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Air / Sea / Land: Integrated Force 2030 11 April 2017 Program and Synopsis Download Pdf Handbook Download Pdf Final Report Dr Robbin Laird Final Report: Designing the Integrated Force: The Australian Defense Force Repositions for the Next Phase of 21st Century Force Structure Development Presentations VADM Ray Griggs AO, CSC, RAN, Vice Chief of Defence Force The Integrated Force Imperative: Vice Chief of Defence Force (the Joint Force Authority) Perspective Presentation unavailable BRIG Jason Blain DSC, CSC, Vice Chief of Defence Force Group Achieving an Integrated Force by Design - Challenges and Opportunities Download Pdf AIRCDRE Robert Chipman CSC, Royal Australian Air Force Integrated Force Design - the Air Perspective Presentation unavailable BRIG David Wainwright DSC, Australian Army Integrated Force Design - the Land Perspective Download Pdf CDRE Philip Spedding DSC, AM, RANR, Royal Australian Navy Integrated Force Design - the Sea Perspective Download Pdf Mr Steve Froelich, Lockheed Martin Industry’s view on Integrated Design Presentation unavailable LTGEN USAF (Ret) Jeff Remington, Northrop Grumman Industry’s view on Integrated Design Presentation unavailable AIRCDRE Leon Phillips, Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group Challenges and Opportunities in Acquisition and Sustainment of the Integrated Force Download Pdf AVM Andrew Dowse AM, Chief Information Officer Group Challenges for CIOG in connecting the Integrated Environment Download Pdf RADM Tony Dalton AM, CSM RAN, Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group Joint Capability Acquisition Download Pdf Mr Andy Watson, MBDA Australia The Defence/Industry relationship and the Integrated Force Presentation unavailable AVM John Blackburn AO (Retd), Sir Richard Williams Foundation Launch of the Williams IAMD Study - Implications for the Integrated Force Download Pdf

A New Approach, and Attitude, to Electronic Warfare In Australia 23 August 2017 Program and Synopsis Download Pdf Handbook Download Pdf Final Report Dr Robbin Laird, Second Line of Defense The Future of Electonic Warfare Final Report: A New Approach and Attitude to Electronic Warfare in Australia Download Pdf 08/26/2017 Robbin Laird The Williams Foundation Seminar on Electronic Warfare Presentations BRIG Stephen Beaumont AM, Information Warfare Division, Joint Capabilities Group Growler and Force Level Electronic Warfare Presentation unavailable GPCAPT Glen Braz CSC, DSM, 82 Wing, Royal Australian Air Force An Operators View of Growler Download Pdf Mr Lawrence Burt, Boeing TACAIR Programs Enabling Capability for EA Presentation unavailable AIRCDRE Robert Chipman CSC, Capability Planning – Air Force Royal Australian Air Force EW, C4I and Enablers Download Pdf LtGen Jon Davies (Ret) United States Marine Corp Distributed Electronic Warfare Download Pdf CAPT Steve Dryden RAN, Navy Information Warfare Royal Australian Navy Implications for the Royal Australian Navy Presentation unavailable Dr Brad Ferguson, Raytheon Industry as an Input to Electronic Warfare Capability Presentation unavailable GPCAPT Andrew Gilbert, Air Power Development Centre A Historical Perspective of RAAF Airborne Electronic Attack Presentation notes Download Pdf Mr Jeffrey D. “JD” McCreary Georgia Tech Research Institute The Future of Electronic Warfare Download Pdf CDR Mike Paul, Electronic Attack Wing, U.S. Pacific Fleet The USN Approach to Achieving EMS Superiority Download Pdf MAJGEN Kathryn Toohey AM, CSC, Land Capability Australian Army Implications for the Australian Army Presentation unavailable

The Requirements of High Intensity Warfare 22 March 2018 Synopsis and Program Download Pdf Handbook Download Pdf Final Report Dr Robbin Laird, Second Line of Defense, Final Report: The Strategic Shift from Counter-Insurgency and Stability Operations: High Tempo Ops, High Intensity Operations and Deterrence A report overview can be viewed at Defense.info Presentations Dr Ross Babbage AM, Strategic Forum The Strategic Face of Conflict in the 21st Century Presentation unavailable- for inquiries please email admin@williamsfoundation.org.au VADM Tim Barrett AO, CSC, RAN, Chief of Navy Implications of High Intensity Warfare for the Royal Australian Navy Presentation unavailable MAJGEN Sampo Eskelinen, Commander, Finnish Air Force The Requirements of High Intensity Warfare – Planning and Mobilisation: Finnish Air Force Perspective Unavailable - for inquiries please email admin@williamsfoundation.org.au ACM Sir Stephen Hillier KCB, CBE, DFC, ADC, Chief of the Air Staff, Royal Air Force High Intensity Warfare in Europe – Royal Air Force Perspective Presentation unavailable Peter Jennings PSM, Executive Director, Australian Strategic Policy Institute Shaping a way ahead – the importance of Deterrence Rear Adm. Mike Manazir (Rtd), Boeing Company The Fifth Generation Fight; An Insider’s View JD McCreary, Chief of Disruptive Programs Georgia Tech Combat Decision-Making in High Intensity Conflict Presentation unavailable Dr Carl Rhodes, RAND Australia Ensuring air operations in the presence of advanced threats Download Pdf Dr Alan Stephens OAM, Williams Foundation Fellow “The Task Ahead” Download Pdf MAJGEN Marcus Thompson AM, Deputy Chief Information Warfare, Joint Capabilities Group Information Warfare: Old & New – Emergent capability in High Intensity Warfare Presentation unavailable - for inquiries please email admin@williamsfoundation.org.au Lt. Gen. Kenneth S. Wilsbach, Commander, Eleventh Air Force, United States Pacific Air Forces The Requirements of High Intensity Warfare United States Air Force Perspective Presentation unavailable

