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Brian Weston 'On Target 'Fourth to Fifth Generation: Enter the F-35A Lightning II' in Australian Aviation' August 2017 p.25 Following the earlier RAAF fighter transitions from CAC Sabre to Dassault Mirage IIIO, then to the McDonnell Douglas F/A-18A, the RAAF, as evidenced by the deployment of its first two F-35A fighters across the Pacific for the 2017 Avalon Airshow, has already commenced its transition from a fourth generation to a fifth generation fighter capability. Like the two previous fighter transitions, each with their unique characteristics and challenges, the introduction of the F-35A will pose some new problems especially given the large step-up in capability. Like previous transitions, this change will also require the RAAF to maintain a credible level of combat capability throughout the change, and possibly require it to sustain concurrent operational deployments. But aside from this, most of the issues arising from the transition can be categorized as related to either the management of the increased resources and personnel needed for the transition, or to the introduction of significantly increased levels of technology and capability. Previous transitions certainly have stressed both resources and personnel during the phase out of the preceding fighter, the phase in of the new fighter, and during the period of overlapping operations and sustainment of the two types. However, unlike earlier fighter transitions, the RAAF now can exploit the availability of overseas F-35A training, rather than conduct all of the transitional activities in Australia. No 3 Squadron (3SQN) will be the first RAAF unit to convert to the F-35A with some personnel already in the US for training. This progressively expanding group will further consolidate their F-35A training by remaining in the US for some time, with some pilots gaining further experience as instructional pilots (IPs in USAF jargon) in the USAF F-35A training unit. Soon after, personnel earmarked for future Australian-based F-35A fighter instructional duties will join 3SQN personnel in the US. As this cohort of Australian F-35A instructional staff builds in the US, No 2 Operational Conversion Unit (2OCU), the RAAF’s dedicated fighter training unit, will cease F/A-18A operational training. Once 3SQN has built to a critical mass it will return to Australia where it will mature into Australia’s first operational F-35A unit. Shortly after, the cadre of instructional staff that had also been building in the US, will return to Australia to reconstitute 2OCU as the dedicated Australian F-35A training unit. From this US-trained cadre, 2OCU will build its F-35A training capacity and expertise, at a measured rate, until the unit takes on the responsibility for converting pilots from the remaining two F/A-18A squadrons onto the F-35A; as well as commencing the training of pilots direct from the RAAF Lead-in Fighter Program. With the phase out of the F/A-18A, and with No 6 Squadron (6SQN) becoming an EA-18G unit, there also will be consequences for the training of RAAF EA-18G aircrew and RAAF F/A-18F aircrew at No 1 Squadron (1SQN). As the option of establishing a training organization for F/A-18F and EA-18G aircrew would come at the cost of eroding the operational capabilities of the squadrons, a decision to train future Australian F/A-18F and EA-18G aircrew in the US has been made ‒ with ‘C’ Flight of 1SQN being tasked only with the conduct of RAAF F/A-18F refresher and standardization activities. Apart from managing the personnel and resource aspects of the transition, the RAAF must also manage the technological advances which are core to the operational effectiveness of the F-35A. Stealth, sensors, sensor fusion and connectivity, all involve technological leaps which will be periodically advanced through software and hardware upgrades. These evolving technologies will generate substantial changes in roles, operational doctrine, tactics, and procedures which will impinge on not just other air force capabilities, but also on army and navy capabilities. The evolutionary expansion of the unparalleled connectivity of the F-35A to other ADF capabilities will presage an expansion of F-35A roles well beyond the roles traditionally espoused for combat systems with an ‘F’ designation. So the air force seems well-placed in its transition to a new air combat capability, which is not surprising given Australia’s long and deep involvement with the JSF program as a Level 2 Partner Nation, as was evident by the presence of the two Australian F-35A aircraft, and their RAAF pilots, at Avalon. The transition from F/A-18A Hornet to the F-35A Lightning II is well underway, with the RAAF on the verge of a new operational era, with its combat force of three F-35A squadrons, an F-35A operational conversion unit, one squadron of F/A-18F Super Hornets and one squadron of EA-18G Growlers. It would seem to be a good time to be a junior air force Australian Defence Force Academy cadet, with the prospect of earning wings on the spirited Pilatus PC-21, followed by lead-in fighter training on the capable Hawk, and then converting directly to the F-35A. Air-Vice Marshal Brian Weston (Retd) flew Sabre, Mirage and Hornet fighters during his air force career. Brian is a Board Member of the Williams Foundation and this On Target article appears in Australian Aviation magazine. Download pdf

Dr Alan Stephens 'Meteor versus MiG: Challenging the Myth' in Australian Aviation' July 2017 A story board in the Korean War display at the Australian War Memorial asserts that, “after the first encounter between [RAAF] Meteors and [Chinese] MiGs … it was clear that the MiGs outclassed the Meteors in nearly every way”, a judgment that has become received wisdom. It is, however, inconsistent with the facts. For the first five months of the Korean War, the RAAF’s No 77 Squadron, flying P-51 Mustangs, made a vital contribution in the ground attack role. However, in November 1950, the appearance of Chinese Air Force MiG-15s indicated that the air war had entered a new and more dangerous phase. The MiG-15 was an advanced technology fighter, its swept-wing aerodynamics and 2470-kilogram thrust engine giving it an excellent rate-of-climb, service ceiling and maximum speed. The RAAF decided to replace its Mustangs with jets as soon as possible. Because the United States’ best fighter, the swept-wing F-86 Sabre, was unavailable, the twin-engine, straight-wing British Gloster Meteor Mk VIII was chosen. In the circumstances the Meteor was the best the RAAF could do. The question was whether that “best” would be good enough. The Meteor had been designed to intercept high-flying bombers under the guidance of ground radar. Air combat in Korea, however, involved the classic “dog-fight”, in which speed, manoeuvrability and acceleration were the critical qualities. Doubts about the Meteor’s ability to compete against faster swept-wing aircraft were eased when it performed reasonably well against a USAF F-86 during trials in Japan. In particular, the Meteor demonstrated a better rate-of-climb and a tighter turning radius at altitudes below 7600 metres. After six months training in Japan, in July 1951, No 77 Squadron deployed twenty-two Meteors to Kimpo airfield northwest of Seoul. The Americans had only two squadrons of Sabres in Korea, so the arrival of a third squadron of jet fighters was keenly anticipated. The RAAF was confident the Meteor would be effective as an air-to-air fighter: the challenge would be to employ tactics which maximised its advantages and minimised the MiG-15s. On 29 July, sixteen Meteors conducted the RAAF’s first jet fighter mission, a sweep up to the Yalu River (nicknamed “MiG Alley”). Given the findings of the trials in Japan, it was curious that the Australians patrolled between 9150 and 10,700 metres, flying top-cover for USAF F-86s at 6100 to 7600 metres. The reverse would have made more sense. The first combat occurred on 29 August, when eight Meteors and sixteen F-86s clashed with twelve MiGs at 10,700 metres. One Meteor was shot-down and another sustained major damage. A week later the second clash took place, with one Meteor being badly damaged while the enemy escaped unscathed. The inference was immediately drawn that the results “proved” the Meteor’s inferiority, and No. 77 Squadron was restricted to operations away from MiG Alley. A number of RAAF pilots considered the decision hasty believing that with a little more