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In this two part series, Squadron Leader Michael Spencer details the significance of NASA’s remote piloted aircraft, the Ingenuity helicopter. In this first installment, Spencer outlines NASA’s mission concept and system designed to integrate the air domain into space exploration. This disruptive technology showcases the innovation of NASA engineers and how accessible off-the shelf technologies can be all that’s needed to challenge traditional methods and missions. The Ingenuity helicopter’s importance goes beyond space exploration, with the mission providing understanding of design risks for remote piloted aircraft systems missions and mission systems on Earth. NASA is preparing to test fly its "Ingenuity" helicopter deployed on Mars in mid- April 2021 in an experimental technology demonstration of humankind's first powered and controlled flight on another planet. The test flight and mission systems' designs have followed fundamental principles that can be important considerations to make effective designs for remotely piloted air power on Earth. Figure 1. NASA illustration depicting the Ingenuity Mars helicopter standing on Mars next to the Perseverance rover (NASA image). Ingenuity & Perseverance – NASA Effort to Integrate Air and Space Power Air power theorists and practitioners should be keenly monitoring the Mars 2020 Perseverance mission. NASA configured the Perseverance rover to carry the "Ingenuity" helicopter to demonstrate the first remotely piloted air vehicle operated by humankind on another planet as a potential disruptive technology to include in future space missions. NASA specifically designed the vertical lift air vehicle for autonomous, powered, and controlled flight in thin Martian air. NASA's mission objective for Ingenuity is not part of the primary science mission for the Perseverance rover but a separate and discrete engineering target to "demonstrate the viability of rotorcraft flight in the extremely thin atmosphere of Mars." NASA hopes the Ingenuity flight test will demonstrate a disruptive technology that may expand options available for future NASA interplanetary exploration missions to planets with an atmosphere. Mission complexity has increased with each successful NASA mission to Mars. In early missions, NASA landed sensors on the Martian surface that directly observed the landing site area and periodically exchanged data when Earth appeared in view. The latest NASA exploratory program relies on increasing the rover's size with each mission to mobilise increasingly larger sensor payloads to cover a greater surface area. Most recently, NASA successfully landed its Mars 2020 Perseverance mission on Mars with the largest-sized rover ever launched from Earth. Perseverance can carry more sensors with a greater capacity for mission roles and functions. The Perseverance rover will autonomously follow its daily uplinked mission plans to gather scientific data for NASA to study different types of Martian terrain. It also collects rock and dust samples where a future NASA recovery mission will return them to Earth and seek out microbial signs of ancient life on Mars. However, ground features on the Martian surface can pose risks and constraints to the rover missions' daily plans. Rough terrain, steep slopes and soft soil can adversely affect the stability, manoeuvrability, routing options, and maximum daily endurance and operating range. Figure 2. The Mars Helicopter Delivery System (centre) holds Ingenuity aboard the Perseverance rover (NASA image). Ingenuity, a solar-powered, electric motor driven and autonomously controlled helicopter was stowed on board the Perseverance rover. NASA is using Ingenuity to explore the feasibility and advantages of exploiting the Martian air domain to aerodynamically stabilise, manoeuvre, and mobilise an airborne sensor with greater freedom of manoeuvre than is possible with a ground vehicle. Ingenuity is a test asset and is not carrying sensors to support the Perseverance rover's science mission. NASA designed Ingenuity to demonstrate autonomous operations, follow remotely planned missions, and exchange data and command signals with its base station configured in the Perseverance rover to communicate with Earth. An air vehicle can more easily and readily reach new vantage points over and beyond ground features that might generally limit or deny routes for the rover, constraining the reach of groundborne sensors. Accessing and exploiting the Martian air domain will improve future NASA exploration missions to deploy sensors with increased speed, reach, flexibility, and responsiveness and with improved sensor coverage over the ground. More importantly, the air power advantage provides a perspective that will enable the airborne deployed sensor to see further in range, see more within the same field-of-view, and cover greater ground area more quickly. Vertical lift negates the constraints and additional design burdens needed to enable fixed-wing aircraft flight. The ability to reach an altitude above the ground will improve the search capabilities by elevating a sensor to extend the surface range and expand the coverage area using the same sensor field-of-view. Additionally, the hover capability will enable the airborne placement and steering of a sensor to look at surface phenomena from above and make observations where the ground terrain denies access to the rover. The vertical lift capability enables Ingenuity to take-off and land without needing a prepared runway to transition between zero and flight speed, unlike fixed-wing aircraft. Ingenuity's vertical-lift capability allows it to descend vertically over the edge of steep terrain or into a naturally formed cavernous hole (e.g. fissure, crater, lava tube, etc.) and recover, using a vertical trajectory to reach a point in time and space more efficiently than is possible for a rover navigating through the varying conditions on the ground. Mission Concept Perseverance will travel to a previously surveyed area assessed by NASA as suitable for supporting the flight trials. The first mission outcome is to validate that the Perseverance mission successfully delivered a functioning helicopter to Mars. Ingenuity needs a test area that is level with stable solid ground and with low risks of foreign object damage from the dust and debris blown up from its rotor-wash. For similar safety reasons, plus compliance with planetary protection protocols, Perseverance will depart to maintain a safe standoff distance from the flight test area for the flight trial duration. NASA did not intend for Ingenuity to operate organically with Perseverance. Still, it will maintain line-of-sight communications with the Perseverance base station to receive downlinked mission plans from the remote pilots on Earth and uplink flight test results back to Earth. Figure 3. The flight test programmed planned by NASA for Ingenuity (NASA image). Ingenuity will be programmed to ascend only to a height of three-metres for its first test flight. The test flight program will incrementally increase the flight duration, operating altitude, and travel distance over each of five test flights planned on separate days over a month. After the end of the month-long flight trial, Perseverance will depart to continue on its intended science mission without Ingenuity. Mission System NASA JPL engineers challenged themselves to develop a design for the air vehicle, preferably using off-the-shelf software, system components, and manufacturing techniques where possible. The final design needed to be lightweight, radiation-resistant, ruggedised to survive a space lift, transit, and descent to Mars, and then perform powered controlled flight in the thin Mars air. The result is the 1.8 kg Ingenuity helicopter appearing similar in physical size to a box of tissues configured with an electrically powered motor to drive two contra-rotating composite carbon-fibre rotor blades. The made-for-Mars helicopter design uses two stacked contra-rotating blades spinning at 2,400 revolutions per minute, creating a spinning disc measuring about 1.2 metres in diameter. The Ingenuity power subsystem is configured with a battery in the payload and solar panels optimised to harvest the reduced solar flux arriving at Mars and mounted above the rotors. The battery can be recharged within one Mars day. Approximately one-third of the power budget is needed to heat the onboard systems to survive the freezing temperatures at night; the electronic payload uses one-third of its power for navigation (feature imaging camera, point-to-point mission guidance software, laser altimeter, inertial measurement system), flight management, and communications (to the Perseverance base station); and one-third of the power drives the rotor blades on each daily mission. The remote operation of both the Mars rovers and the Ingenuity helicopter incurs a significant time delay needed for the control and data signals, travelling at the speed of light to transit between Earth and Mars. On average, the one-way transmission time is about 20 minutes, depending on the planets' relative positions. The average 40-minute delay in receiving feedback signals means that the mission cannot rely on remote pilots to control the helicopter manually. Ingenuity needs to rely on a flight management system to autonomously follow a downlinked mission plan with a digitised representation of the flight trajectory prepared during the previous Martian day by the remote pilots on Earth. Operating during Martian daylight hours, Ingenuity will use its laser-altimeter, inertial measurement unit, and a downwards looking feature camera. The camera captures distinctive ground features that can be autonomously identified to track relative position, speed and direction from sequential images to navigate Ingenuity around the flight test area. The designs for the mission and mission system have critically relied on years of scientific observations of Mars, the Martian air and land operating environments, and the Sun-Earth-Mars integrated operating environment that will be described in Part 2 of this article. Squadron Leader Michael Spencer is a Maritime Patrol & Response Officer in the Air Force Reserve. He started his Air Force career as a Navigator in P-3C Orions, conducting long-range maritime patrols. During an extensive and diverse Air Force career, he completed postgraduate studies in space science at the Royal Military College of Canada for duties back in Australia in the Defence Space Coordination Office and Defence acquisitions of ground-based space surveillance systems. Currently, he is employed in the Defence COVID-19 Task Force and the Air Force Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems(RPAS) Team. He also promotes space interests and opportunities through volunteering with the Space Law Council –Australia & New Zealand and the American Institute for Aeronautics & Astronautics. Bibliography Open-source intelligence available online from NASA for Mars, Perseverance, and Ingenuity. Air Force (2013). AAP1000-D The Air Power Manual. Sixth Edition. Air and Space Power Centre. Online at https://airpower.airforce.gov.au/APDC/media/PDF-Files/Doctrine/AAP1000-D-The-Air-Power-Manual-6th-Edition.pdf. Accessed 27 March 2021. Air Force (2019). AFDN 1-19 Air-Space Integration. Air and Space Power Centre. Online at https://airpower.airforce.gov.au/APDC/media/PDF-Files/Doctrine/AFDN-1-19-Air-Space-Integration.pdf. Accessed 27 March 2021. Associated Press (2021). NASA unveils details of Mars helicopter Ingenuity, containing piece of Wright brothers' first plane, ABC News. Online at https://amp.abc.net.au/article/100025168. Accessed 25 March 2021. NASA (2021). Deep Space Network – Canberra Deep Space Communication Complex. Online at https://www.cdscc.nasa.gov/. Accessed 27 March 2021. NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory (2021). Ingenuity Mars Helicopter Landing Press Kit. Online at www.jpl.nasa.gov/news/press_kits/ingenuity/landing/. Accessed 25 March 2021.