The Imperative for an Independent Deterrent: A Joint Strike Seminar 23 August 2018 Synopsis and Program Download Pdf Handbook Download Pdf Final Report Laird, Robbin The ADF and the Way Ahead for an Australian Deterrent Strategy September 2018 Also available on the Second Line of Defense and the defense.info (ebook version) websites. The Central Blue In the lead up to the conference the Williams Foundation Blog The Central Blue focussed on the seminar theme. The Twitter/FB/LinkedIn hashtag is #jointstrike. To see the discussion, please visit, and possibly contribute, to the The Central Blue. Presentations WGCDR Jo Brick, Royal Australian Air Force and The Central Blue Strike, Deterrence and the RAAF - Speaking Notes Download Pdf Also available on The Central Blue Blog Michael Shoebridge, Australian Strategic Policy Institute The Strategic Implications of Regional Proliferation of Strike Capabilities No presentation available Dr Stephan Frühling, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University Australian Strike Capability and Nuclear Deterrence No presentation available GPCAPT Jason Begley, Headquarters Joint Operations Command The Future of Full Spectrum Strike No presentation available Dr Thomas Bussing, Raytheon Missile Systems Future Strike Systems No presentation available James Heading, Lockheed Martin Long Range Strike Presentation - available on request email info@williamsfoundation.org.au AM Stuart Atha CB, DSO, ADC, Royal Air Force Air Command Modern Deterrence: The RAF’s Contribution No presentation available AIRMSHL Gavin ‘Leo’ Davies AO, CSC, Chief of Air Force Implications for the RAAF No presentation available Michael Tarlton, Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems Reconceptualising Independent Strike in the Digital Age: A Future Force Perspective No presentation available CDRE Timothy Brown RAN, Submarines, Royal Australian Navy In and From the Maritime Domain: The Royal Australian Navy’s Approach to Future Joint Strike No presentation available MAJGEN Adam Findlay AM, Special Operations Command Beyond the FLOT: The Australian Army’s Approach to Future Joint Strike No presentation available

LTG Michael Oates (Retd) Coalition Warfighting and Pacific AOR Interoperability Errol McCormack Members Lunch, 7 August 2019 Download pdf

Dr Robbin Laird Final Report: The Requirements of Fifth Generation Manoeuvre October 2019 In this report, the major presentations and discussions at the Williams Foundation seminar on the requirements for fifth generation manoeuvre held on October 24, 2019 in Canberra, Australia are highlighted along with interviews conducted before, during and after the seminar as well. What is fifth generation manoeuvre? The definition by Air Commodore Gordon of the Air Warfare Centre: “The ability of our forces to dynamically adapt and respond in a contested environment to achieve the desired effect through multiple redundant paths. Remove one vector of attack and we rapidly manoeuvre to bring other capabilities to bear through agile control.” The Australians are working through how to generate more effective combat and diplomatic capabilities for crafting, building, shaping and operating an integrated force. And the need for an integrated force built along the lines discussed at the Williams Foundation over the past six years, was highlighted by Vice Admiral David Johnston, Deputy Chief of the ADF at the recent Chief of the Australian Navy’s Seapower Conference in held in Sydney at the beginning of October: “It is only by being able to operate an integrated (distributed) force that we can have the kind of mass and scale able to operate with decisive effect in a crisis.” The need for such capabilities was highlighted by the significant presentation by Brendan Sargeant at the seminar where he addressed the major strategic shift facing Australia and why the kind of force transformation which the Williams Foundation seminars have highlighted are so crucial for Australia facing its future. In the future there will be times when we need to act alone, or where we will need to exercise leadership. We have not often had to do this in the past – The INTERFET operation in Timor, and RAMSI in the Solomon Islands are examples. We are far more comfortable operating as part of a coalition led by others. It is perhaps an uncomfortable truth, but that has been a consistent feature of our strategic culture. So I think our biggest challenge is not a technical or resource or even capability challenge – it is the enormous psychological step of recognising that in the world that we are entering we cannot assume that we have the support of others or that there will be others willing to lead when there is a crisis. We will need to exercise the leadership, and I think that is what we need to prepare for now. To return to the title of this talk: if we want assured access for the ADF in the Asia Pacific, then we need to work towards a world that ensures that that access is useful and relevant to the sorts of crises that are likely to emerge. I will leave one last proposition with you. Our assured access for the ADF in the Asia Pacific will be determined by our capacity to contribute to regional crisis management. That contribution will on some occasions require that we lead. The task now is to understand what this means and build that capacity. In short, it is not just about the kinetic capabilities, but the ability to generate political, economic and diplomatic capabilities which could weave capabilities to do environment shaping within which the ADF could make its maximum contribution. Download pdf