experience, tactics would have been developed to maximise the Meteor’s positive qualities, and that unrestricted air combat operations could have been successful. Then-pilot officer, later air vice-marshal, Bill Simmonds (who subsequently shot-down a MiG-15) believed the Meteor was much underrated, and that the Australians’ problems were related primarily to inadequate training and poor tactics. Simmonds’ opinion was shared by the RAF, who privately criticised the RAAF for making its decision after only two “short sharp ... inconclusive engagements”. A senior RAF pilot attached to No 77 Squadron argued that no Meteor pilot should ever be shot-down by a MiG-15 below 9150 metres unless he made a mistake, because the Meteor was more manoeuvrable. And the commander of the USAF in Korea considered the British aircraft’s “good rate-of-turn ... excellent climb and excellent armament” had not been used to full effect by the Australians. No 77 Squadron was taken off fighter sweeps and was tasked with protecting bombers and ground attack aircraft. The squadron generally flew at an altitude of 7000 to 7620 metres. If attacked, pilots immediately descended to their optimum fighting altitude of 5500 metres and jettisoned external stores. At that height and in a clean configuration, the inferior thrust of the Meteor’s engines was less pronounced and its superior turning qualities were enhanced. Nevertheless, there was a limit to the Meteor’s competitiveness, which was determined by the speed differential. The MiG-15 was capable of Mach 0.9 in level flight, compared to the Meteor’s Mach 0.82. That differential almost invariably allowed enemy pilots to decide when a dogfight would start and when it would end, a critical tactical advantage. RAAF and USAF pilots were almost invariably outnumbered. On 24 October, eight B-29 bombers attacking a railway bridge south of MiG Alley were escorted by sixteen Meteors and ten USAF F-84 Thunderjets. The formation was “relentlessly” assailed by sixty MiG-15s. Three days later, sixteen Meteors and thirty-two F-84s flying cover for eight B-29s were “overwhelmed” by ninety-five MiGs. Notwithstanding the intensity of those attacks, one of No 77 Squadron’s senior pilots reported that the protective screen established by the Meteors was never penetrated. On 1 December, fifty MiGs made a “vicious” attack on fourteen Meteors, shooting-down three. But in turn, No 77 Squadron shot-down two MiGs, a highly creditable performance given the numerical disparity. However, the following day, the squadron was told that it would no longer fly air combat sorties over North Korea; and, for the rest of the war, the Meteors were used in the ground-attack role. Yet in total, only four Meteors were ever shot-down by MiG-15s; by contrast, the Australians scored five confirmed MiG kills. There is no question that most air combat pilots would prefer the MiG-15 to the Meteor. But the belief that the MiG-15 “outclassed the Meteor in nearly every way” is inconsistent with the facts. Dr Alan Stephens is a Research fellow of the Williams Foundation and a visiting fellow at UNSW Canberra. On Target is published as a regular column in the Australian Defence Business Review. Download pdf

Brian Weston 'On Target 'The F-111C: A Technological Leap for the RAAF' in Australian Aviation' June 2017 Soon after WWII a new “Cold War” descended and Australia’s regional geostrategic environment rapidly deteriorated, especially after 1949 when Mao Zedong’s Chinese Communist Party established its rule over mainland China. The deterioration continued with the Korean War (1950 to 1953), the defeat of the French by the Viet Minh in Indo-China in 1954, and the rise of the communist insurgency in Malaya from 1948. Closer to Australia, the newly independent Indonesia lurched in an increasingly uncertain direction under President Sukarno who had assumed largely autocratic power and whose relationship with the Indonesian Communist Party was causing great concern in Australia. At a time when Australia’s population was less than 8 million (1949), and just nudging 10 million (1959), it was not surprising Australia sought to augment its combat power with a long-range strike capability, with the English Electric Canberra coming into RAAF service in 1953. It was also not surprising that, for some time, Australia seriously considered acquiring a nuclear strike option. The nuclear option did not eventuate but with the Canberra bomber lacking a radar and electronic warfare capability – possessing only a Doppler navigation set – the lack of a credible strike capability continued to weigh on government and air force. Thus with hindsight, it is easy to understand the train of argument leading to Prime Minister Menzies, on 24 October 1963, announcing the acquisition of two squadrons of the General Dynamics TFX as a replacement for the Canberra – aided no doubt by the imminent Federal election and some criticism of Australia’s lack of defence preparedness. Aviation occasionally experiences technological leaps, and the TFX, later the F-111, was one such leap. Its combination of a variable-geometry wing, an afterburning turbofan, a high fuel fraction and a comprehensive suite of radar, navigation and electronic warfare equipment, produced a new long-range, low-level, all-weather strike capability able to penetrate air defences of the day. Although conceived by US Secretary of Defence, Robert McNamara, as a strike/fighter to serve the US Air Force and US Navy, the F-111 was also a unique solution to Australia’s need for strategic reach. It was also to be the greatest step-change in capability the RAAF has ever undergone. A contract for 24 F-111A aircraft was soon signed with Australia planning to take delivery of its first aircraft in July 1968. But as the program evolved, a myriad of problems emerged including a range deficiency which caused the RAAF to add the longer wing and heavier undercarriage from the USN F-111B – giving rise to the Australian F-111C variant. The first contingent of RAAF personnel (two pilots, two navigators and an aircrew simulator specialist) arrived in the US in July 1967, to serve as line instructors at the USAF 4527 Combat Crew Training Squadron. A RAAF test pilot followed, and RAAF maintenance personnel were sent to various USAF bases and to General Dynamics. By early 1968, the first cohort of six operational crews had arrived in the US for conversion and for the ferry of the initial six F-111C to Australia, with the RAAF having already thoughtfully provided the Sabre pilots with a Canberra conversion and the Canberra pilots a Sabre conversion. But serious concerns about the maturity and airworthiness of the F-111 surfaced. As well, the longevity of its airframe was in doubt, especially regarding the wing carry-though box and the swing-wing pivot pins constructed of D6ac steel. These concerns led Australia to defer the hand-over ceremony to 4 September 1968, and then, prompted by two further F-111 accidents, place the acceptance of the F-111C on hold. It was then the sizeable investment made by the RAAF in developing a strong uniformed Technical Branch paid dividends, with the air force engineering expertise – augmented by the specialist aircraft metal fatigue knowledge resident in the Aeronautical Research Laboratories – played a key role in recovering the F-111C program. The subsequent inspect and repair as necessary program, as agreed by the Australian and US defence ministers (the Fraser-Laird Agreement) was not quick, taking until June 1973. But the delay proved an astute decision, as when the F-111C finally arrived it came with a redesigned wing carry-through box, a Cold Proof Load Testing regimen, and the inclusion of numerous Engineering Change Proposals. The RAAF had finally acquired the long-range strike capability it had long sought. The F-111C represented a technological watershed for the RAAF with huge implications for capability, doctrine, personnel, logistics and industry. It was a seminal event on the history of the RAAF and readers with an interest are referred to Going Solo – The Royal Australian Air Force; 1946-1971 by Alan Stephens, and From Controversy to Cutting Edge by Mark Lax, for two comprehensive accounts of the F-111C acquisition. Air-Vice Marshal Brian Weston (Retd) was CO No 75 Squadron in 1980, CO Base Squadron Richmond in 1986, OC Base Support Wing Richmond in 1987, and CDR Tactical Fighter Group from July 1990 to July 1993. Brian is a Board Member of the Williams Foundation and this On Target article appears in Australian Aviation magazine. AVM Brian Weston (ret’d) acknowledges the contributions of Dr Alan Stephens, Wing Commander Lance Halverson (ret’d), and others, in drafting this column Download pdf

