost and risk, to push the Russians out of Latvia, for example? That’s the key question, because what will deter Moscow, if anything does, isn’t the presence of the EFP tripwire itself, but the military campaign that it believes NATO would launch if the tripwire were crossed. Therefore, in addition to the tripwire, NATO needs to conceive, plan and exercise a credible full-scale campaign to expel Russian forces from frontline NATO member states. Unless Russia can see that NATO has a credible plan for such a campaign, it is unlikely to be deterred. It is more likely to conclude that, faced with a Russian fait accompli, NATO would talk tough but do little. Moreover, Moscow would need to be persuaded not just that NATO had a plan, but that its members were willing to implement it. There would need to be a clear and evident consensus among NATO members and their voters that they would be willing to bear the costs and risks of a major war to rescue Latvia from the Russians. Building that consensus will not be easy. It won’t be enough to appeal to abstract principles of international law or the sanctity of Article 5 of the NATO Treaty. It will be necessary to explain why other NATO members’ security depends on recovering Latvia, rather than stopping Russia from advancing further west and south. It’s not clear how that argument could be made. Without this, the EFP tripwire looks a very feeble deterrent. Indeed, it risks becoming the opposite of a deterrent. Instead of displaying NATO’s strength and resolve, it demonstrates just how far the alliance was weakened when it was extended into the territory of the former Soviet Union itself. This brings us back to Asia. We readily assume that the US and its Asian allies can deter China from attacking Taiwan, for example. But there’s no credible campaign plan which would convince Beijing that Washington and its partners could intervene effectively, or that they would be willing to pay the costs of such a campaign even if they had a plan. Without those, China doesn’t face much of a deterrent. Hugh White is professor of strategic studies at the Australian National University. This article first appeared on ASPI’s The Strategist on 26 June 2018 and is republished here with the kind permission of The Strategist’s editors. #history #lessonslearned #Strategy

12 Aug 18 This post is the second of a two-part series on deterrence. The first sought to define deterrence holistically as an option for national strategy. This post examines how Australian air power has been influenced by the concept of deterrence, and specifically, how this has influenced developing a strike capability. Putting aside considerations as to whether conventional deterrence is the most appropriate strategy for Australia, there has been a long-standing tendency within air forces to equate ‘deterrence’ with ‘strike’. This tendency lends itself to a belief that if we have a fleet of bombers, then we will automatically deter. This conviction endures in the 2016 Defence White paper which states that ‘A potent strike and air combat capability’ is ‘essential to our ability to deter attempts to coerce or attack Australia and our national interests, including the ability to seize the initiative, and defeat potential threats as far from Australia as possible’. But why is this the case? The very beginning… Long before the RAAF had clearly articulated its doctrine, or a Defence White paper as we know them today had been published, Australia was intuitively employing strike aircraft in support of national deterrence. The defence of Australia during World War II serves as a useful example. Australian air power, along with the allies, shaped the minds of future decision makers through the success at The Battle of Bismarck in March 1943. Using USAAF B-17, B-25 Mitchells, P-38 Lightnings and RAAF Beaufighters, the allies sunk 12 Japanese warships, thus eliminating any possibility that Australia might be invaded. In effect, allied air power had applied ‘defensive deterrence’ by dominating the air/sea gap through the northern approaches. ‘Offensive deterrence’ was also being exercised as a national strategy with the RAAF operating 254 B-24 heavy bombers by the end of the war. [1] The acquisition of these aircraft enabled the RAAF to potentially prepare for the use of chemical weapons – that is, weapons of mass destruction – that the Air Force had tested and stockpiled during the war, but which it never used.[2] Post World War II The decade following the Second World War significantly shaped how the Australian government, and specifically the RAAF, viewed deterrence. This was epitomised in 1954 when Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) Sir Donald Hardman told the Air Board that ‘an air force without bombers, isn’t an air force’, a conviction which was held just as strongly by his successors. While Hardman and his senior colleagues embraced the concept of deterrence, it was not always clear that their reasoning has been well thought-out. At the time, bomber aircraft were synonymous with terror because of the experience of World War II. Consequently, ‘people generally thought of bombing in apocalyptic terms, the mere presence of an Air Force with a reasonable bomber fleet might serve as a deterrent.’[3] While valid in hindsight, the flaw in this strategy was its failure to understand how future wars might be fought, a growing concern with collateral damage, and the ability to accept risk while also generating fear. Following the Second World War and against this background, the RAAF looked to bolster its strike force; however, the government was less inclined. A survey of Australia’s triennia Strategic Basis documents between the late 1940s and early 1970’s shows little official inclination to embrace conventional deterrence as an explicit military strategy.[4] This was until the Cold War. The Cold War changed the equation significantly, with conventional deterrence becoming an important factor in strategic debates during the mid 1970’s and 80’s. This was evident in 1976 with the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (SDSC) suggesting that the principal task for ‘Australia’s defence policy was to develop a posture that would help in establishing credible deterrence which can keep aggressors from her shores without suffering human casualties or physical destruction which inevitably and increasing accompanies the actual use of force.’[5] This resulted in a requirement and prioritisation of a strong maritime strike capability – that is, for a defensive deterrent force – in order to ‘give an enemy pause’.[6] The 1976 White Paper ‘Australian Defence’ followed, and included a discrete section entitled ‘Strike, Reconnaissance and Deterrence’. The core of the RAAFs strike force resided with 24 F-111C aircraft, which supported the RAAFs ability to ‘deter aggression’.  Minister for Air Peter Howson said of the purchase ‘it was the presence of air power and the psychological threat it presented that was the basis of the RAAF’s deterrence, proving the overriding consideration was posture rather than a rational assessment of capabilities.’ Post-Cold War – an official policy By the mid 1980’s, the focus on conventional deterrence once again waned and was replaced by a strategy of denial. The 1987 Defence White paper clearly articulated the defence of Australia’s air-sea gap to the north and rejected the concept of deterrence.[7] This forced the RAAF to conduct an internal review of the concept of deterrence, and to articulate what air power could actually achieve in the defence of Australia. The CAS at the time, Air Marshal John Newham, was troubled by the White Paper’s apparent ambivalence toward strategic strike. Newham argued that regardless of the scale of hostilities, it was essential for the ADF to have the option of striking an enemy force at its source. Consequently, it was suggested that while the RAAF may have lacked the capability for offensive deterrence, it could still be capable of supporting a defensive deterrence strategy. With only a handful of platforms; no matter how capable the F-111’s were, without modern weaponry, the credibility of Australia’s strike capability was questionable. For a defensive deterrence strategy to be accepted, the RAAF had to acquire Precision Guided Munitions; for without precision, the collateral damage and subsequent risk would be problematic. With that said, as India’s leading air power scholar Air Commodore Jasjit Singh (retd), pointed out at the 1991 RAAF Air Power Conference,  the combination of Harpoon-equipped F-111s, P-3s and F-18s, gave the RAAF the most potent maritime strike force in the Asia-Pacific[8] thus highlighting that perception is everything. In this case, defensive deterrence was achieved in the region due to the perceptions of a joint strike capability. It is not a single platform or weapon alone that created a valid threat or deterrent, it was the ability to generate an effect. An undefinable threat and protagonist With a shift away from a single source threat epitomised by the Cold War, a new period of unpredictably was, and is still at play. An ‘unpredictable new international order, which is culturally diverse and prone to both political fragmentation and weapons proliferation’[9] now shapes how the concept of deterrence must be applied. Low level conflict is now more likely than the threat of an all-out nuclear war, and a deterrence strategy must acknowledge this. This is not to say the nuclear threat has been eliminated, but simply that it must be acknowledged that this tactic will not always deter, depending on who the protagonist is. Where nuclear deterrence is not the appropriate choice based on the protagonist, a technological edge may fill the void within the realm of conventional deterrence. In this sense, ‘some analysts suggest that deterrence theory can be emancipated from Cold War thinking to emphasise a more dynamic modality of strategy. ’[10] As such, it could also be reasoned that the supremacy of Western conventional forces rests on new joint strike and precision weapons. Gary L Guertner indeed argues that conventional deterrence requires ‘technological superiority, a form of collective security, forward presence, strategic agility and theatre defence’.