The bushfires, floods, and now COVID-19 will change the discussion of national security in Australia. The exact form of that change is still unclear; however, the subject matter experts in the Australian Defence Force must engage in and inform the debate early, consistently, and logically. This post is an example of how. Written before the effects of COVID-19 hit Australian shores, Nathan Thompson responds to calls – made in the aftermath of the bushfires – to divest the ADF of the C-27J Spartan. Recently, Michael Shoebridge from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute called for the Australian Defence Force (ADF) to restructure and divest assets that are not focused on the greatest threat level of conflict with China. Of particular note is Shoebridge’s call to divest the C-27J Spartan; to remove it from the ADF asset mix and place it with another government agency for domestic and regional disaster response. This move would produce an unbalanced force and reduce strategic options for Government, as well as a potential reduction in support from the Australian people. Geopolitical relations are increasingly being viewed as a spectrum; from cooperation to competition and at the far right, conflict.[1] This spectrum presents several challenges to international relations in an age typified by events such as the Crimean conflict,  South China Sea tensions, and ongoing economic development in Africa. Somewhere in the middle of this spectrum is a wide range of possible outcomes associated with competition that is often underestimated. A Royal Australian Air Force C-27J Spartan aircraft lands at Honiara Airport, Solomon Islands, on completion of a maritime surveillance mission during Operation Solania. Shoebridge is right to argue that the C-27J is unlikely to survive in a ‘dense threat environment of a conflict with a peer-level state military’. The C-27J, like other air mobility platforms, was not designed with the attributes that make air combat platforms survivable in high threat environments. The C-27J is, however, designed with a modern electronic warfare self-protection suite that aims to ensure its survivability in conflicts at lower threat levels than those present in a peer state military. This is important because conflict will not just be with a peer-level competitor. Throughout the Cold War – arguably, an extended competition similar to what is presently being observed with China – proxy conflicts were fought between countries with lower levels of capability, thereby presenting scenarios with lower threat levels than is present in direct conflict with China.[2] In this phase of the competition, China is increasingly seeking influence over other countries. A successful method for China to achieve this influence would be contributing militarily to a low-level conflict security mission within another state’s borders. The Australian Government’s decision to retain an ability to contribute to low-level conflict resolution is critical in this age of competition. Military air mobility platforms such as the C-27J permit survivable access to low threat level conflict, as well as survivable logistic support during the conflict, such as that provided in Afghanistan and Iraq over the past 18 years. Divesting assets not focused on the highest threshold of conflict also reduces the ability for the ADF to interact with the Australian people. By design, highly specialised military platforms have restrictive security requirements on both their display and general capability specifications. A military order of battle which features only high-end, specialised and secure capabilities will necessarily be concealed to the public. Reduced interaction with the Australian people will potentially lead to calls for re-allocation of scarce resources, and limit recruiting pools, with longer-term capability impacts. The Australian Defence Force must retain a balanced force. Assets that are part of a ‘balanced force’ are vital to the cooperation end of the spectrum for domestic and regional disaster relief. ‘Balanced force’ assets enable better interaction with the Australian population and achieve reputational benefits for the ADF. Operation Bushfire Assist earlier in 2020 demonstrated this – the C-27J evacuated citizens from Mallacoota ahead of the fire front, among other civilian authority assistance and presence. Focusing only on the highest threshold of conflict removes response options for the Government in the cooperation, competition, and conflict phases of geopolitical relations. ‘Balanced force’ assets give the Australian Government greater strategic options and have positive longer-term capability impacts. Calls to focus only on the highest threat will lead to an unbalanced force, one who struggles to maintain a positive narrative with the Australian people. Squadron Leader Nathan Thompson is a serving Royal Australian Air Force officer. He is currently a C-27J pilot and flight commander at 35 Squadron. The opinions expressed are his alone and do not reflect those of the Royal Australian Air Force, the Australian Defence Force, or the Australian Government [1] See, for example, Accelerated Warfare and The Forge [2] Hugh White, 2019, How to Defend Australia (La Trobe University Press 2019), p. 11, 14, 38. #C27JSpartan #AustralianDefencePolicy #RoyalAustralianAirForce #AirPower #AustralianDefenceForce

