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Peter Layton’s series on other peoples’ air power has included an examination of Islamic State’s use of unmanned aircraft and the employment of air power in the Ukraine campaign. In this third post, Dr Layton considers the varied influences on China’s approach to air power and it’s focus on multi-domain ‘firepower warfare’. In late October President Xi Jinping’s “Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” was written into the Chinese Communist Party’s Constitution.  In some respects Chinese airpower follows a similar dictum. Ideas from beyond China are considered, modified and adapted to meet Chinese needs. In this, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) long-term development owes much to Soviet and later Russian support, doctrine and arms sales.  In some decades though such assistance has vanished initially through ideological differences and more lately over fighter aircraft intellectual property theft (the J-11 saga). In these periods, the PLAAF has needed to develop primarily using indigenous resources and in broad terms, this is where the Service finds itself today – albeit a contract for 24 Su-35s was signed with Russia in November 2015 with deliveries now underway. Having only limited access to the latest technical innovations within the global arms market puts the Chinese military aerospace industry and its PLAAF customer at some disadvantage.  Even the US finds being able to obtain foreign advanced technology important in the design and manufacture of new aircraft – the F-35 being the latest example.  China’s isolation is however eased somewhat by access to global commercial aviation developments and by cyber espionage. American thinking has also been highly influential even if more indirectly than Soviet and Russian assistance. In early 2000, after various American-led air operations in Iraq and the Former Yugoslavia, USAF-style airpower appeared the sine qua non of victory. Accordingly, the Chinese government – in reality the Communist Party – determined that an extensive but focussed long-term modernisation of the by-then almost obsolete PLAAF was essential. Supported by breathtaking national economic growth, this modernisation program continues apace aiming to make the PLAAF into a ‘strategic air force’. Indeed in 2014 President Xi Jinping declared that the country must “accelerate [its] construction of a powerful people’s air force… in order to support the realization of the China dream and the dream of a strong military”. Today’s newly “powerful people’s air force” has a well-defined mission articulated in China’s 2015 Military Strategy White Paper, a document broadly similar to Australian Defence White Papers but considerably shorter and without detail on force structure development plans. China’s White Paper determined that major wars were unlikely however, localized conflicts were possible with the most worrying being any occurring on China’s periphery. Both sides in these local wars were assumed to employ high technology systems and extensive information warfare over an extended, non-linear battlefield of considerable depth. The big buzzword was the rather clunky ‘informationization’, a term to stress that modern wars involved the extensive use of information technology. For “winning informationized local wars”, the White Paper directed that military operations should be based on active defence concepts that integrated defensive and offensive means. To fight the anticipated short-duration, high-intensity local conflicts, the PLAAF has acquired a multi-role air combat fighter force, airborne early warning and control aircraft, an extensive land-based radar network, a modern surface to air missile force, and an appropriate communications infrastructure. This may sound a rather American-like mirror-image force structure. There are however, some noteworthy differences that combine Soviet influences, modern Russian thinking and shrewd Chinese assessments. Firstly, the PLAAF’s land-based Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs) systems are an important element in the extended air superiority battle, rather than just being for home airbase defence.  China has acquired Russian SA-10 and SA-20 SAMs and developed the indigenous HQ-9; these have a range of some 200km with work underway to extend the HQ-9’s engagement envelope.  In late 2014, China purchased Russia’s new S-400 system for delivery by 2020; this leading edge system has a range of some 400 km.  Such long range SAM systems allow engaging aircraft flying at high altitude well offshore, including those operating above 10,000ft across Taiwan. In this it seems curious that Russia’s marked reticence on military aircraft sales since the mid-2000 has not extended to selling advanced SAM systems.  Some hold that that by the time China copies the complex S-400 system, Russia will already have the more advanced S-500 model in service. The implication is that China remains committed to building a numerically large, very-long-range SAM force with an indigenous system appearing in the late 2020s. Secondly, an important target set for the long range SAMs is the combat support aircraft that USAF and other coalition air packages rely upon.  These combat support aircraft include the ‘Iron Triad’ aircraft (E-3 Sentry Airborne Warning And Control System, E-8C Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System and RC-135V/W Rivet Joint aircraft) as well as the tankers without which shorter-range fast jets could not join the battle.   In this regard, China’s new long-range J-20 stealth fighters now entering service are considered to have engaging hostile combat support aircraft as a primary mission.  The aim of the long-range SAMs and J-20 fleet is not so much to shoot hostile combat support aircraft down as much as to push them so far away from where Chinese forces are operating that they cannot undertake their normal support functions. Thirdly, in Chinese thinking ballistic rockets and cruise missiles are important to helping achieve air superiority through being used to suppress enemy air defences by attacking air battle command centres, air defence radars, SAM systems and parked fighter aircraft.  Such missiles are considered very hard to defend against, especially if used in large numbers, and offering a higher likelihood of success in the early stages of a campaign than manned aircraft raids. Automation then substitutes in a way for needing to field highly trained aircrew. In this, the importance China places on missile warfare is evident in having a dedicated Service: the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF). Lastly, Chinese airpower is an integral element of joint “firepower warfare”.  Under this rubric, coordinated manned aircraft, ballistic rocket, cruise missile and information (EW and cyber) attacks would be undertaken in a closely timed sequence that overwhelms the defences.  The primary aim is to create favourable battlespace conditions and in particular realise the “Three Superiorities”: information dominance, air superiority, and sea superiority. Achievement of the three superiorities will, it is thought, lead directly to war termination on China’s terms as the adversary will realise the futility of continuing the fight.  Victory will be achieved to a significant degree through air power. Douhet and Trenchard would be pleased that in East Asia their aspirations remain in play albeit with Chinese characteristics. Dr Peter Layton is a Visiting Fellow at the Griffith Asia Institute at Griffith University. #SAM #Doctrine #information #Strategy #technology #missiles #cyber

Peter Layton continues his analysis of other peoples’ air power. In this post, he looks at Russia’s use of alternative means to deny the air domain to others while exploiting the third dimension for Russia’s own purposes. His first post in this series, looking at Islamic State’s air power, is here. Say ‘air superiority’ and people instinctively think of highly manoeuvrable aircraft, silk-scarfed fighter pilots, the Battle of Britain and perhaps Top Gun. That is all somewhat last century though.  Manned aircraft are no longer always essential to either gain air superiority or even exploit it, as Russian combat operations in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine demonstrate.  Here a kind of air power different to our normal expectations is being employed. While Russia quickly seized Crimea in February 2014, the Donbas proved more problematic.  Ukrainian land forces gradually recaptured lost territory supported by the Ukrainian air force. In mid-June though Russia pushed back, introducing various types of man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS – mainly SA-18) and radar-guided surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems (mainly SA-11).  The MANPADS were used in Ukrainian territory principally by proxy forces while the radar-guided SAMs crossed the border occasionally, were employed and then quickly returned back to Russian territory. This shoot-and-scoot tactic seems to have shot down a high-flying An-26, a Mig-29, a Su-25 and an Su-24M together with Malaysian Airlines MH-17. Overall, ten military helicopters (five Mi-8 and five Mi-24) and eight military fixed wing aircraft (An-30B, An-26, Il-76, two MiG-29s, two Su-25s and an Su-24M) were shot down. Some 89 personnel were killed with the greatest loss of life being the Il-76 shoot-down that killed 58. By the end of August, Russia had gained control of the air over the battlefield almost solely through using SAMs, rendering the Ukrainian air force ineffective and allowing Russian land forces to freely manoeuvre. Russia exploited this air superiority exclusively using drones.  Russia has deployed some 14 different types of drones ranging from high-altitude surveillance UAVs flying along the border to small quadcopters.  Of particular note is that Russian tactical drones in the Donbas are closely integrated with artillery and rocket units.  Artillery has a prominent place in Russian military doctrine. Whereas for Western forces, artillery supports manoeuvre, for Russian forces, manoeuvre supports artillery – which then finishes off the engagement. Some 85% of the Ukrainian land force casualties have been caused by Russian artillery and rocket attacks. An American observer noted that in one attack: “in a three minute period… a Russian fire strike wiped out two mechanized [Ukrainian] battalions with a combination of top-attack munitions and thermobaric warheads.” Ukrainian forces consider that if a drone flies overhead and locates them, a Russian area attack from mobile artillery and multiple launch rocket systems can be expected within 10-15 minutes.  