In our fourth instalment in our series on how can you help make the #AFSTRAT a reality, Flying Officer Patrick Helsing raises important questions about potential disconnects between the values of Air Force and broader Australian society. AFSTRAT 2020 LOE 4 outlines Air Force’s intent to evolve its culture to reflect that of Australia’s demographics in order to deliver air and space power. Australian society’s perception of Air Force culture directly impacts the willingness for underrepresented groups to consider military service. For the Air Force to be viewed by these groups as an attractive employer of choice, it needs to better understand and address the values of the younger generation of people who will be joining the Air Force of tomorrow. LOE 4 states that understanding cultural norms and questioning the status quo is a necessary element to recruiting and sustaining an inclusive Air Force. Two widely different examples illustrate that we may not currently be reflecting the culture of many young Australians. Many high schools across Australia are abandoning stringent grooming standards. Meanwhile, the Royal Air Force has allowed its members to grow beards. This leads us to question whether current Air Force grooming standards are really value adding to air and space power, or aligns with the values of young Australians across society. Similarly, while the Roulettes provide a means for recruitment; their target is an environmentally mindful generation also concerned about the real effects of global warming. Therefore, the use of superfluous pollutants such as smoke to make their displays more entertaining may not be culturally aligned to the values of many young Australians. To achieve the AFSTRAT LOE 4 goal of evolving the Air Force’s culture so it reflects the values of the Australian people, we must be proactive in our approach. Our goal must be to better understand and address the values of young Australians – the Air Force members of tomorrow. Flying Officer Patrick Helsing is an Aeronautical Engineer in the Royal Australian Air Force. He joined the Air Force in 2018 after working in private industry and is currently studying a Masters of Space Engineering at UNSW Canberra while working in a System Safety role at Air Training and Aviation Commons Systems Program Office. Follow him on LinkedIn @Patrick Helsing

Dr Robbin Laird The Strategic Shift and the Role of Airpower: A Discussion with Ben Lambeth Second Line of Defense, 10 April 2021 I have been focused for several years on what I see as a clear and dramatic shift from how civilians and the military have looked at the land wars in the Middle East to now dealing with adversaries who have built forces for contested operations across the spectrum of operations. We have a generation of civilian and military leaders who have not lived in the context of dealing with peer nuclear powers with significant conventional capability. It is not surprising that understanding of escalation management has atrophied. The strategic shift has a very dramatic impact on maritime and airpower, which clearly should be the ascendent services in the Pentagon to sort through the way ahead. And integration of air and maritime power is the key to meeting the strategic interests of the United States. But the U.S. Army still predominates with a Sec Def from the Army, a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs from the Army and two 4 Army Four Stars in a theater where the U.S. Army does not have the central, perhaps even a central role to play, namely in the Pacific. So how do we make the transition? How do we shape a relevant concept of operations? And how do we stop ground pounders from thinking that they can put missiles into the first island chain or on allied soil ringing China without even considering their impact on escalation management with nuclear powers? It is useful to remember that the Russians face three nuclear powers in the Atlantic; and the United States and its Pacific allies face three nuclear powers in the Pacific. Recently, I reviewed the new book by Ben Lambeth which provide his assessment of the shift from the pure dominance over airpower of counterinsurgency operations to the fight against ISIS, a fight which required airpower to remove the Army’s shackles on its proper use against a state-like competitor. I followed up from that review to talk with the author about how he came to write the book and his sense of the challenges moving forward beyond the land wars. Question: Why did you write the book? Lambeth: “Looking back on my collected work over the past two decades, I’ve made a productive career of writing in-depth air campaign assessments, starting out with my chapters that revisited both the Vietnam air war and Operation Desert Storm in a book of mine published in 2000 called The Transformation of American Air Power. “In the years since then, I went on to produce even more detailed studies of NATO’s air war for Kosovo in 1999, of Operation Enduring Freedom against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan that followed the terrorist attacks of 9/11/2001, and of the air contribution to the three-week major combat phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom in early 2003 that finally toppled Saddam Hussein. “In light of that background, it seemed only natural that once our initially anemic response to the rise of ISIS in August 2014 eventually expanded into a more effective and sustained air effort, that I should take on a critical assessment of that campaign as well.” Question: I was working for Mike Wynne at the time when the Sec Def and the Bush and then the Obama Administrations clearly cut back on the role of airpower and reduced it to support for the ground operations. Was this legacy finally being shed in Operation Inherent Resolve? Lambeth: “Clearly, as counterinsurgency operations became the predominant American way of war after 2003, the USAF lost a lot of muscle memory for doing much of anything else by way of higher-end force employment. “And the predominant Army leadership at U.S. Central Command continued to apply its long-habituated Army thinking going forward into an entirely different situation that was presented by the rise of ISIS. A more assertive leadership in CENTCOM’s air component at the time would have pressed for a different response to the challenge it was handed in 2014 by arguing for targeting ISIS not as an insurgency, but rather as a self-avowed state in the making. “However, CENTCOM’s commander, U.S. Army General Lloyd Austin III, simply assumed ISIS to be a regenerated Islamist insurgency of the sort that he was most familiar with, which it was not at all, and accordingly proceeded to engage it as just another counterinsurgency challenge. “Eventually, his air component’s second successive commander, then-Lieutenant General C. Q. Brown, finally prevailed in arguing for deliberate strategic air attacks against critical ISIS infrastructure targets in both Iraq and Syria, not just for on-call air “support” to be used as flying artillery for the ground fight. “One must remember that the vast majority of today’s serving U.S. Air Force airmen are only familiar with Operation Desert Storm from their book reading. “And even much of the USAF’s more senior leadership today has never really been exposed to higher-end aerial warfare as we last experienced it over Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in 2003. Only now are we slowly coming to realize the opportunity costs that were inflicted by this neglect for nearly two decades, during which time we fixated solely on less-intense counterinsurgency warfare..” Question: Then how do you see the challenge of transition posed by the strategic shift? Lambeth: “It is clearly a significant one. “And the continued absence of proper understanding where it matters most is suggested by the recent Army bid to deploy long-range missiles into the Pacific as one of their contributions. “This is simply a crass attempted roles-and-missions grab in order to stay operationally relevant, yet in a theater in which airpower – both land- and sea-based –clearly offers the only cost-effective tool for addressing the challenges presented in that arena. “In a way, we find ourselves today much like where we were at the end of the Vietnam War. “While we were consumed then by the eight-year distraction of that self-inflicted experience, the Soviet Union enjoyed essentially a free ride for modernizing its nuclear and conventional force postures without significant offsetting measures by us. “It took nearly two decades of hard work in the force development and training arenas for us to compensate in full for that failure to hold up our end of the strategic competition with Moscow. “Fortunately, we succeeded just in time to pave the way for our eventual success in Desert Storm and for the collapse of Soviet communism that followed shortly thereafter. “I believe we face a similar challenge today looking into the third decade of the 21st Century, with a rising China and a resurgent Russia now dominating tomorrow’s threat horizon. “We need to recognize this and wake up to the fact that the challenges we’re now facing are totally unlike the challenge we faced in fighting yesterday’s land wars in Southwest Asia. “But in order for that to happen, the country needs an amalgam of leadership that sees and understands this newly-emerging big picture correctly. “I have long felt, indeed ever since Desert Storm, that CENTCOM is organized incorrectly. CENTCOM’s area of responsibility has long been air-centric, in my opinion. And yet that organization has been consistently commanded by a succession of Army and Marine Corps four-stars. “That, to my mind, has repeatedly entailed putting a square peg into a round hole. “I’ve often felt that it would have been truly an inspired move after Desert Storm if its commander who largely swung that war’s successful outcome, U.S. Air Force General Chuck Horner, had been appointed CENTCOM’s next commander to replace U.S. Army General H. Norman Schwarzkopf. Or, that failing, had the successful air commander for Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, U.S. Air Force General Buzz Moseley, been tapped to become the next commander of CENTCOM. “Either move would have finally broken the mold of the ground services’ long-held but increasingly anachronistic monopoly on that key position in today’s world. “That, in turn, might have made a fundamental difference in our subsequent combat experience in that part of the world for the better.” Lambeth’s Mitchell Forum overview on his book is included in the Second Line of Defense article