Edward Luttwak is a political scientist known for his works on grand strategy, military history, and international relations. Moving to the United States (US) in 1972, Luttwak received a Doctorate in International Studies in 1975 and has served as a consultant to the US National Security Council; the US Department of State; and the US Army, Navy, and Air Force. While working for the Office of the Secretary of Defense/Net Assessment, Luttwak co-developed the manoeuvre-warfare concept. He also introduced the ‘operational level of war’ concept into Army doctrine while working at the US Army Training and Doctrine Command. Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace is a prescribed textbook in US war colleges and has been translated into several languages. In this review of Strategy, David Hood draws attention to Luttwak’s theory of strategy and its paradoxical, ironic, and contradictory logic. Luttwak’s objective is to explain a universal logic of strategy ‘that conditions all forms of war as well as the adversarial dealings of nations even in peace.’ This can be done, he argues, not by examining the often ‘absurd or self-destructive’ acts of statecraft themselves in which ‘no logic can be detected’, but by examining the often unintended outcomes of those actions or inactions. Luttwak suggests that by analysing the consequences of statecraft, the paradoxical, ironic and contradictory logic of strategy becomes manifest. The most important foundation for Luttwak’s theory is that strategy has two dimensions in which its logic unfolds. In the vertical dimension, five different levels—technical, tactical, operational, theatre, and grand strategic—interact but also conflict, because no natural harmony exists between them. In the horizontal dimension, the contest of wills between belligerents plays out through a dynamic interrelationship between action, reaction, culmination, overextension, and reversal. This Clausewitzian struggle is what gives strategy its perverse, paradoxical logic, and it occurs across all five vertical levels. Luttwak provides several illustrations of the paradoxical logic of strategy, including the often-used adaptation of Vegetius (si vis pacem, para bellum; if you want peace, prepare for war). The greatest contemporary example of strategy’s paradoxical logic is nuclear deterrence, where defenders must be ready to attack at all times; where being ready to attack in retaliation is evidence of peaceful intent; where preparing anti-nuclear defences is provocative; and where to derive any strategic benefit, the use of weapons must never occur. Nuclear weapons are therefore necessary, acquired, and maintained at heavy cost, but are strategically unusable. Luttwak organises Strategy around his two dimensions—Part One focusses on the horizontal dimension, while Parts Two and Three address the vertical dimension. The logic of strategy in the horizontal dimension is explored first from the perspective of a single belligerent. Chapter two then evaluates the logic ‘in action’. With little fanfare, Luttwak eloquently frames the paradoxical logic of strategy within the dynamic contest of wills that is statecraft in both war and peace. His description underpins the remaining arguments of the book: there are of course at least two conscious, opposed wills in any strategic encounter of war or peace… the paradoxical logic of strategy [is] an objective phenomenon, which determines outcomes whether or not the participants try to exploit it or are even conscious of its workings… we can recognize the logic in its totality as the coming together, even the reversal, of opposites. And this is a process manifest… in all that is strategical, in all that is characterized by the struggle of adversary wills… when the paradoxical logic of strategy assumes a dynamic form, it becomes the coming together, even the reversal, of opposites. In the entire realm of strategy, therefore, a course of action cannot persist indefinitely. It will instead tend to evolve into its opposite… Without such change, the logic will induce a self-negating evolution, which may reach the extreme of a full reversal, undoing war and peace, victory and defeat. The remaining two chapters in Part One analyse the paradoxical logic of strategy at the technical and grand strategic levels. At the technical level, Luttwak observes that advancements in technology promise much, but in reality provide an advantage only for a short period, as their success and/or vulnerabilities are always countered. Counter-countermeasures then emerge as the contest of wills continues dynamically. The result is that, paradoxically, technological advances do not normally make significant impacts—less remarkable equipment retains its (modest) utility for longer. Luttwak does not draw the analogy, but at the technical level his paradoxical logic plays out as one form of the Red Queen Effect. To avoid being outclassed, competitors must continuously evolve in response to enemy strengths, whilst defending their own weaknesses. Such adaptation is essential, but consumes resources and produces no long-term net benefit: ‘it takes all the running you can do, to keep in the same place.’ Luttwak also makes an observation that should serve as a warning to Western militaries that have in recent times pursued smaller quantities of high quality, often specialised equipment to combat the numerical superiority of traditional and potential future adversaries. Because such equipment costs more, a drive for economy in production, maintenance, and training often results. This should, however, be avoided, because the resultant homogeneity in systems means that military capability will suffer from common and hence easily exploitable vulnerabilities. Furthermore, weapon systems that are highly specialised cannot accommodate broad countermeasures. Joseph Stalin was right—quantity has a quality of its own. At the grand strategic level, Luttwak argues that another paradox becomes evident—political leaders, particularly in democratic states, have great difficulty in acting paradoxically in the manner required by strategy. This is the result of several factors, including the sheer complexity in undertaking strategy at the grand strategic level, that politicians are unskilled in strategy, and the need for politicians to often act astrategically to preserve their power and authority. Luttwak cautions that the pursuit of logical national interests can produce undesired strategic consequences: the consequences of the pervasive contradiction between commonsense [national] aims and [paradoxical] strategic logic… has made history into a record of the follies of mankind… Attempts to project linear logic into the realm of conflict, in search of commonsense cooperative solutions, are fairly frequent. If we want peace, why not simply have it? If we agree that weapons are costly and dangerous, why not simply disarm?… of course it is not intellectual error that induces these attempts… but rather the acute temptation to escape from the cruel paradoxical logic. For Luttwak, the inability of politicians to act paradoxically—and hence strategically—explains why wars are so often won by the belligerent who can apply superior resources. Because the quantity and quality of weapons is not a matter of strategy—a linear, economic logic applies to their use—when politicians fail to understand, or choose not to apply strategy, the belligerent that is able to apply superior resources will likely be the victor. It follows that when neither side acts strategically, the results of statecraft can often be determined in advance by simply identifying who is able to apply the greatest resources. This is a worrying claim for democratic middle-powers like Australia in the current strategic climate. Irrespective of, or in some cases despite, grand strategic behaviour, Luttwak suggests that war must eventually turn into its opposite, because it consumes and destroys the material and moral resources needed to keep fighting. Paradoxically, if measures are applied to end war ‘prematurely’, such as the prevention of military imbalances, humanitarian interventions, and even forced armistices, peace will be driven further from view. In times of peace, the same paradoxical logic conspires to encourage war, for example when a lack of defensive capability invites conquest; or because cultural, economic, social or other changes alter the conditions of strength that previously assured peace. In war, the capacity to wage further war is ultimately limited by war’s own destruction… In peacetime, by contrast, [almost] every form of human progress… tends to increase war-making capacities, and not in a symmetrical way, thus disturbing the military balances that once kept the peace. If peace did not induce war, there would be no war – for war cannot perpetuate itself. Part Two of Strategy deals with the lower four levels of the vertical dimension. Success at each level relies on different factors. At the technical level, weapon systems interact which makes estimating the outcome of any discrete contest relatively easy. These results are, however, the least important strategically because success at one level does not assure success at the next. At the tactical level, skill, leadership, unit cohesion and fortune become important. At the operational level, particular styles of warfare play out. Attrition fails gracefully but can only succeed cumulatively, whereas manoeuvre fails catastrophically but can succeed with little resources being expended. The more manoeuvrist the operational style is, the more important is the operational level. At the theatre level, the mobility of forces takes primacy in shaping strategy. Because ground forces are relatively slow, theatre strategy is more relevant for the land domain than it is for air and maritime domains. Part Three of Strategy is dedicated to the grand strategic level of strategy. This is the only level where ultimate ends and means are both present. Luttwak suggests that grand strategy can be viewed as ‘a confluence of the military interactions that flow up and down level by level, forming strategy’s “vertical” dimension, with the varied external relations among states forming strategy’s “horizontal” dimension.’ Strategy provides a powerful theory through which to comprehend the nature of strategy. It also provides a different way to view strategy, compared to the works of other strategists such as Colin Gray, Lawrence Freedman, and Joseph Wylie. The value of understanding such differences is in broadening our strategic perspective thereby allowing us to interpret circumstances using different lenses. Colin Gray argued that strategy, like war, has an enduring nature but a changing character. Luttwak’s theory suggests that strategy’s changing character is the result of its paradoxical logic. Perhaps the most fundamental paradox of all is also a sombre irony of the human condition. War and peace are intimately connected; one cannot exist without the other. The paradoxical logic of strategy applies to both. Wing Commander David Hood is an Aeronautical Engineer working for the Royal Australian Air Force. He holds a Master of Gas Turbine Technology (Cranfield, UK) and a Master of Military and Defence Studies (Australian National University). Wing Commander Hood is currently Commanding Officer of Air Training and Aviation Commons Systems Program Office (ATACSPO). #BookReview #PME #organisationalculture #PMET #Strategy #ManoeuvreWarfare #ProfessionalMilitaryEducation

Dr Robbin Laird Final Report: The Requirements of Fifth Generation Manoeuvre October 2019 In this report, the major presentations and discussions at the Williams Foundation seminar on the requirements for fifth generation manoeuvre held on October 24, 2019 in Canberra, Australia are highlighted along with interviews conducted before, during and after the seminar as well. What is fifth generation manoeuvre? The definition by Air Commodore Gordon of the Air Warfare Centre: “The ability of our forces to dynamically adapt and respond in a contested environment to achieve the desired effect through multiple redundant paths. Remove one vector of attack and we rapidly manoeuvre to bring other capabilities to bear through agile control.” The Australians are working through how to generate more effective combat and diplomatic capabilities for crafting, building, shaping and operating an integrated force. And the need for an integrated force built along the lines discussed at the Williams Foundation over the past six years, was highlighted by Vice Admiral David Johnston, Deputy Chief of the ADF at the recent Chief of the Australian Navy’s Seapower Conference in held in Sydney at the beginning of October: “It is only by being able to operate an integrated (distributed) force that we can have the kind of mass and scale able to operate with decisive effect in a crisis.” The need for such capabilities was highlighted by the significant presentation by Brendan Sargeant at the seminar where he addressed the major strategic shift facing Australia and why the kind of force transformation which the Williams Foundation seminars have highlighted are so crucial for Australia facing its future. In the future there will be times when we need to act alone, or where we will need to exercise leadership. We have not often had to do this in the past – The INTERFET operation in Timor, and RAMSI in the Solomon Islands are examples. We are far more comfortable operating as part of a coalition led by others. It is perhaps an uncomfortable truth, but that has been a consistent feature of our strategic culture. So I think our biggest challenge is not a technical or resource or even capability challenge – it is the enormous psychological step of recognising that in the world that we are entering we cannot assume that we have the support of others or that there will be others willing to lead when there is a crisis. We will need to exercise the leadership, and I think that is what we need to prepare for now. To return to the title of this talk: if we want assured access for the ADF in the Asia Pacific, then we need to work towards a world that ensures that that access is useful and relevant to the sorts of crises that are likely to emerge. I will leave one last proposition with you. Our assured access for the ADF in the Asia Pacific will be determined by our capacity to contribute to regional crisis management. That contribution will on some occasions require that we lead. The task now is to understand what this means and build that capacity. In short, it is not just about the kinetic capabilities, but the ability to generate political, economic and diplomatic capabilities which could weave capabilities to do environment shaping within which the ADF could make its maximum contribution. Download pdf