Exploiting this fear, the Russians often fly multiple drones at varying altitudes; if one draws fire this can highlight the location of the Ukrainian forces to other drones. Russian tactical drones are vulnerable to hostile fire such as from 14.5mm machine guns, but have proven difficult to engage with a rare loss acceptable given their generally low cost.  Apart from intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions, and artillery fall adjusting, some drones are also reportedly used for signals intelligence and electronic jamming. Russia’s use of electronic warfare (EW) in the Donbas differs from Western approaches that sees EW mainly as an adjunct to kinetic attacks.  Russia considers EW “an important part of their offensive and defensive arsenal” and is closely integrated with air and land forces to allow multi-domain attacks Some Russian EW systems are used to geo-locate electronic signals emanating from Ukrainian land forces (or mobile phones) and pass this targeting data onto command centers, allowing mass artillery and rocket attacks. Other EW systems undertake wide area jamming preventing dispersed Ukrainian forces either communicating using radios or accessing GPS signals for navigation.  Other systems intercept Ukrainian transmissions to collect useful intelligence information.  Still others jam the electrical fuses used in Ukrainian artillery shells preventing these exploding.  Lastly, mobile phones are exploited with text messages sent to local communities just prior to an attack to create confusion and panic, while the defending Ukrainian soldiers receive personal SMSs calling on them to surrender. There are some implications from all this. Firstly, SAMs alone can achieve air superiority through inflicting a steady rate of attrition. Russian forces use an interlocking network of diverse SAM systems where each compensates for technical or tactical weaknesses in others.  This may seem a problem only for fourth generation aircraft as fifth generation stealth aircraft today can confidently penetrate walls of intertwined SAM systems.  USAF however sees this capability noticeably eroding over the next decade. Secondly, battlefields may not be clear fire zones.  Many wars have had territorial sanctuaries where friendly forces cannot engage hostile units.  In the Donbas case, the SAM batteries can be within Russian territory but their engagement envelopes can reach well into Ukrainian territory albeit only against high-flying aircraft.  Honouring the potential threat can force friendly aircraft down low into MANPADS zones, prevent persistent surveillance of hostile ground units and push back combat enabler aircraft. Thirdly, providing close air support for friendly land forces in the face of SAM and EW threats may be challenging. It may be difficult to maintain adequate air-ground communication links, particularly if ground forces fear any transmissions will shortly lead to an artillery and rocket attack.  Air assets may need to be allowed to engage identified targets independently of nearby ground units.  On the other hand, close air support without good ground intelligence may require aircraft to loiter while building up a comprehensive picture.  Loitering inside a SAM envelope may need some adroitness, including for fifth generation aircraft without all-round stealth. Fourthly, drones have some ability to undertake several manned aircraft missions. In addition to ISR and EW tasks, Russian hexa-copter drones have dropped small incendiaries onto fuel and munitions depots. These attacks have occasionally included accompanying hexa-copters dropping fragmentation grenades to dissuade friendly fire fighting efforts.  Such attacks can be effective. In July 2017 a drone dropped a ZMG-1 thermite grenade on a vulnerable part of the Balakliya munitions storage facility causing continuing sympathetic detonations and some one billion dollars worth of damage. A similar attack at Svatovo in October 2015 destroyed some 3,000 tons of explosives. Lastly, the use of drones rather than manned aircraft to support Russian land forces suggests that Russia perceives using drones as being in some way less provocative, and thereby lowering the possibly of conflict escalation.  In future gray zone conflicts – like the Donbas – drones may be the initial aircraft of choice. Dr Peter Layton is a Visiting Fellow at the Griffith Asia Institute at Griffith University.

Much ink has been spilled on the challenge posed to Western militaries’ traditional control of the air domain. In this post, Peter Layton poses a number of questions about the impact of other people’s air power. Only states have air forces and only states apply air power.  Or so we mostly think, even if it’s not actually completely true. There was a Biafran air force during the Nigerian civil war and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam staged air strikes in the Sri Lankan civil war.  Nevertheless these were arguably oddities across our 100 years or so of air power history. Times have now changed. The sudden emergence of low-cost, small, commercial-off-the-shelf drones has empowered armed non-state actors. They can now operate their own miniature air forces and apply air power in some roles as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has convincingly demonstrated. For an armed non-state group, ISIS is particularly bureaucratic. Unsurprisingly then its adoption of air power has followed a path seemingly familiar to how most air forces have embraced new technology.  ISIS first became interested in drones in 2013 (so before ISIS’s formal establishment), then acquired various types of rotary and fixed wing drones, trialed these to determine the most useful kinds, and finally formed a specialist drone unit.  ISIS then bought in bulk (mainly DJI Phantom quadcopters) and begun modifying these in mass – and the weapons they carried – to optimise them so as to best meet ISIS’s operational requirements.  Given all this, its then no shock to learn that ISIS’s drone operators have to submit standardised drone usage reports after every mission for post-flight analysis by superior headquarters. With the group facing annihilation across Iraq and Syria, the recent battle of Mosul is probably the high water mark of ISIS drone operations with its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and ground attack missions particularly worthy of note. ISIS makes great use of Suicide Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (SVBIED): a vehicle loaded with explosives detonated when the driver runs the vehicle into a designated target such as tanks, Humvees, and static checkpoints.  ISIS developed effective tactics that integrated these SVBIEDs with drone missions.  The drones provided real-time reconnaissance video that was used to guide the SVBIEDs through narrow side streets that avoided checkpoints and defensive roadblocks ensuring they survived long enough to attack their selected targets. The quadcopter high-definition video imagery of the attack was then quickly uploaded to the Internet for propaganda purposes. Friendly forces responded to these tactics by launching air strikes against the on-ground ISIS drone controllers. To counter this, ISIS then began using mobile drone controllers who moved around the city using motorcycles. ISIS’s major drone innovation during the Mosul battle, however, was its use of weaponised drones.  ISIS customized Phantom quadcopter drones to carry and drop small munitions such as grenades or mortar shells, themselves also modified by adding fins to stabilize their fall.  The drones, in being designed to use high-definition cameras, can be hovered overhead a stationary target and provide a fully stabilized platform for accurate weapons delivery albeit freefall. To gain an appreciation of this it is useful to see video of it in action. Armed drone attacks began in late 2016. By February 2017 some 70 drones were reported airborne in one 24-hour period with 12 armed drones counted overhead simultaneously at one time.  While each attack caused only limited damage, the persistent harassment day and night by the so-called ‘killer bees’ adversely impacted morale. At one point the offensive to retake Mosul almost stalled.  With his units advising and supporting Iraqi forces at this time, United States Special Operations Command’s General Raymond Thomas, noted of this period that the: “most daunting problem was [that ISIS]…for a time, enjoyed tactical superiority in the airspace under our conventional air superiority in the form of commercially available drones and…our only available response was small arms fire.” There are some implications from all this. Firstly, ISIS has now proved the use of consumer drones in combat. In future irregular wars, it would be wise to assume the armed non-state groups will try to emulate ISIS.  Western forces have not faced a hostile air environment since Korea but they might soon albeit not in the kind of wars or ways they might have expected. Secondly, ISIS attacked tactical targets. In-theatre air force bases may in future be subjected to surveillance by drones and possibly strikes. Such surveillance could make hostile ground force attacks much more effective (as ISIS did in capturing a Syrian airbase in Raqqah) while strikes even if using fairly minuscule weapons could disable parked aircraft. Thirdly, don’t be dismayed – perhaps. Consumer drones can be readily countered and there is a growing industry devising new and exotic ways of doing just that ranging from laser cannons to trained eagles. Trouble is these defensive systems are short range and so considerable numbers may need deploying to provide coverage across an operational area.  Moreover, some are warning that drones are becoming more autonomous – making defensive jamming less effective – and using multi-vehicle control, allowing swarming attacks.  Massed attacks using autonomous drones would be readily detectable but hard to defeat, an airbase under attack might be overwhelmed. Fourthly, there are important capability development lessons here. The fifth generation air force supporting Mosul operations could not deny the air to pop-up drones.  An unexpected threat arose that undercut the splendidly high-technology air forces orbiting overhead – well not quite, the United States Air Force’s (USAF) Reaper drones were useful and forced ISIS to institute its motorcyle countermeasures. This has resonances with a current internal debate about whether USAF should force structure for likely or unlikely wars (also see here). People knew ISIS’s drones were coming but the focus was on other longer-term issues until Mosul reached a crisis point.  Judgments on whether to win today’s wars or worry about tomorrow’s can have important consequences. Lastly, the age of hostile consumer drones has arrived raising questions about how our fifth generation air force should respond.  Some see an Air Force role in killing drones while others might argue it’s solely a matter for Army.  Is control of the air in future irregular wars a new single service responsibility or are there more efficacious joint ways to counter this emerging threat?  Over to you. Dr Peter Layton is a Visiting Fellow at the Griffith Asia Institute at Griffith University. An alternative version of this post appeared on The Interpreter. #AirPower