[11] To achieve this, a true joint approach is required. The 2016 Defence White paper states that Australia ‘must be prepared to carry out offensive strike operations against the military bases and in-transit forces of a potential adversary’ and that this will be achieved through ‘strategic strike capabilities, including air strike and special operations capabilities’. While an independent strike capability expands the range of options to achieve Australia’s strategic ends, as well as signalling a serious intent and commitment about Australia’s national security, it probably is not optimised. Defining who the potential adversary is – their strengths and weakness as well as their strategic culture – all dramatically shape how Australia might successfully deter. In the interim, as ASPI advises, ‘the single most important task of the RAAF is to raise the costs and risks of threatening Australian territory to any would-be aggressor. A key part of the role of Australia’s future air combat capability will be the way it enables or conducts maritime denial operations.’[12] Squadron Leader Jenna Higgins is an Air Combat Officer in the Royal Australian Air Force and a co-editor at The Central Blue. You can follow her on twitter at @jenna_ellen_. The opinions expressed are hers alone and do not reflect those of the Royal Australian Air Force, the Australian Defence Force, or the Australian Government. __________________________________________________________________________ [1] Stephens, A., 1997, Power Plus Attitude: Ideas, Strategy, and Doctrine in the Royal Australian Air Force 1921 – 1991, Canberra, p82 [2] ibid [3] Stephens, A., 1997, Going Solo: Royal Australian Air Force 1946 – 1971, Canberra, p362 [4] Department of Defence, Key Elements in the Triennial Reviews of Strategic Guidance since 1945, Submission to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, 17 February 1987, Inquiry into the Management of Australia’s Defence and National Security, Official Hansard Report, Submissions and Incorporated Documents, Volume II. [5] O’Neill, R (ed), 1976, The Defence of Australia – Fundamental New  Aspects, ANU, Canberra [6] Ibid p131 [7] Department of Defence, 1987, The Defence of Australia, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra. [8] Stephens, A. (ed), 1991, Smaller but Larger, Conventional Air Power into the 21st Century, RAAF Air Power Studies Center, Canberra. [9] Evans, M., 1999, Conventional Deterrence in the Australian Strategic Context, Working Paper No.107, Land Warfare Studies Center, p7 [10] Ibid p9 [11] Guertner, G., 1992, Deterrence and Conventional Military Forces, Strategic Studies Institute – U.S. Army War College, p5 [12] Commonwealth of Australia, 2016, Report: Planned acquisition of F-35 Lightning II (Joint Strike Fighter), Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra.

10 August 2018 On 23 August 2018, the Sir Richard Williams Foundation is holding a seminar on #jointstrike to discuss the imperative for an independent deterrent. The aim of the seminar is to build a common understanding of the need for an independent joint strike capability to provide Australia with a powerful and potent deterrent and a means of demonstrating strategic intent. In the lead up to the seminar, The Central Blue will be running a series in order to generate discussion and enable those that cannot to attend to gain a perspective on the topic. In this post, Chris Buckley explores the challenge of firstly establishing and then re-establishing deterrence if and when initial efforts fail. Deterrence exists in the mind, not necessarily the battlefield. Nations posture against each other attempting to influence actions and perceptions. For many years, airpower has been a powerful tool of deterrence strategies. But what happens when it doesn’t work.  What happens when deterrence fails? Deterrence is the art of influencing adversary actions before they occur, the art of coercing adversaries to choose pathways consistent with your desires.  Simply put, deterrence is the use of threats, either implicit or explicit. Thomas Schelling literally wrote the book on deterrence, and he states the science of military victory is no longer the determinant factor. To deter an adversary, military action must be anticipated, however the action is avoidable if the adversary changes their behavior. That is a key factor most often overlooked. If the military action is unavoidable no matter what the adversary does, the adversary is not deterred. The adversary must be given an out, or an off-ramp, to avoid the military action. Deterrence is normally associated with weapons of mass destruction, specifically nuclear weapons, however don’t be fooled.  Deterrence exists everywhere, in all military action and strategies. The act of publicising the creation of the B-21, or the shadowy operations of the X-37, or the deployment of a Carrier Battle Group enhance deterrence across the spectrum. But it goes both ways.  The pilot retention crisis, lack of a coherent foreign policy, and the failure of new systems degrade deterrence.  In international relations, everything has deterrent value. Much has been said recently about chemical weapon attacks in Syria, and whether deterrence was achieved, failed, re-established or not. When looked at from a larger perspective, it appears that Assad was deterred from using chemical weapons, then he wasn’t, then he was, then he wasn’t, and now he is again. The reality of the situation when looked at in depth may be that Assad was never really deterred at all. Images of the Barzeh research and development centre in Syria from 13 April 2018 and 15 April 2018. [Image credit: BBC] Let’s rewind. By mid-2012, the United States became concerned that chemical weapons would possibly be used in Syria. President Obama attempted to deter that use in August 2012 by calling out chemical weapons use as a ‘red line.’  The use of ‘red lines’ is actually quite common in diplomatic circles and has been shown to be very effective in deterrence strategies. Red lines are always communicated, they have to be or they do not serve any useful purpose. The adversary must know in order to affect his decision matrix. The perception was this ‘red line’ communication firmly established the US position on the use of chemical weapons. Syria was now fully aware that there would be consequences. It was the use of chemical weapons in Ghouta in August 2013 (a full year after Obama’s statement) that called into question the US threat of retaliation. The media was all over this chemical attack, and what the US response would be. Deterrence had failed, how would the US respond?  However, there had already been 15 reported uses of chemical weapons between the President’s remarks and the Ghouta attack. Ghouta had crossed the red line, why didn’t the others? In this case, the US had to respond or risk losing all credibility. The US did so in September 2013 by bringing legislation that would authorise the use of force against Syria. The US Secretary of State publicly stated Syria could avoid this military action if they turned over its entire chemical weapons stockpile. Syria agreed, and the military action was averted. Therefore, in theory, deterrence was re-established. The threat of military action had become very real to Syria, but they were provided an off-ramp (give up your arsenal). They accepted, and the perception of deterrence was re-established. The threat of force coerced Syria into a favorable action. The gnashing of teeth in the media over whether this was the right or wrong move, whether it was good or bad, whether it was strong or weak, was debated on party lines. The political objective was to remove Syria’s chemical weapons and that objective was (supposedly) achieved without the use of force. Therefore the partisan outcry over the manner in which the military threat served the political purpose is irrelevant. UN Resolution 2118 granted permission to any member of the UN to “take action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security” in event Syria makes use of chemical weapons again. Deterrence was re-established. Case closed. The people who didn’t like it, didn’t like it because of their political party. The American public was led to believe that all was well until April 2017 when Khan Shaykhun was attacked with chemical weapons killing dozens and injuring hundreds. Deterrence was never in place, Syria had only gone underground. It was revealed the UN Resolution had not deterred Syria, and they had lied about turning over their stockpile. The problem is, those inside the action already knew about both of those things. There were over 45 separate reported uses of chemical weapons between the UN Resolution and Khan Shaykhun. Obama and Trump both saw chemical use and chose not to respond during this period. Most people are surprised to know there have been over 60 separate reported uses of chemical weapons in Syria since 2012. When President Trump was forced into action, his goal was to re-establish deterrence. He had to convince Assad this type of action is not acceptable, and would be punished. The cruise missile strike on Shayrat punished Syria for their action, and the messaging that took place afterwards cemented the unacceptable nature of such action. We know that his goal was not to remove the threat of chemical weapons. It that were the case Shayrat would not have been struck. This airbase was chosen because the attack on Khan Shaykhun was carried out by Su-22s from Shayrat, even though a majority of past attacks were carried out by attack helicopters. Just as before, the people who didn’t like it, didn’t like it because of their political party. However, the question remains, has deterrence been re-established? Ask North Korea. It is not an accident the strike on Syria took place at the same moment the leader of China was meeting with President Trump. That strike was done to demonstrate US willpower to multiple adversaries, not just Syria. When it comes to North Korea, the US cannot effectively deter anything. When digging through the four instruments of national power, most are not effective in North Korea. Diplomatic ties are weak, there is no real connection to North Korea and the US works through intermediaries who all have their own agendas. The information methods also don’t work very well due to the tight grip the North Korean government has on information in that country. The US’ ability to pierce that propaganda shield is limited. Economic sanction from the US are also ineffective and have been for years. North Korea’s only true economic link to the global system is China, therefore only China can hurt North Korea economically. He only option remaining is military, however it remains unclear if the threat of military force gets through to North Korea. The strike on Syria showed China this threat is credible. This highlights the real key to deterrence: credibility. In response to the Syrian strike, China turned back coal imports from North Korea. That single action told the world China believes the US threat to North Korea is credible. Only China can put enough pressure on North Korea to avert military action and alter their choices. Syria will continue to act with impunity until their sponsor, Russia, puts enough pressure on them. President Trump used a single strike to communicate to 4 different adversaries. But the question remains, did it work?  