Brian Weston 'On Target 'TA Fast Caravan Indeed: The Mirage goes to Butterworth' in Australian Aviation, May 2017 In October 1958 and February 1959, Nos 3 and 77 Squadrons ferried their Sabre fighters to Malaya to join No 2 Squadron’s Canberra bombers at RAAF Butterworth. For the short-range Sabres this was a demanding exercise as the pilots had to circumnavigate a hostile Indonesia. Once at Darwin the squadrons flew to Biak in Dutch New Guinea, and then to Labuan in British North Borneo, refueling enroute at Guiuan on the southeastern tip of Samar in the Philippines, before completing the final leg to Butterworth. These deployments were exciting affairs, with the alien topography and rapidly changing tropical weather generating moments of intense anxiety in many cockpits. When the Mirage IIIO replaced the Sabre in RAAF service (see Australian Aviation, March 2017), No 3 Squadron returned to Australia in 1967 and was replaced by No 75 Squadron, the first RAAF squadron to convert to the Mirage. Any long-range deployment of short-range jet fighters, with minimal navigation aids and few suitable diversion airfields through potentially dangerous and unpredictable tropical weather, is no milk run. Indeed, these early fighter deployments were so demanding that they rank as significant operations which contributed much to the development and maturing of the RAAF as a modern fighting service. With this year marking the 50th anniversary of No 75 Squadron’s deployment from Williamtown to Butterworth, it is appropriate to recall the circumstances of Operation “Fast Caravan” conducted over 15-18 May 1967. Given that the Mirage was officially described as an “all-weather fighter”, why was the deployment so challenging, especially as it had a range advantage of about 20% over the Sabre? The reality was, that even with its two 374-gallon external fuel tanks, all bar 130 gallons of the total of 1420 gallons on board was needed to travel some 1,200 nm. Holding fuel was just as non-existent in a Mirage as it was in a Sabre. Navaids and radios? A single TACAN and two UHF radios were not much help in a region where TACAN beacons and UHF radios were almost unknown. Furthermore, the first fifty Mirage IIIO(F) aircraft lacked the ground mapping radar and Doppler navigation set that were installed in the subsequent upgrade to the IIIO(A) standard. The routing was also complicated by Dutch New Guinea having been ceded to Indonesia in 1962, and with Nadzab airfield in Papua New Guinea being overgrown with Kunai grass, combined with security concerns in the Philippines, a similar routing to the Sabre ferry of 1958 was ruled out. Fortunately, Australia’s relations with Indonesia thawed somewhat in mid-1966 and a more direct routing from Darwin to Butterworth was negotiated. A visit to Djuanda, near Surabaya in East Java, revealed an excellent runway, but the airfield had no facilities, no communications, and was littered with derelict MiG fighters. Tactful diplomacy secured approval to deploy through Djuanda, although continuing sensitivity dictated the refueling location was never publicly identified – it became known as “that place”. Wing Commander “Jim” Flemming assumed command of No 75 Squadron – “Australia’s First Mach 2 Fighter Squadron” – in April 1966. It was not Flemming’s first stint as CO of 75 Sqn, the Korean War veteran having commanded the squadron in its Meteor days. He was also a Sabre fighter combat instructor, having graduated from No 2 FCI Course in 1955, and had served on exchange with the USAF flying the Lockheed F-104C Starfighter. The RAAF could have picked no better man to take its new supersonic, but short-range, fighters from Williamtown to Butterworth. Flemming had one year to work up the squadron and what a busy year that was. Not one to tolerate bureaucracy or officious staff officers, Flemming stepped-up to the plate, winning a battle to remove his jets from the impersonal (some would say inefficient) centralised maintenance “garage” at Williamtown, while simultaneously working his unit into its new all-weather fighter role. He was also central to planning the coming deployment, including the administrative and logistics aspects. All this paid off when on 15 May 1967, No 75 Squadron ferried 23 Mirages – three aircraft were spares – to Darwin via Townsville. On 18 May, 20 Mirages flew on from Darwin to Butterworth without incident, refueling en route from rudimentary facilities at Djuanda. On arrival at Butterworth, Flemming immediately embarked on another fight to prevent his Mirages disappearing into another centralised maintenance “garage”. Several months later the unit’s disassembled two-seat Mirage IIID trainer arrived by sea, bringing the squadron up to its establishment strength of 21 Mirages and 21 pilots, and elevating the combat capability of the Far East Air Force to a new level. Air-Vice Marshal Brian Weston (Retd) ferried a Sabre and a Mirage to Butterworth, and led the first Mirage deployment to Exercise Cope Thunder, from Butterworth to Clark AFB in the Philippines, in 1981. Brian is a Board Member of the Williams Foundation and this On Target article appears in Australian Aviation magazine. 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Brian Weston 'On Target Mirage IIIO to F/A-18A Hornet Lightweight to Light-heavyweight fighter transition' in Australian Aviation, April 2017 Following-on from the CAC Sabre to Dassault Mirage transition, after two decades of service, the RAAF replaced the Mirage IIIO with the F/A-18A Hornet. Unlike the preceding transition, the Hornet did not involve the vast broadening of capability conferred by changing from a day-fighter to an all-weather tactical fighter. The Hornet did, however, introduce a far deeper tactical fighter capability than was ever possible with the Mirage. Much of the capability gain came not just from generational and technological developments, but from the size of the Hornet which conferred immediate improvements in payload and sensors, especially radar aperture and power. The Hornet also improved on a major limitation of the Mirage, namely, its short range. Not that the Mirage was any worse than its 1950s peers; simply, the advance of time and technology gave the Hornet a 25 per cent range increase. More significantly the Hornet was capable of air-to-air refueling, thus setting right some earlier conceptual thinking, when the RAAF asked Dassault not to equip the Mirage IIIO with single-point pressure refueling, on the basis that pressure refueling facilities would not be available at forward operating airfields. This decision had long term consequences, because even if the RAAF had later sought to modify the Mirage for air-to-air refueling, it could not be done easily as there was no single-point pressure refueling manifold within the Mirage into which to tap an air-to-air refueling probe. To these enhancements, brought about by greater size and an ability to refuel while in flight, can be added aerodynamic advances, digital technology advances, and the benefits flowing from the F/A-18A human/machine interface which set a new benchmark in fighter cockpit design. The RAAF had done well, and its promotion into a bigger league of tactical fighters was starkly evident when the first two F/A-18B aircraft were ferried to Australia, non-stop, across the Pacific. Given its 20 years of Mirage operational experience, the RAAF also had a solid foundation on which to introduce the new fighter. That expertise had been gained not only from the permanent deployment of Mirages to Malaysia, but also from an increasing participation in Australian and regional exercises, including deployments to the USAF Pacific Air Forces Exercise Cope Thunder, at Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines, commencing in 1981. Like the preceding transition to the Mirage, that of the Hornet also needed to be accomplished without any loss of operational capability. Hence when No 3 Squadron returned from Butterworth to convert to the Hornet, a new Mirage unit, No 79 Squadron, was formed at Butterworth to meet Australia’s Five Power Defence Agreement obligations. During the Sabre to Mirage transition, No 2 Operational Conversion Unit was over-burdened, but this time the Fighter Conversion Unit was tasked solely