Look to the sky! In our third instalment in our series on how can you help make the #AFSTRAT a reality, Squadron Leader Kate Yaxley draws on the power of curiosity to inspire ourselves and our teams to advance #AFSTRAT, and by extension, air and space power. Follow her on Twitter @K8Yaxley. I can help make #AFSTRAT a reality through inspiring curiosity. By inspiring air and space power professionals to look up to the sky and be curious, the desired #AFSTRAT outcomes become possible. When looking up to the sky, we all bring a different perspective. One person may only see clouds, while another may see a platform for strategic effect. When I look up, I look deeper and see the electro-magnetic spectrum. This spectrum extends beyond the sky, into space; while also enveloping the ground and sea. It also extends laterally to encompass our networks and how we interface with each element in a joint environment. Given this spectrum allows us to interface with physical elements beyond what we see in the sky, it offers an opportunity to extend our reach. Along this spectrum, we can integrate autonomous elements to extend our reach. Such autonomous elements may form a swarm of agents. I could use a piece of this spectrum to interface with these agents and team with them to realise new capability. I would do so using elements of transparency and trust to fulfil outcomes. I would be their shepherd and guide them towards a goal of reaching strategic effects. When you next look up to the sky, ask; what do I see? Is there something deeper? Can what I envisage create a new narrative for air and space power?

Robbin Laird and Ed Timperlake Featured Article in Second Line of Defense 28 March 2021 Last Fall, 2nd Fleet hosted the 2020 version of Black Widow, an Atlantic-focused USW exercise. But to be completely accurate, although the term ASW is most commonly used, what we are discussing is undersea warfare. USW is an integrated fight against all undersea threats, with submarines being a key, but not the only threat. ASW is part of USW. As one Naval officer put it: “When we tend to discuss an integrated fight, we try to use the term USW, but when we are specifically hunting for just a submarine, ASW is the correct term.” This is not classic USW, but one in which new capabilities are being woven into shaping a 21st century version of USW to deal with a 21st century threat posed from the sea. USW is becoming reshaped by the interactive kill web approach of multi-domain assets focused on a core warfighting capability and set of relevant skill sets. U.S. Navy aircraft, surface ships and submarines will participate in Exercise Black Widow 2020 in the North Atlantic Sept. 12-18. During Exercise Black Widow our Fleet warfighters employ, hone, and evaluate tactics, techniques, and procedures to enhance our readiness for real world operations, with specific focus on advancing our theater undersea warfare advantage in a multi-domain environment. This exercise will allow us to develop new doctrine and innovative tactics that address the capabilities of our near-peer competitors across the range of missions we expect to encounter in major combat operations. This year’s participants include the amphibious assault ship USS Wasp (LHD 1), the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers USS Arleigh Burke (DDG 51) and USS McFaul (DDG 74), a Virginia-class fast-attack submarine, a Los-Angeles class fast-attack submarine, Patrol and Reconnaissance Wing 11, and Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadrons 46 and 72. This marks the first time U.S. 2nd Fleet (C2F) and Commander, Submarine Group (SUBGRU) 2 will lead the force. “The reestablishment of Submarine Group 2 enables the Navy and our Allies to finely tune our efforts in this resurgent battlespace, and reinforces the critical trans-Atlantic link,” said Vice Adm. Andrew Lewis, Commander, U.S. 2nd Fleet. “Exercises like Black Widow give the undersea force a venue to showcase how we are agile, persistent, flexible, interoperable, and resilient.” Participating units will refine communication techniques between platforms and simulate real-word application to enhance the lethality of the team as one cohesive fighting force. Black Widow also provides a chance for an increased focus on training in anti-submarine warfare on multiple platforms to enhance strategies and heighten the combat readiness of the fleet. Vice Adm. Daryl L. Caudle, Commander, Submarine Forces. “We train like we fight, and strive for innovation, development, and improvement across all spectrums of warfare. To maintain superiority, we must be more agile in concepts, geography and technology.” We had a chance to get further insights into the evolving “team sport,” from Rear Admiral Jim Waters, Commander Submarine Group Two (SUBGRU2) during our visit to Norfolk in March 2021. The Admiral has a distinguished career with significant operational experience in both the Pacific and the Atlantic (see biography at the end of the article.) When SUBGRU2 celebrated its first anniversary of its establishment in September 2020, the Commander was quoted in a story published by the command on September 30, 2020. Submarine Group 2 (SUBGRU 2) celebrated its first anniversary after reestablishment on Sept. 30, 2019. SUBGRU 2 was reestablished a little more than a year after the reestablishment of U.S. 2nd Fleet in August 2018, and was aimed at enhancing the Navy’s capacity to command and control its undersea warfare (USW) forces in the Western Atlantic. Rear Adm. Jim Waters, SUBGRU 2 commander and Ellington, Connecticut native, highlighted the importance of reestablishing the command. “We are tasked with advancing the art of undersea warfare through the combined efforts of our air, surface, submarine, and other underwater capabilities and to provide exquisitely trained forces to ensure undersea dominance in the Atlantic…I am honored to be a part of developing and leading this command into the future of integrated undersea warfare.” SUBGRU 2 serves as the Theater Undersea Warfare Commander (TUSWC) for 2nd Fleet and 4th Fleet in response to increasing near-peer competition in the Atlantic. SUBGRU 2 has the authority to command and control air, surface, and undersea forces to execute integrated multi-domain undersea operations in defense of the homeland. In our discussion, a number of themes emerged and what clearly was especially hammered home was a significant focus on innovation in working a wide variety of platforms to deliver the desired combat effect. In fact, the Rear Admiral underscored that for Vice Admiral Lewis, many Navy platforms maybe considered an USW platform since they all have the ability to see, to communicate, and as necessary provide weapons as contributors to what is now known as the USW Team Sport. Clearly, the submarine remains the number one sub killer with weapons deployed for this purpose. But with the expanded capability of surface and air-borne assets to find, track and kill submarines, the role of the underwater U.S. Navy force changes as well. It can be the cutting-edge stalker or killer or work through the kill web force to get the desired result. In fact, having a wider range of options for prosecution and destruction of adversary submarines than in the past is a key element for 21st century maritime operations and warfare. Over the past few years in interviews with aviators in the transformed Maritime Patrol community with the P-8 and the Triton., along with a more focused integration of the Romeo helicopters we saw the U.S. Navy reshape airborne forces working together to deliver a desired kill web combat effect. Along that journey we saw the establishment of fleet level Maritime ISR (MISR) officers reflect the importance of the Information (note we are calling it “I” for Information vice Intelligence), Surveillance and Reconnaissance capability availability for maritime warfare, including ASW in particular. Command guidance reflected in what is known as the “Commanders Intent” side of this effort is the key focus of Vice Admiral Lewis and is clearly seen in the work of Submarine Group 2. Mission command is crucial and Command guidance intent is clearly distributed to the fleet to shape and task forces that can deliver the desired combat effect. Obviously, how communications and how ISR is shared between an undersea, surface and airborne force varies in terms of operating theaters and is a challenge; working interactivity across the domains is a key part of exercising an ASW team approach. Rethinking how to use platforms is an essential part of the process because the U.S. Navy can practice like Black Widow demonstrated, employing amphibious platforms as part of sea control and sea denial. In Black Widow 2020, they did so in the form of the USS WASP. The WASP was used as an ASW helo platforms, and the Rear Admiral underscored that the seaworthiness of the WASP and its deck space allowed for the team to use the Romeos operating