Brian Weston 'The Birth of an Australian Air Force – Part 2' Australian Defence Business Review – May/June 2019 p 82 The On Target column in the previous edition of ADBR ‒ written on behalf of the Sir Richard Williams Foundation ‒ provided a brief outline of the man who is regarded as the person responsible for not only establishing an Australian Air Force, but also establishing a sufficient and robust foundation on which the service could later expand into a credible Australian Air Force. This column will expand on the huge task Richard Williams faced when the Australian Air Force was established on 31 March, 1921 ‒ the prefix Royal being added in August 1921. The genesis for the establishment of independent air services lay in the rapid advances in military aviation during World War I, accompanied by much theorising about how military aviation might be used in future conflicts to provide alternative strategies to the stagnant and attritional industrial-scale trench warfare of World War I. But there was no consensus in this debate about the future strategies, roles and organisation of military aviation, with claim and counter-claim vigorously prosecuted; with navies and armies generally showing little enthusiasm, indeed often outright hostility, for the concept of independent air forces. Britain, with massive personnel losses in World War I, was at the forefront of the development of new concepts for air operations with a view to finding new ways of winning future conflicts, without suffering the huge human losses incurred in World War I. In a watershed decision, Britain decided to establish an independent air force by merging the Royal Flying Corps (RFC) and the Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS) on 1 April 1918, to form the Royal Air Force (RAF) ‒ seven months before World War I concluded. Australia, tied into the British Empire and with the experience of raising the Australian Flying Corps (AFC) in 1915 and of its subsequent employment with the RFC in the Middle East and the Western Front, soon gained experience with the employment of military aviation in war. AFC personnel also witnessed the establishment of the RAF as the world’s first independent air service, as well as understanding the reasons why the RAF was established. The debate about the future of Australian military aviation was decided by the Australian Government on 9 September, 1920 when, speaking in the House of Representatives, the Prime Minister, Mr Hughes said: “It may be confidently expected that aviation and those scientific methods of warfare which developed so rapidly during the war, and which, particularly during the latter period of the conflict, were resorted to so freely, may develop still further. No doubt that development will completely revolutionise warfare and let us hope that it will make war impossible… The air, that new element which man has now conquered, is but the sea in another form and it is on the sea and in the air that we shall have to look for our defence…” We believe too that in the air we may hope to create a force which will be of incomparable service in defending us from an enemy. The Government therefore are placing on the estimates a sufficient sum for the building up of an efficient air force. It is proposed to afford such inducements as are hoped will encourage manufacturers to make engines and aeroplanes in this country and the Government will not hesitate to give a very substantial bonus for that purpose.” To give effect to the government decision, the Air Board was constituted on 9 November, 1920 to provide for the governance of the new air force. It comprised four members: First Air Member ‒ Director of Operations and Intelligence Second Air Member ‒ Director of Personnel and Training Third Air Member ‒ Director of Equipment Fourth Air Member ‒ Finance Member Wing Commander Richard Williams was appointed as First Air Member although his position was not as a chief, but as a ‘first among equals’. The task for Williams, and the Air Board he chaired, was immense. There was no legislative governance framework unlike the Navy and Army, to which the Naval Defence Act and Defence Act applied. Then there was the matter of the gifting, by Britain, to the new fledging air force, of 128 aircraft ‒ indeed, the new air force had more aircraft than personnel ‒ including spare parts, engines, motor transport, tenders, motorcycles, tools, ammunition, bombs, cameras, wireless equipment, etc. For which, there was no process to receive, receipt and account for the gift equipment, nor to store and maintain the equipment. A not insubstantial task for the new Air Board led by Wing Commander Richard Williams, then of 30 years of age. The fact that he did succeed is why he is held in such high regard today. Brian Weston is a Board Member of the Williams Foundation and On Target is published as a regular column in the Australian Defence Business Review. Download pdf here

The Australian Government is actively seeking to increase Whole of Government efforts in the South Pacific in a meaningful and consistent way.  In this post, SGT G outlines how the Royal Australian Air Force could contribute to the Australian Defence Force Pacific Mobile Training Team (MTT) through the incorporation of an ‘Air Advisor’ flight. Competition for influence in the South Pacific has increased markedly over the past decade. Debt-trap diplomacy, coercion, and inducements are rapidly challenging the status quo. Australia can no longer assume it will be a default security partner, nor can it simply outspend alternate partners. Australia must articulate a clear value proposition to South Pacific nations as to why Australia should remain the region’s security guarantor of choice. A values-based relationship, founded on mutual respect with demonstrable benefits that build capacity vice dependency is our best point of difference over other regional influencers. The 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper called for increased engagement in the