The Central Blue is pleased to welcome a first-time Navy contributor, Nate Streher as he considers how Robotics and Autonomous Systems exist within the scope of mine warfare, and the potential impacts on Mine Counter Measure operations for the #ADFRAS2040 series. The rise of Robotics and Autonomous Systems (RAS) in all spheres of warfare has accelerated in recent times to a point where constant revision of tactics and procedures is now common practice.[1] The area of mine warfare, and in particular Mine Counter Measures (MCM), has been no exception. Heavy reliance on RAS has not only replaced proven tactics but has also increased the demand on the autonomous systems to work efficiently at the cost of effective redundancy planning. This leads to two questions; can we exploit the known weaknesses of adversary autonomous systems for maritime aerial denial? Or can we manipulate the adversary's autonomous systems to create an advantage? A natural byproduct of increased scrutiny on MCM has been the divergence of attention from purely mine clearance to offensive/defensive mining operations.[2] As RAS became the new normal in the context of MCM, a focus in identifying and exploiting the known vulnerabilities of these autonomous systems to increase the effectiveness of offensive mining efforts has grown. The critical vulnerability of the MCM system, manned or otherwise, is the dependence on acoustic and magnetic search techniques as a means of location and identification of potential threats. This is in addition to the communications link vulnerability that plagues unmanned technology and leaves it susceptible to electronic attack. Therefore, future opportunities exist to counter autonomous MCM operations through both kinetic and non-kinetic means. Kinetic Attack A simple model for countering autonomous assets is area denial of the minefield through kinetic attack tailored specifically for autonomous assets. This may take the form of underwater guided munitions, sowed amongst a real or distraction minefield, that targets explicitly autonomous MCM assets. This could be achieved relatively simply and inexpensively, due to the small size of the munition required and the simplicity of a sensor package that actively seeks known operating frequency range of enemy autonomous search systems. The cost versus damage ratio would be favourable, and the kinetic destruction of an autonomous asset by a countermeasure does not confirm a mine field’s location, instead, it leaves a sense of ambiguity of threat presence. The psychological effect of an autonomous asset being destroyed seconds after insertion into a possible minefield may also quickly interrupt the decision-making process of the enemy commander. An argument could be made that a simple fishing net placed in the probable path of Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV) could delay the MCM effort. This is somewhat true; however, a lone kinetic countermeasure could serve to provide the illusion of a persistent mine threat where there is none. It may also degrade the adversary’s physical ability to conduct MCM operations through asset attrition at a favourable cost versus damage ratio. This concept is not restricted to underwater RAS, as these countermeasures could also target unmanned MCM Surface Vessels through search frequency identification and targeting. Non - Kinetic Attack Opportunities also exist for non-kinetic and clandestine countering of RAS behaviour models. Like any system that operates on a feedback loop (search/ return/ identify/ locate/ analysis/ action) there exists the opportunity to manipulate the flow of information overtly or clandestinely. One such opportunity would be the manipulation of information, namely the acoustic signature, to delay or prevent entirely the identification and location of sea mines through acoustic jamming or acoustic signal manipulation. This concept can be displayed through the provision of a hypothetical scenario. The Blue force MCM UUV proceeds ahead of the main Amphibious Task Group (ATG), clearing a path through the contested waters surrounding Orange force held littoral regions. The clearance route identified for UUV clearance will allow the Blue ATG to close to an optimal distance to launch Amphibious forces to regain control of the islands. Intelligence suggests the sea approaches have been mined and the MCM forces have already located and neutralised several conventional sea mines. An unknown threat, a sea mine with the ability to subtly manipulate acoustic sonar returns from MCM RAS, waits in the approaches. The UUV proceeds along the clearance route, actively searching for anomalies that may indicate a possible mine, providing a visual representation of the acoustic return to the operator through a mission interface on the surface. The mine lays dormant until the acoustic signal from the UUV reaches it. A module within the mine identifies the frequency of the signal and triangulates the position of the UUV. Instantaneously the mine emits an acoustic signature that is received by the UUVs receivers. This acoustic signal has been created by the sea mine, using the position and movement of the UUV, to alter the acoustic return of the UUV transponder, altering any possible return signal identifying an anomaly. The UUV continues receiving acoustic signals consistent with known sea bottom types, displaying a flat sea bottom with no contacts of interest, or a signal that represents a large submerged wreck that does not present a hazard to surface navigation, back to the operator. No anomalies are detected, and the channel is assessed to be clear by the MCM forces. As the ATG moves through the channel, the sea mine functions, breaking the back of the high-value target critical to Blue force success. A simple underwater weapon has not only managed to intercept and manipulate the behaviour cycles of enemy RAS but has also managed to kinetically function as designed, providing the occupying forces with a relatively cheap mission kill. While this is somewhat beyond the scope of the function of current generation sea mines, the effect of manipulating sonar returns has been shown in nature. The Tiger Moth uses well-timed acoustic signals to evade predation by bats through jamming of the bat’s echolocation method of hunting. Upon hearing the echolocation of the bat entering its terminal attack phase, the Tiger moth emits a series of signals on the same frequency that is expected by the bat. The unexpected clicks emitted by the moth confuses (while not completely jamming) the echolocation receptors of the bat by disrupting its known terminal location behaviour. This creates an error in the bat’s echolocation of the moth and affects the bat’s terminal attack phase. In controlled studies, the ‘silent’ moths (not emitting the disruptive clicks) were ten times more likely to be successfully caught by the bats, than the moths emitting the acoustically disruptive clicks.[3] This behaviour displays the ability of the moths to use acoustics to disrupt the echolocation behavior of the bats successfully. In warfare, this could mean to intercept and disrupt the expected acoustic return and manipulate the information to disrupt the identification behaviour cycle of the RAS. While current military examples of acoustic jamming exist, they are all overt countermeasures which completely block the acquisition of the desired acoustic return; none currently can manipulate the desired acoustic return and disruption of the identification behaviour cycle that is displayed by the Tiger moth. A consideration of this example of the Tiger moth is that it displays an inherently overt method of acoustic manipulation not entirely appropriate for a clandestine weapon such as a sea mine. The overt manipulation of an acoustic signal would provide an exceptionally quick way of anomaly identification, drawing unwanted attention to the mine. More importantly, this concept of information warfare through acoustic manipulation could be developed upon and introduced as a means for countering autonomous technologies and may significantly disrupt the mine warfare sphere if successfully developed. Overall, a significant opportunity exists for RAS to be countered in mine warfare, particularly in MCM operations. From an MCM standpoint, unmanned systems will reduce risk to human operators through the provision of results from a distance and may increase the effectiveness of MCM operations through higher fidelity information. However, while these opportunities exist, so do the ability to manipulate the technology against the owner/user subtly or to remove the RAS asset even quickly from the battlefield altogether through the exploitation of known weaknesses. While RAS will continue to improve MCM operations, treatment of these technologies as a panacea may be highly detrimental if all possibilities of countering and exploitation are not considered. LCDR Nate Streher joined the Royal Australian Navy in 2005 as a Maritime Warfare Officer, before specialising as a Mine Warfare & Clearance Diving Officer in 2011. After service as Executive Officer - Australian Clearance Diving Team Four and multiple operational deployments, LCDR Streher chose to discharge for 18 months where he worked in Commercial Maritime and Unmanned systems. Re-joining in 2018, LCDR Streher has since been selected as the Tactical Underwater Warfare Instructor on exchange with the Royal Malaysian Navy in Lumut, Malaysia. The opinions expressed are his alone and do not represent the views of the Royal Australian Navy, the Australian Defence Force, or the Australian Government. #ADFRAS2040 #FutureWarfare #RoyalAustralianNavy #AusDef [1] Evans, A. William, Matthew Marge, Ethan Stump, Garrett Warnell, Joseph Conroy, Douglas Summers-Stay, and David Baran, ‘The future of human robot teams in the army: Factors affecting a model of human-system dialogue towards greater team collaboration’ in Pamela Savage-Knepshield,, Jessie Chen (eds.), Advances in Human Factors in Robots and Unmanned Systems (Springer, 2017), pp. 197-209. [2] Justin Doubleday, ‘Navy's expeditionary warfare office putting focus on offensive mining,’ Inside the Navy, 29:23 (2016), pp. 1-5. [3] James H. Fullard, James A. Simmons, and Prestor A. Saillant, ‘Jamming bat echolocation: the dogbane tiger moth Cycnia tenera times its clicks to the terminal attack calls of the big brown bat Eptesicus fuscus,’ Journal of Experimental Biology, 194:1 (1994), pp. 285-98.