off of the WASP to provide a key capability for the integrated fight. Another driver for change in USW operations in the Atlantic is clearly new capabilities being operated by our allies, whether they be new diesel submarines or nuclear attack submarines in the case of the French and British, or new USW frigates, or new maritime patrol aircraft capabilities, whether they be the new P-8s as in the case of Britain or Norway, or new capabilities on older aircraft, as in the case of Canada. As Rear Admiral Garvin, then the MPRA commander, put it last year; “In effect, we are shaping kill web “matesmanship.” “Our policy frameworks simply need to catch up with our technologies.” “Our allies understand the fundamental nature of their region better than we do. “If you have properly maintained these important working relationships, both interpersonal and technological, then you will have access to the cultural knowledge and human geography that might otherwise would not be available to you. “We clearly have closer relationships with some allies than with others, which shapes policy and data sharing. However, the technology is now out there which can allow us, within the right policy framework, to provide data at appropriate security levels much more rapidly than in the past. “Those partnerships need to be nurtured and exercised now to help shape our interactive webs into a truly effective strike force over the extended battlespace.” Rear Admiral Waters certainly reinforced this point, as in the Atlantic, we have a number of key partners who work ASW and anti-surface warfare as a core competence for their national navies, and their domain knowledge is a key part of the equation in shaping enhanced warfighting capabilities and re-enforcing deterrence. “Because of the complexity of the underwater domain, it is necessarily a team sport. There are people that would love to say, “It’s the submarines. And they do ASW and that’s what they do.” “And certainly, it’s a major mission for the submarine force. But the threat is so complex, and the environment is so challenging, that you can’t rely on one particular platform to do this mission. “We as a navy have evolved a very robust structure of training and assessing and preparing and innovating. We’re really good at carrier-centric integration. “But our ability to integrate a non-carrier-centric force, like a theater undersea warfare task force, needs to be enhanced. And that was what Black Widow represented. We operated as a fleet or a task force to deliver the desired combat effect.” Finally, there is the question of the coming of maritime autonomous systems and how they might fit into the concepts of operations which the Rear Admiral is shaping and executing. Recently, the Navy released its plan for developing and then integrating maritime autonomous systems into the force. Clearly, one domain where this may well happen is in the ISR side of providing information for both ASW and anti-surface warfare. The promise is there, but also the question of the readiness of the networks to handle data and where that data will go remains a work in progress. This is how Rear Admiral Waters put it: “Unmanned systems will play an important role in the future. “The fact that they can dwell for long periods, and we don’t have to worry about feeding the people on board, will provide an important contribution in the undersea warfare area. “Unmanned systems have the ability to stare for a long time and if you could put a platform out there that can either stay in the air a really long time or stay in the environment with acoustic sensors for a really long time, that gives you the ability to sense the environment. “The challenge comes with regard to how what information you have gathered becomes useful. “We have to have the place where they plug in, and how to use that information in the area of interest?” It is clear that the undersea domain which is the focus of attention of Rear Admiral Walters is best understood not only in terms of its own dynamic, but how it interacts with the threats and challenges across the multi-domain theater of operations which C2F and Allied JFC Norfolk focus upon. As Vice Admiral Lewis noted the change in his March 2021 Proceedings article: “Both JFCNF and C2F are shifting their mind-sets from predominantly operating from the sea to fighting at sea—which requires mastery of the domains below, on, and above the sea. We are executing high-end maritime operations from seabed to space. Our collective security and interconnected global economy depend on open shipping lanes, unhindered air travel, and uninterrupted flow of data., C2F and JFCNF are natural partners—each advocating for the other and working in unison. “ Russia has increased its military posture during the past decade, to signal its ability to threaten allied capabilities, infrastructure, and territory. Russia has invested in capability versus capacity—it knows it will never have more ships, aircraft, or submarines than all of NATO—with an eye toward asymmetric capabilities. So, we carefully monitor Russian investments in force multipliers such as hypersonic weapons, submarine quieting, extended-range missile systems, and information warfare.” “Russia’s activity in the gray zone notably includes its underwater reconnaissance program and information operations. In recent years, Russia intensified its submarine activity around the undersea cables, which are essential for global communications—including the internet. The ability of an American user to access a website in Europe or vice versa largely depends on a network of several hundred fiber-optic communication cables that run across the ocean floor—and Russia has deployed submarines to map out the cables, likely in preparation for nefarious activity.” In short, the undersea domain is a key field of action, where dominance is best ensured by having a 360-degree operational capability encompassing the surface, air and space domains. Clearly, Rear Admiral Waters not only understands this, but is leading the way in shaping the kind of innovation crucial for the defense of the homeland and U.S. interests abroad. Rear Admiral James Waters III, Commander, Submarine Group TWO Rear Adm. Waters is a native of Ellington, Connecticut and 1989 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy with a degree in Systems Engineering. He completed graduate studies at Oxford University in 1991. His sea tours include various division officer assignments onboard USS Henry M. Jackson (SSBN 730G), engineer officer onboard USS Philadelphia (SSN 690) and executive officer onboard USS Alabama (SSBN 731B). He commanded USS Virginia (SSN 774) and Submarine Squadron Four. Rear Admiral James Waters III, Commander, Submarine Group TWO His staff assignments include operations officer at Submarine Squadron Two, engineer at Submarine Squadron Three, submarine executive officer detailer, deputy commander of Submarine Squadron One, battle watch commander and chief of staff for U.S. Strategic Command’s Director of Global Operations (J3), CNO Strategic Studies Group 35, and as deputy executive director for the Chief of Naval Personnel. He most recently served as director, Maritime Headquarters, U.S. Pacific Fleet. Waters assumed his current duties in August 2019 as commander, Submarine Group Two in Norfolk, Virginia. His decorations include the Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Meritorious Service Medal, Navy-Marine Corps Commendation Medal, Navy-Marine Corps Achievement Medal, and various other individual, unit, campaign and service awards. He is most proud of those awards that reflect the hard work and success of the many teams he has been privileged to serve. Dr Robbin Laird is a Williams Foundation Fellow. See his bio here. Reference: Second Line of Defense

In our second instalment in our series on how can you help make the #AFSTRAT a reality, Luke Webb demonstrates how good questions are key for realising the #AFSTRAT core desires of innovation, creative forces, and a cultural shift in mindset. Follow him on Twitter @lukewebb7 We live in the world our questions create - David Cooperrider Questions are creative acts of intelligence. - Francis Kingdon Ward As an educator who’s worked in the STEM field with 10,000s of students, I’ve seen first-hand an incredibly powerful technique for driving a shift in mindset and thinking: Good questions. It’s been at the core of the Jewish Rabbinical teaching model for 1000s of years, and is a key feature of the Socratic method, too. The Nobel prize-winning Jewish physicist Isidore Rabi attributes his success as a scientist to a daily prompt from his mother: ‘Every other child would come back from school and be asked, “What did you learn today?” But my mother used to ask, instead, “Izzy, did you ask a good question today?”’ At the core of #AFSTRAT is a yearning for a Force of Forces that can rapidly assess the subtle-but-complex shifts in the world around us, and react to reorient itself around these many emerging realities. It’s a pursuit that requires creativity and insight – it requires a constant ability to learn, unlearn, and relearn. Peter Senge posits that creative tension, essential for building agility and responsiveness, is the "gap between vision and current reality”. I’d suggest that carving out space in the work programs – indeed, in the mental lives – of Air Force practitioners to ask and ponder deeper and deeper questions is a major enabler for any organisation pursuing an innovative edge. Asking good questions is now recognised as a key part of effective lesson design in the education system and something I’ve seen firsthand as a lynchpin in helping young minds grasp the complexity of the world around us. I’m also convinced it’s a vital capability for building a Force for the future.