Pacific in support of a more resilient region. Foreign Minister Marise Payne, when addressing the State of the Pacific Conference in September 2018 said: “Stepping up in the Pacific is not an option for Australia, it is an imperative”. Prime Minister Scott Morrison reinforced this sentiment in a November media release stating: “Australia will step up in the Pacific and take our engagement with the region to a new level”. Among the initiatives in this whole of government effort was the establishment of an Australian Defence Force (ADF) Pacific Mobile Training Team (MTT). This paper will outline a recommended Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) contribution to this initiative. One option is for the RAAF to form of an ‘Air Advisor’ flight, staffed with experienced Non-Commissioned Officers (NCO) and Officers from all specialisations. This flight would work in concert with the newly established Office of the Pacific within Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) to identify engagement opportunities through the region and to dispatch/deploy an appropriate ‘Tiger Team’ of advisors tasked to provide training assistance to local organisations. Support to local authorities could range from technical or doctrinal development support through to the deployment of a persistent MTT, complemented where necessary by members are drawn from the wider RAAF. Assistance can range from finance and personnel governance through to delivery of fires, and humanitarian and disaster relief (HADR) responses. The aim of this assistance would be not to impose a RAAF solution, but to analyse the local problem set and constraints, and to devise a culturally appropriate and sustainable product. When not actively employed in an advise and assist task, advisors could develop regional language proficiency, review and improve RAAF tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) and pass on their experience to their parent communities in the wider RAAF. There are several second-order benefits from this proposal. Involvement in a regional MTT could lead to hundreds of personal relationships with a network of professionals across the region, which act as accelerants in time of crisis. With careful maintenance, these relationships would deepen over time and increase in value as individuals progress in their organisations. The formation and deployment of regional MTTs would also improve the ADF’s geographic situational awareness through constant first-hand engagement in the region. For example, the speed and efficiency of HADR responses will be improved if the location of the event had been recently surveyed by an Airfield Engineer or Combat Controller members of an MTT. Several areas within the RAAF already conduct regional assistance work within the region, most notably medical. The concentration of this role into an Air Advisor construct would allow this effort to be more focussed, tailoring the delivery of assistance and centralising the information and relationships developed to ensure they adequately collated, disseminated, and managed. An opportunity to serve as an Air Advisor should appeal to RAAF members who wish to contribute their tactical experience to achieve an operational effect while working with a high degree of autonomy. Years of experience of operating with a variety of coalition members and partner forces in several theatres has exposed RAAF personnel to a plethora of methodologies, TTPs and workarounds. Just as valuable is the experience in building relationships that recognise cultural nuance and differing levels of resourcing: This is precisely the type of effect that government needs from the ADF to support the whole of government effort to build strong values-based relationships across the region. The establishment of an Air Advisor capability within the Tactical Air Wing allows us to retain, leverage and improve upon these vital skills as we adjust to the emerging regional security challenges. SGT G. is a current serving Combat Controller in the Royal Australian Air Force. The opinions expressed are his alone and do not reflect those of the Royal Australian Air Force, the Australian Defence Force, or the Australian Government. #MobileTrainingTeam #DepartmentofForeignAffairsandTrade #RoyalAustralianAirForce #AustralianDefence #foreignpolicy

The Imperative for an Independent Deterrent: A Joint Strike Seminar 23 August 2018 Final Report Laird, Robbin The ADF and the Way Ahead for an Australian Deterrent Strategy September 2018 Since 2014, the Williams Foundation has held a series of seminars, which have looked at the nature of military transformation enabled by new platforms, new technologies and new approaches. Now, the Foundation is focusing on the new strategic context within which this force will operate and the kinds of further changes necessary for Australia and allied forces in facing the challenges posed by peer competitors. On March 22, 2018, the Williams Foundation hosted a seminar which began the process of examining these key questions. This report is based on that seminar. This enhanced version of the report includes the interviews conducted prior to, during and after the seminar. We have published on defense.info, a version with just the seminar report itself. Also available on the Second Line of Defense and the defense.info (ebook version) websites.