Russia got the message, and Syria has not executed any further chemical attacks, therefore it appears deterrence has been restored. Or has it? China got the message, but can they coerce North Korea fast enough and long enough to avert another devastating Korean Conflict? While I believe a unified Korea is inevitable, I do not believe military action against North Korea is.  There is time to resolve this conflict without force, but time is running out. While it has not been communicated, I believe the President has created his own internal ‘red line’ with regards to North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. The detonation of another nuclear device is that red line. If that event transpires (and it probably will very shortly), the President will be forced into irreversible action. Chris Buckley is an active duty military officer in the United States Air Force. He has more than 16 years experience in the fields of strategic deterrence, offensive airpower, aerial bombing, and aircraft & systems acquisitions. He is a Master Navigator with 3000+ hours in more than 40 different aircraft types. He is graduate of the USAF Test Pilot School, Air Command and Staff College, Joint Forces Staff College, and the Air War College. This article appeared on Angle of Attack on 13 April 2017 and is republished here with the kind permission of Angle of Attack’s editors. #AirPower #Culture #Doctrine #Strategy

This week The Central Blue welcomes back Flight Lieutenant Joshua Vicino as he asks some 'reasonably challenging' questions about contemporary safety thinking. Balancing mission-readiness with consistent safety was never going to be an easy proposition, but is it time for a rethink of the current dominant approach? Vicino lays out his argument with two case studies, concluding with thoughts about the next stage of safety culture development. How safe is too safe? Some would argue that even asking this could be considered blasphemy from Defence’s Aviation Safety perspective. After all, our airworthiness system, first introduced in the early 1990’s, is regularly described as being written in blood. But our mission is to generate air power, which inherently places our platforms and people in harm’s way. Achieving the right balance, ‘Mission first, Safety Always’, is easier said than done, and so we should be willing to revisit our regulatory system to see whether it is giving us the outcomes we need. This is also easier said than done. While incident and accident investigations often refer to similarities between different occurrences, it is rare to find two situations so similar as to draw direct comparison. Furthermore, to have this occur in a way that allows us to consider different regulatory systems would seem almost impossible. But I am about to outline two almost identical aircraft defects, one of which was managed under the previous aviation safety system, and one managed under the current ‘So Far As Reasonably Practicable’ (SFARP) regime. Having considered their rectification processes and the impact that these processes had on delivery of air power, we can and should ask whether our pursuit of a generative safety culture has caused us to lose sight of our reason for being – generation of air power. And if so, what can we do about it? Back in 2016… A RAAF aircraft and support contingent were deployed on a regional surveillance operation. On return from the second last sortie before it was to return to Australia, a post-flight inspection found a 3.75 inch-long rupture in the wing surface. The rupture was found in an area of secondary structure that did not impact the flight controls. With the diplomatic clearances locked in for the return to Australia, and one operational mission remaining, the deployed maintenance team needed to achieve a solution within 24 hours or drop the last mission. The simplest fix was simply to leave it be. But at 3.75 inches long the structural repair manual defined the crack as outside the safe limits for flight, even for a secondary structure. Moreover, a repair option was unavailable because there were no deployed aircraft structural technicians or associated tooling and equipment. Similarly, the timeline didn’t permit the option of awaiting a novel engineering solution from the engineering support office back home. This left the sole remaining option to be for the deployed engineering officer to authorise a non-standard risk assessment that deferred the repair and allowed the aircraft to continue to fly. This assessment needed to outline the impact and likelihood of the risk as well as provide alternative treatment measures. That treatment was goop[1]. As per the safety framework of the day, the surface rupture was filled with goop – a known mechanism for stopping crack propagation – and informal engineering advice was sought from the engineering support office via email to inform the risk assessment. As an additional control, the technicians were instructed to inspect the rupture after the flight in order to verify that it had not propagated further. Under these conditions, the risk level was evaluated as sufficiently low enough from a technical airworthiness perspective to continue flying. Operational endorsement of the risk assessment was provided by the detachment commander as authorising officer, and the aircraft completed its final operational mission and transited home uneventfully the following day. All up, the whole process took just over six hours to complete. Fast forward to 2021… The same aircraft type, the same region and remarkably, the same problem. This time, a 3.5 inch-long rupture was discovered on an after flight inspection in the same part of the wing. Uncannily, this aircraft also had a single operational sortie left prior to its return to Australia, and had no structural technicians deployed or the tooling and support to affect a repair. This time, however, the deployed maintenance team was working under the Defence Aviation Safety Regulation framework. Under this framework, the ability to conduct a risk assessment and treat the risk with a non-standard process, operationally endorse this and continue flying, was no more. In fact, the new authorised maintenance manual explicitly forbids the use of a risk assessment by the deployed engineering officer as was used in 2016. Filling the rupture with goop and ‘cracking-on’ (pardon the pun) was no longer possible. This time, the solution came from the engineering support office. They had to develop a formal engineering instruction that allowed the aircraft to be transited back to Australia in order to conduct a full structural repair. Their solution was to cover the rupture with aluminium tape, effectively an equivalent treatment to the goop method used in 2016. That resolution process, culminating in the issuance of a formal engineering instruction, took 41 hours to achieve, and led to the cancellation of the final operational sortie. What lesson should we learn? The remarkable similarities between these two scenarios provides us a unique opportunity for comparison. The same problem, addressed under two different regulatory systems, ended with nearly identical technical solutions. However, one did so in a way that enabled the generation of air power, and one that did not. In 2016, the deployed engineering officer and the detachment commander/authorising officer, were able to appropriately consider the operational imperative and weigh that against the aviation safety risks in consultation with appropriately qualified people. In 2021, a conservative application of the new regulatory system in place, they no longer felt empowered to do so. The result of this rigid and prohibitive interpretation of the new regulations was that they were forced down a formal process entirely controlled by a separate engineering organisation. There’s good reason to separate church and state. Keeping the operational element and engineering support office apart by design prevents operational personnel playing fast and loose with their risk assessments and getting back in the air when they shouldn’t. However, the current approach by those who interpret the regulations and sponsor the expositions that detail how their organisation will meet their regulatory requirements, eliminates the ability for both parties to apply agile governance methods to the specific circumstances, as was done in 2016. In removing this, the enterprise as a whole loses the ability to apply reasonable risk treatment methods that maintain a focus on the reason for flying in the first place – the operational context. As such, the result of this inability to rapidly generate defensible technical risk assessments in support of operations was the loss of an operational mission – a direct reduction in air power. But DASR wasn’t meant to be used this way. The SFARP principle was meant to allow reason to prevail. Unfortunately, we are in this position because the new, outcomes based regulatory framework was overlaid with the same process-driven practises that governed the old system. Instead of a system where we should be more capable of generating air power, we are now less effective. It doesn’t have to be this way. DASR can be implemented as the outcomes-based regulatory framework it was meant to be. Engineering support offices across the RAAF have the opportunity to improve their processes, to enable us to once again generate defensible technical risk assessments at short notice, with limited time, and to optimise the generation of air power. If the potential for major conflict is as imminent as some would suggest, this optimisation is a must. Now is the time for Commanders and Managers alike to understand what it means to be reasonably practicable and to drive the cultural change in their organisations necessary for genuine progress. This doesn’t mean we should return to pathological cultures of the early 90’s, but given our reason for being, we simply can’t afford to be so safe that we unnecessarily limit our operational effectiveness. [1] Imagine an aviation version of Selley’s kitchen sealant Flight Lieutenant Joshua Vicino is an Electronics Engineer working in the Royal Australian Air Force. He holds a Bachelor of Science and Master of Electrical Engineering from The University of Melbourne. He is currently the Officer in Charge of Maintenance at No. 10 Squadron.