At the start of the year, The Central Blue posed the question: How can you help make the #AFSTRAT a reality? We're excited to share with you over the next week the responses we received. First up, Squadron Leader Matt Kelly highlights how important reflection and contextualisation is to making #AFSTRAT a reality. Follow him on Twitter @trueblueloggie Turning strategy into reality is never easy. The AFSTRAT is no exception, and sets some pretty ambitious goals for the RAAF. Having said that, I’ve never known a ‘RAAFie’ to shy away from a challenge. So, here’s my two cent’s worth on how to turn the AFSTRAT into reality: 1. Understand it. Read the AFSTRAT. Finished? Read it again. Think about why those words were chosen. Why those lines of effort were chosen above all others. Think about the context of the document. It’s no coincidence that the AFSTRAT was released on the heels of the Defence Strategic Update. Once you’ve thought deeply, go to Step 2… 2. Vouch for it. Some will roll their eyes and think the AFSTRAT is ‘just’ another strategy. You need to convince them otherwise. How? Spend time discussing it. Get your team to read it, then talk about it. Link it to things like the Enhanced Career Management framework. These linkages will bring the AFSTRAT to life. But! It’s not time to rest on your laurels just yet… 3. Live it. The AFSTRAT is a conversation-starter, a guide. It’s a seed that won’t germinate unless you feed it. You do this by incorporating AFSTRAT ideas in everyday life. How? It’s up to you! Inject strategic thinking into your goals for this year’s PPR. Consciously invest time & effort into relationship building. Actively seek opportunities to award & recognise your people. Things like that… Do this and together we can make the AFSTRAT real.

Robbin Laird Second Line of Defense 23 March 2021 A year ago, I was in Australia and working on my Australian OPV report. I visited Western Australia and then returned to Canberra to discuss the acquisition with a number of DoD officials. That report highlighted how the new-build OPV set in motion the new shipbuilding strategy for Australia, one which highlighted the need for integratability across the distributed fleet. A year later, an the Arafura class OPV enterprise has been launched. And since my visit, the formal decision has been reached to use the OPV hull design to build other variants of the ship as well. A story published on March 8, 2021 by the Australian Defence Business Review provides further details. The Commonwealth has launched the Arafura class Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV) Enterprise and has opened the OPV System Program Office at Henderson in WA. The OPV Enterprise consists of Commonwealth and defence industry teams working together to build and sustain the 12 new Arafura Class OPVs being acquired under Project SEA 1180. “It is great to see the co-location of Commonwealth shipbuilding and sustainment personnel and Luerssen, CIVMEC and Raytheon industry partners delivering outcomes for our Navy,” Deputy Secretary National Naval Shipbuilding, RADM (Ret) Tony Dalton said in a statement. Head Maritime Systems, RADM Wendy Malcolm added, “The launch marks a critical step towards the implementation of Plan Galileo, an ambitious Future Maritime Sustainment Model which ensures our sustainment organisation engages with acquisition teams early in the build process.” “Evolution of our asset management, supply chain, infrastructure, improved commercial models and professionalisation across the enterprise will be key to success,” she said. “This process ensures sustainment needs are considered during the design phase, and brings together Defence, primes, small business and service providers to facilitate sustainment of our naval vessels from strategically located ports around the country.” Based on the Luerssen OPV90 design, the first two Arafura class vessels are currently being constructed at Osborne in Adelaide, while the remaining vessels plus additional mine countermeasures and survey vessels of a similar design will be built at Henderson. Dr Robbin Laird is a Williams Foundation Fellow. See his bio here. Reference: Second Line of Defense

Can a machine grow beyond its programming and learn to be brave? Wing Commander Trav Hallen uses science fiction to explore an Air Force where autonomous drones are not only a reality, but a leading contributor to personnel security. Join ‘the Hamiltons’ in a mission to discover the elements of connection, courage, and trust. Join The Central Blue in questioning whether humans could ever consider a machine their teammate. Examine what forms the bonds of mateship and ponder what human traits our machine-counterparts might adopt. I never liked the term 'drone'. That word always reminded me of the monotonous engine sounds of the aircraft my dad flew in the early 2000s. There was nothing monotonous about these jets. First off, the engine made more of a high-pitched whine than a drone. But more to the point, these jets were not boring, they were sleek, fast, adaptable, capable, and damn high maintenance. I don't mean maintenance like the old days, when maintainers would spend hours fixing the things the aircrew broke just to get the aircraft back with the aircrew having broken new things. For one, there were no aircrew to break anything. Maintenance on my FQ-3s was all about their high sortie-rates and the need to change their configuration regularly between missions. No, my jets were not drones; they were combat aircraft, the best in the Air Force's inventory. The introduction of the FQ-3s changed the Air Force. But even though I would often tell my dad—particularly when he started on his misty-eyed rants about 'his' Air Force—that today's Air Force today is nothing like his day, there is one thing that seems to have endured. After I graduated from the academy and joined my first squadron, he told me that the aircraft that he flew each had a different personality; you knew what to expect when you saw which tail number you were assigned for each flight. Dad's favourite story was how, on his early operational deployments, the maintainers would name each aircraft after a celebrity, and that was how he started to develop a hatred for Vin Diesel. That hasn't changed, dad still doesn't like Vin Diesel and each of our jets, though born in the same factory and educated with the same code, has a unique personality. I had that story in mind when I took command and stood up the Air Force's first operational FQ-3 squadron; in introducing the Air Force's future, I would take a leaf out of the history book. As each new jet arrived on the flight-line we named it. The squadron was skeptical at first, particularly with my decision to name them after the characters of the musical Hamilton (the younger squadron members had to search up what I was talking about). But as we started flying and each jet's personality began to emerge, I found that hangar conversations had changed in tone. The jets were no longer an 'it', they were 'he/she'. Tail numbers were only useful for entering details into the maintenance database or the C2 system; if you wanted to talk to anyone about a jet, you had to use their name: Hamilton, Washington, Jefferson, Laurens, Schuyler, Lafayette, Burr, and George (III). I was ridiculed at the time by my crewed-aircraft-squadron peers. There was some validity to their jibes: these were machines, not people. But the reality was that we were a warfighting squadron, our crews would go into harm's way, and when we did, we would fight as a team. And when we fought, I needed my airmen and airwomen to see the jets not as 'attritables' but as essential players in what would be a bloody contest. As it turned out, my instincts were right. We could see the war coming. The daily intelligence reports had changed in tone from concerned interest to ominous warning. Although our families did not have access to that intelligence, the media, both traditional and social, kept them surprisingly well-informed about how the region had become a powder keg with a short, lit fuse. It was when the ambassadors were expelled that we knew we had passed the point of no return. So it was no surprise when I received the warning order for our first operational deployment. The deployment itself was uneventful. The jets deployed themselves, ironically with a crewed-fighter escort, and were met at the forward operating base by the squadron's advance party. The advance party was surprised to see the jets taxi in with newly minted nose art that gave the aircraft the appearance of sleek, grey birds of prey. The remainder of the squadron deployed the following week. It took us three weeks from receipt of the warning order to having the jets conducting their first milk-runs from our new island home. My dad would have found our deployed air base bizarre; there were lots of aircraft—three squadrons worth as we cohabitated with two allied squadrons—but there were no aircrew. The decision had been made that the uncrewed squadrons would deploy to separate locations, which were often farther forward than their crewed counterparts. The rationale being the reduction of personnel forward minimised both risk and the logistics demands on the small islands from which we operated. Many