with Hornet training. And rather than establish another fighter training unit to assume responsibility for the ongoing Mirage conversion courses, as had been done for the Sabre to Mirage transition, the conduct of all Mirage operational conversions was transferred to No 77 Squadron – contravening the dictum that military training should always be carried out in training units, not operational units. No 77 Squadron also assumed responsibility for the MB-326H lead-in fighter training and for the conduct of the last Mirage fighter combat instructor course. All this, while maintaining its status as an operational fighter squadron. This was not a smart decision, as was evident when the unit’s aircraft establishment and annual flying rate grew to more than 40 aircraft and 11,000 hours per year respectively. After No 77 Squadron converted to the Hornet in 1987, No 75 Squadron followed. No 75 Squadron, which had been based at Darwin with its Mirages since 1983, then moved to the newly-constructed base at Tindal. The sole remaining Mirage unit, No 79 Squadron, was concurrently disbanded, thus ending two decades of Australian service by Dassault’s elegant fighter, and bringing an end to 32 years of a permanent RAAF fighter presence in Malaysia. The transition from Mirage to Hornet was completed in May 1989, along with the most significant reorganisation of RAAF operational units since World War II. This change amalgamated all of the RAAF’s tactical fighter units and air defence radars, irrespective of where they were located, into one operational group, the Tactical Fighter Group. The RAAF had successfully brought into service not only an outstanding tactical fighter but also a new system of functional command, changes that without doubt, contributed to the exemplary performance of No 75 Squadron in the Iraq War of 2003, where the unit successfully conducted air superiority, close air support and air interdiction operations. Air-Vice Marshal Brian Weston (Retd) was Commander Tactical Fighter Group from July 1990 to July 1993. Brian is a Board Member of the Williams Foundation and this On Target article appears in Australian Aviation magazine. Download pdf

Air / Sea / Land: Integrated Force 2030 11 April 2017 Final Report Dr Robbin Laird Final Report: Designing the Integrated Force: The Australian Defense Force Repositions for the Next Phase of 21st Century Force Structure Development

Brian Weston 'On Target: RAAF Fighter Transitions: From Sabre to the Mirage' in Australian Aviation, March 2017 With the fifth-generation F-35A Lightning II waiting in the wings and time soon to be called on the venerable F/A-18 Classic Hornet, it is timely to reflect on how the RAAF effected previous fighter transitions. Subsequent articles will examine the shifts from the Mirage to the Hornet, and from the Hornet to the F-35A Lightning II. The transition from the Australian-built CAC Sabre to the French Dassault Mirage IIIO involved a huge advance in capability from a day fighter to an all-weather interceptor, and later developed into a (lightweight) all-weather tactical fighter. And while some operational profiles were carried over from the Sabre to the Mirage, especially when the sun was shining and the sky was blue, there was nothing in Sabre operational doctrine which compared with flying intercepts at low level, at night, over the thunderstorm-riddled Malacca Straights. Nor of flying all-weather, low-altitude night strike missions utilising the capabilities of the Cyrano IIB ground mapping radar, the Doppler navigation set, and the aircraft’s grid navigation system – a technology based on the Canadians’ CF-104G Starfighters in their all-weather, low-level, NATO tactical nuclear strike role. Dassault had designed a formidable fighter platform, as RAAF test pilot Squadron Leader Bill Collings demonstrated during tropical trials at Darwin in February 1964, when he took Mirage A3-1 to Mach 2.198 at 53,000 feet and Mach 1.3 at 77,000 feet. The Mirage had an advanced integrated weapons system, albeit of analogue technology. The heart of this was a twin-gyro platform reference system which in the air-to-air mode linked the Cyrano IIA radar, the Matra R530 all-aspect semi-active radar missile, and the various facilitating (analogue) computers. To this was added the air-to-ground modes of the Cyrano IIB radar and a Doppler-enhanced grid navigation system. The Mirage’s flight controls also included an analogue fly-by-wire mode which when engaged, facilitated attitude hold, height lock, and heading hold, as well as reducing “transonic tuck”, an abrupt nose-up pitch when decelerating from supersonic speed. Ground school for the Mirage was a world away from the simplicity of the Sabre, generating the occasional cry from students, “we only need to learn how to fly the Mirage, not build it”. But their pleas were to no avail as “know your equipment” has always been a hallmark of RAAF aircrew training. Because the first fifty Mirage IIIO(F) aircraft had only an air-to-air capability, the RAAF initially converted Nos 75 and 76 Squadrons as air defence only fighter units. When No 3 Squadron began receiving its Mirage IIIO(A) aircraft, with the Cyrano IIB radar, Doppler and supporting ground-attack systems, it was designated as an 80/20 ground attack/air defence unit, with a remit to develop the RAAF Mirage air-to-ground operational doctrine, strike tactics and air-to-ground weapons expertise. Simultaneously, No 2 Operational Conversion Unit conducted the largest fighter combat instructor course since the course’s inception, with No 10 FCI Course having six students flying the Sabre and six flying the Mirage. The lessons from both No 3 Squadron’s ground-attack prioritisation and No 2 Operational Conversion Unit’s fighter combat instructor course were fed back into the Mirage operational conversion syllabus and the operational Mirage squadron categorisation schemes. The Sabre to Mirage transition placed a huge load on No 2 Operational Conversion Unit as the unit was also required to conduct the introductory fighter weapons courses on the Vampire trainer/fighter, Sabre operational conversions, and maintain a de facto Sabre squadron known as “2OCU Transition Squadron”. In March 1970, the RAAF concluded such tasking was excessive, and those three responsibilities were spun off into a new unit ‒ No 5 Operational Training Unit, whose heritage traced back to World War II. While the fighter force was in transition, the RAAF was also required to maintain two operational fighter squadrons at Butterworth, Malaysia, as part of the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve, and to convert those units from the Sabre to the Mirage. Additionally, Nos 75 and 76 Squadrons had to upgrade their Mirages from air defence fighters to all-weather tactical fighters. Further demands were placed on the fighter community through a commitment to train Malaysian and Indonesian personnel prior to the gifting of refurbished RAAF Sabres to Malaysia and Indonesia. And while all this was going on, outside the fighter force, the RAAF was introducing Iroquois helicopters and Caribou STOL airlifters (both of which were immediately committed to the Vietnam War), C-130E Hercules transports, P-3B Orions, and Aermacchi MB-326H advanced trainers; and, not too far away was the most complex aircraft the RAAF had ever operated to that time, the F-111C. It’s fair to say that, in the face of considerable institutional challenges, the transition of the RAAF fighter force from the Sabre to Mirage was a job well done. Air-Vice Marshal Brian Weston (Retd), flew the Jet Provost, MB-326H, Vampire, Hunter, Sabre, Mirage and Hornet during his RAAF career. Brian is a Board Member of the Williams Foundation and this On Target article appears in Australian Aviation magazine. 