This week we welcome back Dr. Peter Layton who turns a spotlight to a sometimes-understated aspect of airpower: Airbases. As airpower generation points, airbases are critical enablers of capability, but they face a raft of potential threats – everything from natural weather phenomena, to kinetic strikes during hot conflict, to cyber and other ‘nuisance’ operations during cold peace. Absorbing and recovering from such impacts can look quite different for a range of base contexts. To better characterise and understand these various threat-resilience-capability continuums, Layton identifies 4 base archetypes that help frame clearer thinking about future airbase design and investment. The Chief of Air Force’s strategic intent update makes airbases a priority for future investment. Airbases certainly seem ripe for change. Conceptually, they have barely changed since World War Two when grass runways gave way to concrete ones. In this the Chief has laid out three criteria for the RAAF’s airbases: be fit for purpose, robust and resilient. In terms of purpose, RAAF airbases need to generate airpower from peace into major conflict. For this, they need to be in the right place; geography is important. In that regard, the RAAF’s southern Australian bases are very distant from potential flash points. The Air Force will need to deploy forward to bring air power to bear. In terms of robustness, airbases are large static facilities, easily targeted using kinetic and cyber weapons. In time of war, the most concerning kinetic weapons are precision guided weapons and in particular cruise missiles and ballistic missiles. Their proliferation means hardening an airbase is of little use anymore. Instead dispersion, that is hiding, is the better option. In this, the Iranian ballistic missile attacks on al Asad Air Base are instructive. The Iranian’s apparently used commercial space imagery for targeting and were able to achieve surprisingly accurate attacks. Forewarned, the US moved personnel and equipment from the area. CENTCOM General Frank McKenzie said later that the strike could have killed up to 150 Americans and destroyed 20-30 aircraft if these measures had not been taken. Iran was not a peer competitor; such attacks in a major war would be much larger, more numerous and widespread. Kinetic strikes are a wartime problem but cyber is a clear and present danger. In times of conflict the rate of cyber-attacks will step up but it is already an ongoing threat against any and all RAAF airbases. There is also a new appreciation emerging of natural disasters. Fires and floods are getting bigger, while there are more Cat 4 and 5 cyclones. Moreover, natural disasters can cascade and once triggered set off further events with impacts that can be both non-linear and distant to the triggering event. Southern Australia’s 2020 bushfires almost led to a major wide-area protracted power outage, just as the cold weather did later in Texas. Such an outage could disrupt airbases and communication networks including base personnel and their families. In terms of resilience, airbases need to be able to absorb a shock and continue to operate. In this, the shock needs to be kept to a manageable scale. If it’s very large, resilience measures can be overwhelmed and any recovery during a limited duration conflict is then unlikely. Moreover, it’s necessary to define what an airbase is to be made resilient to, when it needs to be resilient and for how long. In this, an airbase is a large facility; are some parts less important than others? Lastly, the notion of what returning to operations can range from: surviving a shock in some reduced form; continuing operation in the presence of a shock; recovering from a shock to the original form; or absorbing a shock and evolving in response. Which of those four options is desired? Let’s pull these disparate threads together into a simple quad chart. The x-axis line runs from the large southern bases across to deployment air bases, likely offshore. On the y-axis the line goes from today’s cold peace to a hope-not hot war. The chart then covers where, and in what context, airbases will need to be fit for purpose, robust, and resilient. It’s a chart to make us think about what the design of future airbases needs to be, and implicitly where to invest. Lookin’ Out My Back Door The Lookin’ Out My Back Door quadrant is the best of all worlds. The airbase is well practised in carrying out standard flying operations on a regular and ongoing basis. There is ready access to a large workforce and the ability to generate more quickly through using contractors. The airbase is well integrated into national and global supply chains. There are threats however, with cyberattacks prominent. The rise of compound and cascading disasters suggest that the airbase may need to be able to function for a short period independently of the local energy and communication networks. There is also a potential issue from nuisance commercial drones. On such airbases, the primary aim is to improve efficiency. Down on the Corner The Down on the Corner quadrant involves deploying to a northern or offshore base for an exercise that may feature a heavy international engagement strand. There will be considerable reliance on the local infrastructure and support network. RAAF staff will be a scarce asset with few available on the airbase, particularly for protracted operations. Supply will often be using commercial means with specialised maintenance items and stocks brought from Australia, at times on dedicated RAAF air transport. Cybersecurity remains a threat with the possibility of drone interference higher than in Australia. Compound and cascading disasters could still be an issue. The nature of deployed operations though is that when trouble threatens, there is always the pack up and leave option. In such an airbase, the primary aim is effectiveness; each deployed person needs to be as productive as possible. Bad Moon Rising The Bad Moon Rising quadrant involves southern bases in times of war. The main changes from the cold peace would be the higher rates of effort demanded and possibly for an extended period; the sizeable numbers of airbase personnel sent forward to run deployment airbases; the sharp rise in numbers and sophistication of cyber-attacks; and some argue the possibility of kinetic attacks from the occasional submarine launched cruise missile. Such a context means that the airbase might need operating by reservists with limited training or more likely, by newly recruited staff with enthusiasm but not much else. The advances in training that digital technology brings may be really important to bring these new people up to speed. This might be for both maintaining the airbase facilities and in sustaining the airbase’s flying operations. In terms of threats, the airbase will come under significant space-based surveillance using a variety of sensors. Moreover, it must be expected that software malware placed in systems years before will be activated to cause general disruption. This disruption might be on the airbase, but also in local and national energy and communication systems. Independent airbase operation may be necessary. Who’ll Stop the Rain The Who’ll Stop the Rain quadrant is the worst case, particularly in terms of kinetic attack. Activities will need to be dispersed so as to ensure a single attack does not inflict catastrophic damage. Regular movement may also be needed to ensure survival as attacks continue. Accordingly, a primary aim is to keep in front of the adversaries targeting system, so the location of critical items like aircraft, supplies, maintenance support and personnel is always uncertain. Precision attacks then become problematic. To back up dispersion and movement, the airbase will include active measures to fool and deceive an adversary. In this, deployed operations by their nature are always short of people while in a combat situation exposing fewer people to danger is always desirable. There are hard issues of resilience under fire. Let’s sum up. The airbases in the bottom half of the diagram aim to deliver air power as efficiently as possible. Decisions can be driven by cost-benefit analysis. In contrast, airbases in the top half of the diagram need to focus on achieving effectiveness gains. Decisions are driven by how to best increase the airbases’ outputs, hang the costs. Across all quadrants looms the spectre of cyber-attack. Crippling an airbase might cut air operations but even having someone watching online what you’re doing is bad too. Having software experts at hand looks essential, not just a nice to have, especially in the diagram’s top half combat operations. Airbases are central to air power. They need to be as the Chief sets out: fit for purpose, robust, and resilient. If not, others may steal a march. The RAAF might have the better aircraft, but with mediocre air bases might deliver less effective air power than an adversary can. That’s not a war winning place to be in. Dr Peter Layton is a Visiting Fellow at the Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith University and an Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (UK). He is the author of the book Grand Strategy. His other posts, articles and papers may be found at: https://peterlayton.academia.edu/research.