The Central Blue is pleased to welcome first-time contributor Kristi Adam as she considers the historical developments and military implications of biometrics for the #ADFRAS2040 series. Using biometric technology in security is not a new concept. Something unique to an individual – a fingerprint or a retina – has been used for identification alongside access cards and passwords for some time. Historically, biometric security technology has predominantly focused on facilities and network access and been conducted with the consent of the individual being identified. More recently, there have been significant developments in non-cooperative identification of individuals using biometrics. Using this newer technology, it could be possible to identify an adversary utilising extensive database and targeting systems automatically. While there are significant and promising advancements occurring in biometrics, it is also an ethical minefield. Due to these ethical considerations, it is unlikely that the Australian Defence Force (ADF) will progress to a fully autonomous human-out-of-the-loop targeting system. However, the ADF must understand how other military forces could exploit these technologies in the future. Historical developments Fingerprints were the beginning of biometric identification, but continually advancing technology has enabled significant developments in voice, gait, and facial recognition. Progression has been assisted by common, commercial-access systems like those used for accessing smartphones. As a consequence, there has been a significant increase in accuracy for facial recognition over the past four years, with the failure rate reducing from 4 per cent down to 0.2 per cent in certain circumstances such as passport photo identification. The United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM) have capitalised on this improvement with a project named Advanced Tactical Facial Recognition at a Distance Technology. This project has enabled a portable face recognition device that can operate at up to one kilometre. With the addition of thermal imaging, it is further possible for facial recognition to occur while a person is wearing a face mask, though with decreased accuracy. Biometric identification technology has moved beyond just facial recognition; one example is the use of lasers to measure a person's cardiac signature at a distance of up to 200 metres. The system, also known as ‘Jetson’, was developed in response to another request from US SOCOM. Using laser vibrometry, the device measures the vibrations on the garment fabric sitting against the chest. The technique can be used to add additional unique data to biometric databases as individuals' hearts differ in size, shape, and contraction patterns. The main advantage of this type of identification is that, unlike facial or gait recognition, a heartbeat cannot be altered or disguised. Unfortunately, the technology is currently limited by the thickness of the garment worn by the target as the laser is unable to penetrate heavy fabrics or body armour. Further, it requires 30 consecutive seconds of scanning to make an identification, which means that the target would need to be sitting or standing still. ADF application In contemplating how the ADF could utilise advanced biometric technology to gain a winning advantage, there are several operational concepts to explore. Using a layered approach, friendly forces could simultaneously conduct face, voice, and gait recognition, along with cardiac signature measurements to improve identification accuracy significantly. This data could further feed databases to either enable a positive identification or make connections from the continued use in one area. For example, it could assist in locating an individual from an earlier scan even when the identity of that person had not yet been confirmed. The technology applications are very versatile - from humanitarian and disaster relief to base security. In the conduct of humanitarian missions, the technology could be used to locate missing persons in a natural disaster or war zone, while for base security applications, it offers additional safety through distancing personnel from the potential threat. Biometric technology software integrated onto Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) may be able to positively identify friend from foe, thus pushing boundaries out to circumvent attacks on-base infrastructure. Then there are the potential combat uses. Automatic Target Recognition (ATR) has improved the efficiency of offensive weapon and surveillance systems. An armed UAS may potentially find, fix, and track an individual through biometric recognition. As with many other capabilities, the ADF will require access to common allied databases to maximise efficiencies and opportunity for success. The US has been building a database of biometric data from global operations, and access to this or similar allied databases could assist Australia in fully exploiting biometric capabilities. Ethical considerations Like many of the topics studied within the robotics and automated systems field, there are significant ethical questions to be considered. Regarding biometrics specifically, questions relate to the risk of misidentification as well as data protection. Biometric data collection and storage has raised privacy concerns globally. In China, there is an ongoing legal case concerning the collection of facial recognition data without specific consent. Chinese law has yet to catch up to rapidly advancing technology, with biometric data currently being included as personally identifiable information covered under non-binding guidelines within a broader data protection framework. This is not dissimilar to current Australian law, which has yet to move beyond fingerprint technology. To address concerns, the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) is developing an Artificial Intelligence (AI) framework. The framework covers important topics regarding both data governance and automated decisions; however, its focus is domestic applications. In covering issues of privacy and democratic freedoms, the framework may serve as a useful foundation from which military applications can be further considered. Conclusion Although technologically possible, utilising AI reliant on biometric data to make life and death decisions and removing the human-out-of-the-loop for efficiency raises significant ethical questions worthy of deep consideration. Until ethical considerations are resolved, or at least further understood, the ADF will likely retain human-in-the-loop processes for targeting; however, the technology has other uses that will be worth exploring. The ADF must consider how and when other militaries could exploit this capability in the future, and what defensive capabilities could be used in response. Pilot Officer Kristi Adam is in the Royal Australian Air Force and currently undertaking a Bachelor in Business through University of New South Wales in addition to a Bachelor in Global Security through Murdoch University. The opinions expressed are hers alone and do not represent the views of the Royal Australian Air Force, the Australian Defence Force, or the Australian Government.

The potential future applications of Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) capabilities in support of everyday military operations are widely acknowledged. Over two parts, SGT William Gill analyses UAS capability through the lens of the force-in-being, objective force and future force, as well as opportunities for technological advancement. This is the second instalment in that series. Part one can be found here. The Future Force Human-out-of-the-loop (HOL) autonomy is expected to grow significantly over the coming decades and could include the full automation of an airbase such that human involvement is minimal. By utilising autonomous vehicles to complete tasks that have traditionally been conducted by human operators, Australian Defence Force (ADF) personnel can be reassigned to more specific, useful roles. Peter Layton explains this concept succinctly in his recent paper Surfing the Digital Wave. Autonomous vehicles could include forklifts, aircraft tow motors, general maintenance vehicles, air operations vehicles and ancillary motored ground support equipment. Fuel trucks, cargo loaders and power units could also be autonomous, positioning themselves as appropriate and then connecting themselves to the aircraft. People could then inspect the setup either at the flight line, or through some remote means, and authorise fuel delivery, cargo loading or power on, respectively. Weapons could also be transported and loaded by autonomous systems. Extrapolating this illustration to include airbase security; UAS could be used to detect anomalies during a base perimeter patrol. The UAS could cue an Automatic Guided Vehicle (AGV) to respond and interrogate the detected anomaly. Through developments in machine learning and artificial intelligence (AI), the above scenario demonstrates the potential of fully autonomous systems. This concept is not limited to base security; potential exists across the whole airbase to incorporate such technology to streamline processes and create efficiencies. While it may seem far-fetched, this concept has already been partially tested by the Australian Army’s Robotic and Autonomous System Implementation Coordination Office (RICO) in collaboration with BAE Systems in the development of the Autonomous M113 Armoured Personnel Carrier. Gabby Costigan, the CEO of BAE Systems Australia, highlighted that the M113 project demonstrates a `commitment to leading the development of new technologies and collaborating across industry and academia to advance autonomous capabilities.’ The Future of UAS Awareness and education are vital to promoting the value of UAS within the Royal Australian Air Force. Recent trial activity conducted by Air Force 3 Security Force (3 SECFOR) involving UAS operations within RAAF air bases highlighted a common lack of knowledge and understanding. Base Command Posts, Air Traffic Control and Base Security Officers each required in-depth education from the project team upon arrival to alleviate security and safety concerns. There was a common perception among personnel that the UAS was a toy, not a tool that could enhance capability outputs for various tasks. In order to gain UAS operating permission, a significant amount of time was spent educating base staff on how safety and governance requirements were being fulfilled. Implementation of standardised base operating procedures would go a long way to increasing understanding on a broader scale, allowing for more efficient and widespread utilisation. Standardised processes across all defence bases would further streamline approval processes and reduce the need for surplus education. To assist in this process, the Air Force could again leverage from the Army's success in implementing a drone literacy program. In 2018, the Army invested in 350 UAS, which enabled Army personnel a hands-on approach to UAS education. As explained by Colonel Gabby Follett, Commanding Officer of 17th Combat Sustainment Support Battalion (CSSB), ‘drone literacy is every soldier and commander understanding what a drone can do for them. What the possibilities are, how to pick the right drone for the mission.’ The 3SECFOR trial identified the significant potential of UAS within a 5th generation Air Force. It is imperative, however, that a positive narrative is provided by leadership to support the implementation of UAS capability. This includes promoting UAS as a capable tool with many diverse applications across all Air Force. There are numerous opportunities across the workforce to streamline everyday tasks, improve surveillance and accuracy, minimise risk exposure and realise time and cost efficiencies. Such an approach supports the Air Force Strategy 2017-2027 which states that Air Force must ‘develop a 5th generation workforce that can quickly and effectively adapt to rapid technological and operational change and exploit the opportunities presented by Australia’s changing workforce demographics.’ Conclusion Introducing new and innovative, technologically advanced methods for completing everyday tasks, while challenging traditional methodologies is crucial to driving innovation in any workforce. A 5th Generation Air Force requires adept and agile thinkers to generate innovation in its approach to applying new and evolving technologies. Through an analysis of UAS capability across the Force-in-Being, Objective Force and Future Force, this two-part series aims to encourage conversation surrounding the potential of UAS capability and emerging technology in the 5th Generation Air Force. Recent Technology advancements have proven invaluable across all spectrums of UAS capability, ground vehicles, artificial intelligence, big data, and analysis. Technology not only improves efficiencies and outputs; it can reduce human error and minimise risk in the workplace. Impressive technological innovation already occurs across Air Force, Army and Navy; however, additional cross-pollination would prove invaluable. Collaboration in trials, research and outcomes across the joint force will generate greater cost efficiencies and streamline engagement with Australian industry. The creation of a joint centre for excellence would further strengthen this collaboration and provide a channel for clear communication and knowledge. The implementation of these recommendations ensure that research and lessons learnt are shared and leveraged for continuous improvement within the ADF as a whole. Indeed, tri-service collaboration is imperative for the 5th Generation Air Force. Sergeant William Gill is an Airfield Defence Guard in the Royal Australian Air Force. He has extensive and diverse operational experience including service on Operations FIJI ASSIST, SLIPPER and MAZURKA. Sergeant Gill is passionate about Small Unmanned Aerial Systems, and how they can deliver enhanced security effects to national support bases and expeditionary security forces. In 2020, Sergeant Gill received a Conspicuous Service Cross for his dedicated work in Small Unmanned Aerial Systems. The opinions expressed are his alone and do not represent the views of the Royal Australian Air Force, the Australian Defence Force, or the Australian Government.

Air Vice-Marshal John Blackburn, AO (Retd) Integrated Air and Missile Defence Study: The Challenge of Integrated Force Design, April 2017 The Williams Foundation conducted an Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD) study between Sep16 and Feb17 to explore the challenges of building Australia’s IAMD capability and the implications for the Department of Defence’s integrated force design function. The study was focussed at the Program level of capability. The study incorporated a visit to the US for a month to explore the IAMD challenge with United States Defense Forces and Agencies, think tanks and Industry. The initial study findings were then explored in Australia in three Defence and Industry workshops on 31 Jan 17 and 1 Feb 17, using a Chatham House model of unattributed discussions. Many of the statements made in this report are not referenced as they are derived from these Chatham House discussions and associated meetings. IAMD is a highly complex issue; comments made in this report should not be construed in any way as being critical of the IAMD approach of the Department of Defence. This report cannot account for the full complexity of the integrated force design process that is being addressed within Defence; however, it may offer some value in providing suggestions based on the study findings. This study would not have been possible without the support and assistance of several areas within the Australian Department of Defence, the US Defense Department, Industry and think tanks. The Williams Foundation deeply appreciates the support of the IAMD Study major sponsors, Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman. Thanks are also due to Jacobs in funding the services of Dr Gary Waters who provided valuable support in the research for the study and in the production of the workshop notes. This report represents the views of AVM Blackburn (Retd), the IAMD Study lead. This study report is intentionally high level and brief; in the author’s experience, long and detailed reports are rarely read by senior decision makers. Download pdf of the report

The potential future applications of Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) capabilities in support of everyday military operations are widely acknowledged. Over two parts, SGT William Gill will analyse UAS capability through the lens of the force-in-being, objective force and future force. These three distinct time periods enable planning and are utilised to forecast strategic development in the Royal Australian Air Force and explore opportunities for technological advancement. In raising awareness of UAS capability potential, this series aims to demonstrate that with more significant investment in UAS capability, Air Force development will be better aligned with future technological advancement. It further aims to encourage greater research and development in the use of UAS to minimise risk, save costs, decrease task timelines, and create human resource efficiencies while simultaneously enhancing joint capability. Characteristics of UAS Remote Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) range from micro platforms, such as the in-service Black Hornet, to much larger platforms such as the MQ-4C Triton, with each having a unique range of advantages and limitations which require careful consideration for task application. Noting the potential tactical, operational and strategic objectives required of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) as outlined in the 2016 Defence White Paper and 2020 Defence Strategic Update, it is unrealistic to expect that one platform can or will provide a holistic ‘one size fits all’ solution. Fundamental characteristics of air power such as reach, range or manoeuvrability do not apply equally to tasks such as wide-area surveillance or base security. It is, therefore, imperative that each RPAS is tailored to suit the required mission profile. System architecture is equally important and must be flexible and adaptable to exploit industries’ rapid advancement in a timely fashion. Small Unmanned Aerial Systems (SUAS) are relatively low cost, highly capable platforms and therefore easily replaceable by newer technologies if structured in a manner which supports rapid spiral upgrades. Technology is advancing at such a rate that SUAS platforms will likely only remain in service for three to five years. Within that time frame, they will likely require yearly spiral upgrades, such as sensor and software improvements to ensure a technological edge is retained. This concept is echoed by Chris Herd, author of A Brief History of Humanity and the Future of Technology in which he says ‘we need to stop viewing technology as an existential threat and embrace it in partnership. Technology isn’t our biggest threat; our biggest threat is not embracing it to invent the future.’ Appropriate investment in the right technology will ensure that the ADF sustains a current, capable, and superior RPAS capability. The Force-in-Being At present, ADF SUAS utilisation is setting the foundations for the objective and future force. As illustrated below, SUAS range in capability, resulting in potential applications across the tactical, operational, and strategic environments. Their applications can shape and enhance the conduct of everyday tasks while also creating cost efficiencies across Defence. Take, for example, a SUAS coupled with pixel analysis software, which can be utilised to conduct visual inspections of aircraft to detect damage. This application promises to minimise the human requirement to work from heights generates time and resource efficiencies and increases accuracy. Further, the financial outlay required to obtain such a system is minimal when compared to the force-multiplying capability it provides. Like all new technology, the introduction of SUAS is not without issue. Any implementation of such a capability requires due diligence, trials and adequate investment in both resources and manning. If the ADF does not adequately invest in resources and manning, the sustainability of these systems and the ADF’s position as a leader in technological advancement will be jeopardised. As stated in an Air Power Development Centre Bulletin, the SUAS ‘capability needs to be carefully analysed if the full capabilities of these versatile vehicles are to be realised.’ Successful implementation of SUAS in mainstream Air Force is necessary to create the foundations for a positive narrative; both internal to Air Force, and outwardly to the public. An Internal positive narrative aids in increasing workforce literacy and understanding of unmanned systems, while a positive narrative in the general public highlights the benefits of RPAS and their role within Defence, as well as avoiding inaccurate clickbait headlines such as, ‘ADF buys remote killer drones’. Resource considerations During a three year test and evaluation period of the Multi-Rotor Unmanned Aerial System (MRUAS) concept, it became evident that the unit establishment would require review and variation in order to ensure dedicated staff allocation to implement, manage and deliver an enduring UAS capability. Only when units are adequately resourced do, UAS capabilities provide force multiplication opportunities through the creation of time and cost efficiencies, as well as a reduction of safety risks. Efficiencies are lost without suitably experienced and trained personnel to enable the successful implementation and execution. Expecting existing personnel to take on extensive UAS secondary duties in addition to daily roles and responsibilities is setting the capability up for failure and creating a negative narrative. In a highly active and task-driven Air Force, this expectation is not feasible or sustainable. A dedicated workforce structure has been successfully implemented within the Australian Army and Royal Australian Navy, enabling key fundamental inputs to capability, including engineering, maintenance, training, operations, and supply to occur. These models must be emulated in an Air Force UAS structure to ensure ADF wide standardisation and training, capability, mission worthiness and future platform procurement. Air Force Strategy dictates that ‘Air Force must build on the experience and knowledge gained with its current platforms and systems to help inform future force-design decisions. This includes the greater use of unmanned systems.’ Capability Considerations In the context of innovation and capability development, understanding the Fourth Industrial Revolution is a key for the ADF. Brendan Marr, Futurist author, explains: The Fourth Industrial Revolution describes the exponential changes to the way we live, work and relate to one another due to the adoption of cyber-physical systems, the Internet of Things and the Internet of Systems. As we implement smart technologies in our factories and workplaces, connected machines will interact, visualise the entire production chain and make decisions autonomously. The fourth industrial revolution has already had a significant impact on the ADF, particularly within the ongoing development and employment of unmanned systems and capabilities. Investment in new technologies and concepts must continue for the ADF to remain at the cutting edge of technology. This sentiment is further echoed by Klaus Schwab, Engineer, Economist and founder of the World Economic Forum when he highlights that ‘the scale, scope and complexity of how technological revolution influences our behaviour and way of living will be unlike anything humankind has experienced.’ To ensure Air Force remains in lock step with the fourth industrial revolution, UAS capabilities need to be trialled and implemented within short time frames such that the current and most relevant technologies are exploited. In doing so, the chain of command must be willing to accept a higher level of risk for capability failure in order to enable progress. Trials must also consider exploiting opportunities to better understand ADF collection of big data, artificial intelligence (AI) and automation thus driving further efficiencies and building greater corporate knowledge. Objective Force (3-5 years from present) Human-in-the-loop (HIL) systems are currently being implemented effectively within semi-autonomous capabilities across the ADF. For example, the Expeditionary Tactical Automated Security System works to autonomously identify potential ground-based threats and is playing an integral role in ISR and increasing security-in-depth. These interactions currently place a high level of importance on the human as a critical decision-maker throughout the mission profile. This raises the question – what does this concept look like without direct human involvement? Moreover, more importantly, what resources and training are required to ensure its success? As the ADF continues to explore the use of autonomous vehicles and SUAS technology to enhance the force-in-being, the evolution of these capabilities and technologies over the next three years must be examined. What foundational infrastructure does the ADF need to invest in to support the future force? While end-user components of SUAS may have a limited shelf life (approximately three to five), critical investments in IT and airbase infrastructure will provide longevity in support of both current and future capability. One such concept which has the potential to provide a strong return on investment is the utilisation of semi-autonomous vehicles within the objective force. Semi-autonomous vehicles may be used to conduct simple everyday tasks across an airbase at all levels of operation, allowing for increased efficiencies throughout. Conducting ISR of an airbase is imperative to ensuring security and freedom of manoeuvre of friendly force operations. Airbase force protection measures ensure the protection of infrastructure, aircraft, and personnel. Using UAS instead of traditional human methods provides a wider aperture of awareness and an ability to react to threats more quickly with greater situational awareness. UAS mission profiles will continue to evolve as testing with an increased scope towards full autonomy develops. Instead of a security force conducting a perimeter patrol, runway sweep or checking base infrastructure, a UAS or Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV) could be tasked to simultaneously achieve these collection requirements in one flight or mission, many times each day. In doing so, the UAS and UGV optimise human resources for employment at the right place, and the right time. This task could be further enabled by an increased application of AI which may enable machines to make decisions and reduce human input during simple tasks. Training Parallel to developing foundational infrastructure, the ADF should consider a joint centre of excellence in order to optimise efficiencies. Currently, Army has successfully adopted 20 Surveillance and Target Acquisition (20STA) Regiment as their centre of excellence, while the Navy has chosen 822 Squadron within their Fleet Air Arm. While each service would continue to champion their individual mission Concept of Operations (CONOPs), developing a joint centre would better highlight opportunities for efficiencies in innovation, Australian industry engagement, capability implementation and funding. In addition to the creation of a joint centre of excellence, a whole of Government approach to the development of AI and autonomous vehicles would prove valuable. Such an establishment would endeavour to share knowledge in areas such as concept development, research, training, procurement, policy and procedures and technical support. Mechanisms for direct access to Australian industry would further ensure effective ADF access to cutting-edge technologies for joint and interagency use. Moving forward, the Air Force must acknowledge and learn from the current systems and processes that have been developed by the Army. In 2018, the Army released the Robotic & Autonomous Systems Strategy (RAS) which explores and promotes concept development and the potential of robotics in a Defence setting. An Air Force UAS strategy should similarly be implemented to ensure that the full potential of the system is exploited. Sergeant William Gill is an Airfield Defence Guard in the Royal Australian Air Force. He has extensive and diverse operational experience including service on Operations FIJI ASSIST, SLIPPER and MAZURKA. Sergeant Gill is passionate about Small Unmanned Aerial Systems, and how they can deliver enhanced security effects to national support bases and expeditionary security forces. In 2020, Sergeant Gill received a Conspicuous Service Cross for his dedicated work in Small Unmanned Aerial Systems. You can follow Will on Twitter @_williamgill #AustralianDefenceForce #RoyalAustralianAirForce #UnmannedAerialSystems #Drones #FutureWarfare

Brian Weston 'On Target - Defending south of Australia’s ‘First Island Chain’ – Part 3' in Australian Defence Business Review, May/June 2020 pp 72-74 The two recent On Target columns in the Jan-Feb and Mar-Apr issues of ADBR noted the strategic importance to Australia’s security of ‘Australia’s First Island Chai’ ‒ the island chain stretching from Sri Lanka to Fiji. The most recent column concluded that, given the geo-political changes taking place in the Indo-Pacific, perhaps it is time for Australia to focus on the preparedness of the ADF to conduct credible operations in this vast theatre. Without downplaying the importance of the Australia-US alliance, global issues might dictate that anticipated levels of US military and logistic support fall short of Australian expectations ‒ a not unreasonable assumption given the commitments the US has in the Indo-Pacific (Japan, South Korea and Taiwan), in Europe (especially in Eastern Europe and the Baltic), in South Central Europe and the Black Sea, and in the Middle East. Across the globe the US ‒ facing a militarised China under the rule of an autocratic, nationalistic, aggressive and belligerent Communist Party of China ‒ might be forced to focus its limited Indo-Pacific military resources on matching China’s capabilities, especially air and naval, from established US bases in Japan, South Korea and the Central Pacific. That could lead to the US leadership ‘delegating’ to Australia, the conduct of all military operations south of Australia’s First Island Chain. The two On Target columns concluded that, although not by desire but necessity, Australia might find itself almost wholly responsible for the defence of its island continent and its approaches, and of the Australian (and US) logistic and enabling bases therein. The columns further concluded Australia should, therefore, pay more attention to the expansive theatre of operations extending outwards from continental Australia to Australia’s First Island Chain. A useful starting point, especially given the pace with which militarisation is occurring in the Indo-Pacific, would be to assess how well the capabilities outlined in the 2016 Integrated Investment Program (IIP) have prepared the ADF for unilateral military operations in the operational theatre south of Australia’s First Island Chain. Second, given the speed with which technology is advancing military capabilities in the Indo-Pacific, this assessment should be a nearer-term assessment ‒ such as 2025 ‒ rather than a longer-term assessment out to 2035. Accordingly, this column will make some observations on how well Australia’s 2016 IIP force structure has prepared the ADF to respond to the challenge of an adversary venturing into Australia’s ‘front yard’ to coerce and intimidate, to ensure Australian deference to a superior military power. Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities are the foundation of national security. But in the past, Australian defence policies have used ISR in the strategic context of ‘Warning Time’ rather than in an operational or tactical context. In this strategic context, the role of ISR is to warn of the emergence of threats as they emerge so that they are recognised and responded to by a corresponding upgrade in national defence capability. Today, there seems little doubt Australia is in Warning Time. Indeed, that realisation appears to have come a little late with some 2016 IIP defence capabilities not scheduled to begin to appear until the mid-2030s. Capabilities that will not begin to materialise until the mid-2030s and later, will be of little use in 2025. Fortunately, many of the ISR capabilities that Australia has prioritised also have immense value in an operational theatre. These include the acquisition of six MQ-4C Triton unmanned surveillance systems and 12 P-8A Poseidon manned aircraft, both recommended in the 2016 IIP. The IIP also foreshadowed an increase to 15 P-8A, which at a mission availability rate of 75%, translates into 11.25 “mission-available” P-8A. The MQ-4C and P-8A capabilities are complementary, and when combined with the four long-range electronic warfare support aircraft based on the Gulfstream G550, the Jindalee OTH Radar Network (JORN), and coalition Australia-US ISR capabilities, Australia will possess a modest but impressive operational ISR capability. But is this ISR capability enough to sustain ongoing operations out to Australia’s First Island Chain? And, is it possible for these ISR capabilities to sustain ongoing operations, simultaneously, in two areas of operations such as in the North Coral Sea and off the North West Shelf? Noting the US Navy allocates five MQ-4C to an operational node from which to sustain 24/7 ISR operations, the Australia MQ-4C capability will support only one node of 24/7 unmanned ISR operations. Whether this is adequate is debatable given long-range ISR operations are asset intensive as illustrated by the heavy AP-3C commitment in the mid-1990s search and rescue operations for round-the-world yacht racers; their heavy tasking in operations against illegal Patagonian Toothfish fishing boats; and in the search for MH370. So, getting the MQ-4C and P-8A operational fleet sizing right and balanced, will be critical to the efficiency and effectiveness of the operational ISR capability. But one positive from the introduction of the unmanned MQ-4C is that it relieves the manned P-8A of most of the long duration and repetitious surveillance activity, freeing the P-8A armed with mines, torpedoes and anti-ship missiles (ASM) to focus on the anti-submarine and anti-surface roles. Given the changing maritime power balance in the Indo-Pacific, this refocus of P-8A operations is timely and, arguably, provides justification for the early acquisition of the three additional P-8A foreshadowed in the IIP. The changing maritime power balance in the Indo-Pacific has also stimulated the development of new, technologically advanced, US ASM capabilities (noting recent US reports of a possible Foreign Military Sale of AGM-158C LRASM to Australia for carriage on F/A-18F Super Hornet). And with the AGM-158C likely to be cleared for carriage by the P-8A in the mid-2020s, there is a strong case to arm RAAF P-8As with the AGM-158C. With both the P-8A and F/A-18F armed with the stealthy, heavyweight, sophisticated and long-range AGM-158C, the ADF will possess a strong deterrent to threatening foreign naval incursions south of Australia’s First Island Chain. Air dominance is the prime role of the F-35A, although the in-theatre distances will make F-35A operations generally reliant on AAR support. The F-35A with its stealth, AIM-120D AMRAAM, long-range targeting ability and networked operations is a potent air dominance capability. As 2025 approaches, the operational capabilities of the F-35A will be further enhanced by the Block 4 upgrades which, apart from system and weapons upgrades, could include the integration of the Joint Strike Missile (JSM) or another ASM, and the possible integration of the follow-on AIM-260 JATM long-range air-to-air missile. The air force operates six E-7A Wedgetail, Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft; a world class, critical enabling capability for both air and naval operations. But a fleet of six aircraft translates into only 4.5 mission-available E-7A. But while the 2016 IIP includes a significant upgrade to the AEW&C systems, it’s failure to increase the AEW&C fleet to eight aircraft (which would provide six mission-available E7-A) leaves the ADF deficient in the key operational and tactical co-ordination and control nodes, critical to mission success. The E-7A is also reliant on AAR support. A mission of about 10 hours, for a task at 1,500 km distance, involves five hours in transit and five hours on-station. Therefore, to sustain a 24/7 on-station E-7A presence, 4.8 missions must be tasked ‒ not achievable from the current fleet of six aircraft. But E-7A on-station time can be achieved with AAR support. By increasing mission duration to 15 hours, which also increases E-7A on-station time to 10 hours, AAR realises a 100% increase in E-7A on-station time. With AAR support, only 2.4 missions are needed to sustain a 24/7 on-station E-7A presence. This example also demonstrates that enabling AAR generally flows ‘straight to the bottom line’ of increased on-station presence. AAR support confers similar dramatic increases in on-station presence to the P-8A, EA-18G, F/A-18F and F-35A. The 2016 IIP expanded the MRTT capability to seven aircraft and foreshadowed a further increase to two aircraft, nominally to support P-8A operations. But even a fleet of nine MRTT aircraft ‒ with 6.75 mission-available MRTT ‒ is insufficient to provide the necessary AAR enabling capability to conduct credible air operations, at task force level, in our region. In short, this deficiency in AAR support puts at risk the operational effectiveness of an otherwise potent Australian air combat and sea denial capability upon which successful Australian air and naval operations must be based. In conclusion, the 2016 IIP has provided a framework of complimentary air capabilities that, in 2025, and with some augmentation, will pose a formidable challenge to any hostile air and naval incursion south of Australia’s First Island Chain. But the IIP has not recognised the criticality of the E-7A AEW&C capability to successful air and naval operations in the theatre, and of the necessity of increasing enabling AAR capability to support the range of likely concurrent air and naval activities. Brian Weston is a Board Member of the Sir Richard Williams Foundation. He served tours in Defence’s Force Development Analysis Division and the HQADF Force Structure Development Planning Branch. Download pdf

In June, AIRMSHL Mel Hupfeld AO, DSC (CAF) supported the opportunity to reach our members in a pre-recorded interview. In the interview with me, AIRMSHL Hupfeld provides a deeper understanding on Air Force Strategic Intent as well as insights into future Air Force capability development. The interview has resulted in a 3 part video series. We hope you find the video of interest and look forward to your feedback. View videos here Geoff Brown AO, Chair

The US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) published an unclassified assessment of Chinese military developments on 15 January 2019. The report, China Military Power: Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win, disclosed that China is developing ‘new medium- and long-range stealth bombers to strike regional and global targets’, thus confirming long-standing rumours regarding a potential regional bomber. The development of a new strategic bomber, the H-20,  had been confirmed by the commander of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) in 2016. The medium-range bomber is also described as a tactical bomber and a fighter-bomber in the DIA report: significantly, the new aircraft will reportedly possess a long-range air-to-air missile capability. The medium-range stealth bomber programme is indicative of China’s efforts to expand and enhance its air power capabilities, in particular through the pursuit of multiple fifth-generation aircraft (such as the J-20, J-31 and H-20), unmanned air systems, and an aircraft carrier force. It will also constitute a potent addition to China’s growing long-range strike capability. Although the DIA report does not provide detailed information concerning either of China’s stealth bomber programmes, it does offer useful insight, which together with other open-source analyses, enable some discussion of the regional bomber, its potential roles, and the implications both for the PLAAF and more broadly. The Regional Bomber China Military Power states that stealth technology is central to the development of the regional bomber and that it will employ ‘many fifth-generation fighter technologies’ (as will the H-20); the aircraft will include an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar and be capable of delivering precision-guided munitions. The new bomber is not likely to enter service before 2025, nor has it been disclosed whether the aircraft will be subsonic or possess a supersonic capability. In this regard, if the regional bomber is indeed the JH-XX, a designation noted by observers in connection to a regional strike aircraft programme for a number of years, it will likely be supersonic. The JH-XX is believed to be a relatively large, twin-engine aircraft, possibly around 100 feet long with a maximum take-off weight of 60 to 100 tons, with a combat radius potentially around 1,500 miles (estimates vary between 1,000 and 2,000 miles). A combat radius of 1,500 miles would, for example, be sufficient to cover Japan, the Korean peninsula, (if operating from Hainan) the South China Sea and northern halves of Sumatra and Borneo plus the entirety of the Philippines, and from western or southern China, much of India and the Bay of Bengal. If forward deployed to the airfield on Panganiban Reef in the South China Sea, the regional bomber could threaten, with stand-off weaponry, targets in northern Australia. The JH-XX has been compared in concept to the FB-22 regional bomber project. The armament of the regional bomber is likely