of the squadron members took exception to the view that putting them inside the enemy's missile bubble should be considered as 'minimising' risk. Once the first couple of strikes came in, that angst turned first to resignation and then to resolve. True to historical form, our airwomen and airmen found focus in their work and solace in some genuinely dark gallows-humour. Despite the threat, and the seemingly endless demands of base recovery and mission launches, the squadron developed a level of cohesion and resilience that I had not imagined possible. Key to that cohesion was the jets. When I watched Top Gun 2 in the seventh grade, I was inspired by the pilots I saw. Their personalities were larger than life, and that translated into the way they 'flew'. I knew this was fiction, but it was hard to shake that view of Maverick as the epitome of what aircrew were, both good and bad. In reality, the pilots I had met both through my dad and as I progressed through my Air Force career reinforced that there was a direct connection between the personality of the pilot and the way they flew and fought. We saw this play out with the jets as well. As the jets operated either independently or with their crewed counterparts, they learned and evolved; this learning process was not uniform. The nature of the training schedule back home and the operational mission flown when deployed meant that no two jets gained the same experience. What emerged out of this was that each jet developed a personality. At the squadron we had seen this from a maintenance perspective, each jet had his or her quirks in terms of faults and physical maintenance. But we never saw them fly. Once they checked into the mission package we were blind to where they went and what they did. The operating squadron did not have a need-to-know. But after every sortie we would get feedback from the crews they flew with on how our jets had performed. The first few times a crewed aircraft flew with the jets the feedback would be technical and precise: "A105-3 performed as tasked with only minor deviations from expected actions". But as they became more familiar and comfortable, the feedback became more detailed and descriptive. Formally we would still get the technical data on performance relative to task and expected behaviour, but the crew would accompany the technical with a more colourful and personal description: "Jefferson is getting pretty aggressive. He has no fear." Just like those who worked with them on the ground, those who flew with them in the air were humanising our jets. Hearing the jets described in this way made them feel even more human than machine at times. A bond was forming between human and machine. A bond that proved so critical and, at times, difficult during the war. From the first sorties the routine became for the squadron to turn out for each launch and recovery. We would see our squadron mates off and then we would watch them come home. The scenes were reminiscent of the B-17s returning home from bombing Europe during the Second World War. For the first few weeks we did this with a sense of excitement, but as the conflict turned it was more trepidation and anxiety. We were lucky. Our first weeks were casualty free. The squadrons we shared the base with did not share our luck. They began losing aircraft just four days into their deployment. We came to think that it was not luck that kept our jets safe, but the way we treated them both on the ground and in the air. The effort we—our squadron and the crews that flew with them back home—had put into preparing the jets for war had paid off; they were ready, willing, and survivable. That thinking was naive. We lost Jefferson four weeks in. That day will be forever stuck in my memory. Jefferson had launched with five other jets for what turned out to be a protection mission for a high-value air asset that was being pushed deeper into the so-called "threat bubble". At the time we didn't know the specifics of the mission, just that we needed them launched by a set time and that the expected mission duration was 18 hours. The pre-mission prep and the launch were standard. And after the package had formed up and gone dark to us, the squadron finished up the administration, and then dispersed to rest, work-out, or just hang out. That relative peace was disrupted 16 hours and 38 minutes after launch. As was standard, the airborne control authority established contact with us just before their hand-off of control back to us as the operating squadron. The message was short, formulaic, and heartbreakingly cold: "Mission successful. A105-3 destroyed. ETA remaining aircraft T1455Z." We'd lost Jefferson. As the squadron turned out for the arrival of the jets, I announced that Jefferson had been killed-in-action. The news was met by silence. No-one spoke as we watched the landing lights of five jets approach the runway. The following day I received a call from the squadron commander of the airborne early-warning and control aircraft that our jets were tasked to protect the previous night. I could hear the sadness in her voice. She told me that the squadron had worked with our jets many times and always felt a sense of security, having seen what they could and would do to protect them in a fight. They had been nervous before the last mission knowing that they would be pushing far deeper into the threat bubble than ever before, but their nerves had been eased somewhat when they found out that 'The Hamiltons' would be their escort. They trusted our jets. It turned out the crew's nerves were justified. Attacks against the crewed aircraft were relentless for the full duration of the mission, and our jets played an essential role in fending them off. It was in the final hour of the mission that Jefferson was lost. A coordinated attack from land- and sea-based surface-to-air missiles was overwhelming the defensive systems of both our jets and their protected crew. They were stretched, but they were managing. It was then that they were advised of an inbound four-ship of long-range fighters approaching from the west. All other assets were engaged, and so the only option was for the aircraft to scram east to hopefully out-distance themselves from the new threat. The post-mission analysis would show that they would never have made it. While our jets and the protected asset fled east, Jefferson turned and tracked west. By this stage he was down to just two missiles; not enough. As he closed the enemy fighters, Jefferson loosed off his last two missiles, both hitting their targets. But instead of turning away, he had pressed on. The third fighter was destroyed as it manoeuvred to avoid Jefferson bearing down on it at full-speed. The enemy never had a chance. Jefferson's machine intelligence and performance capabilities meant that would always outmanoeuvre a crewed adversary. All the protected crew saw was two tracks becoming zero. With the threat reduced to a single fighter, the remaining five jets learned from Jefferson and turned to engage. Though we will never know for sure, it would seem that Jefferson's actions followed by the approach of the remaining five jets appropriately adjusted the remaining fighter's risk calculations. It turned and fled. "Jefferson died saving my crew." The squadron commander's word stuck with me. I am not ashamed to say that hearing that made me both immensely proud and deeply sad. Intellectually I knew that there was no comparison: the life of one airman or airwoman was worth more than all of the uncrewed jets in the Air Force inventory. But that does not mean that I could not help but feel that I had lost one of my team. Though Jefferson bled oil not blood, he was a member of our squadron. There was no funeral for Jefferson, no medals, no obituary, and his name will never be on the Honour Roll at the War Memorial. We get that; we knew Jefferson was not a real person. But that did not mean that we didn't see his loss as our squadron's first combat casualty. Nor that his conspicuous absence from the flight line did not cast a pall over us. Jefferson was not a drone; he was a member of our squadron, our family, and his loss is still felt keenly by all who knew him. I have never liked 'drones', and I will never see my uncrewed jets as 'attritables'; those are terms that are used by those who do not work or fight with the jets as part of their team. The companies that build them, the journalists that discuss them, the public that marvels at them, and the politicians that send them into harm's way will never appreciate the bonds that form between the humans and machines in a warfighting team. But they don't need to. The sense of family and the bonds that form between the members of a military unit, which makes them so effective, is not for external consumption; it is for us and us alone to know, understand, and cherish. Wing Commander Trav Hallen is the RAAF exchange officer in the USAF A5/7 Combined Airpower Futures Team. He is a graduate of the USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies and a Sir Richard Williams Foundation Air Power Scholar. This story was inspired by an article on the RAAF’s Airpower Teaming System and a discussion with his 12 year old, Hamilton-obsessed daughter about her plans to join the RAAF.