Dr Robbin Laird, Next Generation Autonomous Systems: A Williams Foundation Special Report, 9 June 2021 In this report, the key themes and presentations at the April 8, 2021, Williams Foundation seminar on Next Generation Autonomous Systems are highlighted. A number of interviews with participants are included as well as insights from earlier interviews from pre-COVID visits to Australia. In addition, selected articles are included in an appendix which address the question of shaping a way ahead with regard to manned-unmanned teaming and the coming of autonomous systems. The original seminar was scheduled for March 2020 but was postponed due to COVID-19. Download the report here From the author On April 8, 2021, the Williams Foundation held a seminar originally scheduled for last March. It was postponed as the COVID-19 pandemic took hold. As Air Marshal (Retired) Geoff Brown, Chairman of the Williams Foundation put it in his prologue to the conference: “Since 2013 the Sir Richard Williams Foundation conferences have focused on building an integrated fifth generation force. Recent conferences have evolved from the acquisition of new platforms to the process of shaping and better understanding the environment in which that integrated force will prepare and operate. Highlighted have been the challenges of making the strategic shift from counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan to higher tempo and higher intensity Joint operations involving peer competitors. “Within this context, the 2021 conferences further develop the ideas associated with an increasingly sophisticated approach to Joint warfighting and power projection as we face increasing pressure to maintain influence and a capability edge in the region. The Williams Foundation will continue to look at the evolution of the Australian Defence Force from the perspective of the sovereign lens and setting the conditions for future success. “This conference will explore the force multiplying capability and increasingly complex requirements associated with unmanned systems. From its origins at the platform level, the opportunities and potential of increased autonomy across the enterprise are now expected to fundamentally transform Joint and Coalition operations. Defence industry can and will play a major part in the transformation with opportunities extending beyond platforms to the payloads and enabling systems which underpin the necessary risk management and assurance frameworks demanded by Defence. The importance of industry is reflected in the design of the conference program and the speakers identified.” The introduction to the program highlighted the focus of the seminar as follows: “The concept of the Unmanned Air System (UAS), or Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), is nothing new nor is their use in missions which traditionally challenge human performance, fragility, and endurance. Ongoing operational experience confirms unmanned systems on their own are not the panacea and trusted autonomy in manned and unmanned teaming arrangements in each environmental domain is emerging as a key operational requirement. “The narrative has progressed the argument for greater numbers of unmanned systems in a far more mature and balanced way than hitherto. The manned-unmanned narrative is now sensibly shifting towards ‘and’, rather than ‘or’. Manned and unmanned teaming leverages the strengths and mitigates the weakness of each platform and concentrates the mind on the important operational aspects, such as imaginative new roles, and the challenges of integration to generate the desired overwhelming firepower. “This capability will require a complex web of advanced data links and communication systems to make it operate as a combat system. Designing and building the ‘kill web’ so that it can enable the delivery of manned-unmanned firepower across domains will be a huge challenge not least due to the laws of physics. However, the ability to train, test, evaluate and validate tactics and procedures will add a whole new level of complexity to generate the ‘trusted autonomy’ required for warfighting. “The aim of the April 2021 conference is to promote discussion about the future implications of autonomous systems. It will investigate potential roles for autonomous systems set within the context of each environmental domain, providing Service Chiefs with an opportunity to present their personal perspective on the effect it will have on their Service. “The conference will also explore the operational aspects of autonomous systems, including command and control and the legal and social implications that affect their employment. And finally the conference will examine the current research agenda and allow industry an opportunity to provide their perspective on recent developments in unmanned air, land, surface and sub-surface combatants.” The final report is being issued today (June 9, 2021) after there was a chance to review the materials presented, including videos, briefing slides and presentation documents. In addition, a number of interviews with presenters were conducted as well to shape the narrative to pull together the various presentation strands. The ADF is already undergoing a transition to shaping a distributed integrated force. Next Generation Autonomous Systems can provide a further set of capabilities for a more effective, dense, survivable and capable ADF as it builds out for operations in the Indo-Pacific region and enhances its defense of the Australian continent. https://sldinfo.com/2021/06/next-generation-autonomous-systems-a-williams-foundation-special-report/ The e-book version can be found here: https://defense.info/williams-foundation/2021/06/next-generation-autonomous-systems-report-on-the-williams-foundation-seminar-april-8-2021/

Dr Robbin Laird, Defence Industry and Working with Defence in Shaping a Way Ahead for Autonomous Systems, 8 June 2021 Link to the article Defence Industry and Working with Defence in Shaping a Way Ahead for Autonomous Systems - Second Line of Defense (sldinfo.com) The development and incorporation of autonomous systems into the Australian fifth-generation force requires a close working relationship between defense industry and the Department of Defence and the services. But also requires meeting the challenge already seen with regard to the introduction of software upgradeable systems such as F-35, P-8 and Triton. That challenge is for the warfighters to be able to drive advantages through rapid code rewrites and being able to develop and generate with the autonomous systems advances, disposable systems as well. This was well put in the discussion with Jason Scholz. As Scholz put it in our interview, with the Centre’s focus on the “smart, the small and the many”, compared with traditional “complex, large and few” manned systems, code rewriting can be much faster. It is also the case that digital engineering and digital twins is changing how all platforms are designed and supported. But in the case of next generation autonomous systems, the entire life cycle of these “smart, small and many” systems is very different. “They will be attritable; there will be no need to develop and maintain 30 years of systems engineering documentation – some of these might be used only once or a few times before disposal. When you need to adapt to the threat, digital engineering supports fast redesign and T&E in the virtual, and to add a new capability you just download it as software.” Scholz says. At the seminar, there were presentations by six industrial partners. Boeing Australia focused on the development of the Loyal Wingman. With the space which Australia has along with the technical capabilities in the country, Australia is in a good position to be a leader in autonomous systems. According to Andrew Glynn, Boeing Australia, the Airpower Teaming System, which has been established to develop loyal wingman is an important approach to shaping a way ahead. He noted that “the loyal wingman program is an experimentation program with RAAF to provide insights in the use for this type of capability.” Clearly, from Boeing’s perspective, the standup of the program in Australia is not simply about meeting the ADF needs, but provides a launch pad for broader global development. Glynn underscored that the teaming approach is designed to develop capabilities which can work with existing fleets. “Once ATS is operational, it will assist the RAAF to protect and project force by addressing quantity at the right quality.” He noted that the program went from concept to first flight in under three years and that was enabled by the fact that the platform is built on a completely digital foundation. A second presentation was given by Dr. John Best of Thales, Australia. In his presentation, he focused on the opportunity to build or enhance sovereign defence capability built around autonomous systems. But to do is not just an industry challenge, it is in his words “an enterprise challenge.” What is required is defence and industry to shape an ecosystem where they can work together to deliver the desired outcome. He also underscored that Australia has the building blocks in place to deliver such a solution. A particularly important aspect of shaping a way ahead is to shape more effective ways to manage complex systems, and within that context the autonomous piece of complexity. And the continuous learning piece which comes from use in the real world of combat and gray zone operations needs to be fed into the evolution of systems, This means that the “learning piece” needs to be worked into the contractual relationships which industry has with Defence. A third presentation was by Dr. Andrew Lucas of Agent Oriented Software. He provided a very helpful clarification of how autonomous systems are different from automatic or automated systems. For Lucas, an autonomous system is goal directed and capable of rational reasoning with regard to those goals. An autonomous system can perceive its environment, determine if the environment affects its goals and then takes actions in alignment with its goals up against the operational environment. It is able to balance proactive and reactive behaviors. This is in contrast to automated system which simply follows a task list or script. He then provided a way to look at the evolution of autonomy within the context of man-machine operations. His schema is built around the axis of increasing levels of delegation to the system. It moves from the machine simply providing timely advice with the humans making all the decisions; to a semi-autonomous relationship in which the machine is subordinate to a certain level of human authority; and then operating fully autonomous in which the machine operates without huma control or direct oversight. Dr. Lucas