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The success of the Royal Australian Air Force’s Plan JERICHO rests on the development of innovative ways to exploit the capabilities that will enter service over the next decade. Critical to this innovation will be the ideas of those charged with employing Australian airpower on operations. In this post, SGT G, a current serving Combat Controller, draws on his operational experience to identify the potential employment of the Air Force’s newest acquisition, the P-8 Poseidon, in a land strike role. Over the past 15 years Australian Defence Force (ADF) Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTAC) have utilised USAF B-52 and B-1 aircraft in the Close Air Support (CAS) role on operations. Originally conceived and employed as nuclear strike aircraft these airframes have evolved into uniquely effective CAS platforms. This evolution has been achieved through a combination of Advanced Targeting Pods (ATP), integration of new weapons and arguably most importantly, a shift in training and culture for those communities. Bombers such as the B-52 offer distinct advantages over traditional Fighter Ground Attack aircraft in the CAS role. [Image Credit: Commonwealth of Australia] Characteristics of Bomber Aircraft The bomber aircraft brings a particular set of advantages to the CAS environment, in doctrinal terms these are best identified as enhanced payload, reach and flexibility, while mitigating the traditional Fighter Ground Attack (FGA) aircraft compromises in terms of dependency and impermanence. Below is a brief expansion of these points. Payload: The bomber carries a large number of varied weapons allowing for persistent effects, also enabling the aircraft to support high tempo fighting that requires multiple JDPIs (Joint Designated Point of Impact) to be serviced in a compressed timeframe. This capability has achieved a powerful psychological effect on both supported friendly forces and enemy combatants. The ability to strike several dispersed JDPIs simultaneously presents a threat to the enemy that they are unable to effectively counter with their usual tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) and still posture to repel ground attack.  The varied nature of the weapons available allows JTAC, Ground Commander (GC) and aircrew to derive optimum weaponeering solutions. This is best reflected in the ability to carry multiple high-yield weapons that impose significant payload and endurance penalties on FGA aircraft. Reach: The bomber aircraft possesses a long unrefueled range, reducing the requirement for tanker support and increasing the range of basing options, reducing dependency. The long periods of endurance allow the bomber to support the GC for extended periods, without the requirement for frequent air-to-air refuelling (AAR). This enables the GC to integrate air power synchronised with the ground operation vice short windows of support. Flexibility: Equipped with an ATP the bomber is able to support the GC through Non-Traditional ISR, combined with endurance and speed the bomber provides C2 agencies with the ability to rapidly re-task a single platform to rapidly transit and support multiple Areas of Operation (AO) over a large geographic area. The P-8 bomber In recent decades, operating a fleet of bomber aircraft has been the preserve of a very small group of air forces. Advances in air defence and the prohibitive cost of operating a niche role aircraft within already shrinking force structures saw the bomber disappear from all but a handful of air arms. The RAAF’s first P-8 will arrive in Australia this month. [Image Credit: MBTPhoto 2016 via Defence Image Gallery] Plan JERICHO calls on Royal Australian Air Force to ‘harness the potential of our current systems’ and to ‘operate and support these platforms in a way that provides agile and responsive options.’ JERICHO envisions a fully integrated force that: will be more agile and adaptive have extended reach hit harder with greater precision see further distribute information more quickly The introduction of the P-8A into ADF service presents the opportunity to realise a capability that supports this vision. At present, the ADF’s ability to rapidly force project a kinetic strike capability in support of a Joint Task Force (JTF) requires a large supporting package of KC-30 and airlift assets. Employing the P-8A as a strike platform would increase the number of options the ADF are able to provide to Government in support of short notice tasking. In the type of low-intensity war the RAAF is currently fighting such as Operation OKRA several efficiencies may be realised. These include more persistent effects delivered at lower cost per flight hour, reduced AAR requirements and smaller support footprint. The experience that Number 92 Wing (92WG) gained in performing overland ISR during Operation SLIPPER demonstrated the inherent flexibility of the AP-3C platform and the adaptive culture of the crews who flew them. 92WG developed a highly effective set of TTPs that enabled a maritime patrol aircraft to morph into one of the most highly regarded and requested ISR assets in theatre. The P-8A offers a quantum leap in capability over the AP-3C, and will possess the following capabilities that make it a highly suitable strike/CAS platform: High Definition camera Ability to transmit full motion video VULOS (VHF/UHF Line of Sight)/Beyond Line of Sight (BLOS) radios Link 16 11 x 1553 databus hardpoints Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) Electronic Support Measures (ESM) suite Close to 4000nm range, plus an AAR capable Stores compatibility with a wide variety of in-service RAAF air-to-surface weapons Currently, the P-8A does not have the ability to laser designate or spot track. While not essential, laser designation systems are very useful as an aid to target correlation and handoff. The inclusion of a laser target designator (LTD) and spot tracker (LST) within the P-8A capability roadmap would see this capability added at a relatively small technical risk. If employed to the fullest of its capabilities the P-8A is ideally suited to the type of operations the ADF has conducted over the last 15 years. It has the organic capability to find, fix, finish, exploit (in the electromagnetic spectrum) and then transmit to a processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) node for analysis and dissemination. Drawing on over a decade of experience in the Middle East Region, 92WG  has developed and refined TTPs for maritime patrol aircraft to support land forces in an overland ISR role. [Image Credit: Commonwealth of Australia] While it is recognised that adding any training to already heavily tasked communities is not to be taken lightly, there are several mitigating factors that de-risk this proposal 92WG AP-3C crews regularly support Special Operations Command (SOCOMD) units and already have a good institutional understanding of overland ISR tasks. Furthermore, new generation ASW weapons will be primarily Bombs on Coordinate (BOC) capabilities; this should provide significant overlap in switchology and crew procedures. The range and endurance of the platform will allow it to transit to the locations of stakeholder unit JTACs to conduct CAS serials as part of a broader training sortie. This measure would also broaden the pool of platforms that are available to provide CAS currency to ADF JTACs, leading to mutually beneficial training outcomes. A Way Ahead The following items are recommended to facilitate this proposal: 92WG, in partnership with stakeholder units familiarise crews with the procedures contained within the Joint Publication 3-09.3 Close Air Support to enable them to employ the aircraft in the CAS role. Engagement with NAVAIR for full air-surface weapons integration and LTD/LST inclusion in the P-8A capability roadmap The temporary use of JTAC/FGA qualified air-riders to smooth any cultural interface issues The old paradigm (excepting ASW) of Surveillance Response Group (SRG) as a force to “Find and Fix” and Air Combat Group (ACG) the “Finish” is outmoded and lengthens the kill chain. To paraphrase Lieutenant General John Davis USMC, in a battlespace of fleeting targets every platform needs to be a sensor, shooter and sharer. To quote the first theme of Plan JERICHO: ‘The Air Force of the Future will be a networked and integrated force. Operators and commanders at all levels will need to exploit the full capabilities of each system in the force, and not operate in isolation. Our future force capabilities will transcend traditional organisational structures, our concept of operations and our collective training must evolve to support this.’ If the proposals outlined above are adopted, the RAAF will be able to offer a broader range of options to government in the way it provides kinetic strike effects. SGT G. is a current serving Combat Controller in the Royal Australian Air Force. The opinions expressed are his alone and do not reflect those of the Royal Australian Air Force, the Australian Defence Force, or the Australian Government. #CAS #P8 #AirPower #Strike #Bomber