The Central Blue editor, Wing Commander Ulas Yildirim, challenges current strategic thinking with a thought-provoking article on contemporary deterrence for a nation and its military. The Australian Defence Force’s focus on its warfighting materiel creates the misconception that deterrence is a weapon-centric strategy. Yildirim argues that strategic policy must broaden to integrate national resilience beyond the boundaries of military bases and establishments. Effective deterrence rests upon a wide range of factors within the national security enterprise, and Defence must play an active role in identifying vulnerabilities and growing sovereign capabilities. Despite the recent 2020 Defence Strategic Update bringing to prominence new Defence objectives, Defence appears rather comfortable maintaining its dominant focus on the materiel it sees crucial for warfighting effectiveness. Defence argues that effective warfighting capabilities nested under its objective ‘to respond with credible military force, when required’ also deter actions against Australia and its interests. There is no doubt this claim holds some weight. However, too myopic a focus on warfighting capabilities as a single means of deterrence ignores the dependence of these capabilities on the national base and its resilience, while highlighting a problematic condition at the core of Australia’s approach to military strategy. At best, a narrow focus on warfighting capabilities and materiel suggests a lack of imagination for strategy development and strategic planning; at worst, it sustains the misleading perspective that Defence can achieve deterrence independently. This contribution builds on recent efforts to critically unpack the notion of war-fighting in the context of the 2020 Defence Strategic Update. It aims to illuminate the need for Defence to better understand that any deterrent effect it seeks to achieve through the capabilities it employs is inescapably enmeshed with the resilience of the nation. It is this nuanced relationship that generates deterrence which extends beyond the current arsenal of warfighting capabilities, and the boundaries of military bases and establishments. To further explicate, this article presents a brief history of deterrence theory, discusses an alternative contemporary deterrence theory as well as a more nuanced approach to deterrence. Finally, it provides some concluding provocations for future contexts. A brief trace of deterrence theory Formal theories of deterrence first appeared during the Cold War. Nuclear strategy and nuclear deterrence were popularised in the 1950s due to the perceived advantage that nuclear bombs could replace costlier conventional forces. The coupling of fission technology with rocket technology used by the Germans in World War Two led to the development of weapons of mass destruction never seen before. The ground breaking technology created strategic and diplomatic uncertainty for nuclear capable countries who faced total annihilation in the event of their use. This in turn meant that nuclear weapons were not used in conflict after World War Two. Their mere existence created a perception of a deterrent effect due to a lack of any direct action between nuclear capable countries, therefore forcing them to find other ways to compete in the international stage without their use. As American political scientist Albert Wohlsetter succinctly summed up in his seminal paper Delicate Balance of Terror ‘[d]eterrence however, is not automatic.’ Notwithstanding, the perception of deterrence created from nuclear weapons was enough to create a skewed view of weapons technology which instilled a malaise that effective deterrence could only be achieved with exquisite weapons. Countries lacking mass in weaponry, such as Australia, have relied on nuclear capable countries such as the US to create the perception of extended deterrence, while constantly seeking to acquire high-end warfighting materiel. Others have sought to develop nuclear weapons via sovereign means. Pakistan for instance announced its capabilities as a nuclear capable country in 1998 against what it sees as a belligerent nuclear capable India. In a similar trajectory, North Korea has, for decades, remained steadfast on its path to develop nuclear weapons to create a degree of strategic ‘wiggle room’ with the hope of countering a perceived aggression by the West. Arguably, tensions between India and Pakistan have not changed even after Pakistan acquired its nuclear weapons; economic sanctions against North Korea have not eased, while India has recently been on the receiving end of open aggression from China—another nuclear capable country. These brief examples highlight that the mere availability of nuclear and exquisite weaponry does not generate automatic deterrence. Historian Lawrence Freedman rightly points out that the origins of nuclear strategy date back to the theories surrounding strategic bombardment in the 1920s and 1930s when airpower was starting to take a bigger role in conflict. In this context, it was airpower rather than nuclear weapons which were perceived as the deterrent. Hence, a focus on weapons and ‘the employment of force along traditional lines for traditional purposes’ has created myopic views on specific weapons technologies rather than having a long-term view on the desired effect. Traditionally this has created several challenges for militaries. Firstly, it has led to seeking further funding from governments to update ‘like-for-like’ weapons technologies perceived to be outdated at the cost of other systems such as airbases. For example, over the past 15 years the Air Force undertook a major fleet upgrade to transition from its fleet of F-111 and F/A-18 Classic Hornet to F/A-18F Super Hornet, EA-18G Growler and the F-35A Lightning II aircraft drawing large resources. Only recently airbase resilience has come into focus in recognition that the effect that Defence seeks to create with these aircraft is enmeshed with the airbases where they operate. Or secondly, it has driven them into the ‘sunk cost fallacy’ through the continuation of funding of ‘newer’ technologies without a revaluation of effectiveness in creating deterrence within their current strategic environments. Contemporary theory The purpose of deterrence is to prevent rash actions by complicating the calculations of a malign actor while increasing one’s choices for attaining continuing advantage. A recent RAND report suggests that ‘[d]eterring adversaries by threat of punishment is often ineffective by itself.’A report titled the Resilience of the Deterrence Effect developed between Flinders University and Torrens Resilience Institute argues that over the last two decades deterrence theory has moved away from traditional applications of punishment or denial. The report suggests that new deterrence theories seek to persuade an actor to target elsewhere or build inherent capabilities into the national systems to limit the harmful effects of a disruption rather than specifically countering weapons systems. Arguably, coupled with Defence’s existing materiel, the new suggested deterrence theories are an extension of Wohlsetter’s effective retaliatory capability theory. In this context, Wohlsetter convincingly argued for retaliatory capability—albeit his focus was on nuclear retaliation—within which all systems must work in cohesion to effectively retaliate against an actor following an attack. For this capability, there is no prize for one system working exceptionally while all others flounder. Australia’s dependence on imports of refined liquid energy illustrates a simple but telling scenario. While Australia’s high-end warfighting capabilities can match or overmatch a malign actor, their reach and duration of operations are closely linked to liquid energy stockpiles on Australian soil or place of operation. Hence, any disruptions to the sea lines of communication can have a severe impact on the credibility of the deterrence achieved from these high-end warfighting capabilities. The establishment of sovereign capabilities able to produce and store liquid energy from indigenous feedstock can partly resolve this concern by ensuring that a single linear activity by a malign actor does not cripple Defence. Therefore, it is not the presence of many exquisite weapons that creates deterrence. Rather, a deterrence effect is realised through an ability to protect Australian interests, by having a choice to select multiple options for a measured response. As highlighted by Australia’s liquid energy dependence, Defence’s credibility to deter is reliant on the national base beyond the boundaries of military bases – without which it will always be presented with the necessity rather than a choice to respond with unquantifiable results. A more nuanced approach to deterrence Technology, innovation, strategy, and national resilience are the bedrocks of deterrence. The release of the Defence Strategic Update and various departmental innovation programs cover off on strategy and innovation to maintain Defence’s technological edge. While these documents attempt to fill an existing void, resilience of certain aspects of the nation such as critical manufacturing as part of this deterrence paradigm beyond warfighting materiel does not appear to feature on Defence’s psyche. This has the effect of creating the unfortunate misconception that Defence and its high-end capabilities achieve deterrence independently. Resilience of the Deterrence Effect aptly points out that the resilience of an effect—in this context deterrence—cannot be discussed without the resilience of the nation that generates the effect. For instance, historian Geoffrey Parker