to include a variety of precision-guided munitions, stand-off weapons (potentially including air-launched cruise missiles such as the CJ-10), and anti-ship missiles. In terms of the aforementioned long-range air-to-air missile capability, this could include the ramjet-powered PL-XX, a 400 km-range weapon featuring mid-course off-board targeting support and active radar and infra-red terminal guidance, and intended to target large platforms such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft. The integration of a significant electronic warfare capability may be likely, given that the H-20 strategic bomber is described as ‘able to disturb and destroy incoming missiles and other air and ground targets through a range of equipment including radar, electronic confrontation platform, high power microwave, laser and infrared equipment’. Likewise, as with the H-20, the regional bomber may be ‘capable of large-capacity data fusion and transmission. It can serve as a C4ISR node and interact with large sensor platforms like UAV, early warning aircraft and strategic reconnaissance aircraft to share information and target data’. In this respect, the long-range air-to-air capability of the regional bomber may be particularly significant. That is, the aircraft could be employed as an extended-range interceptor utilising targeting support from unmanned air vehicles such as the Divine Eagle counter-stealth airborne early warning system. This would, assuming a 1,500-mile combat radius for the regional bomber, together with the 250-mile range of the PL-XX, enable the PLAAF to target high-value assets such as ISR aircraft and strategic bombers deep within ostensibly friendly airspace. Implications The development of the regional bomber, alongside the H-20 strategic bomber, reflects China’s ambition to develop world-class armed forces. The pursuit of two stealth bomber programmes alongside two known fifth-generation fighter projects – the J-20 and follow-on variants and the J-31, unmanned air systems, and hypersonic technologies provide a clear statement of intent concerning the level of air power Beijing is seeking. In this context, the regional bomber project is noteworthy. Although the US and Russia are working on strategic stealth bombers, the B-21 Raider and PAK DA (‘Prospective Aviation Complex for Long Range Aviation’) respectively, neither are known to be developing a manned sub-strategic bomber (Russia had previously sought to develop a stealthy medium-range bomber, the Sukhoi T-60S, to replace the Tupolev Tu-22M3 Backfire). The regional bomber, given its combination of stealth, precision-guided munitions and long-range air-to-air missiles, AESA radar, and other advanced systems, will provide the PLAAF with a potent ‘day one’ (the ability to conduct operations at the start of a conflict, against an adversary’s strategic targets defended by a still-intact integrated air defence system) capability. The new aircraft will constitute a significant defensive challenge, in particular with regard to the find, fix, track, target, engage and assess (F2T2EA) process. Moreover, the potential for the regional bomber to be employed in a deep, offensive counter-air role would likely necessitate the diversion of allied fifth-generation aircraft from offensive operations to defend high-value assets. Also, is the development of the regional bomber intended to enable the PLAAF to focus its eventual H-20 force on strategic air operations, in particular, vis-à-vis US forces in the Pacific and potentially the continental US? Similarly, the H-20 is believed to be intended to have a nuclear role; will the regional bomber also be dual-capable? It also warrants asking whether an intermediate-range stealth aircraft offering precision-strike and long-range air-to-air capabilities should be considered by, for example, the US, UK, Australia and Japan? Would such an aircraft offer a sufficient level of capability, in particular against high-end anti-access/area denial and advanced air threats, to justify what would likely require considerable investment? The trajectory of Chinese air power development in the coming decades, the options it confers on policy-makers in Beijing, and the implications are likely to prompt too many more questions regarding the direction of Western air power. Dr James Bosbotinis is a UK-based specialist in defence and international affairs, and Co-CEO of JB Associates, a geopolitical risk advisory. Dr Bosbotinis has written widely on   British defence issues, Russian strategy and military modernisation, China’s evolving strategy, and regional security in Europe, the Former Soviet Union and Asia-Pacific. #China #RegionalSecurity #AirPower #5thGenerationAirPower #DrJamesBosbotinis

Following a week that saw many Australians observe the centenary of the Battle of Hamel and debate the significance of that action, Alan Stephens invites us to consider our views on the unseen Second World War battles in the sky. Street names at the Australian Defence Force Academy honour notable wartime actions. While every one of those actions was a matter of life or death for the men involved, when measured against the broader sweep of history some scarcely merit the description “battle”. It might seem curious, therefore, that three of the greatest battles in which Australians have fought are not acknowledged. Those three battles all took place in the skies over Germany during World War II and were fought by the men of the Royal Air Force’s Bomber Command, some 11,500 of whom were members of the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF). The first was the Battle of the Ruhr from March to July 1943, the second the Battle of Hamburg from 24 July to 3 August 1943, and the third the Battle of Berlin from November 1943 to March 1944. Statistics can never tell a story by themselves, but the figures from those three epic clashes reveal a fearful truth. No Bomber Command aircrew who fought in them could expect to survive. An operational tour on heavy bombers consisted of thirty missions. Crews were then rested for about six months, usually instructing at a training unit. (That “rest” was, however, in name only, as more than 8000 men were killed in flying accidents at bomber conversion units.) They might then volunteer for or be assigned to a second operational tour of twenty missions. Over the course of the war the odds of surviving a first tour were exactly one-in-two – the classic toss of a coin. When the second tour was added the odds slipped further, to one-in-three. And during the battles of the Ruhr, Hamburg, and Berlin the figures became even more terrible, with the loss rates for each mission flown averaging 4.7 per cent, 2.8 per cent and 5.2 per cent respectively, making it statistically impossible to live through thirty missions. No other sustained campaign in which Australians have ever been involved can compare with the air war over Germany in terms of individual danger. The men of the RAAF who fought for Bomber Command amounted to less than 2 per cent of all Australians who enlisted in World War II, yet the 3486 who died accounted for almost 20 per cent of all deaths in combat. The RAAF’s most distinguished heavy bomber unit, No. 460 Squadron, alone lost 1018 aircrew, meaning that, in effect, the entire squadron was wiped out five times. It was far more dangerous to fight in Bomber Command than in the infantry. According to the Nazis’ minister of war production, Albert Speer, following the Hamburg raids he “reported for the first time to the Fuehrer that if these serial attacks continued a rapid end of the war might be the consequence”. And the official United States Strategic Bombing Survey concluded in September 1945 that air power had been “decisive in the war in Western Europe … It brought the [German] economy … to virtual collapse”. As a direct result of allied bombing, during 1944 the Nazis’ production schedules for tanks, aircraft and trucks were reduced by 35 per cent, 31 per cent and 42 per cent respectively. Additionally, an enormous amount of resources which might have been used to equip front-line troops had to be diverted to air defence. By 1944 the anti-aircraft system was absorbing 20 per cent of all ammunition produced and between half to two-thirds of all radar and signals equipment. More than one million German troops were engaged in the air defence of the Reich, using about 74 per cent of all heavy weapons and 55 per cent of all automatic weapons. Physical destruction and the massive diversion of resources was accompanied by psychological demoralisation. Contrary to conventional wisdom that the bombing boosted morale, the sustained campaign had a crushing effect on people’s mental state. Post-war surveys found that workers became tired, highly-strung and listless. Absenteeism because of bombing reached 25 per cent in some factories in the Ruhr for the whole of 1944, a rate which drastically reduced output and undermined production schedules. When asked to identify the single most difficult thing they had to cope with during the war, 91 per cent of German civilians nominated bombing. The men of the RAAF who flew with Bomber Command made the major contribution of any Australians to the defeat of Germany and, therefore, to victory in World War II. They alone opened a second front in Germany, four years before D-Day; and they alone inflicted decisive damage on the German war economy. As Albert Speer later lamented, Bomber Command’s victory represented “the greatest lost battle on the German side”. This article first appeared in the June edition of Australian Aviation  and draws on Alan Stephens, The Royal Australian Air Force: A Centenary History (Oxford University Press: Melbourne, 2001); and Richard Overy, “World War II: The Bombing of Germany”, in Alan Stephens (ed.), The War in the Air 1914-1994 (Air University Press: Maxwell AFB, 2001) Dr Alan Stephens is a Fellow of the Sir Richard Williams Foundation. He has been a senior lecturer at UNSW Canberra; a visiting fellow at ANU; a visiting fellow at UNSW Canberra; the RAAF historian; an advisor in federal parliament on foreign affairs and defence; and a pilot in the RAAF, where his experience included the command of an operational squadron and a tour in Vietnam. He has lectured internationally, and his publications have been translated into some twenty languages. He is a graduate of the University of New South Wales, the Australian National University, and the University of New England. Stephens was awarded an OAM in 2008 for his contribution to Australian military history. #RAAF #history #organisationalculture #AirPower #AirForce #lessonslearned