In accordance with the Constitution, Air Marshal Errol McCormack (Ret'd) was required to step down as the Chair of the Foundation at the AGM held 25 Oct 16. Air Marshal Geoff Brown (Ret'd) was elected to replace him. Air Marshal McCormack was elected to fill the position of Deputy Chair. The following were also elected to the Board at the AGM. Rear Admiral Mark Campbell RAN (Ret'd) Mr John Conway Mr Ken Moore Ms Nicole Quinn Air Vice-Marshal Brian Weston (Ret'd)

“After neutralizing this advanced surface based air defense system [our flight of four F-35s] destroyed four additional targets. Suffice to say that this mission would have been close to suicide with a four-ship of F-16s alone!” This post was first published by Kampflybloggen (The Combat Aircraft Blog), the official blog of the Norwegian F-35 Program Office within the Norwegian Ministry of Defence. The author, Major Morten “Dolby” Hanche, has more than 2200 hours in the F-16, is a U.S. Navy Test Pilot School graduate, and on 10 November 2015 became the first Norwegian to fly the F-35. He now serves as an instructor pilot with the 62nd Fighter Squadron at Luke Air Force Base in Arizona. Yet again, information from the Director Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E) has stirred critics into a frenzy over the F-35. The fact that the information was leaked seems to have agitated people even more. (We have our hands on classified documents! Now we know it all!) Yet again, the leaked memo described aspects of the F-35 which need improvement. Yet again, the report resulted in press articles which painted a pretty sinister picture of the F-35. The article featured in POGO (“F-35 May Never Be Ready for Combat”) serves as one such example. I finished up writing this article before getting ready to fly another sortie in the F-35. Based on my own experiences flying the F-35A, I feel that the media’s interpretation of the previous DOT&E report is influenced heavily by unrealistic expectations – something which seems to be a trend. I don’t see the point in countering every claim that’s being brought up. First off, it’d make for a very long article. Secondly, I would not be dealing with the bigger problem, which in my mind is a lack of understanding. I fully expect the F-35’s most hardened critics to discount this article, regardless of what I write. However, some may choose to believe my story, based on the fact that I know the airplane and its capabilities as a pilot. I don’t make my claims based on bits and pieces of information, derived from potentially unreliable sources. They are based on experience actually flying and training with the jet for nearly a year. My goal is to shed some light on airplane development and testing; why we test, what we discover in testing and what a test report may result in. I write this based on my own experience, both through education at the US Naval Test Pilot School, but more importantly through working with the F-16 and the F-35, both operationally and in test settings. What smartphones tell us about technology development I’ll start with smartphones, as another example of technology development. Admittedly, phones are somewhat different from a fighter airplane, but there are similarities. A smartphone is a complex system of systems – just like a fighter jet. The phones keep evolving with both new hard- and software. It is not unheard of therefore that the manufacturers issue updates. Updates which provide new capabilities, but which also aim to correct previous errors. According to Wikipedia, Apple released its iOS 9.0 operating system to their iPhones and iPads on 16 September 2015. The 9.0.1 update was issued already on 23 September, followed closely by the 9.0.2 update on 30 September. Then 9.1 on 21 October and 9.2 on 8 December 2015. Such a frequent update rate might indicate that not everything worked perfectly from the start. Still, wouldn’t it be a bit harsh to claim that the phones didn’t work with the first four software versions? Might the truth be a little more nuanced? Can a smartphone be a good product, even if it doesn’t work 100% from day one? Does a smartphone ever work 100%? I have experienced various strange occurrences with my phones over the years. Still, for me, having a phone with all its peculiarities has been more useful than the alternative – not having a phone. This isn’t an article about phones. The point I’m trying to make is that technology development and testing is a series of compromises; compromises in reliability, in performance and in quality. Only rarely is the world black or white. A machine may work well, even if it doesn’t fulfill all specifications. I’ll go on with a brief intro to how we typically test. How we test a fighter jet Testing of combat aircraft typically sees a distinction between Developmental Test (DT) and Operational Test (OT). In short we can say that DT seeks to answer whether the machine works according to the design specifications, whether the machine is safe to operate and what its safe operating limits end up being. OT on the other hand seeks to find out whether the machine can solve a particular task, like: Is the XYZ able to provide effective Close Air Support, in the presence of threat A, B and C? The test program for a machine like the F-35 is an enormous undertaking. The contours of the F-35’s test program are described top-level in the Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP), totalling 1400 pages. Each sub-test in the TEMP results in a detailed test plan for that event. Especially in DT, a test flight is literally planned down to the minute, in order to accomplish as many test points as quickly and safely as possible. Flight testing is an expensive undertaking. A test program should discover most important errors and flaws. However, time and resources available make it unrealistic to uncover every single issue. Risk is mitigated by testing the most critical components, like the engine in a single-engine fighter, to stricter tolerances. The amount of testing is a statistically driven decision. We know that there are things we don’t know, even at the completion of testing. We also know that there are likely few gross or dangerous errors which haven’t been found. Each error we find during testing is documented and characterized. The language and format used is to the point. The test engineer and test pilot type up their findings and typically describe the situation “in a vacuum” – without regard for how costly or difficult it might be to address the issue. Each issue is then related to the mission – how will this quality or problem affect the given task? Such a test report might read something like: “The SuperToaster 3000 was evaluated for uniform heat distribution and time to crispy toast, at the National Toast Center of Excellence, with room temperatures varying between 65 and 75 deg F. The toasting temperature was selected by turning a dial on the front of the toaster. Even with full crispiness selected, the toaster’s maximum temperature was low, and toasting of even the thinnest slices of white bread took more than 10 minutes. During early morning breakfasts, the time consuming toasting process will result in cranky parents, the kids being dropped off late for school and correspondingly negative effects on their grades and later career opportunities.” This mission relation was probably a little over-the-top – a little like how some media articles relate its titbits of information to an imagined F-35 mission. In isolation, a system may not work as advertised, but could there be a workaround? (In the toaster-case, maybe cereal for breakfast?) Anyway, after the issue is documented, the errors are then catalogued, debated and prioritized. Test engineers, test pilots, design engineers and customer representatives are often involved in the dialogue that follows when something undesirable is discovered. Together, these will have to agree on a path forward.  