suggests that historically simple replication of weapons technology has not achieved success. Parker convincingly argues that success requires the “‘replication” of the whole social and economic structures that underpin the capacity to innovate, enabling the ability to adapt to given situations. Semiconductor manufacturing to support research and development of Artificial Intelligence (AI) is a case in point. MERICS senior analyst John Lee and Jan-Peter Kleinhans, director of the project Geopolitics and Technology at SNV recently published an article suggesting that while software and computer chips can be designed in various parts of the world, only Samsung in South Korea and the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) in Taiwan are capable of manufacturing computer chips that are 5nm in size. In the last 20 years, due to the increased complexity and cost of the fabrication equipment the number of plants dwindled to two as the size of the computer chips decreased from 180nm to 5nm. TSMC which produces the Xilinx chips used in the F-35 aircraft, estimates that it will soon spend close to $20 billion to establish the capability to produce 3nm computer chips. TSMC is only able to invest such vast sums because it holds 55 percent share of a sophisticated capital market founded upon strong social and economic structures which are always seeking innovative ways to remain competitive with the ability to fund them. This enables TSMC to raise revenue by conducting research collaborations with a large group of suppliers who seek to meet the demands of modern societies for ever more innovative products such as smartphones and quantum computing. Substantial government backing further ensures that TSMC is able to remain at the leading edge of semiconductor manufacturing. Due to these factors, the ability to replicate TSMC’s products over the next decade will be, at least on the surface, rather difficult. Additionally, TSMC’s market dominance ensures that it is on the international markets’ critical path for success in future technologies. This further has the likely effect that ensures foreign powers remain engaged with Taiwan’s future. The latter creates the perception of deterrence Taiwan seeks by complicating the strategic calculations of malign actors. But, it would be imprudent to fall into a false sense of security by seemingly identifying ‘our preferred malign actor strategies’ against Australian interests. The strategic permutations are innumerable requiring continuing and sustainable effort nested under a clear strategy for winning. Concluding provocations Where does all of this leave Defence? Elisabeth Braw, a journalist and Visiting Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, aptly points out that given the close linkages of private and commercial interests in the operation of a nation and its critical systems, any issues within them are national security concerns. COVID-19 has exposed vulnerabilities in relation to supply chains and pharmaceuticals which has led to reactive actions geared to only respond to the immediately discernible. In this context, Defence’s heavy intellectual investment in AI and its future application in military affairs is a prime example which highlights that simply providing a list of warfighting acquisitions to enable it to respond to events will not suffice. ‘Deterrence is a matter of comparative risks’ requiring a delicate balance rather than an automatic response to acquire high-end warfighting capabilities. Hence, Defence needs to recognise that the deterrent effect it seeks to achieve through the capabilities it employs is enmeshed with the resilience of the nation which creates a deterrent effect in its own right. Therefore, Defence needs to view its effectiveness in defending Australia’s interests through the lens of a complete capability beyond the boundaries of military bases and establishments. Accordingly, Defence needs to take an active role in not only its warfighting materiel but also be actively engaged in identifying vulnerabilities within the national security enterprise and assist in growing sovereign capabilities on Australian soil. This way of rethinking and engaging with the idea of deterrence is crucial to enable Australia’s long term success in actualising its strategic objectives. The views expressed are the author’s alone and do not reflect the opinion of the Royal Australian Air Force or the Department of Defence. Wing Commander Ulas Yildirim is the Deputy Director Force Structure Design in Air Force Headquarters. He has a Masters in Military and Defence Studies from ANU and a Doctorate in Aerospace engineering from RMIT. He is also an editor of The Central Blue blog. Follow him on Twitter @lightningulas

#futureautonomous On 8 April, The Sir Richard Williams Foundation is holding a seminar to discuss Next Generation Autonomous Systems. The aim of the seminar is to explore the force multiplying capability and increasingly complex requirements associated with unmanned systems. From its origins at the platform level, the opportunities and potential of increased autonomy in the generation and delivery of airpower effects are now expected to fundamentally transform Joint and Coalition operations. Defence industry has a major part to play in the transformation with opportunities extending beyond platforms, to the payloads and enabling systems which underpin the necessary risk management and assurance frameworks demanded by Defence. In the lead up to the seminar, The Central Blue will be running a series (similar to #highintensitywar and #jointstrike) to generate discussion and enable those that cannot attend the seminar to gain a perspective on the topic. What does #NextGenUAS mean for Australia and its region? We want to hear from you! The concept of the Unmanned Air System (UAS), or Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), is nothing new nor is their use in missions which traditionally challenge human performance, fragility, and endurance. Often described as the dull, dirty, and dangerous missions, unmanned systems have now provided the commander with a far broader range of options for the application of force against even the most challenging target sets. However, ongoing operational experience confirms unmanned systems on their own are not the panacea and trusted autonomy in manned and unmanned teaming arrangements in each environmental domain is emerging as the preferred method. The narrative is now forming across defence which has progressed the argument for greater numbers of unmanned systems in a far more mature and balanced way than it has been in the past. The manned-unmanned narrative is now sensibly shifting towards ‘and’, rather than ‘or’. Manned and unmanned teaming leverages the strengths and mitigates the weaknesses of each platform, and concentrates the mind on the important operational aspects, such as imaginative new roles, and the challenges of integration to effectively generate the desired effect. This capability will require a complex web of advanced data links and communication systems to make the autonomous vehicle operate as a complete system. Designing and building the ‘kill web’ so that it can enable the delivery of manned-unmanned firepower across domains will be a huge challenge not least due to the laws of physics. However, the ability to train, test, evaluate and validate tactics and procedures will add a new level of complexity to generate the ‘trusted autonomy’ required for the delivery of strategic effects. With this background and intent in mind, the editors at The Central Blue suggest a number of topics to provoke your thinking in the lead up to the seminar. This is by no means an exhaustive list but we hope it prompts mental contact! Questions to consider: What is the impact of #futureautonomous systems on the national, campaign, operational and tactical levels? How have partner forces developed and employed #futureautonomous capabilities in recent campaigns? What emerging technologies should be considered to enable support, planning and targeting systems? What are the impacts of emerging #futureautonomous capabilities on training and exercise regimens? What impacts would prioritising #futureautonomous have on Australia’s existing and future force structures? What are the near and far future implications of #futureautonomous systems? What specific issues which must be considered in the context of the next Defence White Paper and Force Structure Review? What are potential roles for #futureautonomous systems set within the context of each environmental domain? What are the command and control, legal or social implications that affect employment? What is industry’s role in the developments in unmanned air, land, surface and sub-surface combatants? How should we reconceptualise Joint operations and move away from the platform-on-platform engagements which have traditionally characterised the battlespace? We hope these suggestions provide some food for thought and hopefully prompt some discussion. We would love to hear your ideas on what issues should be explored as part of the #futureautonomous series. If you think you have a question or an idea that would add to the #futureautonomous discussion, or know someone who might, contact us at thecentralblue@gmail.com

The Future of Unmanned Military Systems by Arthur H. Barber III Chief Analyst, Systems Planning and Analysis, Inc. 19 February, 2021 Systems Planning and Analysis (SPA) Australia Pty Ltd is a contributor to The Sir Richard Williams Foundation. Here, the company’s Chief Analyst provides a brief introduction to the topic and it’s effect on future war fighting capability as a preamble to our upcoming seminar.