then discussed the relationship between AI and autonomous systems. AI is defined by him as the “theory and development of computer systems able to perform tasks normally requiring human intelligence.” AI enables machine learning which is to be understand in terms of “a computer program can learn and adapt to new data without human intervention.” And this then enables to creation of intelligent agents which can be defined as “a computer program that is capable of perceiving and interpretating data sensed from its environment, reflecting events in its environment, and taking actions to achieve given goals without permanent guidance from its user.” He underscored that to achieve the capability for autonomous systems, several trend lines in the evolution of AI and machine learning need to coalesce or synthesize. From this point of view, he noted that there were several AI trends, thrusts and directions which are shaping a way ahead. These included image analysis and recognition, or sensor identification and assessment, speech recognition and the ability of the human and machine enablement of dialogue, intelligent search and assessment, and intelligent software agents able to work through big data. With such capabilities evolving then situate AI and robotics are enabled with the possibility of machine learning. In other words, there is clearly a pathway already being shaped to autonomous systems, but investments, experimentation and development remains. And he argued that Australia needs to invest in this development to deliver on the promise of autonomous systems both for the civil and defence sectors. A fourth presentation was by Northrop Grumman, but done by remote participation from the United States. Northrop is a key player in Australian defence, and in the area of man-machine teaming, clearly the arrive of Triton is part of the way ahead. But the key focus which the company has upon expanding the types and nature of sensor networks and finding ways to leverage those networks to deliver timely decision-making data is a key part of the way ahead. Clearly one way already that Northrop is contributing to such a way ahead is with regard to how the F-35 functions as a C2 and sensor “flying combat system” and enables it to fight in an 8-ship formation as a wolfpack. This was not mentioned at the seminar but clearly is a key enabler of the way ahead for the ADF which also provides a foundation for shaping the broader efforts to shape an integrated distributed force able to work a diversity of sensor and communication networks to deliver the desired combat effects. In the Northrop Grumman presentation, a key point is to shape a way ahead for battleship control where sensors can track operations within that battlespace. Clearly, remote sensors are proliferating and the importance of AI and autonomy for helping the tactical and strategic decision makers to que systems to perform key and dynamic tasks will become increasingly important in the extended battlespace. A fifth presentation by defense industry was given by Air Vice Marshal Bill Henman (Retd), who is currently a strategic advisor Air and Space for Raytheon Australia. His presentation focused on a key issue, namely, the countering of autonomous systems. This subject is a key one both in terms of understanding how adversaries are using their own automated systems, which needs to include not simply the question of technology but concepts of operations, which in turn allows you to examine the vulnerabilities of your own systems. Autonomous systems have vulnerabilities which can be built around spoofing, data corruption as well as braking effective sensor network to C2 communication flows. At the heart of the autonomous system impact is the control challenge. Henman defined control as “enabling friendly manoeuvre while denying adversary manoeuvre. He argued as well that control also involves deconfliction of friendly manoeuvre in terms both of kinetic and non-kinetic fratricide. In his presentation, he highlighted how autonomous systems can be disabled or eliminated in combat. This can happen by disrupting or spoofing the detection and tracking systems. Or this can happen through various softkill options, such as jamming and spoofing, electronic attack or cyber intrusions. He then highlighted a number of hardkill options both kinetic (close in weapons systems) and non-kinetic, notably high energy lasers and directed energy systems. These vulnerabilities clearly provide a realistic cautionary note to how autonomous systems can be introduced and used. And this is why their introduction into infrastructure defense such as extended port security or into logistical support, up to and included logistical management systems, are good places to start and to sort through how to do so enhancing rather than compromising national defense and security. ` He ended his presentation by proposing a number of key actions as the way forward with regard to autonomous systems is worked. First, it is important to create the optimum environment to allow industry, Academia, Research and Development communities to be able to create and field innovative control soltuions. Second, it is crucial to be able to understand the operational implications of an adversary who has greater freedom of manoeuvre with respect to all dimensions of governance of autonomous systems than do the liberal democracies. Third, there needs to be as much focus on the development of superior autonomous decision cycles as there is upon the development of the sense and respond control systems enabling autonomous systems. And finally, he argued for shaping autonomous decision making ‘tutorship’ in roder to build the future confidence needed to send autonomous systems into combat as the force evolves with more agile, multi-domain C2 capabilities. A final defense industry presentation was by Lockheed Martin Australia. Dr. Tony Lindsay, formerly of the Australian Department of Defence’s Department of Science and Technology or DST, provided insights as well. Lindsay provided an overview on the decision cycles for the force and how autonomy might provide both enhancements to such decision making as well as more capability to leverage the proliferating sensor networks. He argued that AI and autonomous systems have the possibility for impacting on all parts of the decision cycle, such as persistent ISR, sensor cuing, scene understanding, and cognitive battle management. They could just as well undercut decision effectiveness if not worked into an effective decision-making cycle. This requires allowing the operator to act using relevant information, be able to align with commander’s intent and provide for system adaptation. The broader shift associated with the fifth-generation force transformation, namely distributed force which can be scalable and integratable provides a solid foundation for managing proliferating sensor networks as well as finding ways to use autonomous systems within distributed decision-making systems. In short, shaping a new enterprise approach already underway driven by software-upgradeable systems, and reworking how platform providers work with the forces and defence, presages the significant changes underway into which autonomous systems will be introduced and integrated within the force. The featured graphic is taken from Dr. Tony Lindsay’s presentation to the Seminar.

Dr Robbin Laird, The Australian Army, Navy and Air Force Shape a Way Ahead for the Inclusion of Autonomous Systems, 5 June 2021 Link to the article The Australian Army, Navy and Air Force Shape a Way Ahead for the Inclusion of Autonomous Systems - Second Line of Defense (sldinfo.com) WGCDR Keirin Joyce noted: “All of the services see robotic autonomous systems as a significant part of the road ahead. It’s just that the services are getting after them differently.” At the Williams Foundation seminar held on April 8, 2021, each of the service chiefs provided their perspective on the way ahead for their service with regard to such systems. Even though the strategic way ahead is shaping a force able to work across service platforms to deliver the desired combat or crisis management effects, each domain has a physical quality to it different from the other domains. And autonomous platforms like any platforms have to respect the domain within which they operate. And so doing, they might well be able to contribute to platforms operating in other domains, but they must first of all work effectively within a ground, air or naval combat force. The Australian Army and RAS With regard to the Army, the ability to experiment is significantly greater than with the other two services. The cost to do so and the fratricide which such systems can introduce into the operational force is much less to do so. There is little doubt that introducing such systems into near term operations, such as logistical support for HADR operations make a great deal of sense and can provide the force with near term learning from which to generate a broader capability to use such systems. In an August 9, 2020 video, the Army put its case succinctly in highlighting an optionally crewed autonomous casualty evacuation vehicle (OCCV): “The Australian Army will increase its experimentation, prototyping and exploration of autonomous vehicles and emerging technologies through Defence industry contracts valued at $12 million, allowing Army to learn, prototype and develop future concepts. Technology such as Robotics, Autonomous Systems, and Artificial Intelligence act as a force multiplier, and the mastery of the technology will make us more effective on the future battlefield and help to keep our personnel safe.” Optionally Crewed Combat Vehicles Link to Department of Defence You Tube video https://youtu.be/tlPdX1s-ZL4 Lieutenant General Rick Burr, Chief of the Australian Army, underscored the work Army is doing to introduce autonomous systems and to integrate them into the force. The Army’s overall approach is described as accelerated warfare within which autonomous systems are developed and assessed as contributors to enhanced capabilities, like all platforms and systems are as well. They are part of being what he calls having a force which is “future ready.” The inclusion of intelligence learning machines will contribute to what the Chief refers to as his approach to shaping the Army as a “force in motion.” He argued that Robotic Autonomous Systems (RAS) can maximize solider performance, improve decision-making, generate mass and scalable effects, protect the force and enhance efficiency. Today, Army is the largest user of uncrewed air systems. The Chief argued that uncrewed ground systems in the future will proliferate in a similar way. “Greater use of autonomous systems will be a feature of future ground forces.” An important point which he highlighted was that in making capability investment decisions are being done with regard to their ability to incorporate or work with RAS. For example, with regard to the future infantry fighting vehicle, the Army is focused on that vehicle able to operate with RAS, including controlling several smaller autonomous vehicles as well. “The vehicle will have the power and computing potential to operate numerous, smaller uncrewed and autonomous systems.” In the Army Chief’s approach, autonomous systems are part of the future force, but part of force being driven by a number of technological developments. “Greater platform collaboration, new power sources, new forms of active and passive protection, more lethal strike weapons, and directed energy weapons, are examples of this way ahead.” He underscored that in the future “Army’s teams will be more connected, protected and lethal so they can achieve their missions against current and emerging threats at the lowest possible risk to Australian soldiers.” He argued that the force as it modernizes is examining throughout this effort new opportunities for the use of RAS in the force. For example, “our aviation crews are examining the opportunities for manned-unmanned teaming, notably as we look forward to the delivery of the new attack helicopter.” The Army chief highlighted the nature of the globally competitive environment where maintaining an edge is both more necessary and more difficult. He argued that such a competitive edge could accrue to the ADF to the extent to which the force can be better integrated, and coordinated than its adversaries. This requires superior training and decision-making capabilities. This is why, he argued, why people is at the “center of our efforts. It is people that get the technology working effectively in the dangerous and contested environments.” The Royal Australian Navy and RAS The Chief of Navy, Vice Admiral Noonan, discussed the Navy’s RAS-AI 2040 strategy which he had introduced last year. As he described that strategy: “The way that we’ve sought to visualize this vision is through five very fundamental effects. Force protection, obviously all about keeping our people safe and out of harm’s way so that they can get on and do their job. Force projection is about how we can achieve mass. Force potential using human machine teaming, ultimately to achieve better and more effective decision-making in the war fighting effort. Partnered force concept around how we will operate as an integrated and joint force by design.” Vice Admiral Noonan then discussed the six principles which underly the RAS-AI Strategy 2040. “The six fundamental principles were built around a user centered design. The system design is user centered. In terms of decision support, we are looking to have systems that significantly reduce the cognitive load on our commanders and operators alike, allowing for them to achieve greater shared situational awareness to deliver effective, efficient, and ethical decision-making. “The joint integration piece is critical. I cannot stress that highly enough in terms of we must ensure that these systems are integrated. Not just integrated into the platforms or their parent platforms but integrated into the force. “And they are capable of being evergreen. This is the new term for spiral development. It’s about ensuring that we have systems that remain contemporary, and I am challenged on a daily basis about capability gaps and about deficiencies in the long lead times that require us in the shipbuilding space. It takes about 10 years to build a submarine, or five years to build a frigate. “And are we incorporating old technologies? Bottom answer is no, in that we are designing future and evergreen in growth into our platforms. And I think that’s a very important concept that we have not always fully grasped. “Finally, is the importance of made in Australia. Our systems must be designed for the very unique circumstances that we operate in, particularly in the maritime environment.” Vice Admiral Noonan then highlighted really the key aspect of using any new sensor networks, whether they be autonomous or not, namely, their integration into a C2 system. “Operating all these systems would simply be too complex, too time consuming and ultimately unmanageable without a common control framework. Therefore, as part of the way that we seek to get after that, the building blocks of that framework, as we see them in Navy, it needs to be a legal and ethical module that allows us to have embedded and encoded regulatory and legal protocols. Clearly a common control protocol that unifies the means of machine control. “We need common control bridges that provide an interface between the proprietary control systems and the combat management systems of the platforms from which they’re housed. We need a common control language that can express C2 in a way that both human operators and RAS-AI machines can understand. And ultimately, we need a common spectrum management protocol, levering and integrating programmed projects to harden and ensure the spectrum in which we operate.” The Royal Australian Air Force and RAS The RAAF has already acquired two flying platforms which are designed to work together in a manned-unmanned teaming effort, namely, the P-8 and Triton. These platforms for the U.S. Navy working with other platforms, such as the Romeo Helicopter are providing important real world operational lessons with regard to shaping a foundation for the future. In addition, with the loyal wingman program underway, the RAAF as one of the most advanced air forces in the world, we introduce the loyal wingman into a force already being reworked with the introduction of the F-35. The challenges to introduce Loyal Wingman and then to use it effectively will be an important part of shaping a way ahead for autonomous systems in the airspace. At the seminar, Air Marshal Mel Hupfeld provided the RAAF perspective on the way ahead in this area of development and operations. At the outset of his remarks, he noted: “Defense can gain significant advantage through leveraging autonomous systems, that’s to make better decisions faster, to more effectively allocate resources, and to discover new ways of delivering military effects. Artificial intelligence and human-machine teaming will play a pivotal role in air and space power into the future.” The RAAF is working a way ahead with regard to integrate manned new and existing aircraft with remotely piloted and autonomous systems. A key case in point is Loyal Wingman. According to Hupfeld: “The true value is indeed hidden inside the airframe of Loyal Wingman. And that is the development of the code and the algorithms which form the artificial intelligence behaviors that will optimize its combat capability. The Loyal Wingman project is a pathfinder for the integration of autonomous systems and artificial intelligence to create smart human-machine teams. “The aim is to provide capability advantage, working alongside existing platforms to complement and extend our air combat platforms and our other systems. And we’re exploring totally new concepts of operations, whereby multiple systems will pair with crude capabilities, such as the F-35, the Growler, the E-7 Wedgetail, with an aim to bolster our relatively small but potent Air Force. “And it’s clear how this changes things for us. Such an asset will change the way we calculate risk. The Loyal Wingman is the giant uncrewed gorilla in the room, but we’ve got many other programs that don’t immediately catch the eye. And these programs, though less visible, will no less revolutionize the way we do business.” He underscored that the Plan Jericho program through the Jericho Disruptive Innovation effort is looking at ways of automation and artificial intelligence that can step in to help pull the weight. There are still jobs in Air Force that we have people performing which are predictable, repetitive, and they don’t require creativity. “But this is not about replacing people with machines. We’ve got a shortage of people and they’re a scarce resource. And our work in this space is really about freeing up those people so that we can employ them in those areas that humans do best. “In my view, one of the best examples of this theory at work is some work we’re doing, once again, through the Jericho program, on quarriable sensors program. Now, while we would probably work on a catchier name, and hopefully one that’s easier to pronounce, what this project is seeking to achieve has the capacity to force-multiply our intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance capability by a factor of two or three…. “I believe that our sensors are currently employed very inefficiently. So for example, most of what our sensors stream is meaningless noise, and even when we do capture important information, it’s not necessarily available to the people that need it. The quarriable sensor program takes care of all this by using artificial intelligence and machine learning to automatically detect when an event of significance occurs. It will then report that directly to commanders and decision-makers in real time, enabling the customer to determine whether the automated response and the intelligence is valid.” Air Marshal Hupfeld provided a good summary to the day and to the presentations of the Service Chiefs. “We’re disappointed in reporting that we see from some of our commentators who still choose to discuss Air Force capabilities in isolation. Qhether or not Super Hornet can breed another capability one on one is really, to me, not a useful conversation. The force of tomorrow will be characterized by those invisible connections across air, land, maritime space and cyber, with masses of data from sensor inputs being fused, using artificial intelligence and machine learning, to rapidly convert data to information, to knowledge, to insight, all at unfathomable speeds. “The entire Defence Force will be one integrated system of systems. My vision for automation is that the joint force will be AI-enabled using robotics to augment roles, and humans working with machines, so they get the best out of both. The days of boring menial tasks will be gone. Our most scarce resource, our people, will focus on higher value and the creative tasks that we need. “And with this vision, we’ll march in lockstep with our colleagues in Navy and Army and across Defense to ensure that we deliver an autonomous future, and the responsiveness and precision of air and space power that we need, into our future joint force.” Appendix: THE ARMY APPROACH: OCTOBER 2018 STRATEGY War, by nature, remains an intense human activity and the use of armed force to compel change remains at its heart. The character of war is changing with the adoption of emerging and disruptive technologies. As these technologies become more available and affordable, the gap between well-equipped militaries and the motivated individual or group with a cause is closing. Therefore, sustaining and maintaining a technological edge over potential adversaries is becoming more challenging. An area where we can maintain an edge is in the large scale integration, synchronisation and coordinated employment of these technologies, coupled with superior training and decision-making. This can be achieved through robotics and manipulation of data through advanced networks (or system of networks) that can improve the speed and accuracy of information sharing. These networks can connect soldiers to other combatants (both human and machine), the broader Army, the Joint Force and partner nations; improving situational awareness, survivability and lethality. However, adoption of emerging technologies should be considered objectively prior to acquisition to confirm the capability offered by the technology is justified and cost effective. Risk, informed through future casting, modelling, simulation and experimentation, should also be considered to ensure the right technology is adopted at the right time. In this context RAS can be viewed as the application of software, artificial intelligence and advanced robotics to perform tasks as directed by humans. Simply “autonomy is the ability of a machine to perform a task without human input. Thus, an autonomous system is a machine, whether hardware or software, once activated performs some task or function on its own”. The term autonomy can be a barrier to understanding as it is, generally, specific to a system or sub-system. Therefore, it can be misleading to refer to an autonomous platform if the entire system of systems is not autonomous. It can be helpful to consider the level of human input, how much discretion the machine has with regard to the task and what aspect of the system has been automated. Within this strategy, RAS will span the full spectrum of human input from remote control through to full autonomy – the level of autonomy required will be determined by the role and also the maturity of the underpinning technologies such as AI. Therefore RAS is a lens through which to describe a system, hardware and software, which has varying elements of autonomy and/or robotics and commonly both. THE ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY RAS-AI STRATEGY 2040 The forward to the strategy by Vice Admiral Noonan: On 1 July 2020, the Prime Minister launched the Defence Strategic Update 2020. This highlighted that we are experiencing the most consequential strategic realignment since the Second World War. Consequently, our Navy must be able to meet the emerging challenges of regional military modernisation, the risk of state-on-state conflict and technological disruption, to maintain our ability to Shape the Maritime Environment, Deter actions against our national interests in the Maritime Domain, and Respond with credible Naval Power to defend our Nation, and our National Interests. Robotics, Autonomous Systems and Artificial Intelligence (RAS-AI) are transforming every aspect of our lives. As a Fighting and Thinking Navy, we must leverage these advances to also transform, and improve, our ability to Fight and Win at Sea. I am therefore pleased to release Navy’s RAS-AI Strategy 2040, which nests within Navy’s capstone strategic documents – Plans MERCATOR and PELORUS, and supports the achievement of each of the five Navy Outcomes. RAS-AI Strategy 2040 sets out the challenges and opportunities that these technologies present and explains to Navy, our Joint Force colleagues, the broader Defence Organisation, our allies and industry the benefits e seek from RAS-AI, and how we aim to realise them. To fulfil our potential we need to engage in constant experimentation, and encourage collaboration and innovation at all levels. This will enable us to leverage RAS-AI to enhance Navy’s capability by strengthening our Force Protection, increasing our Force Projection in the maritime approaches of our near region, improving our Joint Integration through Partnership, maximising our Force Potential, and ensuring Australian Control. Just as our people and machines must operate in teams to enhance their strengths and overcome weaknesses, we must team with Defence as a whole, industry, academia and our international partners, to achieve the potential of these technologies. My vision is for Navy, industry and academia to build upon our established transformational partnerships, allowing us to address the challenges outlined in this strategy, together. Make no mistake; the pace of change is increasing and will challenge us all at some point. To meet that challenge, all that I ask, is that each of us focus on being a little better – every day. In embracing technology, we must remember that warfare is, and will remain, a fundamentally human activity. Our people will be at the core of our technological advances, and we must design systems with them at the centre. RAS-AI will make our people better warfighte s, and will enable us to achieve expanded reach across the region, however it is our people who remain our competitive edge. The race in autonomous warfare has already begun. Doing nothing, or waiting for allies to solve our requirements, is not an option. I commend the RAS-AI Strategy to you all and challenge each of you to think about how you can contribute to it. The featured photo: Chief of the Australian Army addresses the Williams Foundation Conference on April 8, 2021.

Dr Robbin Laird, Perspectives on the Introduction of Autonomous Systems into Combat, 4 June 2021 Link to article Perspectives on the Introduction of Autonomous Systems into Combat | Defense.info The Williams Foundation seminar on Next Generation Autonomous systems held on April 8, 2021, began with two presentations which focused on the nature of the challenges of introducing autonomous systems into the combat force. The first presentation was by Group Captain Jo Brick of the Australian Defence College. Brick frequently opens up Williams Foundation seminar and provides very helpful orientations to the issues to be discussed at that particular seminar. It was no different with regard to the challenging topic of understanding the nature and the way ahead for next generation autonomous systems. She highlighted a number of fictional examples of how the machine-man relationship has been envisaged in the future. But she honed on a key aspect of the challenge: how will data flow in the combat force and how will that data be used to make lethal decisions? She posed a number of key questions facing the way ahead for the introduction and proliferation of autonomous systems into the combat force. Do we trust the systems that we have created? Are we expecting them to be perfect, or to accept that they are flawed just like us? Do we understand autonomous systems enough to information the creation of an effective system of accountability? How would autonomous and intelligent systems make decisions, free from human intervention? Would they reflect the best of humanity or something less inspiring? Does the conduct of war by autonomous and intelligent systems dilute the sanctity of war as a societal function? Who or what is permitted to fight wars and to take life on behalf of the state? What does the use of AI and autonomous systems in warfare mean for the profession of arms? One could add to her questions another one which was discussed directly or indirectly throughout the seminar: What will be the impact of the introduction and proliferation of autonomous systems on the art of warfare? The second presentation, which followed that of Group Captain Brick, was by Professor Rob McLaughlin from the Australian National Centre for Oceans Resources and Security. In his presentation, McLaughlin dealt with the broader ethical and legal issues which autonomous systems raise and which need to be resolved in shaping a way ahead for their broader use in the militaries of liberal democratic states. One should note that another key question is how authoritarian states use and will use them which is not restricted by the ethical concerns of liberal democratic societies. There is always the reactive enemy who will shape their tactics and strategies in ways taking into account how the liberal democratic militaries self-limit with regard to systems, like autonomous ones. McLaughlin started with the most basic question: What is an autonomous weapon system? He turned to a definition provided by the International Red Cross which defines AWS as follows: “Any weapon system with autonomy in its critical functions. That is, a weapon system that can select and attack targets without hum intervention. After initial activation by a human operator, the weapons system – through its sensors, software (programming/alogrithms) and connected weapon(s) – takes on the targeting function that would normally be controlled by humans.” He then added this consideration as well from the International Red Cross as well: ”The key distinction, in our view, from non-autonomous weapons is that the machine self-initiates an attack.” This raises in turn the key consideration of when is the AWS (in legal terms) an independent unit (like a warplane or warship) rather than simply a sensor/weapon? This in turn raises a further consideration: Can a maritime autonomous weapons system be a warship in terms of international law? According to the Law of the Sea: “For the purposes of this Convention, warship means a ship belonging to the armed forces of a state bearing the external marks distinguishing such ships of its nationality, under the command of an officer duly commissioned by the government of the state and whose name appears in the appropriate service list or its equivalent and manned by a crew which is under regular armed forces discipline.” Such a definition quickly raises issues for autonomous maritime platforms. Are they marked with the nation’s identification? Are they introduced such as the Germans in World War II did with merchant “warships” without such markings? What does under command mean specifically as autonomous maritime platforms operate? Is there a mother ship which controls them which is crewed by humans? And if uncrewed then what about the manning issue? He argued that we are not yet at a threshold where these are practical questions impeding development. But we “will meet a frontier at some point – probably with AI and advanced machine learning.” In short, with autonomous systems on the horizon, a number of questions about how they will impact on the force, and how concepts of operations using these capabilities will face ethical and legal challenges as well.