Completely understanding the issue is crucial. Alternatives could be a re-design, accepting the flaw, mitigating the flaw procedurally or compensating by documenting the issue better. The team will have to compromise when prioritizing. Even when developing a new fighter jet, there are limits to what can be fixed, based on cost, time available, test resources available and also the complexity of the problem. Altogether, development and testing is an iterative process, where adjustments may have to take place during DT, OT or after the system is put into operational service. Where are we with the F-35? What is then the current state of the F-35? Is it really as bad as the commentaries to the DOT&E report and DOT&E memo might indicate? Personally, I am impressed by the F-35. I was relieved to experience just how well the F-35 performs with regard to speed, ceiling, range and maneuverability. It would have been very problematic if the airplane’s performance didn’t hold up in these areas – there’s just no software update which is going to compensate a draggy airframe or a weak engine. (Read more about such a case in the Government Accountability Office, then the General Accounting Office´s report on the Super Hornet). When asked about my first flight in the F-35, I compared it to flying a Hornet (F/A-18), but with a turbo charged engine. I now can quote a USMC F/A-18 Weapons School Graduate after his first flight in the F-35: “It was like flying a Hornet with four engines!” (His point being that the F-35 can afford to operate at high Angle-of-Attack and low airspeed, but that it will regain the airspeed quickly when needed). Another unintended, but illustrating example on performance came a few weeks back, when a student pilot failed to recognize that he had climbed through our temporary altitude restriction at 40,000′. The F-35 will happily climb past that altitude. Another critical aspect of the F-35 is its minimal radar signature. Just as with the aerodynamic performance, the stealthiness of the F-35 is an inherent quality of the airframe itself. There would be no quick-fix to a disappointing signature. So far, my impression is that the F-35 is very difficult to find. We see this every day when training with the F-35; we detect the F-16s flying in the local airspace at vast ranges, compared to when we detect another F-35. Sensor stability, and specifically radar stability, has been an issue. I’m not trying to downplay that the radar’s stability needs to improve, but I am not worried. What would have worried me was if the radar had poor detection range, or if the stability issues were caused by external factors like limited electrical power supply or limited cooling available. Fortunately, our biggest issues are related to software, and not performance.  I think it’s realistic to expect software issues like this to be resolved (just like iOS 9 eventually ended up working well). Remember that we’re not trying to re-create another Fourth Gen fighter in the F-35. If we had set our aim lower, we’d likely have had an easier job of developing the airplane – it would have been easier to build the F-16 again today.  But is that what we need? The F-35’s specifications are ambitious, and reflect a machine which will outperform the previous generation of fighters.  Having or not having that kind of military advantage eventually becomes a political question.  For now, our leaders think we need that military edge. In this context, I would like to bring up another point. The F-35 is in its infancy as a weapons system. Yet it is being compared to mature systems like the F-16. The F-16 has been developed and improved for more than 40 years. Correspondingly, certain aspects of the F-16 are more mature than the F-35 at this time. Having said that, I will caution readers against believing that other mature fighters are without their issues. There has been an unprecedented openness about the F-35’s development. The DOT&E report is one example on how media has gained insight into the F-35 Program. I still ask; do those who write critical articles about the program have a realistic baseline, from which they can reasonably assess the F-35? Next, I’ll give some examples which have influenced at least my own baseline. The sometimes messy world of fighter development Many will agree that the F-16 has been a successful fighter design. The fact that it has been continuously produced since the 1970s should speak for itself. The fighter has come a long way from where it originally started: as a day-only dogfighter, equipped with heat-seeking missiles. (How would that mission set compare to a post System Development & Demonstration Block 3F F-35 and its mission sets?) Modifications to the “fully developed” F-16 started right away. One early visible modification was the replacement of the horizontal stabilizers with larger stabs, in order to reduce the F-16’s susceptibility to go out of control during aggressive maneuvering at high Angles-of-Attack (AOA). Going out of control is a bad thing, and could lead to loss of both the jet and its pilot. Since then, the F-16 has kept evolving through many different programs, aimed at improving both structural life and combat capabilities. Other fighters also bear visible marks of error correction. The Hornet-family provides some good examples of aerodynamic band aids. An example from the F/A-18 “Baby Hornet” is the vertical fences mounted on each side of the machine, just aft of the cockpit. These were eventually added to mitigate stress on the vertical tails, which caused their supporting structure to fail. Another example from the Baby Hornet is how the stabs and rudders are driven to full deflection before takeoff. This modification was necessary to enable the Hornet to lift its nose during takeoff roll. The “band aid” added drag during the takeoff roll. Thus, the takeoff roll increased in distance, but no more than what was considered acceptable. The band aid was an easy workaround to what could have been a very costly re-design of the airplane – compromises… The more modern Super Hornet has a porous fairing where the wing-fold mechanism is located. This was fitted in an attempt to alleviate a problem termed “wing drop”. The wing drop in the Super Hornet was described as an abrupt and uncommanded roll, which hampered air combat maneuvering. The band aid partially fixed the wing drop issue, but at the same time introduced other problems related to reduced range and increased buffet levels. These were still deemed acceptable trade-offs – compromises… Even today, our modern-day F-16s live with many issues; errors which were discovered in DT, OT or operational use, but which haven’t been corrected. Either because of prohibitive cost, complexity or because no one understands the failure mechanism – what is causing the problem. I’m not just talking about cosmetic or minor issues. One example is that the Norwegian Armed Forces for a period of about 10 years could not operate its F-16s in single ship formations, in bad weather or at night. The restriction was put in place because the Main Mission Computer (MMC) broke down relatively often. The resulting operational limitations hampered both training and operations. It took more than 10 years to diagnose and correct the issue, mainly because the failure mechanism was elusive. The most outspoken critics of the F-35 couldn’t have known about our issues with the MMC in the F-16 at the time. If they did, and read that deficiency report, would they have concluded that our F-16s were non-operational, and incapable of fulfilling their mission? I’m tempted to think so, based on how isolated pieces of information about the F-35 often are misinterpreted and taken out of context. Would they have been right in their conclusion? I don’t think anyone could have made that conclusion, based on just the fact that the MMC sometimes crashes. The reality I know, working with fighters all my life, is not black or white. There are nuances. We work around and overcome problems. Our F-16s still have issues today which will never be corrected. This is not dramatic or unexpected. The normal state of affairs for a fighter is that we operate in spite of issues with structure, sensors, software and logistics. We’re normally able to work around the major problems while we devise long-term solutions. Some issues are temporary. Some end up being permanent. Compromises… (I personally wouldn´t believe the salesperson claiming to offer a fighter jet which had zero issues). I said I wouldn’t quibble over individual factual errors which the F-35’s critics present as truth. To me, a compelling argument for how well the F-35 works is evident by what we’re able to do in training. Three weeks back I was part of a four-ship flight of F-35s. Our mission was to overcome an advanced airborne threat, while locating and destroying an equally advanced surface based air defense system. After neutralizing these threats, we destroyed four additional targets. All this prior to receiving the Block 3F capabilities. Suffice to say that this mission would have been close to suicide with a four-ship of F-16s alone!

The F-35 Lightning II has been operational with the USMC for more than a year, with the USAF for several months, and is nearing introduction into the USN. These services see the F-35 not merely as a new capability, but as part of a much broader transformation of the power projection force. It is timely to review the perspectives of the US services and their allies, including Australia, on the impact of fifth generation-enabled combat capabilities. In general, there is a convergence of thinking about the broad strategic direction of the reshaping of power projection forces, but a diversity of approaches with regard to how best to achieve change. Twenty-first century warfare concepts of operations, technology, tactics and training are in both evolution and revolution. The F-35 is at the heart of this change for a very simple reason – it is a revolutionary platform. The F-35 will make combat aviation history with its first-of-kind sensor fusion cockpit. The jet is far more than an “F” – a “fighter” – it is in fact an “F/A/E”, effective in air-to-air, air-to-ground, and electronic warfare, all in the same mission if necessary. Allied and US combat pilots will develop new tactics and training; and over time this will drive changes that leaders must make for effective command and control to fight future battles. An issue has been that the F-35 has been labelled a “fifth generation” aircraft, a sensible demarcation when the F-22 was being introduced a decade ago. But the evolution of the combat systems on the F-35, the role of the fusion engine, and the impact of a fleet of integrated F-35s operating as a foundational element will make the description “5th Gen” obsolete. The F-35 is, rather, the first of a new generation of design features and airborne capabilities that will change everything. It is a first generation information and decision making superiority “flying combat system”. The global fleet of F-35s will be the “1st Gen” for building a foundation for a fundamental change in the way air power operates in overall combat concepts of operations. This is not about a single aircraft platform; it is about what an integrated fleet of F-35s can deliver to transform everything. The coming decade will be very innovative. Combat warriors at all ranks can leverage what they learn and then apply those lessons to reshaping the force over and over. The impact of an integrated fleet of F-35s with fused internal pilot combat data and a distributed information flow out will allow the US and its allies to rethink how to do 21st century air-enabled operations. Each F-35 will be able to network and direct engagements in 360 degrees of three-dimensional space by offloading tracks to other air/land/sea platforms including UAVs and robots. The most overlooked aspect of the roll-out of the F-35 is its global nature. This will become more apparent as the three US services and their allies concurrently roll-out their F-35s and sort out how their new air systems are transforming their forces. The F-35 is not an airplane; it is a global air combat system. Looking forward to the time when US forces and their allies have substantial numbers of F-35s flying in the Pacific, the commander of the USAF’s Air Combat Command, General Herbert “Hawk” Carlisle, envisaged “an American and allied CAOC (Combined Air Operations Center) …  sharing a common operating picture [and becoming] become more effective tactically and strategically throughout the area of operations”. Although the F-35 is a US aircraft, it has significant foreign content provided by an integrated global network of suppliers. With the introduction of F-35s globally comes the nascent global sustainment enterprise. Air forces are working-out ways to leverage the commonality in the aircraft and the support structure to sustain them in combat. It is a nascent effort, but is already laying down building blocks such as sustainment enterprises in Europe and Asia to support the partners, and the operation of US forces from regional support centres, such as those being built by the Italians, the Dutch or the Australians. The roll-out of the aircraft is built upon a common logistics enterprise shaping a global sustainment effort similar to that of the successful the C-17 global enterprise. Global defence industry, not just the US defence industry, is significant to building and sustaining the F-35. About 30% of the F-35 fleet will be built with foreign content, and the maintainability will rest on best practice from global suppliers. The F-35 logistics enterprise will not simply be forced to rely on sole-source suppliers for any number of key parts produced globally. And with the system to identify parts, the performance of those parts will be put to the test and the better performing parts suppliers determined by performance in combat and in operations, not simply by a procurement bureaucracy. The US’s F-35 partner countries are Australia, Canada, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Turkey, and the UK. And there are a number of other countries buying the aircraft via the more traditional Foreign Military Sales acquisition route, including Japan, South Korea, Israel and possibly Singapore. Each of those countries is buying the F-35 as part of their overall efforts to reshape 21st century defense forces. The global nature of this fleet will be a trigger for change, and key allies are looking at an F-35 enabled defence transformation. Leveraging this transformation, rather than pursuing the traditional stove-piped approach to platform modernization and upgrade, will be the essential catalyst for subsequent platform acquisitions. The decade ahead will be one of significant technological, strategic, and tactical innovation, which in turn will set the base for future systems. Dr Robbin F. Laird is a military and security analyst who has taught at Columbia, Princeton and Johns Hopkins universities, and has worked for the Center for Defense Analyses and the Institute for Defense Analyses.

On 2 December 2015, the Senate referred the following matter to the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee for inquiry and report by 1 May 2016.  On 17 March 2016, the Senate extended the reporting date for the inquiry to 29 June 2016. The planned acquisition of the F-35 Lightning II (Joint Strike Fighter). Read Williams Foundation submission to the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, the planned acquisition of the F-35 Lightning II (Joint Strike Fighter). Download here: